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This dissertation investigates the role played by the image of the body that features 
prominently in Coetzee’s novels. In a series of close readings and utilising the tools of 
cognitive linguistics, it argues that the image creates meaning because of the 
employment of two conceptual metaphors, TRUTH IS IN A CONTAINER and BODY 
IS A CONTAINER, which endow the represented body with the attributes of truth. 
The meaning is then created through the foregrounding of the body (most commonly 
in the images of mutilation, disability and disease), through the use of the image as a 
blended space (a signifying body) and through the situating of the image as the 
narrative focal point, an object of scrutinity and interpretation. Such use of the image 
aids in interpreting the body as a container for truth, a kernel of human identity, a 
source of thought and morally purposive action. This often leads to interpreting the 
image of the body allegorically and partly explains the nature of the critical reception 
of Coetzee’s novels. 
 
The dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 presents the history and theory 
of thinking about the metaphor from Aristotle to cognitive linguistics with an emphasis 
on the context-based understanding of metaphor and on its cognitive value. The final 
section of this chapter presents the author's engagement with the ideas expressed in 
Derek Attridge's J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading. Chapter 2 presents the 
problem of reading and interpreting the body on the example of Waiting for the 
Barbarians and Life and Times of Michael K. Chapter 3 analyses corporeal metaphors 
and gender symbolism in history through the reading of Dusklands and The Age of 
Iron. Chapter 4 presents Foe and Master of Petersburg as examples of the 
















1.     Metaphor: From Aristotle to Lakoff, From the Noun to the Text.       
 
2.      Metaphor and Truth: Reading the Body. Waiting for the Barbarians and Life 
and Times of Michael K. 
 
3.     Organic Metaphor: Embodied History or History of the Body. Dusklands 
and The Age of Iron.    
 
4.     Metaphor and Fiction: The Perversion of Substantiality. Foe and Master of 
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One of the things a reader of Coetzee’s fiction might soon notice is the ubiquity 
of bodily mutilation and disability represented in his novels. There is impotence and 
rape (as well as disease, stabbing and murder) in Dusklands; rape, hatred for one’s 
'monstrous' physicality and fantasies of self-mutilation in In the Heart of the Country; 
blindness and torture in Waiting for the Barbarians; cleft palate and starvation in Life 
and Times of Michael K; mutilation and muteness in Foe; cancer, mastectomy, and 
disability resulting from an accident (in addition to fantasies of self-immolation) in 
Age of Iron; epilepsy and suicide in The Master of Petersburg; rape and violence in 
Disgrace; ageing, disability, execution, dying, sexual attack, and the Holocaust in 
Elizabeth Costello; amputation and blindness in the Slow Man; Parkinson’s disease in 
the Diary of a Bad Year.  
Another thing our reader may notice is the endowing of a mutilated body with 
meaning whereby the body is made the object of scrutiny: it is read and analysed with 
the hope of uncovering and expressing the mystery imagined to exist within it. The 
tortured Barbarian girl and Michael K, Friday and Vercueil, Joll and Nechaev, are all 
mysterious creatures, who are read by other characters but repeatedly elude their 
interpretative attempts. Unclear are the reasons for Lucy’s acceptance of her fate, the 
source of Joll’s evil, Elizabeth Costello’s obsessions, Pavel’s death or Friday’s history 
and behaviour. Similarly problematic seems to be the characters’ relationship to their 
own bodies. Much is made of their coming to terms with the fact of embodiment: Mrs 
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Curren, Magda, Dostoevsky, Dawn or Paul Rayment all share estrangement from their 
bodies and strive to understand them, and for all the lack of acceptance, the analysis of 
disease, illness, old age or sexuality is an obsessive fact of daily life.  
While most of these characters crave understanding and expression of their 
embodiment, all of them are at the mercy of language as the medium in which their 
experience is conceptualised. Many crave, variously understood, ‘bodily 
communication’ from which the imperfections of language as a tool for expressing 
bodily truth would be absent. Many directly discuss language as the reason for their 
failures to express, and thus come to terms with, their physicality.  
The most extreme, and consciously realised, case of this entrapment in 
language can be found at the end of Elizabeth Costello. No longer a “lesson,” the 
ending passage is suggested to be Costello’s fiction, an example of her “parasitizing 
the classics” (14). This part begins with an excerpt from the Letter of Lord Chandos to 
Francis Bacon1 that presents Chandos experiencing bliss and joy at the sight of the 
world. Expressing a sentiment akin to that expressed earlier by Costello,2 his letter 
makes a reference to figurative meanings by distinguishing between things and signs: 
“It is as if . . . everything that exists, everything that I recall, everything my confused 
thinking touches on, means something” (226). The passage is followed by a letter from 
“Elizabeth C” (“Lady Chandos”) to Bacon (230).  
Fictional Elizabeth Costello, Coetzee’s creation, follows in the footsteps of 
Von Hoffmannsthal's Philip. His crisis of faith in literature and language is mirrored 
                                                 
1
 The passage is dated according to the publication of von Hoffmannsthal's Ein Brief (1902), rather than 
the fictional date given to the letter by von Hoffmannsthal (1603). 
2
 Her argument that being alive is being “full of being” (77) is rephrased by him as “fullness” (226). Her 
“light soul” (215) is akin to Lady Chandos’s “extreme soul[]” (228).   
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by Costello.3 Both are writers of considerable repute. Their first defeat is in academia 
where their discourse on philosophy and morality does not gain desired acceptance. 
Later, both experience the failure of language in everyday communication, and both 
turn to the Classics for inspiration. These failures lead to mental disarray in which 
reasoning fails, no proposition can be seriously maintained, and no thought grasps 
experienced reality. This lack of conceptual coherence contrasts with the promise of 
illumination and attaining full meaning offered in emotional epiphanies which, when 
expressed, remain imperfect mistranslations. Costello and Philip both seem to embody 
the assertions of Wittgenstein's Tractatus that sees in the limits of language the limits 
of thought, but also undermine its pronouncements about the relation between 
language and the world insofar as they find their experience inexpressible.4 Both 
Costello and Philip are thus trapped in language which circumscribes what could be 
thought and expressed, relegating their bodily experience to the non-existent.  
Elizabeth’s letter explicitly deals with the entrapment in metaphorical 
language. She first admits to experiencing epiphanies through embodiment: “moments 
when soul and body are one, when [she] is ready to burst out in the tongue of angels” 
(228). Such moments arrive through sex; the “ruptures” form ‘body language’ that 
unites her mind and her body: “Soul and body he speaks to me, in a speaking without 
speech; into me, soul and body; he presses what are no longer words but flaming 
                                                 
3
 Thomas Kovach sees this also as a crisis of “cognition” where the “inability to speak coherently is 
preceded by the inability to think coherently” (88). This seems to be how Costello is often perceived by 
her audience. He also presents the tension between “the self as observing subject and creative portrayer 
of reality” as opposed to “the self as object” as well as the tension between language as a product (a 
thing) and a medium (a sign) (91). Both these dichotomies exist in Costello’s experience.     
4
 The analysis of Wittgenstein’s role for von Hoffmannsthal’s work and his fascination with Ein Brief 
falls beyond the scope of this thesis. For a brief account see: Alfred Nordmann Wittgentstein’s 
Tractatus: An Introduction (2005).  
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swords” (228). Yet, the non-communicativeness of such experience threatens to trap 
the couple within figurative language in which words do not refer to objects but to 
other words, where meaning is perpetually in flux, and where the unanchored signifier 
always slips: 
Flaming swords I say my Philip presses into me, swords that are not words; but 
they are neither flaming swords nor are they words. It is like a contagion, 
saying one thing always for another (like a contagion, I say . . .). Like a 
wayfarer . . . I step into a mill . . . and feel of a sudden the floorboards, rotten 
with the wetness, give way beneath my feet and plunge me into the racing mill-
waters; yet as I am that (a wayfarer in a mill) I am also not that; nor is it a 
contagion that comes continually upon me or a plague of rats or flaming 
swords, but something else. Always it is not what I say but something else . . . 
Only for extreme souls may it have been intended to live thus, where words 
give way beneath your feet like rotting boards (like rotting boards I say again, I 
cannot help myself, not if I am to bring home to you my distress and my 
husband's, bring home I say, where is home, where is home?) (228).  
 
This gap between language and the body (or the signifier and the signified), uncovers 
the metaphorical nature of language that forces her to say “one thing always for 
another” (228). The emphasis on metaphor is strengthened by the metaphorical images 
used by Elizabeth (speaker as a wayfarer, meaning as old boards) and her conscious 
emphasis (through italicising) on figurative expressions. Elizabeth’s language does not 
refer to her body experience and, with her words in flux, her thoughts are similarly 
unanchored. This fluidity of thought becomes the source of mental torment leading to 
insanity. Like the metaphorical evil in Costello's lecture, presented as causing 
contagion (167), her own crisis is contagious and Elizabeth fears infecting the reader 
with her affliction: “for who is to say that through the agency of his letter . . . of mine 
you may not be touched by a contagion that is not that, a contagion, but something 
else, always something else?” (228-229). Elizabeth claims a human being lacks 
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strength to live in the slippery medium of language.5 Her affliction of speaking 
metaphorically is overpowering to the extent where her identity undergoes entropy and 
the speaking subject surrenders to the power of words:6 
(I cease to hold myself back, I am tired now, I yield myself to the figures, do 
you see, Sir, how I am taken over?, the rush I call it when I do not call it my 
rapture, the rush and the rapture are not the same, but in ways that I despair of 
explaining though they are clear to my eye, my eye I call it, my inner eye, as if I 
had an eye inside that looked at the words one by one as they passed, like 
soldiers on parade, like soldiers on parade I say). (229).  
 
Elizabeth finds it impossible to be both an embodied subject and a linguistic object, to 
be both herself and a language figure of something else. The rejection of such 
language is the rejection of God and of her diffuse identity:  
All is allegory, says my Philip. Each creature is key to all other creatures. A 
dog sitting in a patch of sun licking itself, says he, is at one moment a dog and 
at the next a vessel of revelation.7 And perhaps he speaks the truth, perhaps in 
the mind of our Creator (our Creator, I say) where we whirl about as if in a 
millrace we interpenetrate and are interpenetrated by fellow creatures by the 
thousand. But how I ask you can I live with rats and dogs and beetles crawling 
through me day and night, drowning and gasping, scratching at me, tugging 
me, urging me deeper and deeper into revelation – how? We are not made for 
revelation, I want to cry out, nor I nor you, my Philip, revelation that sears the 
eye like staring into the sun (229).  
 
Untouched by language,8 Philip sees things and people not as themselves but as 
“Presences of the Infinite” (230). Since metaphorical language cannot express his 
                                                 
5
 It is not yet the time when “giants or perhaps angels stride the earth” (229). 
6
 Costello’s identity is scrutinised when her repeated “I” in her self-definitions in front of the tribunal 
(221) become Elizabeth C's repeated “eye.”  
7
 The reference is here to Costello's vision of paradise. The sight of a dog guarding the gate immediately 
leads to an allegorical reading (“the anagram GOD-DOG” (225)) and it is only with conscious effort 
that she can see the dog as merely a dog.  
8
 “Words no longer reach him, they shiver and shatter, it is as if (as if, I say) . . . he is guarded by a 
shield of crystal” (229).  
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experience, the help of Bacon is sought to salvage the couple from their entrapment in 
language and to successfully translate their lived existence in discourse. The call for 
help uses the common motif of drowning:   
Not Latin, says my Philip – I copied the words – not Latin nor English nor 
Spanish nor Italian will bear the words of my revelation. And indeed it is so, 
even I who am his shadow know it when I am in my raptures. Yet he writes to 
you, as I write to you, who are known above all men to select your words and 
set them in place and build your judgements as a mason builds a wall with 
bricks. Drowning, we write out of our separate fates. Save us. (230) 
 
The creative passage at the end of the novel refers the reader back to Costello’s 
inability to make sense of her thoughts and ideas about, and her experiences with, the 
body.9 Costello’s problem differs from those of other Coetzee characters only in the 
scale of her self-conscious engagement. A similar preoccupation with physicality and 
entrapment in language is repeated in most of the author’s novels, regardless of 
whether it is presented as a character craving bodily language (Magda, Mrs Curren) or 
perfect language expression (Dostoevsky, Susan Barton), whether it exists in a ‘reader’ 
and interpreter (the Magistrate) or the interpreted (Michael K).   
The second passage I would like to invoke here is the testimony in the last 
lesson, “At the gate.” Irritated at the cheap, almost allegorically “Kafkaesque” 
afterworld (209), Costello repeatedly faces the judges demanding a statement of her 
                                                 
9
 These ideas include realist representation of the body (“Realism”), essentialism and négritude (“The 
Novel in Africa”), animal and human bodies in literature and ethics (“The Lives of Animals”), the 
representation of the body and suffering in Christian and classical tradition (“The Humanities in 
Africa”), violence and its representation (“The problem of Evil”), the body in love and in death (“Eros”) 
among others. Many of the insights gained in the seven lessons are, however, contradicted in the final 
one, for example the idea that a writer should not judge the voice that calls them contradicts her 
assessment of Paul West, the idea that, as a writer, Costello does not hold opinions contradicts the Lives 
of Animals etc.  
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belief. The expression of her belief is presented precisely as a translation of the body 
into language: 
… all she hears is the slow thud of the blood in her ears, just as all she feels is 
the soft touch of the sun on her skin. That at least she does not have to invent: 
this dumb, faithful body that has accompanied her every step of the way, this 
gentle, lumbering monster that has been given to her to look after, this shadow 
turned to flesh that stands on two feet like a bear and laves itself continually 
from the inside with blood. (210)  
 
The uninvented body is contrasted with the inventions of language, its truth with the 
words she reluctantly writes.10 She feels herself not “in this body,” instead, she 
“somehow is this body” (210). The corporeal certainty makes her equate the body with 
the truth. Unlike for Descartes, whom she criticises in one of her lectures, it is the 
existence without the body that is unthinkable: 
How on earth can bodies not only keep themselves clean using blood . . . but 
cogitate upon the mystery of their existence and make utterances about it and . . 
. even have little ecstasies? Does it count as a belief, whatever property she has 
that allows her to continue to be this body when she has not the faintest idea 
how the trick is done? (210)  
 
Appropriately, Costello’s reactions to literature are visceral, her favourite passages 
from the Odyssey “send[] a shiver down her back” (211). The love of literature and the 
belief in the importance of the body combine to produce a hope in the power of 
language to transcribe embodiment: 
The pool of dark blood, the expiring ram, the man . . . ready to thrust and stab 
if need be, the pale souls hard to distinguish from cadavers: why does the scene 
haunt her? . . . She believes, most unquestionably, in the ram . . . The ram is not 
just an idea, the ram is alive though right now it is dying. If she believes in the 
                                                 
10
 The body is unlike language: the “thing which not in a thousand years could she have dreamed up, so 
far beyond her powers would it be” (210).    
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ram, then does she believe in its blood too, this sacred liquid, sticky, dark, 
almost black, pumped out in gouts on to the soil where nothing will grow? 
(211).  
 
The final definition is preceded by a meditation on the possibility of bodily language 
expressing her belief: “She could do the same . . . cut her veins and let herself pour on 
to the pavement, into the gutter. For that, finally, is what it means to be alive: to be 
able to die. Is this vision the sum of all her faith . . .? Will it be a good enough story for 
them, her hungry judges?” (211).11 This emphasis on the body exacerbates the contrast 
with the “literary” surroundings (214, 215) and culminates in the scene of her final 
interrogation.12  
Costello's final statement is a failed attempt to express her belief. Her 
presentation of the river Dulgannon and “tens of thousands of little frogs” (216) is 
meant as a plain description of the body and reality “transparently” and “without 
disguise” (217).13 This presentation fails on two counts. One is Costello’s slipping 
towards figurative, “lamentably literary” (217) language (“excuse my language . . . 
extravagancies of the imagination” (216), “so to speak” (216, 218)) and the realisation 
that “the life cycle of a frog may sound allegorical” even though “to the frogs 
themselves it is no allegory, it is the thing itself” (217).  
                                                 
11
 Both of the quoted passages (211) repeat imagery from the Age of Iron: Mrs Curren’s description of 
blood, and her planned self-immolation to be read and judged by an observer.  
12
 This emphasis is taken further in suggestions of universal language (212), descriptions of her appetite 
(214), ideas that morality stems from the body (“our hearts” (203)) as does truth (“It is here, buried in 
our heart” (214)) and the experience of her body “unpleasantly corporeal” (215).    
13
 This extra-textual reality is emphasised several times: “the . . . mudflats are real, the frogs are real. 
They exist whether or not I tell you about them, whether or not I believe in them” (217), “Because they 
exist” (218). This lack of literariness is emphasised by an appeal to the body (“toute nue”) and the lack 
of “notes” (218).  
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The second count on which Costello’s speech fails is the perception of her 
audience. Initially, the judges wondered whether Costello has anything to say 
regarding “[v]iolations of innocent children,” the “fate of the Tasmanians” or 
“[a]trocities . . . extermination of whole peoples” (202), demanded, perhaps, the 
admission of “historical guilt” (203). In this role as listeners and interpreters the judges 
resemble critics playing the reductive allegorizing game of “Class Conflict or . . . Male 
Domination or any of the other games in the games handbook,” the stance rejected by 
Coetzee in “The Novel Today” (4). Now, the story of frogs is taken to be a “highly 
allegorical” one in which frogs function as a symbol and “embody the spirit of life” 
(218, 219). Because Costello has no direct access to the frog’s body she slowly accepts 
the critical interpretation that sees her believing in “the allegorical meaning of frog's 
life” (220).14 With this interpretation forced on her, she loses her identity: her body 
falters (she feels “hot,” “drugged” (220)) and her language fails. Its failure consists in 
its inability to fix her identity, to establish her “I” in language and to have any relation 
to her bodily core: 
. . . who am I, who is this I, this you? We change from day to day, and we also 
stay the same. No I, no you is more fundamental than any other. You might ask 
which is the true Elizabeth Costello: the one who made the first statement or 
the one who made the second . . . both are true . . . And neither. I am an other . 
. . You have the wrong person before you. If you think you have the right 
person you have the wrong person. The wrong Elizabeth Costello (221).  
 
                                                 
14
 Something she disputes earlier in her criticism of Thomas Nagel (75-79).  
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This attempt at transcribing her visceral intimations into language fails.15 There is no 
truth in her language (“Is it true? It may not be true but it is certainly not false”), nor is 
there a successful self-definition: “Yes. Emphatically no. Yes and no. Both” (221).  
 I decided to begin this Introduction with the analysis of these two passages for 
they are symptomatic of the problems this dissertation raises. The first and most 
obvious is the emphasis on embodiment and corporeality in Coetzee’s fiction and the 
inability to either comprehend it, or to express it in words. The second question, 
suggested in the scene of Costello’s testimony, is the relative lack of critical interest in 
Coetzee’s representation of the body, as well as the reductive allegorical impulse 
leading critics to read the body images as allegories of abstract notions and to interpret 
depictions of bodily sensation as metaphors for what is non-physical.   
Secondary literature that reads Coetzee’s fiction allegorically or metaphorically 
is abundant and multifarious.16 The first monograph devoted to the author, Teresa 
Dovey’s Lacanian Allegories (1988) presents Coetzee as “adopt[ing],” “adapt[ing]” 
and “inhabiting” multiple “modes of writing” (11). His texts are seen as recuperating 
the “themes of each model they inhabit for a thematics of the Lacanian subject, which 
provides the means for a deconstructive reading and a self-deconstructive re-writing of 
these themes and genres” (11) and performing a “psychoanalytic deconstruction of the 
texts of the tradition” (28). But Teresa Dovey sees Coetzee’s novels not only as 
                                                 
15
 Louise Bethlehem sees in the novel the “interrogation of the relations between the representation and 
material embodiment” (23). The irreducibility and “irrefutability” (28) of the body and its connotation 
of truth in Elizabeth Costello is shared, in her analysis, with the treatment of the body in the Truth and 
Reconciliation’s Commission’s final report. While the emphasis on the ‘reality’ and ‘truthfulness’ that 
the body confers is shared in this thesis, the premises, goals and the methods used by Bethlehem are 
different.   
16
 An exhaustive list of all allegorical readings of Coetzee’s fiction falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
For a comprehensive treatment see the introduction to Sue Kossew’s Critical Essays on J.M. Coetzee (5-
11).   
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allegories on the thematic level. Instead, they are seen as “(Lacanian) psychoanalytic 
criticism-as-fiction” (11). As such, their incorporation of theory does not merely 
“appropriate[]” but “problematises” it (12). As “redramatisation[s]” of the “Lacanian 
subject” (13), Coetzee's novels become “allegories of the narrating self” (14). His 
characters are treated as “figure[s]” and “metaphors of the act of narrating” (20). While 
some passages in the text suggest Dovey might have in mind a conscious invitation to, 
and performance of, allegorical reading (the novels perform an “allegorical writing of 
their own evocation of the response of the Other in a future of potential readings” 
(43)), the issue is not explored in greater detail and Coetzee’s work is mostly treated as 
“psychoanalytic allegories (or allegorical psychoanalysis)” (45). If, in Dovey’s 
analysis, Coetzee’s fiction is allegorical, it is interesting to note the opinions of other 
authors who expect clearer political allegory and who believe Coetzee does not go “far 
enough in deploring the system, in delineating the historical and economic bases of 
oppression, or in projecting the ultimate triumph of the oppressed peoples of South 
Africa” (52).17 This first full-length study played the part in “accustom[ing]” the 
readers to the idea that “Coetzee’s fiction represents the form of allegorised theory” 
(Attwell 8) and paved the way for the term (allegory) to be one of the terms “most 
frequently applied to Coetzee’s novels” (Attridge 32).18 
                                                 
17
 For example, Michael Vaughan laments the fact that “material factors of oppression and struggle in 
contemporary South Africa achieve subordinate attention” and Coetzee is too interested in the 
“predicament of a liberal petty bourgeois intelligentsia.” Paul Rich sees Coetzee's art as “destined to 
remain the vehicle for expressing the cultural and political dilemmas of a privileged class of white 
artists and intellectuals” while Peter Knox-Shaw maintains that Coetzee “play[s] down the political and 
economic aspects of history in favour of a psychopathology of Western life” (all qtd in Dovey 53).  
18
 David Attwell’s own study, South Africa and the Politics of Writing, does not give in to such 
allegorising impulse and deals, instead, with the development of Coetzee’s treatment of history and the 
“historicity of . . . storytelling” (7).     
 17 
Thus Dick Penner sees In the Heart of the Country politically, as allegorizing 
contemporary South Africa in the face of an impending revolution (Penner 61-66). Foe 
is seen as a “symbol” of the “silent rage of all those in bondage” (22) and Friday as a 
figure expressing the “impending outrage of all the silent ones waiting to break their 
bonds” (127).19 Stephen Watson’s analysis sees Coetzee’s use of language as an “act 
of decolonization” from which the texts derive their “political meaning” (Watson 
Critical 18). Dominic Head sees Friday’s silence as representing “the repression of 
South Africa’s black majority” and his mutilation as “a figure for colonial repression” 
(119, 120). Waiting for the Barbarians has been almost universally seen as an 
“allegory of imperialism” whose lack of specificity turns it into an “emblem of 
imperialism through history” and the Magistrate as the “contemporary South African 
liberal” (Head 72, 75). Some allegorical readings of Coetzee’s novels go further, 
finding real-life equivalents of fictional characters in a vertical allegory.20  
Other readings of allegory attempt to remove themselves from such easy 
substitutions. Dominic Head, for example, sees allegory as a “specific feature” of 
Coetzee’s work and postcolonial literature more generally (20). He invokes Fredric 
Jameson’s horizontal allegory to analyse how Coetzee’s fiction performs the “blurring 
of . . . the allegorical and the literal referent” (22) and Stephen Slemon’s model of the 
“dialectical interaction of discourses” which explains how the two modes can be 
intertwined. Head is mostly concerned with the representation of history in Coetzee’s 
                                                 
19
 Given most societal groups are in “bonds” in one sense or another, such open-ended metaphoricity 
might be concretised in a variety of readings.  
20
 This is easiest to observe in novels which do not deal with South Africa. Such procedure involves, for 
example, seeing Cruso as an “analogue[]” of white South Africans (Penner 124), or claiming that he 
“represent[s] the Afrikaner government of South Africa” (Post 145), but also in seeing characters and 
events an embodiment of abstract concepts: Friday as “social condition,” or an expression of écriture 
feminine that opposes a “male-dominated analytical discourse” (Gallagher 181, 191)  
 18 
texts (where allegory is to function as “historical revisionism” by foregrounding the 
textuality of history (23)) and with the postcolonial context of Coetzee’s writing 
(where such allegory is to perform “textual decolonizations” (22)) but his analyses can 
equally well be applied to the self-reflexive treatment of allegory in Coetzee’s 
fiction.21 
A breakthrough for allegorical readings of Coetzee’s fiction came with the 
publication of Derek Attridge’s J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading (2005), a 
companion to his earlier Singularity of Literature (2004). In his book, and specifically 
in the chapter “Against Allegory” Attridge argues that the singularity of literary works 
requires a resistance to the easy impulse to allegorize. Easy and reductive 
allegorizations, the author argues, turn the alterity of literature into part of the same, 
stripping it of all that is unique or singular. Against such readings Attridge proposes 
reading as an “event” (39), a reading that is literal and literary in which an astute 
reader does not try, at all costs, to find the significance of the text “elsewhere” but 
treats reading as a singular event (43). I shall engage with Attridge’s argument in 
greater detail in chapter 1 of this thesis, but now I would like to draw attention to the 
moment in which Attridge’s understanding of allegorization seems to suggest it not 
only as a way of reading, but a mode of thinking and understanding characteristic of 
the human mind:  
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 Head’s analysis of Life and Times of Michael K attempts to operate on both planes. On the one hand, 
fictional images are read as allegorical (gardening is an “allegory of repossession” (Head 105)). On the 
other, other images are seen as illustrating theoretical concerns (the medical Officer’s mention of 
allegory alludes to the “idea of an infinitely deferred meaning” (106), and K’s gardening is seen as a 
“parallel of Derrida’s version of textuality as ‘dissemination’” (107)). But whether Head talks of 
representing something in an image or of “alluding” to a theoretical position through an image, he treats 
both as allegorized and hence some of his analyses degenerate into vertical substitutions. In chapter 2 of 
this thesis, I also disagree with the idea that the conscious and self-reflexive reference to allegory and its 
examination in the text calls the “idea of allegory into question” or puts it “under erasure” (107).      
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The urge to allegorize Coetzee – and I am including here the urge to treat 
elements in the text as symbols or metaphors for broader ideas or entities – is, I 
believe rooted in the formidable power of this traditional trope to make sense 
of texts that, for one reason or another, are puzzling when taken at face value 
(39).      
 
This dissertation initially started with the interest in this “power” of allegorical 
thinking to “make sense” of what is unknown. It also developed out of the interest in 
why such allegorical readings, rejected by Attridge as reductive, happen in the first 
place. It therefore attempts to investigate what precisely it is in Coetzee’s fiction that 
makes it such an easy target of allegorical, or metaphorical, thinking. In this small 
sense, I hope, it might answer questions raised by the reading of Attridge’s work.  
 The answer to these questions lies, I would like to suggest, in Coetzee’s use of 
the image of the body. I would like to argue that his representation of the body plays a 
significant role in the creation of meaning, especially allegorical meaning that “makes 
sense” of what is “puzzling.” In other words, I would like to suggest that the function 
of body imagery in Coetzee’s fiction is that of meaning-making that extends far 
beyond the corporeal and the immediate. 
 Such meaning is created in several stages. The first is the foregrounding of the 
body where the prevalence of body imagery suggests its significance. This is achieved 
through depictions of mutilation, trauma and disability, but can also happen in more 
mundane representations of ageing, sexuality or bodily functions.  
The second way is which the image of the body prepares the ground for the 
creation of meaning is through recourse to signification. On the one hand, the body 
exists prior to symbolization and is the passive object of signification. It can be spoken 
about and meanings can be imprinted on its surface. On the other, the suggestions of 
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body language and non-verbal signifying systems, the body’s ability to “speak” or its 
“muteness” introduce an element of activity that contradicts reading it as exclusively 
passive.  
Third, the body is suggested as meaningful within the narrative. This is 
achieved either by means of presenting a character in search of a truth about another 
character (either mute or whose language is untrustworthy), or by depicting characters 
obsessively analysing and investigating their own bodies: their diseases, sexual urges 
or bodily states. They unwaveringly pursue the (imagined) truth residing in the body, 
or attempt to “read” or make the body “speak” in the hope of grasping whatever truth 
they imagine to reside therein.  
The expectation of meaningfulness (and signification) of the body is 
maintained throughout the text but is foregrounded and made dynamic through the 
simultaneous suggestion of meaning and the continual contradiction of this suggestion. 
This is achieved by the narrative navigation between suggesting the body’s 
meaningfulness and denying this meaningfulness, promising a revelation of its 
figurative, transcendent meaning, and the frustration of that promise through the 
foregrounding of the body’s physicality and ‘literalness.’ I have termed this navigation 
between the literal and the figurative, between suggestions of meanings and the denials 
of such meanings a narrative ‘two-way movement.’  
This movement refers to the authorial position vis-à-vis his characters and their 
preoccupations: characters are led through the narrative by their belief that truth (of a 
bodily nature) is accessible, and while their failure to access it and comprehend it are 
always the result, the lack of success of their undertakings is never presented as final, 
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but always as contingent and individual, thus saying nothing about the nature of the 
narrative world. This particular avoidance to take sides and determine whether the 
truth the characters search is only projected – or whether it is actually there but failed 
to be revealed as aletheia in those particular instances – is often achieved not only in 
the succession of events, but also in characters' meditations and in changes of register. 
Typically, such a “two way movement” would consist of: (1) the building up of an 
expectation (on the part of the character, and – by extension – the reader); (2) the 
denial of the fulfilment of the expectation. The denial is never final and seems never to 
apply to universal truths, for it is very often followed by: (3) a contradiction of the 
denial – a contradiction that foregrounds the contingency of the particular situation 
rather than allows the denial to serve as a basis for metaphysical propositions 
concerning the narrative world at large.  
In short, Coetzee’s novels present the reader with a problematic body and 
institute its ‘mystery’ promising the revelation of this meaning at a later stage within 
the narrative. In the course of the novel this meaning is approximated, and the 
revelation of meaning is suggested as imminent. The second movement refuses the 
revelation of such meaning in a suggestion that any meaning is a readerly projection 
and the represented body is literal and meaningless: does not signify anything apart 
from itself. (Indeed, Coetzee is more interested in the process and the failure to find 
meaning, in the pursuit, in problematising the very issue of truth's existence and 
accessibility, in failures on the part of a rational, linear mind to grasp – and on the part 
of the language to express – experience or what is merely an intimation of meaningful 
sense within experience rather than in presenting successful completions of such a 
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search). This tentative model also relies on the novelist’s characterisation of language. 
The two-way movement refers to the language insofar as the promise of the revelation 
of bodily meaning implies the communicability of such meaning, the power of 
language to express bodily reality. The frustration of the expectation is hence matched 
by the suggestions of language’s inability to express what is bodily, as in the case of 
Elizabeth Costello earlier.       
Given the body has been suggested as meaningful, but is not meaningful in any 
concrete sense, it can easily be seen as allegorical, without being allegorical in the 
sense of concretising one particular idea. In this sense, the body provides ample 
opportunity to be an overdetermined figure thus falling prey to the readerly impulse to 
allegorise it in various ways. This explains the ubiquity of allegorical readings 
whereby no reading is final and none exhausts the potential for concretisation 
(interpretation) of the text.   
This dissertation is an investigation of how the image of the body creates 
meaning. Taking its cue from Attridge, it hopes to recreate the singularity of the 
encounter with Coetzee’s novels and preserve this encounter with the text in a series of 
close readings whose result, it is hoped, will shed light on how the readers use the 
image of the body to construct meaning and ‘allegorical meaning’ in particular. It 
departs from Attridge insofar as it takes its methods and apparatus from cognitive 
linguistics (especially work on conceptual metaphor) and applies it to practical literary 
analysis.22  
                                                 
22
 To my knowledge, there have been two main attempts to apply cognitive linguistics to the analysis of 
Coetzee’s novels. These are Blakely Vermeule’s reading of Disgrace in Why Do We Care about 
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Chapter 1 of this dissertation presents a short history of thinking about 
metaphor from Aristotle to Turner. It presents the struggle to understand metaphor as 
context-based rather than noun-based in the Aristotelian sense and ways in which it 
has been conceptualised as possessing of “cognitive value” and a tool of 
understanding. It suggests that the primacy of the body in Coetzee’s fiction stems from 
the overlapping of two conceptual metaphors: THE BODY IS A CONTAINER and 
THE TRUTH IS IN A CONTAINER. Their partial coherence allows for the 
suggestion that the main metaphor of Coetzee’s fiction, a metaphor active in the minds 
of the characters, is THE BODY IS THE TRUTH.  
 Chapters 2-4 present close readings of Coetzee’s novels. Chapter 2 
concentrates on Waiting for the Barbarians and Life and Times of Michael K to present 
the attempts at readings of others which, when unsuccessful, lead to the easy 
allegorization or an admitted failure. Chapter 3 analyses Dusklands and the Age of Iron 
with a view to presenting gender symbolism in historical thinking. Here the narrative 
suggestion deems otherwise inexplicable historical processes as explicable by 
reference to the human organism. Chapter 4 concentrates on Foe and Master of 
Petersburg. It presents the results of the failures to ‘grasp’ the body in the context of 
artistic creation, and the (mis)use to which readings of the body may be put.   
 This dissertation addresses the two questions introduced by the above analysis 
of Elizabeth Costello. In a series of close readings, I first attempt to present Coetzee’s 
treatment of the body as, on the one hand, an epistemologically-charged site, both pre-
linguistic and deeply meaningful, and, on the other, as constantly at the mercy of 
                                                                                                                                             
Literary Characters (2010) and Barbara Dancygier’s “Close Encounters: The Author and the Character 
in Elizabeth Costello, Slow Man and Diary of a Bad Year” (2010).   
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language to express and conceptualize its truth. At the same time, I will explore the 
relationship that the ‘immediate’ body in Coetzee’s fiction has with ‘mediated’ 
language, whose metaphors and allegorical character not only problematize intellectual 
conceptualization and truthful expression, but may, in fact, create the illusion of truth, 
depth and meaningfulness. It will be suggested that the inevitability of metaphorical 
thinking contributes to reading Coetzee’s fiction in a reductive and allegorical way. 
But it will also be proposed that the awareness of language’s potential for 
representation and enactment, and the recognition of the role conceptual metaphors 
play in human cognition may be useful to avoiding such reductionism. Therefore, the 
following chapter prepares the ground for my later literary analysis by presenting the 
history of the terms ‘allegory’ and ‘metaphor,’ discussing allegorical and metaphorical 
character of thought and language, defining the key terms used and establishing how 

















Metaphor: From Aristotle to Lakoff, From the Noun to the Text 
 
1. Substitution, energeia, genius. 
 
 When, in his Poetics, Aristotle classifies names according to quality, one kind 
he distinguishes as “most important by far” (P 32) is metaphor (28).23 It is defined as 
“the application (to something) of a name belonging to something else” and might take 
several forms: “from the genus to the species . . . from the species to the genus . . . 
from a species to [another] species” or “according to analogy” (28). This chapter looks 
first at definitions of metaphor in Aristotelian thought (especially as expressed in the 
Poetics and Rhetoric), and later at the long evolution of the understanding of the term 
with a view to presenting the divorcing of the term from its noun-based understanding, 
and the differing views as to its cognitive value. Both the context-based understanding 
of metaphor and its intellectual value have bearing on the analysis of the metaphors 
used by Coetzee, and on the investigation of the role of his metaphors in the creation 
of meaning. A question pertinent to this discussion is also whether the idea of the 
inescapability of metaphor (as suggested by Coetzee's fiction) is truly Aristotelian. 
This discussion takes place in the context of our understanding of audience as 
perceived by the Aristotelian orator. 
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 The term metaphor, as Kennedy writes in a comment, “is itself a metaphor and literally means 
'carrying something from one place to another, transference'” (R 222). This inescapability of metaphor is 
particularly interesting in reference to its inescapability in Coetzee's fiction. 
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In addition to the main definition (28), Aristotle presents other ways in which 
metaphor can be created. Thus it is possible to “add [to the metaphor] the thing to 
which the name relates, instead of what it means”, for example “old age of day”; or, 
after employing a term belonging to a different realm, “one can deny to it one of the 
things particular to [that thing]”, for example a shield described as “wine-bowl of 
Ares” and then “wine-bowl without wine” (29). As Moran argues (385), Aristotle's 
definition is “general enough to apply to many usages that would not ordinarily come 
under our contemporary understanding of metaphor.” In the Poetics, Aristotle argues 
that the mastery of metaphor is “an indication of genius” and “cannot be acquired from 
someone else” (32) making it a special case among other names described. In the 
Rhetoric, while he maintains that the use of metaphor “cannot be learned from 
someone else” (R 223), he also sees it as a feature of ordinary language, pointing to the 
ubiquity and inescapability of metaphorical expressions: “all people carry their 
conversations with metaphors and words in their native and prevailing meanings” 
(223). 
 In the Rhetoric, metaphor refers to the sphere of lexis rather than logos: it is a 
feature of speech rather than thinking. Much of the discussion there rests on the 
distinction between poetry and what one would nowadays call prose: while 
unfamiliarity of language is welcome in a poet, the orator should  disguise his craft and 
“compose without being noticed” and “should seem to speak not artificially but 
naturally” (R 222). In the Poetics Aristotle outlines ways in which metaphors may 
influence meaning, make something sound better or worse, but he goes even further by 
suggesting that the metaphors have the power to name what is otherwise unnameable 
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(224). This is paralleled by what he claims in the Poetics: while there “may be no 
current name for some things in the analogy” it is possible to express them “in the 
same way” (P 29). Thus, because sowing seed resembles “scatter[ing] radiance from 
the sun” (29) which has no name, expressions like “sowing . . . radiance” (29) become 
intelligible. 
 As Moran argues, Aristotle's ambiguity towards metaphor includes both critical 
rejection (in Topics) and a mixture of praise and regret (in Rhetoric). It the latter work, 
metaphor is, at times, elevated to a “valuable place within . . . philosophy” (386), 
especially in regards to its ability to teach categories and relations, and its enabling of a 
philosopher to see similarity where, apparently, none exists.24 At the same time, it is 
presented as worthy of analysis merely “due to the corruption of political life” (387) in 
which style is more important than substance. According to Moran, a question of 
interest to contemporary philosophers is “To what extent is metaphor a legitimate 
vehicle of understanding, and to what extent does its rhetorical usefulness depend on a 
lack of understanding, on the part of the audience, about its functioning?” (386). It is 
possible that the discussion of the overdetermined figure of the body in Coetzee's 
fiction might be illuminated by the answer to this question. For, if Coetzee presents the 
body as forever elusive and unreadable, and literary scholarship consists in the 
exposition of meaning (understanding) or the analysis of how meaning is constructed 
both by the text and the reader, it would be useful to see how the body in Coetzee's 
fiction creates meaning, and whether it depends for its meaning on a lack of 
understanding on the part of the reading audience. 
                                                 
24
 “Metaphor most brings about learning” (R 244), “in philosophy, too, it is characteristic of a well-
directed mind to observe the likeness even in things very different” (R 250). 
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 Moran sees the Aristotelian ambiguity which “colors even the description of 
the specific virtues of metaphor” as already present in the metaphorical image of 
foreigners that Aristotle uses to describe metaphor (388). More interesting problems 
occur when Moran discusses the requirement that metaphorical expressions be 
disguised when considering the “concealment of their artfulness and their aims” (388); 
one explanation relates to the reliability of the orator and the trust listeners might have 
in his liability for deception or manipulation. This, however, would stand at variance 
with the previous assertions of metaphor as being able to aid the learning of what is 
new or not obvious. It would also imply a contradiction within the audience itself: 
while the audience takes pleasure in “marvelling” and being awestruck, it is also 
unwilling to listen to a speaker who is seen as unreliable (389).25 The strange 
movement consists in wanting to be moved and simultaneously rejecting this emotion 
as unjustifiable (390).  
 To understand the reasons for Aristotle's insistence on concealment Moran 
analyses the problematic relationship between pleasure and learning. After Aristotle, 
he sees differences in judgement as coloured by the emotional attitude of the speaker. 
On the one hand, pleasure plays a role in making a listener “receptive” to the speaker 
and “imaginatively entering into a different viewpoint” (391). While the speaker 
actively pursues the listener's trust, at the same time he is trying to divert the listener's 
attention from this fact and from how much his enterprise depends upon it. At this 
stage the similarity between reading and listening to an orator are similar. The reader 
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 This would be a major difference between rhetoric, where persuasion is the goal, and riddles (389).  
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reads with the hope of being both entertained and informed of something, whilst the 
writer attempts both to gain the reader's trust and to use it.  
 Another important metaphor used by Aristotle is the representation of 
figurative language as creating the meaning in an imaginary or “quasi-experiential” 
(392) way. Metaphor is endowed with the potential not merely to tell but to “make us 
see one thing as another” (392), the ability on which both its persuasiveness and 
emotional impact relies. The pro ommaton poiein (doing something before one's eyes), 
presenting images in the minds of the audience, is, according to Moran, the “primary 
virtue of metaphor” (392) as analysed by Aristotle. The figure of pro ommaton poiein 
(imagery) is intimately connected to the idea of the energeia (activity) of a successful 
metaphor (variously analysed as moving, being alive, being personified or actualised). 
Against Ricoeur, who reads activity “exclusively as pertaining to that which is 
represented in the metaphor,” Moran attempts to show how Aristotle's emphasis on 
energeia is to assist in the explanation of the nature and work of pro ommaton poiein. 
The visualization, thus, is “recognised as itself a metaphorical expression and in need 
of elucidation, and the various senses of energeia are presented as explications 
referring to the phenomenon that the original visual metaphor gestures toward” (393). 
The understanding of metaphor, in Moran's view, would depend on the activity of the 
“subject” of the orator's speech but would also involve active participation of the 
audience.  
 To understand how metaphor induces mental activity on the part of the speaker, 
Moran invokes Burke's analysis in the Rhetoric of Motives. In Burke's view, abstract 
ideas, when represented by imaginary concepts contain a “bundle of principles” 
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including those “that would be mutually contradictory if reduced to their purely 
ideational equivalents” (qtd. in Moran 394). The translation of a term into image 
(security represented as the mother, in Burke's example) allows the speaker to “profit 
not only from this one identification, but from many kindred principles or ideas which, 
when approached in this spirit, are associated with the mother-image” (394). In an 
argument, a speaker who argues using merely one “principle of appeal” of a given 
image is capable of gaining an “unearned increment” from “other . . . principles 
vibrant in the same image” (for example affection, tradition, naturalness etc.) (349). 
The “unearned” nature of the audience's response lies then in the fact that the speaker 
“has not provided reasons for belief about this matter,” but even more poignantly, he 
“may even have not raised that particular matter explicitly for consideration” (394). 
Secondly, the image can be divorced from the context in which it first appeared and 
pondered by the audience in a different context, while the speaker is free to “disavow” 
any unwanted “implications or conclusions” (394) the audience may reach. The 
“inexplicitness” of the image-as-argument insures the speaker against being 
contradicted on logical grounds: as his argument functions as an image rather than an 
explicitly stated proposition, it cannot merely be contradicted. Any contradiction of the 
implications of the image would be a contradiction not of the speaker, but of the 
interpretation of the meaning of the image on the part of the audience (394-395). 
 With this divorcing of the image from the speaker comes, of course, the change 
in the ownership of the argument. The audience members might feel themselves 
actively pursuing understanding rather than being at the mercy of some, perhaps 
unreliable, speaker. They are positioned as active pursuers of truthful conviction rather 
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than passive recipients of wisdom. The “discovery” and reasoning are all their own 
(395). Moran interprets the need to conceal one's own art of metaphor not merely 
linguistically, as necessary to hide “deliberately contrived” metaphors or the fact of 
making the audience “unaware that they are listening to a carefully composed speech,” 
but also in the conceptual sense (396). On the part of the speaker, importantly, there is 
the “avoidance of the commitment of explicit assertion” (396). While literary prose 
might not have all the elements of a persuasive discourse, it shares with it an element 
of creating the meaning or else supplying the reader with a material from which 
meaning can be created. In presenting the figure of the body, and characters – 
dissatisfied with language – passionately and obsessively attempting to “read” it, 
Coetzee's use of the motif resembles to a large degree the handling of a metaphorical 
figure by Aristotle's orator. Like him, Coetzee metaphorically washes his hands of 
interpreting the body for the reader, refuses to present the body as positively 
predicated. He avoids “the commitment of explicit assertion” in showing the body as 
important while leaving the readers to construct the meaning of the image. As no 
interpretation is his creation, he is free to disavow allegorical interpretations of the 
image put forward by his interpreters.  
 While it could be argued that fiction is not philosophy and thus shares little of 
its nature and its objective of persuasion, there are some passages in Aristotle which 
allow for a unified treatment of metaphor regardless of the discursive context of its 
appearance. One of Ricoeur's first points in his Rule of Metaphor is that, despite the 
fact that rhetoric and poetics functioned as two independent disciplines in Aristotle's 
time, metaphor had a “foot in each domain” (12). However dissimilar those two 
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disciplines were, they used the same definition of metaphor ( Rhetoric “adopts, pure 
and simple, the well-known definition of metaphor given in the Poetics” (13)), they 
relied on metaphor for their success, and understood metaphor in the same way. It 
existed both in the “mimetic arts” and in “persuasive proof” (13). 
 One problematic area (problematic both for Ricoeur's hermeneutics as well as 
my project on Coetzee's fiction) is the reliance of Aristotelian diction on the word-
based understanding of metaphor. In Aristotle, metaphor is seen “not at the level of 
discourse” (14) but at the level of noun. Unlike Aristotle, Ricoeur believes that logos 
can have “unity that does not appear to be derived from that of the word” (16). As a 
result, Ricoeur attempts to build his own theory of metaphor in which he severs the 
links with the noun and, rather, develops a “theory of discourse” treating metaphor as 
discourse-based. Analysing Aristotle's reliance on movement for the definition of 
metaphor, “a transfer of the meanings of nouns” (15), and the uses of epiphora, 
Ricoeur reaches the conclusion that, in Aristotle, “metaphor applies to every 
transposition of terms” (17). Because of the difficulties implied by transposition, and 
the equivocation of figures and tropes of resemblance Aristotle appears to be more 
interested in “transpositional movement as such, in processes more than in classes” 
(18). This helps Ricoeur in the divorcing of metaphor from its word-based 
interpretation (18). 
 Another problem which pertains to Coetzee's fiction is the inescapability of 
metaphor. In Aristotle's explanations of its meaning, he uses the terms borrowing and 
metaphor. Ricoeur thus has reason to maintain that “it is impossible to talk of 
metaphor non-metaphorically” (18). Indeed, “there is no non-metaphorical standpoint 
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from which one could look upon metaphor . . . as if [it] were a game played before 
one's eyes” (19).  
 The definition of metaphor in Aristotle implies, according to Ricoeur, more 
than the author himself could have envisaged. Among other issues developed later (to 
do with the contrast between “proper” and “figurative” uses of language), Ricoeur 
pays specific attention to the idea of substitution and the concept of deviation from 
ordinary usage (19).26 The exclusive emphasis on the theory of substitution in Aristotle 
seems to be limiting. Ricoeur explores the notion of epiphora treating it as an example 
of “categorical transgression” (23). By paying more attention to the mere transference 
of terms, Aristotle overlooked the fact that the displacement of meaning (which may 
challenge the categorical order of genus-species and of “relation-rules” (22)) might 
receive a less noun-based interpretation. Thus it is possible to see not the word but “the 
pair of terms or relationships between which the transposition operates” as the basis of 
metaphor (23). In this sense, while metaphor operates from within a given order, it has 
to “disturb a whole network by means of aberrant attribution” (23). It becomes more 
than just an ornament as a result of its capability of “destroy[ing] an order only to 
invent a new one.” It “redescribes” reality (24), provides new information and 
contributes to learning. What is most important for Ricoeur, and later for the 
conceptual metaphor and its relevance for the analysis of Coetzee's oeuvre, is the 
emphasis on metaphor as belonging to an “heuristic of thought” (24). Metaphor may 
displace meanings within an order, but the order itself is also created in the same way: 
“The idea of an initial metaphorical impulse destroys these oppositions between proper 
                                                 
26
 The concept of deviation, re-worded as perversion will be considered in relation to the the Master of 
Petersburg. 
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and figurative, ordinary and strange, order and transgression.” Furthermore, “it 
suggests the idea that order itself proceeds from the metaphorical constitution of 
semantic fields, which themselves give rise to genus and species” (24).  
 Among metaphor's virtues, one pertinent to the analysis of Coetzee is pro 
ommaton poiein (setting before the eyes, visualization): presenting “the abstract in 
concrete terms” (38), making it visible. In Coetzee's case the function might be shared 
by the depiction of the abstract – guilt, politics in Age of Iron for example, as the 
contingent, personified and “visible”: the body, disease, childbearing, sexuality. The 
rhetorical process in Aristotle and Coetzee is thus exactly the same: “Showing 
inanimate things as animate, is indeed not relating them to something invisible, but 
showing these things themselves as if in act” (38). While in the Rhetoric all the 
metaphors analysed concentrate on persuasion, it is undeniable that “one and the same 
strategy of discourse puts into play the logical force of an analogy and of comparison” 
(39). Indeed, to the extent that in his philosophical analysis Aristotle uses almost 
exclusively literary examples, it seems that the difference between the use of metaphor 
in poetry and oratory lies for him not so much in the process but the practical purpose 
(telos, end) of its application (39). 
 While the definition of metaphor in the Poetics is exactly the same as in the 
Rhetorics, the difference lies in the mimetic purpose of lexis in poetics. Ricoeur's 
objective is to ask whether metaphor in poetics may have an effect on the poem as a 
whole, whether, beyond what Aristotle imagined, “the secret of metaphor, as a 
displacement of meaning at the level of words, does not rest in the elevation of 
meaning at the level of muthos” (46). Once again, through the analysis of the concept 
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of setting before the eyes and the troubled term mimêsis, Ricoeur sees metaphor as 
joining what is poetic with what is metaphysical: “to present men 'as acting' and all 
things 'as in act' – such could well be the ontological function of metaphorical 
discourse, in which ever dormant potentiality of existence appears as blossoming forth, 
every latent capacity for action as actualised” (48).27  
 
2. Metaphor as Ornament, Figure and Symbol (Eco).  
 
Many of the problems in the contemporary theory of metaphor are outlined by Eco in 
his “Scandal of Metaphor” (1983), where he links the problems of talking of 
metaphors with the more general question of the nature of language. Depending on 
whether language is viewed as primarily metaphorical or primarily rule-governed, 
definitions of metaphor will suffer in two ways. In the first instance all accounts of 
metaphor will necessarily be circular (because one would attempt to explain 
metaphorical expressions by means of metaphorical language), in the latter view, 
where metaphor is little more than a deviation from the norm, metaphorical 
expressions would exist outside the correct and intelligible use of language. Existing in 
“almost all semiotic systems” (218) the scandal of metaphor is more evident if we ask 
whether metaphor has cognitive value. This, Eco asserts has little to do with truth-
                                                 
27  Literature is akin to philosophy and in opposition to history: both of them deal with the subject of 
what could be, rather than what was. A more systematic account of metaphor can be found in the work 
of Quintilian. Metaphor is still described in terms of substitution that falls within four distinct classes 
(animate for inanimate, inanimate for inanimate, inanimate for animate and animate for inanimate) and 
into four species (431, 433). Unlike Aristotle, Quintilian sees simile as the basis of metaphor, the latter 
being a “shortened form of Simile” (429). It derives from a natural tendency of the human (even 
“uneducated” (427)) mind that uses it “unconsciously” thus ensuring that “nothing goes without a 
name” (427). 
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values but instead with the possibility to mark the ambiguity of “pretend[ing] to make 
assertions, and assert[ing] seriously something that is beyond literal truth” (219). 
 In his analysis of Aristotle's definitions of metaphors, the first two types (genus 
to species, species to genus) are found to be generalizing and particularizing 
synecdoches with little to redeem them (223). The first two types “let us know what 
we already know” (225). After careful analysis, the third type (species to species) 
requires not three but four terms, which effectively makes it a metaphor by analogy, 
and thus the fourth type of Aristotle's metaphor (226). In contrast with the first three 
types which have little cognitive value, in the fourth type of metaphor, Eco claims, a 
“superimposition . . . is created that is almost visual” (228). The new hybrid, both 
visual and conceptual (228), resembles Freud's condensation in jokes and dream 
visions (228). 
 Aristotelian metaphor, analysed in the context of various culturally and 
historically specific metaphors, would say something new only and only if “the 
proportion was not so commonly accepted” or if, alternatively, “it was accepted . . . 
[and] then soon forgotten” (233-234). The cognitive role would involve seeing of the 
“likeness” or “the subtle network of proportions between cultural units,” and would 
thus function as a “cognitive instrument, at once a source of clarity and enigma” (234). 
By invoking Ricoeur's emphasis on the links between mimesis and metaphor, Eco 
maintains that metaphor cannot be merely an “empty, gratuitous game.” In contrast, 
“the best metaphors are those in which the cultural process, the dynamics itself of 
semiosis, shows through” (234). In Eco's understanding, the likeness in Aristotle's 
account concerns both objects and the ways in which language definitions of objects 
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work. Thus Aristotle's lament that pirates call themselves “purveyors”28 functions as 
proof that Aristotle saw ways in which language was used to manipulate reality: “All 
that pirates had to do . . . was find a genus that fitted their species and adapt to the 
purpose of a creditable Porphyry's tree.” What is “manipulatory of reality . . . is to 
select only one out of all the other properties that were characteristic of pirates, and 
through that choice make themselves known, put themselves before others' eyes in this 
perspective and under that particular description” (235).  
 Aristotle's mistake, in Eco's view, lay in his “identifying the categories of 
language with the categories of being,” the mistake that persisted throughout the 
Middle Ages when “every being function[ed] as a synecdoche or metonymy of the 
One.” (235). Everything, as medieval authors from Hugh of Saint Victor to Raban 
Maur claimed, could be interpreted by a code which, by “assigning to things emergent 
properties, allow[ed] them to become metaphors for supernatural things” (235). Thus, 
they posited the existence of a “network of cultural information” operating “as a 
cosmological code” (235) and that the world was a “mazelike network of cultural 
properties” (236). Thomas Aquinas, while maintaining the literal (and figural) nature 
of the Bible, also maintained that when it is impossible to speak of God either 
univocally or equivocally, he “must be spoken of… through analogy” (236).  
 Eco's proposal in the understanding and production of metaphor as a cognitive 
tool depends on the distinction between dictionary properties (conceptual content, 
necessary and analytic properties only) and encyclopedic properties (a theoretically 
unending list of synthetic properties, including metonymic and contextual ones). His 
                                                 
28  Eco uses “purveyors” (234), Kennedy's translation of the Rhetoric renders them as “businessmen” 
(224).  
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own attempt is to explain metaphor founded on “componential semantics” in its 
encyclopedic form, one which accounts for “rules for contextual insertion” (243). 
Criticising the traditional and, according to Eco, unfounded yet philosophically 
disturbing, distinction into synecdoche and metonymy, Eco believes his model to be 
free of “implicit philosophical assumptions” (246). Naturally, given the potentially 
infinite nature of the encyclopedic representation, the importance of context cannot be 
overlooked (247). 
 Eco presents five rules for the “co-textual interpretation of a metaphor” which 
also function, reversely, as rules for its production (251). Invoking Werinrich's 
distinction between “micrometaphorics, metaphorics of the context and metaphorics of 
the text”, Eco proceeds to the analyses of various metaphors claiming that “it is 
difficult to say when the metaphorical interpretation stops” and that the “boundaries 
between metaphor, allegory and symbol can be very imprecise” (252). Eco's 
distinctions do not, obviously, allow us to distinguish between “beautiful” and “ugly” 
metaphors in the Aristotelian sense (254). What they are able to do, however, is to 
distinguish between open and closed metaphors (254) which, in the absence of an 
algorithm for metaphor, Eco believes is quite enough. The relative success of some 
metaphorical expressions would be based upon “the sociocultural format of the 
interpreting subjects' encyclopedia” (254). At the same time, the process allows for the 





3. Metaphorology: Problems and solutions (Genette, Ricoeur).  
 
 A critical view of the development of rhetoric, with a special emphasis on 
metaphor, can be found in Genette's Rhetoric Restrained. Aristotelian rhetoric, in 
Gennette's view, was more general and extensive than the contemporary study of 
tropes. Rhetoric from the Middle Ages onwards is seen by Genette as having suffered 
from a “generalized restriction” which has led to the reduction of the discipline to the 
“study of the poetic lexis” (104). Genette attempts to outline the history of that process 
by focusing on various elements. The first is “tropological reduction” (105) initiated 
by Dumarais's Des Tropes (1730), a work which – by emphasizing “figuration” – put 
the literal / figurative distinction at the centre of rhetoric. The second is found in the 
work of Fontanier, who, by concentrating on the “criterion of substitution” and 
“extending it to the figurative field as a whole,” contributed to the development of 
rhetoric in which the trope became “the model of all figures” (105). While the object 
of his study was comprehensive and included “indeed all figures,” his principle, as 
Genette claims was “fundamentally and purely tropological” (106). If Dumarais's work 
connected metonymy and synecdoche, Fontanier (as Vossius before) was driven by an 
impulse to reduce and to subordinate: thus he disregarded irony as a “pseudo-trope” 
(107) and treated metaphor and metonymy as the principal tropes (107).29 This has led 
to the confusion in the understanding of various types of “connection” and 
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 As Genete claims: “Dumarais sketches a new conflation of synecdoche and metonymy, which are 
seen as connected since they are both based on a relation, or connection (together with “dependence” in 
the case of synecdoche), which is neither the relation of resemblance of metaphor nor the relation of 
contrast of irony: it was implicitly to “subordinate” all tropes to the free associative principles of 
similarity, contiguity, and opposition” (106).    
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“contiguity” and thus to the mistake of seeing synecdoche as identical to metonymy. 
This mistake, according to Genette, consists in treating inclusion (characteristic of 
synecdoche) as simple contiguity without inclusion (characteristic of metonymy); in 
other words, it consists in mistaking the relation of parts to whole (synecdoche) for the 
relation of parts to other parts (“remainder”) forming a given whole (metonymy) (108). 
Both Mauss and Jakobson are guilty of this confusion which overlooks the fact that the 
tropes are fundamentally different (109).  
 If all figures of connection have been, with time, reduced to metonymy, all 
figures of resemblance and analogy have been reduced to metaphor. The traditional 
view of contrasting metaphor and comparison is rejected, and, instead, Gennette argues 
that much more should be taken into account: the absence or presence of a comparing 
(vehicle) and compared (tenor) elements, the presence or absence of a comparative 
modalizer, motive, etc. He sketches a table (112) in which he outlines all the figures of 
analogy. Only one of the ten figures of resemblance can be seen as metaphor proper, 
showing, as Genette hopes, that metaphor is “merely one form among any others” and 
also, that “its promotion to the rank of figure of analogy par excellence is the result of 
a sort of takeover.” (113). Seeing in the metaphor the “trope of tropes” is thus 
misguided.30  
 The restrained nature of rhetoric led, according to Genette, to its demise with 
the survival only of metaphor, “frozen in its useless royalty” (115). Genette sees a 
similar process in the appropriation and misuse of the term image in Surrealism, or 
symbol in Romanticism and Symbolism. In its current state, Genette sees the misuse of 
                                                 
30   Among the authors Genette criticises for the misuse of the term are Proust, Lacan, Tesauro, the 
Liège group, Vico, Aristotle, Deguy or Sojcher, among others.   
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the term metaphor as symptomatic of a larger problem, but having an easily 
identifiable root cause: “There is, it would seem, an almost inevitable confusion . . . 
between standing for and being like, in the name of which any trope may be regarded 
as a metaphor” (120). From my perspective, Genette's views become particularly 
productive when he criticises the “absolute valorization of metaphor, bound up with 
the idea of the essential metaphoricity of poetic language – and of language in general” 
(118). This may suggest that the ideas of the metaphorical or allegorical nature of the 
body in Coetzee's fiction is not helped by the theories of the metaphorical nature of 
everyday language, and that metaphoricity may mean figurativeness rather than 
relating to metaphor as a figure. How then, can cognitive linguistics talk of the 
metaphorical nature of language and thought, rather than of its figurative nature? To 
answer this question it is necessary to trace the status of metaphor and its role in 
thought and language on the example of works by Ricoeur (who dedicates his chapter 
to Genette) and then by Black, Goodman and Davidson, which divorce metaphor from 
what Genette sees as fruitless tropology.   
 Ricoeur's “The Decline of Rhetoric: Tropology” continues his investigation of 
the history of metaphor in rhetoric from its heyday and to its demise, while at the same 
time attempting to free metaphor from its word-based limitations. Ricoeur criticises 
the rhetorical approach to metaphor for “the excessive and damaging emphasis . . . on 
the word . . . on the noun or name, and on naming, in the theory of meaning.” In 
opposition, the semantic approach “proceeds from the recognition of the sentence as 
the primary unit of meaning” (49). Ricoeur first outlines implicit postulates of 
tropology which allowed for the bridging of the gap between the word-based definition 
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of metaphor and the treatment of metaphor as merely an ornamental deviation,31 which 
inspired by Aristotle, nevertheless overlooks his other statements: the close similarity  
between simile and metaphor (dissimilar as “two forms of predication”) or naming as 
predication (53). 
 Ricoeur notices how Genette's return to the figure was important in that, as 
neither merely a word, nor a sentence, it was “coextensive with discourse in general” 
(59). When Fontanier distinguished figures of deviation and figures of substitution, he 
did it, in Ricoeur's view to “found a rhetoric of figures that is not reducible to a 
tropology, to a theory of deviations” (61). In an inherent contradiction the trope 
remained the “key unit” while “the foundation remain[ed] the word” (62). Fontanier's 
work operates then on two assumptions: the first views figure as the basic unit, the 
second treated idea (and, what follows, word and trope) as central (62).  
 The implications of Fontanier's “admirable” (68) definition of metaphor was 
then killed by the “notion of trope taken as a single word” (68). Despite his respect for 
Fontanier's work, Ricoeur nevertheless maintains that it has led rhetoric into a dead 
end (70). In all of this, Ricoeur persists in stressing the need for a non word-based 





                                                 
31
 These are: “the proper versus the figurative,” “semantic lacuna,” “borrowing,” “deviation” (51), 
“substitution,” reason or “paradigmatic character of the trope,” “exhaustive paraphrase,” “no new 
information” and ornament (52).  
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4. Three major approaches: interaction, transfer, comparison  
 
 Max Black's “More about metaphor” (1993) is an extension and correction of 
the earlier Metaphor in which he develops his theory of the interaction view of 
metaphor. The “mystery of metaphor” (21), and the rejection of reductionist 
approaches to its study are the prolegomena to sketching, once again, his view on the 
subject and investigating the cognitive value of metaphors. Throughout his work, 
Black uses metaphorical statements as examples, treating them not like Aristotle, as a 
feature of word, but that of discourse.32 
 Black opposes his interaction view, concentrated primarily on the functional 
work of metaphorical statements, with two other dominant paradigms: the substitution 
view and comparison view. The interaction view is based on two subjects (a “primary” 
and “secondary”), the secondary one “to be regarded as a system rather than . . . [a] 
thing,” in which case we talk not of individuals or ideas but of “a system of 
relationships” or the “implicative complex” (27). Metaphor “works by “projecting 
upon” the primary subject a set of “associated implications,” comprised in the 
implicative complex, that are predicable of the secondary subject” (28).33 Further, the 
producer of a metaphorical statement “selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes 
features of the primary subject by applying to it statements isomorphic with the 
members of the secondary subject's implicative complex” (28). The interaction view 
                                                 
32
 On his use of the term “metaphorical statements” Black writes: “A “statement,” in my intended sense, 
will be identified by quoting a whole sentence, or a set of sentences.” He goes even further in the 
discussion of metaphor-themes “identified merely by a formula like “the metaphor of A as B . . . 
regarded as an abstraction from the metaphorical statements in which it does or might occur” (24).   
33
 Here, the change occurs from the past term system of associated commonplaces. Black defines the 
new term 'implicative complex' as Aristotle's endoxa: “current opinions shared by members of a certain 
speech-community” (28). 
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finally sees the two subjects as interacting in several ways (28). Thus, metaphorically 
described, statements involving metaphor are a “verbal action essentially demanding 
uptake, a creative response from a competent reader” (28). The analysis of metaphors 
consists in comparisons between statements belonging to respective implication-
complexes which, due to their “isomorphic” (29) nature, are correlated “by a “mixed 
lot of projective relations” (30).  
 The interactive view of metaphor is based on resemblance (30). Thus, each 
metaphor “mediate[s] an analogy or structural correspondence” and each “implicate[s] 
a likeness-statement and a comparison-statement” (30). The functional definition of 
metaphor, in the interaction view, is “an instrument for drawing implications grounded 
in perceived analogies of structure between two subjects belonging to different 
domains” (31). Using a series of geometrical figures as examples, Black attempts to 
convince the reader that the imaginary re-visualization of a shape is akin to that of 
metaphorical thinking. The figure functions as model-example for processes “needed 
in producing, handling, and understanding all but the most trivial of metaphors” (33). 
In Black's analysis, metaphors have a cognitive function insofar as they “generate new 
knowledge and insight by changing relationships between the things designated” (35). 
Black analyses various sentences to arrive at his “strong creativity thesis” in which 
metaphors are viewed as “cognitive instruments” (37).  
 With the acceptance of the cognitive value of metaphors comes the conviction 
that metaphors may reveal “how things are” (38). However, while metaphor may 
present “novel views of a domain of reference” (38), Black believes it a mistake to 
attempt to ascribe truth-values to metaphorical statements, concentrating, rather, on 
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their “representational aspect” (39). Metaphor itself, thus, can be “cognitive, 
informative, and ontologically illuminating” (39). The interaction view proposed by 
Black sees metaphors as based on the “interactions between two systems, grounded in 
analogies of structure (partly created, partly discovered)” and subject to the 
determination of their “appropriateness, faithfulness, partiality, superficiality, and the 
like” (39).  
 A competing account of metaphor, and thus a different understanding of the 
literal and figurative, is ‘transfer theory’ of metaphor, developing Aristotle's 
substitution intuitions. Nelson Goodman's theory of metaphoric transfer begins with 
the definition of a realm in which a semantic label operates as the “aggregate of the 
ranges of extension of the labels in a schema” (72).34 In metaphor, a label “with others 
constituting a schema is . . . detached from the home realm of that schema and applied 
for the sorting and organizing of an alien realm” (72). This “transfer of schema” 
resembles a “calculated category-mistake.” It is complicated by the fact that not only 
the schema itself, but also the “ordering” as well as “other relationships” are subject to 
this transfer (73). Rejecting Ernst Cassirer's analysis of how metaphorical statements 
relate to previous literal uses (76-77), Goodman also rejects the view of metaphor as 
an elliptical simile and treats metaphor as the basis of a corresponding simile (77).  
The difference between literal and metaphorical statements does not influence 
their status as true or false, since the “[s]tandards of truth are much the same whether 
the schema used is transferred or not” (79). Although he maintains that a 
“metaphorical sorting” will necessarily be “more novel . . . less sharp and stable than 
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 Schema is defined as “[t]he implicit set of alternatives” (73).   
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correlated literal sorting” the difference lies merely in degree and is not qualitative 
(79). There is also little correspondence between a valid and truthful metaphor, and a 
metaphor that is effective. One speaks of good metaphors (or “potent” in Goodman's 
language) when the “transferred schema effects a new and notable organization rather 
than a mere relabeling of an old one” (80). The significance and value of metaphor lies 
in these new ways of organization (80). However, the reliance on novelty and 
“intriguing” character means even potent metaphors are necessarily short-lived and 
become “commonplace,” reduced to “mere truth” (80). 
 Goodman analyses various metaphors in two groups: those like personification 
or antonomasia, where one can speak of a “transfer of a schema between disjoint 
realms” (80), and those within one realm like hyperbole and litotes, where “the entire 
schema [is] squeezed into a central part of the original realm” (81). In either case, 
metaphor for Goodman always consists of transfer where “some labels of the schema 
are given new extensions” even if, as in irony, “the realm itself may remain constant 
under the transfer” (83). Metaphor, in this view, cannot easily be opposed to literal 
usage for the features helping to distinguish the two are inherently “transient” (85). 
 The third major type of contemporary views on metaphor, alongside interaction 
and transfer, is the comparison view, commonly held in analytic philosophy. In Donald 
Davidson's “What Metaphors Mean” (1976) he posits himself against both Black and 
Goodman. Both the creation and interpretation of metaphor function as creative 
activities without fast rules. In this sense, they are already akin to literal language, 
since “all communication . . . assumes the interplay of inventive construction and 
inventive construal” (29). Assessing or constructing metaphors can only be achieved 
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successfully by reference to “taste”; and there is nothing, as Black claimed, like rules 
of language determining what counts as metaphor and what does not. Davidson, on the 
other hand, maintains that metaphors mean “what the words, in their most literal 
interpretation mean, and nothing more” (30). While not wanting to be associated with 
those who see metaphor as purely ornamental, Davidson claims that metaphors cannot 
be paraphrased “because there is nothing there to paraphrase” (30). And, while 
metaphor might be a useful device, while its point might be “brought out by using 
further words,” metaphor itself “doesn't say anything beyond its literal meaning” (30). 
Metaphor, he argues, “belongs exclusively to the domain of use” (31). Davidson 
rejects the idea of explaining metaphors through reference to ambiguity by claiming 
that in metaphor “we are seldom in doubt that what we have is a metaphor” (33) and 
do not struggle between competing 'meanings' of the word. 
 
5. Metaphor and Allegory (Fletcher, Fineman) 
 
 The author of the most important allegory of the late Middle Ages, Dante, 
provided some conceptualization of the trope. His views on allegory are clearly 
influenced by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, with the latter defining allegorical 
sense in his Summa Theologica as signifying the new law of the New Testament, as a 
prefiguration. The concept, applied by Dante in poetic practice, is analysed 
theoretically in his “Letter to Can Grande della Scala,” where the author admits his 
work to be intended as “polysemous”: literal and allegorical at the same time (121). 
Various figurative, or “mystical” senses are called by the author “allegorical,” “since 
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they are all different from the literal or historical (121).35 Interestingly, Dante notes 
that in his title, comedy “is derived from cosmos”, and is at pains to explain the 
divisions existing in his work: “the form is twofold... treatise and . . . treatment. The 
form of the treatise is threefold . . .” Both the idea of cosmos, and Dante's strict 
structural divisions as characteristic of allegory are later taken up by other 
theoreticians of allegory: Angus Fletcher and Joel Fineman.  
 Angus Fletcher's Allegory (1964), presents what the author intends to be a 
“theoretical” and “non-historical” (1) analysis of the “mode of allegorical fiction” (2). 
Allegory, broadly understood as “say[ing] one thing and mean[ing] another” (2), is 
explained etymologically (stressing the importance of its public nature expressed in 
agoreuein) and traced to Plutarch. Fletcher sees allegory as a “fundamental process of 
encoding . . . speech” that exists across genres. As such it can function equally well in 
verse, drama, fiction, non-fiction, popular genre fiction, religious sermons or political 
pamphlets, poetry (as “extended metaphor” (4)), or as aenigma, a riddle: “the oldest 
allegorical type” (6). It can also function as a motif, as in Zane Grey, where the 
scenery becomes a “paysage moralisé,” description works as a “carrier of thematic 
meaning” (6). The “point” of broadly understood allegory is that it does not need to be 
“read exegetically,” but it “often has a literal level that makes good enough sense all 
by itself” (7). For this reason, one can speak of allegory when the work has a structure 
“that lends itself to a secondary reading, or rather, one that becomes stronger when 
given a secondary meaning as well as a primary meaning” (7). Not every reader of a 
given text need be conscious of its allegorical nature (e.g. political allegories (8)), but, 
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 Allegory is derived from the Greek alleon which is rendered in Latin as alienus (“belonging to 
another”) or diversus (“different”) (121). 
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in agreement with Northrop Frye, Fletcher claims that for a literary critic all literature 
is “more or less allegorical” (8) even if specimens of “pure” allegory cannot be found. 
Even the works famously believed to be allegories (Commedia) would be, for a variety 
of critics (Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Erich Auerbach), “quasi-allegorical” (10). 
Fletcher despairs of the lack of agreement in defining and understanding figurative 
language, but also of the misuse some rhetorical terms are subject to. Thus Goethe's 
distinction between allegory (where one sees “the particular for the general”) and 
symbol (“the general in the particular” (13)) proves to be of historical significance. 
Coleridge's distinction between symbol and allegory, while interesting, is still 
problematic: the understanding of symbolical as synecdoche (untranslatable and 
unconscious) and the allegorical (as translatable, based on metaphor and conscious) 
results in seeing the former as participating in the “idea symbolized” (17-18) and 
allegory as primarily interested in categories and logical order. Coleridge's other 
definition of allegory is eventually used by Fletcher as a starting point for his own 
discussion, where both the psychology of reading and the rhetorical nature of allegory 
are brought together. 
 Beginning with traditional rhetoric of Quintilian and Cicero, where allegory 
was understood as a “sequence of submetaphors which amount in aggregate to one 
single, continued, ‘extended metaphor’” (70), Fletcher continues his discussion with 
William Empson's idea of two distinct levels of being within allegory, and Rosemond 
Tuve's equation of allegory with metaphor (and its “normal relation of concretion to 
abstraction” (71)). For Fletcher, those views are tenable only when “metaphor is 
understood ‘loosely’”: “If metaphor is to be the general name for any and all 
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“transfers” of meaning, it will necessarily include allegory” (71). Fletcher rejects those 
conceptualizations based on the equation of metaphor and allegory. In fact, he sees 
allegory as aiming “at both clarity and obscurity” at the same time, with unreadable 
enigmas as “allegory's most cherished function” (73). While allegories work by 
inviting the recognition of “levels,” “explication, gradual unfolding” in a “sequential” 
manner, what is perhaps important to remember in the characterization of Coetzee's 
fiction is Fletcher's assertion that “most allegories of major importance have ultimately 
very obscure images, and these are a source of their greatness” (73).  
 Another flaw in reducing allegory to metaphor lies, for Fletcher, in the 
confusion as to the understanding of the latter: an often confused term cannot really be 
heuristically productive in explaining another term. While both Cicero and Quintilian 
understand allegory as metaphor, and for Aristotle, allegory would be the fourth type 
of his metaphor, there are various reasons why the equation of metaphor with allegory 
is misguided. The first of these is the criterion of “surprise” (75). For Aristotle, 
metaphor functioned as a “momentary dramatic device” and not as an “organizing 
thematic principle” (77), something that cannot be said either of Commedia or, if one 
chooses to read Coetzee allegorically, of his novels. In his analysis of the “Ship of 
State” poem, Fletcher shows how allegory – generally speaking – “proceed[s] toward 
clarity” and “away from obscurity” and hence, contrary to the Aristotelian formulation, 
they “display the diminishing of metaphoric surprise” (83). Quintilian's distinction into 
trope (“play on single words”) and figure (“on whole groups of words, on sentences 
and . . . paragraphs”) (84) situates allegory in the set of figures, while his discussion of 
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teleologically controlled tropes: synecdoche and metonymy lead Fletcher to conclude 
both may, in turn, be part of allegory (87). 
 Fletcher's analysis of allegory concentrates initially on its epideictic function: it 
is precisely because kosmos36 implies hierarchy that allegory is able to praise, provide 
incitement to action or desire, elevate and degrade, influence the reader “to accept 
given hierarchies” (128). It manipulates ornament to “engage the reader in an 
interpretive activity” (130). While, for a variety of reasons, allegory might have had its 
heyday, Fletcher finds traces of it in popular genre fiction, political pamphlets and 
contemporary culture. The notion of kosmos and ornament that gave rise to the idea of 
propriety seem to operate in contemporary letters as they did in the past, the only 
difference is the “antiauthoritarian shift in status” (140) and the relative importance of 
irony that seems to subvert the notions of cosmos and propriety. Fletcher sees the lack 
of overt allegories in contemporary literature as the result of the work of irony which 
shifted its nature. After Frye, he mentions that literature of the West “shows a steady 
trend “downward” in that it has become increasingly more ironic in tone and point of 
view” (142). Thackeray's novel “without a hero” was one of the first steps in the 
process which later saw Kafka's and Orwell's characters debased and downgraded 
further. On Kafka, the writer whose influence on Coetzee is palpable, Fletcher writes: 
“Kafka's allegory . . . elaborates an imagery which we can call “ornamental” in both 
the strict and the loose sense of the term” (143).  
 An interesting structuralist and psychoanalytical investigation of allegory can 
be found in Joel Fineman's “The Structure of Allegorical Desire” (1980). For Fineman, 
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 Kosmos is treated by Fletcher as one of the oldest terms for ornamental speech. The term itself also 
signifies the world (universe) or hierarchical order.    
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structure itself “presupposes the same system of multiply articulated levels” (46). 
Viewing movement psychoanalytically, Fineman sees similarities between allegory 
and dreamwork (perhaps a reason so many of dream passages in Coetzee seem to 
invite allegory most poignantly), while he also reads psychoanalysis allegorically 
claiming it to be the “critical response to allegory” or “the extension and conclusion of 
the classic allegorical tradition” (46). Both literary criticism and psychoanalysis share 
“the desire . . . of interpretation” (48). Yet allegory is even more akin to 
psychoanalysis: in both desire is based on critical reflection and becomes “both [their] 
theme and a structuring principle” (48). Like psychoanalysis, allegory has “formal 
reciprocity” between its practice and its theory or “its criticism” (48). 
 Fineman notes Plutarch's observation that allegory appears in “critical or 
polemical atmospheres” due to its elusiveness (48) and its “defensively recuperative 
intention” (49) towards authority and hegemonic discourse. He recalls Quintilian's 
traditional formulation of allegory: “what happens when a single metaphor is 
introduced in continuous series” (49), and the resultant view, dominant in the 
Renaissance that saw in allegory a “temporal extension of trope” (50). Classically 
understood allegory would begin with a metaphor articulating a proportion and take it 
further (50).  
 Fineman distinguishes perpendicular allegories (“concerned more with 
structure”) and horizontal ones (“temporal extension”) as well as a blend he presents 
on the example of Canterbury Tales. Openly invoking Jakobson, Fineman sees in 
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allegory “the poetical projection of the metaphoric axis onto the metonymic” (50).37 
Because it does not properly belong to either poetry or prose (51), allegory becomes 
characteristic of language in general. It is “representative of language employed for 
literary ends”, while its basis in synchrony and diachrony makes it embody “the 
definition of linguistic structure . . . developed by Jakobson” (51). Allegory “begins 
with structure,” and employs elements of signification only to “reinforce the 
structurality of that structure” (51). Yet, even though signifiers in allegory seem to 
have no importance in themselves but are “vehicles of a larger structural story which 
they carry but in which they play no part,” they are nevertheless, “ostentatiously 
foregrounded by the very structurality that becomes immanent in them” (52). In this, 
for Fineman, lies the paradox of the structuralist account of allegory, this “most 
didactic and abstract-mongering of poetic figures” (52). In a detailed analysis of 
structural linguistics and its application to Chaucer's work Fineman attempts to find 
out “how allegory begins and why it continues” (59). The answer lies in its structure: 
allegory “initiates and continually revivifies its own desire, a desire born out of its own 
structuring” (59). Allegory, as “continued metaphor” is never “completeable,” and thus 
has affinity with obsessional neurosis and psychoanalysis itself (60).  
 
7. Conceptual Metaphor and Coetzee 
 
An important breakthrough for the study of metaphor came with Lakoff and Johnson's 
Metaphors We Live By (1980), in which the authors presented metaphor as not merely 
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 Where metaphor is defined as “the synchronic system of differences that constitutes the order of 
language (langue)” and metonymy as “the diachronic principle of combination and connection by means 
of which structure is actualized in time in speech (parole)” (50).   
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(or even primarily) a feature of language, but as an inherent part of the conceptual 
system. The conceptual system, in its nature metaphorical, underlies and influences 
human thought (which is metaphorical to a large extent) and might result in 
expressions that are deemed metaphorical in an ordinary sense. In short, “[t]he essence 
of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” 
(5). If concepts are metaphorically structured, so is language, for the use of language is 
based on the metaphorical understanding of concepts. Concepts are highly systematic 
and partially culture-specific. Thus, if Western culture views and understands time in 
terms of limited resource, or argument in terms of battle, that gives rise to a specific 
metaphorical expression. Various metaphors are linked by a relation of entailment, 
which “characterize a coherent system of metaphorical concepts and a corresponding 
coherent system of metaphorical expressions for those concepts” (9).38 Metaphors 
highlight some aspects of a concept and hide another, as “metaphorical structuring . . . 
is partial, not total.” As such, a concept is only “partially structured and . . . can be 
extended in some ways but not others” (13). Every metaphor is structural in the sense 
that a given concept is “metaphorically structured in terms of another” (14). While 
many metaphors are culture-specific (have a social basis), some (orientational 
metaphors) seem to be universal and derive from bodily functioning in the world (have 
a physical basis), although the distinction is, in many cases, difficult to make, and the 
experiential basis for them remains speculative (20).  
 If spatial orientation can be thought to result in orientational metaphors, 
ontological metaphors (“ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as 
                                                 
38
 Thus, as the authors suggest, the metaphor TIME IS MONEY entails a more general metaphor TIME 
IS A LIMITED RESOURCE and TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY (9).  
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entities and substances” (25)), seem to have their source in the experience of one's own 
and others' bodies.39 Translating an abstract quality into an entity in space allows the 
speaking community to “deal rationally” with an experience (26). Lakoff's and 
Johnson's example, the treatment of abstract 'inflation' as an entity, allows us to “refer 
to it, quantify it, identify a particular aspect of it, see it as a cause, act with respect to 
it” and most importantly perhaps, “believe that we understand it” (26), or believe that 
understanding is possible. Ontological metaphors metaphorically structure abstract 
concepts into concrete physical identity (the ubiquity of which becomes unnoticed) 
and most of the time the results of the structuring are taken as “self-evident, direct 
descriptions of . . . phenomena.” Thus, by analysing the metaphors for the mind in the 
English language, Lakoff and Johnson uncover a multitude of ways in which 
conceptualizations of the mind as a machine, container or brittle object are not only 
expressed in metaphorical everyday expressions that are now taken to be almost literal, 
but also how the initial structuring influenced thinking (both everyday as well as 
philosophical and scientific) about the mind. The results of this structuring become “an 
integral part of the model of mind we have” (29).  
 As the authors claim, one of the foundational ontological metaphors is that of 
the container, presumably having as its origin the experience of embodiment: 
We are physical beings, bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the 
surface of our skins, and we experience the rest of the world as outside us. 
Each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation. 
We project our own in-out orientation onto other physical objects that are 
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 The term ontological is misleading here, and Lakoff and Johnson themselves later admit that all 
metaphors are ontological in the sense of creating target-domain entities. I use ontological in the sense 




bounded by surfaces. Thus we also view them as containers with an inside and 
an outside . . . We impose  this orientation on our natural environment as well . 
. . even where there is no natural physical boundary that can be viewed as 
defining a container, we impose boundaries . . . (29)  
 
The basic container metaphor regarding substances, is explained by reference to a 
bathtub, with the tub being a “CONTAINER OBJECT” and the water being 
“CONTAINER SUBSTANCE.” This simple characterization of human 
conceptualization finds, I will argue, a particular literary expression in the work of 
Coetzee. The characters in his novels are driven by an attempt at understanding reality 
(body, language, or land, the latter often identified with the body itself) as a container, 
with a passion for discovering what lies behind its surface or, more pedantically, 
inside: the container substance. This inside / outside, surface / depth dichotomy, 
represented by the container metaphor, seems to be extraordinarily prevalent and fans 
out in all sorts of ways. On the one hand, we have the projection of the container onto 
the human body. The body as container object becomes a container of something 
unspecified: the truth, the essence, the reality within which must be uncovered for the 
full understanding of the other to occur. An offshoot of this is the MIND IS A 
CONTAINER metaphor, which primarily comes into play when characters engage in 
intellectual introspection in addition to their usual pursuits of listening to and trying to 
understand their own bodies and those of others. Language can also be viewed as a 
container: the standard conduit metaphor does indeed imply that language and writing, 
form a  “CONTAINER FOR MEANING” (11) that can be uncovered after entering 
(evoked by recurrent images of digging, diving) and reconstructing the message. Most 
of Coetzee's books employ the container metaphor in a simple way by contrasting 
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language and the body: while the lack of knowledge of the “container substance” 
leaves the theoretical promise of the existence of a given truth intact, misleading 
surface (language) does not. The body itself, by having an outside and an inside, is 
conceptualised with the same metaphor: the physical surface (Joll, Nechaev) is 
contrasted with the presumed “meaning” of the body inside it: the projected true kernel 
of reality and identity. The container metaphor, understanding substances as 
containers, is presented as basic (30). Similarly universal is personification: making 
“sense of phenomena in the world in human terms” (34). I would like to suggest that 
Coetzee's “corporealization” (presenting abstract notions as bodies) achieves the same 
goal of a concrete, and thus more palpable, understanding.  
 Metaphor does not need to be consistent (form a unified image), as long as it is 
coherent. The future and the past, for example, can be conceptualised as preceding or 
following the subject (41-45), but those conceptualizations function as subcategories 
sharing a “major common entailment” (44). Their coherence lies in conceptualising 
time as a moving object. Thus, metaphors are not “defined not in terms of concrete 
images” but rather in terms of “more general categories” (45). What that means for the 
understanding of conceptual metaphor in Coetzee's fiction is that, apart from the 
relative equivalence between body, land, and language, all three of them have outer 
surface and inner container substances.  
 Those unspoken “container substances” share the property of being inside 
something else. The two major metaphors in Coetzee's fiction are BODY IS A 
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CONTAINER and TRUTH IS IN A CONTAINER.40 When Lakoff and Johnson speak 
of metaphorical convergence, they show how the understanding of both time and 
labour as a substance permit viewing the two as almost equal (147). A similar 
convergence forming part of the conceptual system allows for the rough equation here. 
If the body is a container, and truth is in a container, then the truth (however 
understood), might be thought of as residing within the body. Given the systematic 
nature of the motifs, their juxtaposition might yield the BODY IS THE TRUTH, one 
that Coetzee's characters operate according to. As a result, the body can be treated as a 
container object (in which case it shields and hides whatever characters attempt to 
uncover, and in which case its outside form might also be misread and misinterpreted), 
or as a container substance, in which case it can easily be equated with truth and 
contrasted with language. 
 Throughout their analyses, the authors maintain that metaphors “partially 
structure our everyday concepts” and, what follows, that “this structure is reflected in 
our literal language” (46). Among the multitude of examples they offer, many 
naturally could easily be found in Coetzee's novels. Thus many would appear in 
various guises and contexts: IDEAS ARE FOOD (46),41 IDEAS ARE PEOPLE (47),42 
IDEAS ARE PLANTS (47),43 LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE (49),44 SEEING IS 
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 As Lakoff and Johnson show, both language and land are also conceptualised as containers. In 
Coetzee's works the two are often equated with the body. In cases where language is explicitly 
contrasted with the body, I propose to see its outside (surface) form, rather than “deep”, irrecoverable 
meaning, as forming one part of such a contrast: language as container object rather than container 
substance.     
41
 Maximov in conversations with Dostoevsky, Nechaev as an embodied idea, the medical officer on 
Michael K's food.   
42
 Maximov, Nechaev. 
43
 Michael K. 
44
 Dostoevsky's and the Magistrate's references to desired “electric” women.  
 59 
TOUCHING (EYES ARE LIMBS) (50)45 or THE EYES ARE THE CONTAINERS 
FOR THE EMOTIONS and PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL STATES ARE 
ENTITIES WITHIN A PERSON (50) which are extensions of BODY IS A 
CONTAINER and apply to numerous examples: from Friday's and the Barbarian Girl's 
eyes, guilt resulting in cancer in Mrs Curren, etc. Such images in Coetzee’s novels all 
rely on conceptual metaphorical structuring. This dissertation is concerned not with 
tracing such metaphorical images in his fiction but, rather, with investigating how 
Coetzee's meaning (or the invitation to the reconstruction of the meaning accepted by 
his critics) depends upon such metaphors; on how readings and interpretations of the 
texts depend and rely on metaphorical structuring. 
 Lakoff and Johnson consider literary (nonliteral) metaphor or “metaphor” and 
attempt to draw a line between ordinary and “figurative” metaphor. Apart from three 
suggested ways of creating figurative / literary metaphor (53) and “metaphorical 
expressions,” the relative lack of importance attached to literal and figurative 
distinction is symptomatic of their main interest in metaphorical structuring of 
concepts (56) primarily in how a “conceptual system is metaphorically structured” 
(56), that is how one concept is understood through another. A problematic question is 
whether any concept can be understood non-metaphorically, that is, without recourse 
to another concept. A primary candidate might be orientational metaphors: concepts 
directly related to bodily experience (up, down), as well as directly emergent concepts 
of OBJECT, SUBSTANCE, and CONTAINER which can be grounded “by virtue of 
systematic correlates with our experience” (58, emphasis org.). Such concepts are not 
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 Magistrate and the barbarian girl, amputee Paul and his blind lover in Slowman. 
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understood in and through themselves, rather, they seem to arise “from the collection 
of constantly performed motor functions having to do with our erect position relative 
to the gravitational field we live in” (57). While “direct physical experience” (57) is 
never exclusively physical, the authors attempt to understand some metaphorical 
conceptualizations as more basic than others (56-68).46 
 Metonymic relations are more easily accounted for through “experience with 
physical objects” (59). Various synecdoches and metonymies seem so natural that 
even Coetzee's narrators identify characters with their attributes (Joll and his glasses, 
the suit with Pavel, the tongue with Friday etc.). Whether conceptualization is of a 
metaphorical or a metonymic kind the human mind conceptualizes “the nonphysical in 
terms of the physical – that is . . . the less clearly delineated in terms of the more 
clearly delineated” (59), so a physically 'basic' experience need not be conceptualised 
in a basic and simple way. What that suggests is that it is easier to understand a 
metaphorically structured concept (love as war, as collective work of art, as journey 
etc.) than it is for a human mind to deal with abstractions. In what I initially called 
organic (corporeal) metaphor, Coetzee seems to present abstractions as embodied 
qualities of the human organism. Thus the corporeal metaphor – by suggesting that 
land can be treated as a penetrable body, for example – invites the interpretation of the 
images in Coetzee's fictions as allegorical. The abstract, general notions of conquest, 
colonialism, war, or apartheid become conceptualised as concrete and individual 
instances: as sexual desire, impotence, cancer. The treatment of the body in Coetzee's 
                                                 
46
 Some concepts, like causation, are more problematic, and the authors treat them as partly emergent 
and partly metaphorical, with reference to experiential gestalts and various causations as linked through 
a network of family resemblances to its prototype of infantile “direct manipulation” (69-76).    
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novels invites the reader to read the individual body as a sign of the abstract general 
idea, while, at the same time, treating the abstract general notion as resulting from an 
embodied individual. Organic (corporeal) metaphor is thus the “embodiment” of 
abstract notions and the treatment of the body as if its significance and “meaning” 
were more than just literal and contingent. While I am not arguing that Coetzee creates 
allegories of abstract notions, I am interested in how the representation and recurrent 
image of the body might be read as necessarily signifying something more than itself 
when all narrative clues seem to imply its silence, meaning and persistence. 
 Understanding, in the authors' view happens when a human mind 
“superimpose[s] the multidimensional structure of a part of [a] concept . . . upon the 
corresponding structure [of another concept” (81). Thus, conversation can be 
understood as war when “the WAR gestalt fits our perceptions and actions in the 
conversation” (81).47 Thus, directly emergent concepts (categories emerging from 
experience) define gestalts of more complex concepts. The basis of such structuring 
can be participants, parts, stages, linear sequence. Purpose and coherence in 
experiences is achieved when “we can categorize them in terms of gestalts with at least 
these dimensions” (82). While experiential gestalts (emergent from experience) 
structure things and activities to be understood, more complicated “complex gestalts” 
are “structured partially in terms of other gestalts” (85). Many abstract concepts, such 
as love, will always be metaphorically structured, as they are “not clearly delineated in 
our experience in any direct fashion and therefore must be comprehended primarily 
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 Lakoff and Johnson revise their views in their 2003 Afterword claiming that the general concept of a 
“struggle” is experientially more basic than the concept of war, and thus it is more useful for the 
structuring of “conversation” (265).  
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indirectly, via metaphor” (85). All the 'allegorical' concepts in Coetzee's fiction are 
abstract ones: colonialism, history or exclusion. The Magistrate's new understanding of 
humanity and ethics or Mrs Curren's conceptualisations of guilt are such 
concretizations through embodiment. 
 However, metaphoric coherence is always partial. Thus a given concept might 
be understood as journey, war or a container, but each of these structures only a part of 
the concept. Together, however, they might cohere to give understanding of the 
concept (89). Often several metaphors will overlap to some extent, which happens if 
they have “common entailments” (92). Such an overlap provides for coherence, 
although, as has been mentioned, not consistence across metaphors. In other words, 
even if they are all combined, they do not form one complete image. Consistency is 
practically impossible (101): given that one concept can be understood in a variety of 
ways, there is no single structuring that would exhaust all possible understandings of 
it. The role of a metaphor, instead of exhaustive explication, to be a part of a system of 
metaphors. All of them together “serve the complex purpose of characterizing . . . [a 
given] concept . . . in all of its aspects, as we conceive them” (105). What remains for 
the understanding of Coetzee's fiction is that the metaphoric understanding of a 
concept is primarily the notion of metaphorical embodiment, the structuring of “the 
less concrete and inherently vaguer concepts . . . in terms of more concrete concepts, 
which are more clearly delineated in our experience” (112). Understanding in 
Metaphors is primarily based on interactional properties (arising from perception, 
function, motor activity, purpose etc.) and not properties inherent in something in the 
metaphysical sense (122). The perceived properties are not grouped in sets, but rather 
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in “structured gestalts” of categories, where categorization is understood after Rosch in 
terms of relative closeness (family resemblance) to the prototype (123). Concepts are 
not understood and conceptualized in a vacuum but rather by the roles they are known 
to play in experience. At the same time, their open-ended nature requires the use of 
“hedges,” modifiers which can extend or narrow a given category at the same time as 
they define the concept's relationship to the prototypical specimen of a category (123).  
 Lakoff and Johnson have particularly interesting and innovative ideas about 
metaphorical spatialization and the way in which syntactic form can metaphorically 
express meaning – that is, the relation between the “spatialized form of the language 
and the conceptual system” (138). This brings me to the most important issue: the 
creation of meaning (or the cognitive value of the metaphor), meaning in fiction, 
similarity and the notion of truth, all of them related to the question of the analysis of 
Coetzee's fiction.  
 In view of the earlier discussion of what has, for centuries, been taken to be the 
cognitive value, or the lack thereof, of metaphor, Metaphors claims that the role of 
conventional (non-literary) metaphor is to “structure the ordinary conceptual system of 
our culture which is reflected in our everyday language” (139). By comparison, a 
literary metaphor provides a “new understanding of our experience” and thus creates 
“new meaning” (139). Both types are similar in the sense they “provide coherent 
structure, highlighting some things and hiding others” (139), but a new metaphor may 
create new meaning (for example, of the concept 'love') by “highlight[ing] important 
love experiences and mak[ing] them coherent while it masks other love experiences” 
(142). Apart from their attention to structuring and understanding, the authors go as far 
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as to suggest that a new metaphor can create both conceptual and physical reality. 
Although this view finds its fuller expression in Lakoff's later articles and in his Moral 
Politics (1996), the idea of creating a new political metaphor might influence the 
understanding of a given issue. While words (language) themselves do not change 
outside reality, “changes in our conceptual system do change what is real for us and 
affect how we perceive the world and act upon those perceptions” (145-146). Like 
Aristotle, Lakoff and Johnson also view metaphor's cognitive value as the creation of 
similarity. Many similarities that we see in ordinary life stem from the metaphorical 
understanding of our conceptual system (146). Arguing against Davidson’s 
comparison theory, the authors see metaphor as a matter of thought, based on 
similarities (some of which, in turn, may be based upon conventional metaphors) and 
as being able to create new similarities: “The primary function of a metaphor is to 
provide a partial understanding of one kind of experience in terms of another kind of 
experience. This may involve preexisting isolated similarities, the creation of new 
similarities, and more” (154).  
 Lakoff and Johnson presumably have in mind something similar to Moran's 
analysis of the responsibility of a public speaker (who can hide behind the metaphor 
and argue without stating something explicitly) when they analyse President Carter's 
use of war metaphors. The continued use of a given metaphor, according to the 
authors, leads to the acceptance of its entailments as true (157). Thus by a clever use of 
language, its user might alter the conceptual system of receivers, and convert them to a 
way of thinking that would not be accepted if he attempted to argue his case explicitly. 
The truth in such a situation is true “only relative to the reality defined by the 
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metaphor” (158). That is to say that the traditional discussion of the truth or falsity of a 
metaphor seems for the authors misplaced: “In most cases what is at issue is not the 
truth or falsity of a metaphor but the perceptions and inferences that follow from it and 
the actions that are sanctioned by it” (158). Truth is “relative to a conceptual system 
that is defined in large part by metaphor” functioning as a “principal vehicle for 
understanding” (159-160). What follows is that true statements of human 
categorization “do not predicate properties of objects in themselves but rather 
interactional properties that make sense only relative to human functioning” (164). In 
a sense then, it would be pointless to ask if Coetzee presents the body as being the 
container for truth, and the embodiment of reality. What is more important is how his 
obsessive use of the image of (the mutilated) body and representations of the failures 
of his characters to discover the perceived “truth” result in the allegorical readings in 
which Coetzee criticism abounds. When the authors speak of the creation of personal 
metaphors “developed over our lifetimes to make sense of our lives” (269), metaphors 
that underlie both normal functioning and neurosis, Coetzee's position would be 
merely to suggest that his characters develop a personal metaphor to understand the 
abstract “meaning” of their respective situations.  
 Metaphors' rejection of Tarski's and Kripke's definitions of truth prepares the 
ground for a larger project: “the theory of meaning and the theory of truth” based on a 
“theory of human understanding” (184). Here, the authors attempt to situate 
themselves in the philosophical tradition and address some of the authors whose work 
has paved the way for their research. Rejecting both the “myth of objectivism” of 
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Anglo-American analytic philosophy (here they invoke Davidson,48 Frege, Searle and 
Quine among others) (185-226) and the loosely presented “myth of subjectivism” on 
the other.49 Their own work is to be an “experientialist synthesis” (192) of the two 
traditions in aiming to investigate “imaginative rationality” (235). Against Aristotle's 
emphasis on similarity their view on metaphor is based on “cross-domain correlations 
in . . . experience, which give rise to the perceived similarities between the two 
domains within the metaphor” (245). Thus, metaphors do not express any 
metaphysical, objective similarity but use “inference patterns” from one conceptual 
domain to understand and speak about others. In support, the authors invoke research 
in the neural theory of metaphor (254-257), and the blended spaces theory interested in 
“conceptual integration,” namely “how conceptual structures are combined for use in 
particular cases” (261), where blending corresponds to binding in the neural theory of 
metaphor. 
 Lakoff's work on metaphor was applied to literary analysis in More Than Cool 
Reason (1989), co-authored with Mark Turner. Starting from the same conceptual 
basis, the authors claim that the understanding of a literary text does not differ from 
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 In fact the authors do not make much of Davidson's distinction between use and meaning, limiting 
their criticism to the fact that the “objectivist account of truth requires that meaning, too, be objective” 
(201), and stating that he believes that “metaphors are meaningless” (271).  
49
 The authors do not specify who they mean by this term (apart from several references to “the 
Romantic tradition” and to “Wordsworth and Coleridge” (191)). The subjectivist position gets only very 
limited and clearly dismissive treatment. Other authors working in the same tradition would be more 
explicit. For Turner the subjectivist position would be exemplified by Derrida and deconstructive 
criticism whose views are criticised in the Introduction to Death is the Mother of Beauty, originally 
published in 1987 (2000, 10-11). A similar criticism is carried throughout his Reading Minds (1991). It 
is only in the 2003 Afterword that Lakoff and Johnson identitfy “postmodernist thought” as an example 
of subjectivism. Turner and Lakoff and Johnson reject postmodernism on similar grounds: Turner by 
claiming modern linguistics research proves that phonemes do not function as lexemes (what he 
believes is the biggest mistake of “deconstructive criticism” (10)), while Lakoff and Johnson maintain 
that the idea of unanchored, “ungrounded” meaning and seeing meanings as exclusively culturally 
constructed is rejected by all disciplines within cognitive and brain sciences (273-274).    
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the understanding of everyday speech. Literary or figurative reading relies, as does 
everyday speech, on the implicit knowledge of the structure of metaphors in a given 
culture. Many of the commonplace metaphors analysed by Lakoff and Turner are 
plentiful in Coetzee's fiction: the grave as home and motherhood (Magda), life as fluid 
(Michael and Anna repeatedly referred to as dry, Matryona as liquid) the 
understanding of life as bondage etc. Against Davidson's claim that everything is like 
everything else, Lakoff and Turner provide constraints on the creation and functioning 
of metaphors, even simple metaphors such as personifications: “we must find – or 
impose – some correspondence between the ways that a particular agent acts and our 
knowledge of the kinds of events typical of the target domain” (39). While both 
conceptual and literary metaphor stem from the same source, (“the relatively small 
number of basic conceptual metaphors can be combined conceptually and expressed in 
an infinite variety of linguistic expressions” (51)), poets have at their disposal three 
ways of creating “literary” metaphor. Using conceptual metaphor, they can either 
“versify them in automatic ways” or “deploy them masterfully, combining them, 
extending them and crystallizing them in strong images” or they can “step outside the 
ordinary ways we think metaphorically . . . either to offer new modes of metaphorical 
thought or . . . make the use of our conventional basic metaphors less automatic by 
employing them in unusual ways, or otherwise destabilize them and thus reveal their 
inadequacies for making sense of reality” (51-52). While conceptual metaphors are 
often conventionalised to the extent that their metaphoricity goes unnoticed, poetic 
metaphor involves conscious effort. They are “conscious extensions of the ordinary 
conventionalized metaphors” (53) and thus they often derive from “different cognitive 
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resources than the automatic and effortless use of fully conventionalized modes of 
metaphorical expression” (54). Alternatively, an author might work with a 
conventional metaphor (which is “normally automatic and unconscious”) only to 
“manipulate them in unusual ways” (54) by extending or compressing them while 
maintaining the underlying concept that remains everyday and trivial. Thus, they 
conclude that the basic metaphors “are not creations of poets; rather, it is the masterful 
way in which poets extend, compose, and compress them that we find poetic” (54). As 
a result, the difficulty of interpreting poetry stems from basic metaphors being 
presented in a compressed way, which, along with the wilful complexity of 
phonological or syntactical form might render the artifice complex.  
 The only tenable binary dichotomy, in their view, exists between conceptual 
and linguistic metaphors. All the other distinctions between poetic and non-poetic 
remain quantitative as “parameters” along which metaphors may vary (55). One of 
these parameters is “conventionality” (death understood as a departure, for example), 
which applies to metaphors regardless of whether they are understood conceptually or 
linguistically (55). Another is “basicness,” which can be graded: the understanding of 
life as a journey is more basic than understanding of an evening as a patient on an 
operating table50. 
 However, one cannot divide all possible concepts into metaphorical and non-
metaphorical, for “[p]art of a concept's structure can be understood metaphorically, 
using structure imported from another domain, while part may be understood directly, 
that is, without metaphor” (58). We can speak of metaphors (the “profoundly 
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 The latter metaphor is taken from T.S Eliot’s “The Love Song of J.Alfred Prufrock” (Eliot 13).   
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conventionalized conceptual metaphors”) solely when “aspects of one concept, the 
target, are understood in terms of nonmetaphoric aspects of another concept, the 
source.” Thus a metaphor “with the name A IS B is a mapping of part of the structure 
of our knowledge of source domain B onto target domain A” (59). The understanding 
of life as a journey thus depends on our general and rough understanding of journeys 
(B) and mapping it onto the understanding of a less concrete and delineated life (A). 
The mapping occurs between various schemas, or pieces of knowledge structured only 
roughly, in a “skeletal” (61) form with some elements (traveller, route) as necessary, 
with some (vehicles, companions) as contingent and optional, functioning as “slots” 
(61) to be filled in by any particular individual in any particular context: “The 
metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY is thus a mapping of the structure of the JOURNEY 
schema onto the domain of LIFE in such a way as to set up the appropriate 
correspondences between TRAVELER and PERSON LEADING A LIFE, between 
STARTING POINT and BIRTH, and so on” (62). The mapping in question thus 
“create[s] structure in our understanding” for abstract concepts can be viewed in a 
variety of ways, most of them, in fact, “through metaphor” (62). As we have seen, the 
effortlessness and automatic nature of conceptual schemas and conceptual metaphor is 
endowed in their theory with a “persuasive power” over the speaking subject, even if 
this is rarely realised: “To the extent that we use a conceptual schema or a conceptual 
metaphor, we accept its validity”, and, even conversely, “when someone else uses it, 
we are predisposed to accept its validity” (63). The persuasive nature of such 
metaphorical mappings is prevalent in Coetzee's fiction: Mrs Curren's equation of the 
land and the body or cancer with pregnancy, the medical officer's insistent reading of 
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Michael as an element refusing to belong to a system, Magda's drive to have a story 
rather than belong to a story available to her all rely heavily on unconscious mappings. 
Conceptual schemas thus organize knowledge and “constitute cognitive models of 
some aspects of the world, models we use in comprehending our experience and in 
reasoning about it” (65).  
 Lakoff and Turner distinguish generic-level metaphors like EVENTS ARE 
ACTIONS (which lack specificity, have no fixed target or source domains and do not 
possess “fixed lists of entities specified in the mapping” (81)) from specific-level 
metaphors like DEATH IS A DEPARTURE. Whether generic or specific, in each 
instance “the mapping preserves generic-level structure” (83)  
 The difference between image metaphors and image schemas is that the former 
map one image onto another, while the latter are far more generic: they provide 
conceptual structures for mental images and allow spatial reasoning (99). Image 
schemas are active and easily understood as an example of metonymy, where an entire 
schema is evoked by its part (100) or one element in it is evoked by another (101). 
Thus, metonymic mapping occurs within one conceptual domain and any given entity 
making up a schema might stand for the schema as a whole or for another element 
within it (103). Metaphor, on the other hand, occurs between two domains, one 
“understood in terms of the other,” with the “logic of the source domain” being 
mapped onto the logical structure of the target domain (103). Metaphor and metonymy 
are similar in the sense that they are mainly conceptual, they involve mappings; they 
can be more or less conventionalised, and both are “means of extending the linguistic 
resources of a language” (104).  
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 While words evoke schemas in the users' minds, metaphors “map schemas into 
other schemas.” As such, the power of words lies in their ability to “prompt a 
metaphorical understanding,” and invoke conceptual metaphors (106). Metaphor is 
consequently not a “sequence of words,” for in the theory in which metaphor is 
primarily a matter of thought, only “conceptual mappings” across domains can be 
legitimately called metaphors (107). When, by metaphor, one might understand both 
the operation whereby “source domain concepts are mapped onto target-domain 
concepts” and also words which “express such a mapping” (108), a confusion between 
metaphor and metonymy may occur, especially if both these understandings rely on 
the metonymic structure of the term ‘metaphor’ itself (108).51 What needs to be 
maintained is the distinction between “the words in themselves” and “concepts they 
express,” especially in the case of metaphor where words can express more than one 
concept: “the source-domain concept and any metaphorical concepts that it maps onto” 
(108). A similar confusion, according to the authors, arises in literary studies if 
meanings are thought to reside “in the words themselves” (109). In fact, words evoke 
“conceptual schemas beyond part of the schema that the words designates” in other 
words, “words evoke in the mind much more than they strictly designate” (109). If this 
is the case, then the meaning of a literary work, including the “meaning” of the body in 
Coetzee's fiction, resides not so much in the words on the page as in the mind of the 
reader, in the “conceptual content that the words evoke” (109). While meanings, 
                                                 
51
 “The word “metaphor” itself is subject to the metonymy that WORDS STAND FOR THE 
CONCEPTS THEY EXPRESS . . . When the distinction between the words and their conceptual 
content is clear, there is no harm in using this metonymy, which is after all part of the structure of our 
language, and using the term “metaphor” to denote the words that express a conceptual metaphor” 
(108). 
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including literary meanings, are to some extent conventionalised, communicable and 
shared, such meanings also create a limit to what a given text might mean to an 
individual. Hence a work of literature cannot mean “just anything,” but, since 
meaningfulness resides in the mind rather than words, “there is an enormous range of 
possibilities open for reasonable interpretation of a literary work” (109). Within this 
framework, in which all understanding includes active “construal” of meaning, 
“[e]very reading is reading in”: “Even if one sticks to the conventional, shared 
meanings of the words, one will necessarily be evoking all of the knowledge in the 
schemas in which those words are defined. And in using one's natural capacity for 
metaphorical understanding, one will necessarily be engaging in an activity of 
construal” (109). Naturally, various construals differ from one another, and also from 
the intended construal or intention of the author (110). 
 Lakoff and Turner refute one contemporary view of metaphor which they term 
“literal meaning theory” (114). Here, the authors turn to what they call the Grounding 
Hypothesis. The hypothesis in question, used by the authors to show how 
“metaphorical understanding is possible at all” and having as its subject mostly 
concepts (113), is later contrasted with a generalised “literal meaning theory” against 
which the authors argue. Grounding Theory maintains that “many conventional 
concepts” are “semantically autonomous”; however, concepts like this “are not mind-
free” but are “grounded in the patterns of experience that we routinely live”; that 
“source domain of a metaphor is characterized in terms of concepts . . . that are 
semantically autonomous” and that, finally, “metaphorical understanding is grounded 
in semantically autonomous conceptual structure” (113). Naturally, the hypothesis 
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does nor claim that all concepts are metaphorical. The Grounding Theory involves a 
detailed critique of “Literal Meaning Theory,” a bundle of different theories 
characterized as one for the purpose of clarity. Most generally, literal meaning theory 
does not concern itself with concepts, but with language, claiming that “all ordinary, 
conventional language . . . is semantically autonomous, that it forms the basis of 
metaphor, and that metaphor stands outside of it” (114). In other words, the literal 
meaning understanding of metaphor claims that, if an expression in a natural language 
is “conventional and ordinary”, then it must also be “semantically autonomous” and 
“capable of making reference to objective reality” (114). As such, any ordinary 
expression would be literal, and no metaphor could be classified as “literal.” For 
Lakoff and Turner, the literal meaning theory is based on two claims (“Autonomy 
claim” and “Objectivist claim”) both of which are misguided.  
 The former (claiming that all ordinary language is “semantically autonomous” 
(116) is rejected as incapable of explaining “general mappings across conceptual 
domains” (116). What follows is the inability to account for the use of one word 
“across conceptual domains” or for the use of “the same inference patterns across 
conceptual domains” (116). This would not allow to us explain the “conceptual unity” 
of various everyday expressions that treat life as a journey, to account for the frequent 
interpretations of road as life in poetic language, or else to see the unity or similarity in 
both poetic and everyday expressions (116-117). For the authors, their theory of 
conventional metaphor is able to account for a variety of phenomena which remain 
unexplained in literal meaning theory. The most pertinent ones are:    
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how everyday expressions are related by general principles; why the same 
expressions are used in different conceptual domains and why they mean what 
they do; how those general principles can explain the way poetic metaphor is 
understood; and how those principles account for inferences both in ordinary 
everyday expressions and in the novel expressions used by poets (117).           
 
The objectivist claim (the second assumption on which, according to Lakoff and 
Turner, Literal Meaning Theory is based) maintains that the world exists objectively 
and independently of human conceptualization, but also that “conventional expressions 
in a language designate aspects of an objective, mind-free reality.” What follows is the 
belief that any statement “must objectively be either true or false, depending on 
whether the objective world accords with the statement” (117). The Objectivist View 
sees any expression of natural language as “semantically autonomous” and none as 
understood via metaphor (mapping across domains) because it denies any reality to 
mappings (as not existing within objective reality independent of the human mind): “If 
expressions of a language are defined only in terms of mind-free objective reality, then 
metaphors cannot enter into the characterization of the meanings of linguistic 
expressions, since metaphors are not mind-free” (118). The objectivist position is 
dismissed by the authors as failing to see truth and falsity as “relative to conceptual 
frameworks” rather than absolute (118). For them, statements can be meaningful “only 
relative to [their] defining framework” and true or false “relative to the way we 
understand reality given that framework” (118). When conceptual frameworks are 
mind-dependent, language expressions remain “not objective in the technical sense,” 
or “not mind-free” (118). In short, the authors' Grounding Theory differs from Literal 
Meaning Theory in three significant areas. Firstly, it maintains that “some” 
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expressions are semantically autonomous, in contrast to literal theory's universal 
semantic autonomy. Secondly, Grounding Theory does not see semantically 
autonomous expressions as “direct mirror of a mind-free external reality” or providing 
direct reference to an “objective, mind-free reality” but, rather, maintains that 
“semantically autonomous concepts . . . are grounded in . . . patterns of bodily and 
social experience” (119). Lastly, Grounding Theory is concerned more with concepts, 
than with the mere analysis of language.  
 There are various practical consequences, or “spinoffs” (120) of the Literal 
Meaning Theory that relate to our understanding of metaphor. These include what the 
authors term “paraphrase position” (metaphor is meaningful when paraphrased, 120), 
its variant “decoding position” (paraphrase demands decoding into literal language, 
122) and “similarity position” (metaphor's only function is to draw attention to already 
existing similarities, 123). All the various related positions they list are seen as 
unfortunate consequences of contemporary philosophy of language. All of them, the 
authors argue, stem from two approaches: “The Failure-to-Generalize Methodology” 
(which includes both “case-by-case methodology” and “Source-domain-only Error,” 
128) and the prevalence of “The Dead Metaphor Theory” (128-130).  
 To all those various accounts, Lakoff and Turner oppose their own conception 
of metaphor, seeing it as a primarily conceptual and largely unconscious operation 
which forms the basis for both poetic and everyday language (136). In their empirical 
investigations, the authors believe they have shown “general principles” governing 
metaphorical mappings and their relation to linguistic expression. The central point of 
departure in the entire theory revolves around the redefinition of the term itself: 
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We have used the term metaphor to refer to such conceptual mappings because 
they are . . .  responsible for the phenomenon traditionally called metaphor. It is 
the conceptual work that lies behind the language that makes metaphor what it 
is. Metaphorical language is not something special. It is the language that 
conventionally expresses the source-domain concept of conceptual metaphor . . 
. The metaphorical work is being done at the conceptual level. For this reason 
we have used the term metaphor to characterize the conceptual mapping that 
does that work. (138)     
 
Their analysis of William Carlos Williams's “To a Solitary Disciple” sheds light on the 
importance of bodily metaphor, although the authors do not explicitly articulate this 
importance. They are more concerned with global metaphorical structure which, in the 
presentation of the source domain, a reader is “to map onto some target domain of 
larger concerns” (146). While the idea behind global structures overlaps to a great 
extent with that of an organic metaphor (where the source domain is the body), 
specific examples the authors give show how universal, and mechanical such readings 
are. In Williams' poem the outside appearance of the church building (source) 
corresponds, according to the authors, to the target domain, the “essence of religion” 
(148, emphasis original). In the most straightforward way, the pursuit of truths in 
Coetzee's fiction conforms to this very simple mechanics: the body is often suggested 
as not merely the body: it is instead treated as source-domain pointing to some further 
projected revelatory target. More interestingly, most of the conceptual metaphors used 
in the analysis of Williams's poem share “sensory mappings” (142), a reference to the 
body or its functions. Whether this is an inevitable effect of the conceptual grounding 
of metaphorical thinking in body experience is unclear. For my purposes however, it is 
useful to notice that previously unmentioned conceptual metaphors SEEING IS 
TOUCHING (142), and a further pair of IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL / LESS 
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IMPORTANT IS PERIPHERAL (148) can be extrapolated from the ostensibly non-
bodily context of Williams' poem to the bodily world of Coetzee's fiction. The 
touching of the barbarian girl is naturally both an extension of sight, as well as an 
exploration of what sight alone cannot examine. Following in the footsteps of Thomas 
the Apostle, the Magistrate needs to touch after he sees. This touching of the “reality” 
of the body thus has at its heart the attempt to bridge the gap between appearance 
(looking at the girl) and her essence (which will be pondered but not grasped after the 
touching has proved unsatisfactory). The blind girl, on the other hand, never touches 
the Magistrate. Her physical blinding has left her seemingly emotionally devoid of 
interest and speculation. In the Magistrate's attempts to see himself through her eyes, 
he is constantly referred to as a blur on the “periphery” of her vision. His lack of 
centrality in the world of appearances signifies the (assumed) lack of importance of his 
essence: his inability to move the girl. To a smaller extent perhaps, the more generic 
metaphor THE MIND IS A BODY MOVING IN SPACE (158) might point to the 
popularity of the exploration and journey motifs: the identities of Susan Barton, 
Michael K, Jacobus Coetzee or the Magistrate are inextricably linked to their 
experience of journeys undertaken literally or “metaphorically”. In any case, the 
authors' distinction of metaphors into local and global seems crucial, for Coetzee's 
constant references to body experience cause the texts to be understood and interpreted 
as about something more (projected target) than just the body (stated source). In this 
function of metaphor the authors see its significance at the same time as they appear to 
answer the question of metaphor's conceptual value: “Here we find a power of 
metaphor that we have not previously discussed, the power of revelation. This is the 
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power that metaphor has to reveal comprehensive hidden meanings to us, to allow us 
to find meanings beyond the surface, to interpret texts as wholes, and to make sense of 
the patterns of events” (159).  
 While the authors' analysis of the Great Chain of Being deals with issues 
perhaps not significantly connected to the analysis of body image in Coetzee, much in 
the form and structure of the metaphors discussed is relevant to an understanding of 
the conceptual operation of organic metaphor. The Great Chain of Being (and other 
metaphors analysed by the authors) reflect the structure and form of metaphorical 
mappings where “higher-order questions are answered by lower-order-descriptions: the 
human place in the universe in terms of ants on a millstone” (161-162). Proverbs and 
the Great Chain of Being metaphor as a “cultural model” for understanding and 
interpretation (166) hinge on the generic-level metaphor GENERIC IS SPECIFIC. 
This metaphor “maps a single specific-level schema onto an indefinitely large number 
of parallel specific-level schemas that all have the same generic-level structure as the 
source-domain schema” (162). As a generic-level metaphor, this one also has “variable 
source and target domains.” The only restriction on the source and target is the 
requirement that “the source be a specific-level schema and the target be a generic-
level schema.” (162-163). Metaphorical mappings here are not defined by a “fixed list 
of elements” but by a rule that applies to every generic-level metaphor and requires 
that it “preserve the generic-level structure of the target domain, except for what the 
metaphor exists explicitly to change, and import as much generic-level structure of the 
source-domain as is consistent with that first constraint” (163): 
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[T]he constraint on generic-level metaphors becomes, in the case of GENERIC 
IS SPECIFIC, equivalent to requiring that the source and target have the same 
generic-level structure. In other words, GENERIC IS SPECIFIC maps specific-
level schemas onto the generic-level schemas they contain. These are the 
fewest restrictions possible for a metaphorical mapping, resulting in a 
metaphorical mapping of extreme generality. (163)                 
 
Because it is a generic-level metaphor of “extreme generality,” it is “variable;” 
nevertheless, “it guides and constrains the imaginative construction of a range of 
specific-level metaphorical mappings” (165). As a result of that, the GENERIC IS 
SPECIFIC metaphor “allows us to understand a whole category of situations in terms 
of one particular situation” (165). In addition, where the context of an occurrence or an 
event is lacking, understanding can be achieved metaphorically with the help of the 
GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor: “[I]n the absence of any particular specific-level 
target schema, the generic-level schema of the source domain counts as an acceptable 
target. That generic-level schema can fit a range of possible specific-level target 
schemas” (165). Thus, in the absence of context, “we can muse over a range of 
particular situations to which it applies” (165). The metaphor, in this framework works 
and means what it means by “evocation of . . . schema, the choice of which aspects of 
the schema are relevant, the picking out of the generic-level structure of those aspects 
of the schema, and the preservation of that structure” (178).  
 Lakoff and Turner's analysis shows how a specific-level schema that 
characterizes something includes “the structure of a generic-level schema” (for 
example, specific blindness and general incapacity, 180) in accordance with the 
GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor. The common knowledge nature of the Chain of 
Being metaphor allows for further mappings, ones that also apply to the analysis of 
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literature. This is how the authors link the two conceptual metaphors in the analysis of 
“Blind blames the ditch” and “Burned lips on broth now blows on cold water”: 
of course, we can additionally use the rest of the conceptual complex of the 
GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, along with GENERIC IS SPECIFIC to 
understand . . . We may understand that higher-order incapacities (such as 
mental incapacities, like prejudice, ignorance, failure to understand, and so on) 
are to be understood in terms  of the lower-order incapacity of physical 
perceptual blindness. And we may understand that higher-order trauma and 
habit (such as a painful emotional experience and consequent habitual ways of 
dealing with emotional relationships) are to be understood in terms of the 
lower-order physical trauma of being burned and the lower-order physical habit 
of blowing on food. (180-181) 
 
The same understanding which links the commonsensical cultural influence of the 
General Chain of Being metaphor with the GENERAL IS SPECIFIC metaphor might 
easily be applied to the representation of the body in Coetzee's fiction. While many 
metaphors presented in this dissertation are of a more specific – and more restricted – 
nature, the overall organic metaphor (seeing the body as indicative of abstract 
questions) presents us with the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor. Repeated images 
of bodily trauma seem to invite interpretations and understandings of higher-order, 
non-bodily, or allegorical nature. Thus rape or sexuality (Disgrace, Dusklands) are 
easily seen as political conquest and exploitation; illness, pregnancy and death (In the 
Heart of the Country) are seen as the disintegration of the regime, shame, and a 
monstrous political progeny of the initial rape; repeated references to blindness 
(Waiting for the Barbarians) can be seen as a failure to understand (Magistrate), or 
lack of interest and insight (the Girl's peripheral vision), or moral and ethical blindness 
(Joll). The motive of muteness (Michael K, Foe) calls for the presence of interpreters, 
with their belief in the existence of a message that can be truthfully interpreted, and the 
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product of their efforts: the translation or mistranslation of what often remains just 
their own projections on dumb and silent reality.  
 Organic metaphor is precisely such representation and emphasis on the body 
which, in its overdetermined nature, invites the interpretation of lower-order fictional 
events in a higher-order (more abstract) way. It uses the GENERAL IS SPECIFIC 
metaphor to suggest to the reader that a specific instance of suffering has a bearing on 
a universal plane, and invites the reader to see the generality of issues it raises through 
the individual. The “meaning” of the body may lie in the abstract domains of ethics, 
language, or history, while the “meaning” of an abstract concept can only be 
apprehended in a singular existence – the suffering of an individual body.  
 More than Cool Reason is a further development of the conceptual metaphor 
theory, an extrapolation of earlier ideas in relation to larger-scale narratives and the 
Great Chain metaphor, as well as a more focused criticism of other accounts of 
metaphor.52 Indeed, after laying the expository foundations, the authors proceed to 
refuting positions which were only indirectly criticised before. Of particular 
importance is the authors' rejection of Davidson's claim that everything is like 
everything else. Against this reduction, the authors posit that mapping needs to 
preserve “the general shape of the event” including causal links (200). Not everything 
can be mapped onto everything else. As an example the authors analyse death 
understood as the workings of a magician where the “shape of the event” is preserved 
(200):  
                                                 
52
 The reliance of the ecology movement on the hierarchical Great Chain Metaphor overlaps here with 
the argument of John in Elizabeth Costello. The reliance in question makes it counter-intuitive to argue 
for the preservation of given species of animals as hierarchically less precious than others (212-213).   
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The magician causes the disappearance, and therefore, the magician must map 
onto what causes the death. Magician cannot, for example, be mapped onto the 
biological expiration of the dying person. The magician cannot be the dying 
person's last breath . . . the way a terminally ill patient looks. None of these 
mappings preserves the general shape of the event, including the causal 
connections. (200)   
 
Another constraint is the Maxim of Quantity which normally requires us to see 
“highest-level attributes of the source of target domains” (200). In this way, calling a 
banker a shark does not suggest their skin colour or a passion for water sports, but the 
highest-level attribute in a shark (instinctive behaviour) as pertinent to metaphoric 
understanding. Thus the authors reject the arbitrariness which Similarity Theory sees 
in “trivial” metaphorical comparisons: “Though generic-level metaphors permit a wide 
range of inventive interpretations, those interpretations are by no means arbitrary. 
They must fit the overall system of constraints imposed by the nature of metaphorical 
mappings” (201). Another challenge to Similarity Theory is the insistence on the idea 
that metaphor is not a linguistic expression but a cognitive operation of a tripartite 
structure that further constrains it: “It is a mapping from one conceptual domain to 
another, and as such it has a three-part structure: two endpoints (the source and target 
schemas) and a bridge between them (the detailed mapping). Such structures are 
highly constrained. It is not the case that anything can be anything” (203). 
 The rejection of Nietzsche as the extreme contradiction of the views on 
metaphor in analytic philosophy is coupled by the rejection of deconstruction which 
begins Turner's “Death is the Mother of Beauty” (2000). Metaphor as “fundamental 
mode of cognition” having consequences in both “thought and action” (9) is 
contrasted with criticism of the view of the unanchored nature of language. Turner 
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presents the untenability of extrapolating de Saussure's treatment of phonemes on 
lexemes, and describes the more basic assumption of the lack of grounding of the 
phonemic system and the resulting free play of signifiers as “discredited by modern 
linguistic research” (11). The existence of various readings does not, according to the 
author, mean that texts are “free to slip without constraint.” Indeed, all readings would 
be constrained by “modes of cognition”: “deconstructive criticism, like most literary 
criticism, is in the dangerous position of potentially pinning its analyses on potentially 
mistaken presuppositions about thought, knowledge, and language” (12). The rejection 
of one wing of the debate is coupled by the rejection of the other. The Aristotelian 
definition of metaphor fails, the author claims, presenting metaphor as an “expression 
of similarity” which does not “impose structure” but instead relies “on previous 
structure and do[es] no more than highlight, filter, or select aspects of that given 
structure.” (18). This definition is rejected on account of its own metaphorical 
character (18) and because it says nothing about what, for Turner, constitutes true 
metaphor: “a way of seeing one conceptual domain in terms of another conceptual 
domain” (19). Thus, in his own sentence, Turner employs the UNDERSTANDING IS 
SEEING metaphor, analyses the structure of seeing and the structure of understanding 
and sees in them not “a relationship between two words . . . or concepts” but “a 
relationship between two conceptual domains . . . with a highly articulated structure” 
(19). What this metaphor does is to “impose on the concept of understanding the 
structure that we have for vision” even though, scientifically, vision and understanding 
do not seem to have common properties (19). The emphasis on properties in Aristotle's 
definition of metaphor is then a basic metaphor (albeit with no fixed source and target 
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domains) and “can be expressed as a thing is what it has salient properties of” and 
can be reduced to a variety of other metaphors with fixed target and source domains: 
“England is my mother” as an example of “a nation is a person” (20, bold org).53 
Aristotle's metaphors do not explain how various metaphorical understandings can be 
deemed creative, and do not explain orientational metaphors which are clearly not 
based on shared properties (MORE IS UP, for example, 21).  
 This introductory discussion of Aristotle is used to prepare the ground for the 
major theme of the book, metaphors of kinship in literature. First, however, Turner 
discusses two “general conceptual processes” that aid the production and 
understanding of such metaphors (21). These are “metonymy of associations” and the 
general and basic metaphor “properties are persons,” and they deserve closer 
attention as underlying the conceptual work necessary for my reading of the body in 
the fiction of Coetzee. The first, metonymy of associations, is defined as a “cognitive 
process wherein one thing closely related to another in a single conceptual domain is 
used to stand for that other thing” (21). Often, metonymy depends on “conventional 
cultural associations” (22). For example, the Magistrate's disbelief that Joll can see 
with his glasses can suggest metaphorical blindness. The second is personification of 
properties. Its ubiquity stems from the fact that abstract notions are easier made sense 
of when treated as people (22). The most common of personifications is “an abstract 
property is a person whose salient characteristics is that property” (22). What 
makes the personification possible is the interaction between metaphor and metonymy 
whereby “[i]f A stands for B and B is C metaphorically, then A stands for C” (22). If 
                                                 
53
 The last metaphor is pertinent to the understanding of the nation as a person in the Age of Iron or 
colonialism and war in Dusklands. 
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dark glasses stand for a blind person, and blindness can be seen metaphorically as 
moral blindness, evil or indifference, then Joll's glasses may stand for moral blindness. 
If Michael K's escaping from camps is a sign of bodily freedom and lack of physical 
constraint and the lack of constraint can signify metaphorical lack of coercion, then 
Michael K may become a symbol, a “metaphor” of freedom. If the land is viewed as a 
(female) body, then its conquest can be seen in sexual terms as a masculine endeavour 
that is both military / political as it is sexual: both Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee 
obsess about their masculinity and their sexual prowess, both of them feel more 
masculine praising the weapons of destruction as confirmation of their manhood, 
where the gun can stand metonymically for a penis, and where the conquest of the land 
is metonymically associated with rape. If cancer of a female body is its destruction, 
slow disintegration, as well as the unwanted product of this body, and each of those 
could be understood metaphorically, then the equation which Age of Iron suggests 
between the death of the body, the end of apartheid, or the moral collapse of the 
colonial project, the parallels between estrangement from her progeny (daughter) and 
giving “birth” to a devouring disease becomes clearer. More generally, if the soul is 
traditionally thought to be located within the body, and culturally, shields what is 
specific and most important about each individual person, then the discovery of this 
kernel must involve some sort of piercing, entering, penetrating beneath the surface, 
deciphering and interpreting: in torture, in sex, in writing or, supernaturally, in 
possession.  
 One of the issues raised by Turner in his discussion of kinship metaphors is the 
basic kinship metaphor (“an abstract property is the parent of something having 
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that property” (23)), and the application of that metaphor to language (“language, 
mother of thought” (56)) specifically regarding property transfer, inheritance, 
causation, and lineage. It has to be stressed here that the preoccupation with the body 
makes Coetzee's characters unavoidably gendered beings. Unlike protagonists who 
could be of either gender without serious narrative consequences (Kafka's K, for 
instance), much of what Coetzee's characters experience (perhaps with the exception 
of the Medical Officer) derives from their bodily embodiment as male or female: the 
experience of rape, pregnancy, motherhood, impotence, desire for a female body etc. 
At the same time, sexual difference is coupled with language difference. A 
differentiation into male and female modes of speech is emphasized in Mrs Curren's 
motherly speech (variously described as flowing from her maternal body) or in  
masculine competition, lineage, and inheritance as in the case of Pavel and 
Dostoyevsky, or in Susan Barton's striving to express female experience on her own 
terms, competing with Foe in the area of masculine story-telling as continually 
contrasting with feminine voice. In his analysis of various kinship metaphors, Turner 
concentrates on ascribing gender to language. Mother tongue (Mrs Curren's letter, 
Magda's striving for the motherly language she forgot) emphasizes “biological 
generation and nurturing” as feminine traits (53). On the other hand, masculine speech 
is less obviously embodied: “where beliefs or principles are abstract and rational, 
particularly in cases of philosophy and politics, mothers are not mentioned” (53). A 
good example of the exclusion of a woman from male discourse is the political and 
quasi-philosophical world of Eugene Dawn: his striving to have his writing (and, by 
extension, himself) accepted by his male superior as rational is coupled with his 
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rejection of his wife, her women’s magazines and pop psychology. Similarly, religious 
beliefs in possession and artistic genius, even though they are clearly irrational, are, in 
Dostoevsky's case, a masculine affair, here played out in Freudian terms as 
competition with the son for the same woman. According to Turner the personification 
of an abstract quality “leads to understand [this quality] in terms of its purposes, goals, 
desires and intentions” (53). Whether it is colonialism, evil, exclusion or history, the 
concrete body of a character in the novel may stand as the easily identifiable 
embodiment of an idea, quality or abstract notion. This becomes more striking if we 
consider Coetzee's novels to be primarily about failures to understand, and about the 
limits of rationality, conceptual and linguistic expression. In that case the mystery 
which the character attempts to solve is typically identified as existing within the 
female body.54 The case of the Magistrate is perhaps the most poignant here with his 
masculine and rational attempts as a legal and administrative representative of the 
empire at endowing bodies with significance. Such failures in understanding, Turner 
claims, are indeed often feminised in language expression: where clarity and 
rationality is viewed as male, confusion and the failure of the rational mind take place 
in the understanding of the blurred “female” system: 
when this calculus of human intention and decision does not work, does not 
predict the system, when the system is too complex, or when we can ascribe to 
the system human traits but no particular motivation for having them – in sum, 
when the system behaves more like a human than like a consistent and reduced 
model of a human -, the personification almost always feminizes the system. 
This fits connotations  given to femininity of mysteriousness, of deep, 
                                                 
54
 There are exceptions to the rule of course: Susan Barton's attempt to solve Friday's mystery, or Mrs 
Curren's attempt to read Vercueil. Both attempts here however, rely on a de-gendering of the subject: 
the suggestion that Friday is castrated, and that Vercueil is an infertile virgin. Michael K is often treated 
like a child.   
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unknowable, non-reducible inner workings, of holistic and emergent properties, 
of alternatives  to the calculus of rationality. Whatever the anthropology behind 
these connotations - from the biological marvel of death to the role of women 
in religions – kinship metaphor reflects it consistently (53-54). 
 
Susan's failure to solve Friday's mystery can be seen as synonymous with his loss of 
“masculine” identity. One can, like Foe, either accept Friday as irrational and childish 
and write him into De Foe's story as Man Friday, or, like Susan, fail in striving to 
achieve the “bodily language” or express the speaking body that the last pages of the 
novel gesture at. In the course of the novel, his status as Man Friday becomes 
diminished through the suggestion of his castration, representing him as an unruly 
child, with the consequent dropping of “Man” from his name.  
 The already mentioned emphasis on the gendered nature of the body comes 
into focus in the representation of kinship. Kinship relations naturally are defined 
along gender lines, where fatherhood (Michael K, Dostoevsky, Eugene, David Lurie, 
Paul Rayment) forms an important part of human experience sharply contrasted in its 
uniqueness with the experience of motherhood (Mrs Curren, Susan, Magda). While 
this division would not in itself be of particular interest apart from highlighting 
gendered bodily experience further, it becomes vital when seen in parallel with the 
gendering of language. Where Mrs Curren imagines her letter as a motherly gift 
springing from her loving body and contrasts this love-filled medium with hate-filled 
official state propaganda – and where both Susan and Magda strive to express 
themselves in feminine language while feeling trapped in masculine discourse – men 
in Coetzee's fiction pursue masculine expression (Eugene). Coetzee thus typically 
presents the attempts (and often failures) to speak in the “masculine” discourse those 
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male characters actively embrace: the language of rationality and dispassion (Eugene, 
Officer), the language of authority bestowed by law, politics, theoretical ethics or 
artistic craft (Magistrate, Joll, Dostoevsky).  
 Each of the kinship metaphors analysed by Turner has cultural connotations or 
“stereotypical pictures of gender distinctions” (51) which also apply to the gendering 
of the language as the expression of gendered embodiment in Coetzee's novels. On the 
one hand then, “females are characterized by the distinctions between high and low, 
standing for ideals or deviousness, for angels in white or daughters of the devil” (51) 
as can be exemplified by the dichotomy that exists between the angelic Anna and the 
possessed Matryona. They and their speech often suggests their “remov[al] . . . from 
society,” being “manipulated and manipulating” (51). The typical male “decoder” of 
the novels (the Magistrate, David Lurie, Paul Rayment) decodes, typically, female 
mysteriousness. As Turner notes, “[m]ystical concepts and systems regarded as having 
deep, unknowable, non-reducible inner workings are almost always female rather than 
male” (51). On the other hand, in the cases of Nechaev or Jacobus one can see 
examples of masculine speech. As Turner suggests, “[s]trength and power and strong, 
active evil are typically masculine” (51). A similar craving for strength and recognition 
on the part of Eugene Dawn stems from his fascination with male superiors where the 
father-like figure “connote[s] stateliness and abstraction” yet lacks the “nurturing 
states” (51) of the mother. Fathers and fatherly authority figures (Dostoevsky, Cruso, 
Foe, Eugene's superior, Magda's father) lack the nurturing quality: theirs is the 
stereotypical patriarchal role of guardians of the language, the symbolic order and the 
law. Children are endowed with “rights by inheritance” and often “inherit beliefs,” but 
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they also “can mean “lesser cohorts” as in “children of the devil”” (Pavel, Maryona). 
Magda, as a daughter, fulfils her stereotypical role both in body and language by her 
“submissiveness and dependency . . . passivity and inaction” and cannot be termed “an 
individuated socially active agent” (52).55 A son, like Pavel, while more active than 
Magda, is endowed with “activity and strength,” but is stereotypically described as 
brother to Nechaev, whose views his shares (“When beliefs are shared, it is brothers 
who share them” (52). These cultural associations of kinship relate to the language in 
which characters speak (or are spoken about by other characters), the ways they view 
their own speech (as masculine or feminine, anti-patriarchal, fatherly or motherly), the 
way their language and body -- shaped by gender and kinship -- situate them in 
narrative. 
 Turner's book is a further development of both the theory and the application of 
the conceptual metaphor theory to the field of literature. In examining how cognitive 
models can underlie utterances, he attempts to “locate the metaphoric inference 
patterns of kinship terms” (69). His analysis of Paradise Lost, for example, analyses 
mappings between “the target domain of theology and the source domain of kinship” 
(83) showing how kinship metaphors can “create, structure, examine and unpack 
components of Christianity” (89), or more generally, “cast[] meaning upon a domain” 
to be understood (91). In that way he applies practically the theoretical notion of 
cognitive models as creating understanding (110). If for Lakoff, causation was a 
                                                 
55
 This is not to say that such stereotypical connotations are reflected in the novels. Indeed, some 
characters (Susan) actively rebel against their bodily and language determined position. The revolt of 
others (Lurie's daughter Lucy) is so significant it functions as the major mystery-theme of the novel.  
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concept that was partly emergent and partly metaphorical, Turner suggests seeing it in 
terms of progeneration:  
the characteristics of causation is progeneration match the characteristics of 
the otherwise unaccounted-for causal statements. It is natural to conclude 
therefore that we understand these otherwise unaccounted-for causal statements 
by virtue of the conceptual metaphor causation is progeneration (129).  
 
This metaphor is, for Turner, the “basic model of causation” (148), and is prominently 
employed in the analysis of literary works where causal relations are metaphorically 
depicted as kinship relations. However, Turner then distinguishes between creative 
metaphor which requires us to “re-conceive . . . the target domain” and thus “create 
meaning” and non-creative metaphor which asks us to “locate features or structures 
already shared in our conceptual models of the source and target domains” and thus 
does not require us to “revise our mental conceptions” (155).  
 What makes Turner's work useful in the context of the analysis of Coetzee's 
fiction is the explanation of the mental process involved in the understanding of 
creative metaphors. Why, in other words, can readers and professional critics reach 
conclusions that “land” might be thought of as the body, the body as a container for the 
truth, truth as the entity within a container, the body as speaking and endowed with 
language, spoken language as divorced from the body, scars as texts and so on? And 
what about the painfully stereotypical gender and kinship connotations analysed 
above? Turner's explanation of the mental process of creating similarities provides a 
model for the explanation of why certain (specific and contingent) motifs and events in 
Coetzee's fiction might be thought to have certain, more generalised (explanatory, 
allegorical) meanings. The notion of stereotypical cultural connotations comes into 
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play at this point. In the absence of context that might lead our understanding, the 
reader or listener begins by seeking “to match the two concepts involved in a metaphor 
noncreatively by comparing the stereotypical behaviors of the two concepts” (156). 
While behaviour is defined as “how a thing operates,” it is a useful term that implicitly 
indicates the ubiquity of personification. Most nouns and substantives are “cognitively 
represented, prototypically, as behaviors” of agents. Sleep then, is presented as 
“behavior of a sleeping thing” and humility as “the behavior of a humble person” 
(156). For Turner, the initial procedure is the matching of “stereotypical behaviors,” 
each endowed with “stereotypical components” (states of being, actions, relations). 
The “matching of behaviors” consists in comparing “the values of stereotypical 
components” (156). As an example Turner presents a kinship relation between music 
and poetry: “since music gives a sequence of notes affecting minds through aural sense 
and poetry gives a sequence of words affecting minds through the aural sense, their 
stereotypical behaviors match but for the value of component “material,” that is sounds 
vs. word. By performing this match, we understand “Music is twin-sister to poetry”” 
(156).  Similarity can thus be understood as “matching behavior” (157). Thus sleep 
and death might be deemed to be siblings as they share similarities in the lack of 
activity and lack of consciousness in the behaviour of the body. The data achieved in 
Turner's analysis of metaphors suggests that readers “seek[] to determine whether the 
behavior implied for the non-behavioral term is . . . possible and fitting” (157) 
However, readers typically map “the behavior onto a non-behavioral concept” (157). 
In other words, the allegorising impulse most often leads to personification in cases 
where concepts (language, truth, history, race) are not embodied.  
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 Another matter of importance is the fact that “in general” (and this would also 
hold true for the narrative world of Coetzee), “implication is from the more specific 
concept to the less specific concept” (157). In a sense then Coetzee's organic metaphor 
can be explained by reference to one two-way process. The “abstract” notions and 
“meanings” of his fiction (as analysed by critics) stem from the “more specific” and 
more concrete subject matter: the obsessively recurring motif of the body and 
experience of embodiment. Then, by repeatedly suggesting (or, more precisely, by 
endowing his characters with the belief in) the existence of another, less concrete 
aspect of existence, Coetzee leads the reader to move from body into the more abstract 
and general notions which preoccupy critics of his fiction. At the same time, Coetzee's 
representation of those abstract notions (if he indeed represents them) can be traced to 
his representation of embodiment and his characters’ obsessive attempts and failures to 
understand their bodies and grasp their projected significance. Once again, therefore, 
one sees the movement from the specific to the universal: while the universal is 
“presented” in the example of the individual and the contingent, this individual and 
contingent experience, in its mysteriousness and vagueness, is suggestively implying a 
more general and abstract “meaning.” This meaning is naturally pursued by the 
decoding characters craving understanding, but is also to be found in the secondary 
literature where Coetzee is not normally read as a chronicler of the body (ageing, 
sexuality, disease, rape) but as an author concerned with the more general abstract 
notions of history, language, justice, literature, racial and sexual difference, 
colonialism and others.  
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 Turner explains in detail how matchings of non-behavioural concepts are at all 
possible by references to “idealised cognitive models” (158) whereby two concepts 
stand in five different relationships to one another. He analyses “ten major conceptual 
metaphoric inference patterns” (164). The analysis of these greatly exceeds the scope 
of this section. By way of conclusion, therefore, it would perhaps be sufficient to say 
that his work explicitly argues against what he believes to be the dominant trends in 
literary scholarship. He rejects meaning as unanchored and argues for its constrained 
nature by referring the reader to contemporary linguistics and cognitive science 
research. Among other things, he mentions and provides a bibliography for the 
“perceptual and motor basis of basic level categorization,” the “biological basis of 
semantic categorization,” research in word definition “relative to frames,” the “image 
structure in semantics,” the “cognitive constraints on historical semantic change” or 
the “physical and experiential constraints on metaphor” (167). All of these are used as 
a basis for the rejection of Derrida's views on language and signification, which forms 
the point of departure of Turner's work. It should be stressed, however, that Turner is 
not uncritical of certain strands of cognitive linguistics as well. Thus he disagrees with 
Lakoff, for example, on the origins of causation as direct manipulation, while he also 
admits that much more research is needed in order to establish the validity of certain 
philosophical assumptions (such as determinism). The importance and relevance of his 
work for the analysis of Coetzee lie rather in the fact that it takes conceptual metaphor 
considerations further. Where More than Cool Reason attempted to put theoretical 
insights from Metaphors We Live By into practice by applying them to poetic 
metaphor, and the common understanding of relations in the Great Chain Metaphor, 
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Death is the Mother of Beauty moves even further in this practical direction by 
investigating larger-scale poetic works and the causal links used to understand them.  
 How, however, can one move from the understanding of causal links presented 
as moving from one image as another to the understanding of stories as other stories? 
How can we see in the story of sexual frustration the story of colonialism? To answer 
this question one needs to think of metaphor not as a static image, but as a dynamic 
story. The theoretical basis of such an extrapolation is provided by Turner's The 
Literary Mind (1996) in which metaphorical mappings are extended onto the redefined 
notion of “parable”. Turner sees narrative as a “basic principle of mind” whose 
“mental scope” is normally “magnified by projection – one story helps us make sense 
of another” (V). Parable, in this theory, is a basic cognitive operation of the “projection 
of one story onto another” (V). The process of projecting, or using projection to 
understand and reason, can be referred to as “narrative imagining” used in any 
imagining, prediction, explaining or planning (4-5). Understanding events as stories is 
a “literary” capacity which is at work in everyday experience. For Turner, this is “the 
first way in which the mind is essentially literary” (5). Next comes the projection “of 
one story onto another” which, while it seems at first sight “literary,” is also “a 
fundamental instrument of the mind. Rational capacities depend upon it.” It is a 
“literary capacity indispensable to human cognition” (5). Parable, as a literary genre, 
“combines both story and projection,” and, by this means, “condense[s]” meanings 
into “small space” (5). The understanding of the workings of parable is, for Turner, 
understanding the “root capacities of the everyday mind” (5). Narrative imagining is 
then a basic ability to emplot events and understand action, causation and agents as 
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elements of a story. It is “the understanding of a complex of objects, events and actors 
as organized by our knowledge of story.” Parable then combines this primary capacity 
with projection whereby “one story is projected onto another.” The understanding of 
parables involves no special talents or abilities, but stems from this everyday capacity 
of the human mind: the “evolution of the genre of parable” itself is “neither accidental 
nor exclusively literary: it follows inevitably from the nature of our conceptual 
systems” (5).  
 Where Lakoff redefined metaphor both as a cognitive mechanism and the 
product of this mechanism, Turner redefines parable as primarily a mental process 
structuring understanding. Literary parable then becomes “one artifact of the mental 
process of parable” (5). Parable is akin to metaphor in the sense that in order to 
understand a “target story” (target domain) we need a “source story” (source domain). 
Then “we project the overt source story onto a covert target story,” just as with 
conceptual metaphor, in an unconscious and automatic way. Any vagueness can only 
be understood when emploted, made concrete: we project it “onto an abstract story that 
might cover a great range of specific target stories and muse over the possible targets 
to which it might apply” (6).  
 In this mechanism lies the key to understanding how Coetzee's criticism is so 
concerned with the “allegories” he presents. In the face of the vagueness, liminality 
and unresolved conflicts in his fiction, the reader projects the stories in his novels onto 
other stories which might make the work “understandable.” That procedure seems 
almost inescapable. As Turner claims: 
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Even stories exceptionally specific in their setting, character, and dialogue 
submit to projection. Often a short story will contain no overt mark that it 
stands for anything but what it purports to represent, and yet we will interpret it 
as projecting to a much larger abstract narrative, and one that applies to our 
own specific lives, however far our lives are removed from the detail of the 
story. Such an emblematic story, however unyieldingly specific in its 
references, can seem pregnant with general meaning. (7) 
                                            
If a story of South Africa can be the story of a body, and the story of rape can function 
as the story of South Africa, one is understood by projection onto another. In those 
cases where the story is removed from direct relationship with the outside world (Foe) 
it is normally understood as representing something abstract in the outside world such 
as problems of language, gender, or colonialism. What is important, is that parable is 
seen not as an “inventive literary story, a subcategory . . . of fiction;” instead, it means 
“the projection of story” (7): “Parable, defined in this way, refers to a general and 
indispensable instrument of everyday thought that shows up everywhere, from telling 
time to reading Proust” (7). Indeed, Turner analyses the “patterns” and processes of 
parable and comes up with a list of characteristic qualities of a parable. These are: 
prediction, evaluation, planning, explanation, objects and events, actors, stories, 
projection, metonymy, emblem, image schemas, counterparts in imaginative domains, 
conceptual blending and language (9-11).  
 Where metaphorical thinking underlies metaphorical language expressions 
(everyday or literary), the mind constructs stories and projects them on other stories as 
part of its essential mental activity. Thus one can notice that, similarly, “the same basic 
mechanisms of parable underlie a great range of examples, from the everyday to the 
literary” (13). The basic “stories” then are spatial stories: “small stories of events in 
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space” (13). Once created, such stories can be projected “parabolically” onto others 
(15). They are created with the use of “image schemas,” the “skeletal patterns that 
recur in . . . sensory and motor experience” (16). One of the most common and basic 
ones, relevant for my considerations, is the image schema of a container. Two “most 
important” containers in human life are heads and bodies (16). According to Turner, 
simple schemas can be formed into complex image schemas. They are used to 
“structure . . . experience,” to “recognize objects and events and place them in 
categories” and naturally are the product of interaction with and perception of the 
outside world (16). Parable involves the projection of image schemas where “the 
(relevant) image schemas of source and target end up aligned in certain ways,” or, in 
other words, one image schema is mapped onto another (17). In such a way, for 
example, one can map part-whole relationships in the source onto the part-whole 
relationships in the target. The projection does not result in the “conflict of image 
schemas” but carries the structure of the source onto the target (17). It is therefore 
possible to map from the spatial onto temporal, for example. Indeed, Turner suggests 
that “[a]bstract reasoning appears to be possible in large part because we project 
image-schematic structure from spatial concepts onto abstract concepts” (18). As an 
example of such abstract parabolic mapping Turner presents the verb to force: it is an 
example of how “social and psychological causation are understood by projection from 
bodily causation that involves physical forces” (18).  
 A recognition of basic spatial stories would not be complete if the mind did not 
recognize categories to which both objects and events belong and if they were not 
related by being “structured by the same image schema” (19). Such stories can then be 
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recognized and the appropriate behavioural response selected. “Narrative imagining” is 
therefore the “fundamental form” of predicting, evaluating, planning and explaining 
(20).  
 Crucial for the understanding of Coetzee's work is the tendency of the human 
mind to ascribe animacy and agency to inanimate objects (20), even if scientifically or 
philosophically the projection of self-movement, sensation, causality or intention 
might be untenable. Turner's analysis of Aristotle's concept of the soul is interesting 
here, for his survey of various traditions “testifies to the antiquity and durability of 
recognizing actors as movers and sensors”:  
This abstract concept of the soul is created by a parabolic projection. We know 
a small spatial story in which an actor moves a physical object; we project this 
story onto the story of the movement of the body. The object projects to the 
body and the actor projects to the soul. In this way, parable creates the concept 
of the soul. (21)  
 
 Turner's investigations are supported with references to empirical 
neurobiology. These include Damascio's model of convergence zones and attempts to 
find evidence for the existence of image schemas in the brain and Edelman's theory of 
neuronal group selection and its basis in “experiential selection.”56  He draws heavily 
on the psychological works of Eleanor Rosch which provide “evidence for the role of 
image schemas in structuring perceptual and conceptual categories” and on Madler's 
attempts to investigate the development of image schemas in infants (24). Regardless 
of the significance and definitiveness of these attempts, Turner advocates the 
grounding of linguistic and literary concerns in the study of human mind: “narrative 
imagining, often thought of as literary and optional, appears instead to be inseparable 
                                                 
56
 This is used to provide experiential basis for the category of containers (24). 
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from our evolutionary past and our necessary personal experience. It also appears to be 
a fundamental target value for the developing human mind” (25). 
 Parable's “projecting simple action-stories onto unfamiliar or complicated 
event-stories, extends the range of action-stories” (26) corresponds to Lakoff's 
proposed EVENTS ARE ACTIONS metaphor, and also consists in a personification of 
sorts by adding an active agent. Each event has an internal image-schematic structure 
(aspect or “event shape” (28)), as well as a causal structure and modal structure (the 
relationship between its elements) (29). When the projection takes place from one 
story to another, for example from action story onto an event story, there must not be a 
“clash of image-schematic structures in the target” (30) according to the constraint 
referred to as the “invariance principle.” It does not demand that the initial target 
should be endowed with the pre-existing structure of the source, but only that “the 
result of the projection not include a contradiction of image schemas” (31). It is certain 
that often targets are not action-stories and event-stories are not always physical, as in 
the case of mental events (36). An idea is stereotypically not spatial and non-physical 
yet often, in its language representation, people speak of ideas in a way in which “an 
idea can correspond parabolically to an actor in a spatial action-story” (37). Such 
“embodiment” of abstract concepts figures prominently in Coetzee's fiction: in 
frequent reference to words coming “unbidden,” or refusing to “come,” or in 
presenting Nechaev as the “embodiment” of an idea. 
 The metaphor of EVENTS ARE ACTIONS leads to “projecting a story of 
action onto any kind of event-story, whether it has actors or not” where the action is 
primarily a “bodily” action (38). EVENTS ARE ACTIONS metaphor, as outlined by 
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Lakoff and Johnson, can be thought as having a subset of ACTORS ARE MOVERS as 
a very “general” projection from which more “specific” ones could be inferred and – 
through use – conventionalized. It would thus work as a “dynamic, flexible, self-
reinforcing pattern for projecting stories of body motion onto stories of action” (39).  
 After an extensive list and analysis of both metaphors and their common 
expressions in everyday language Turner turns to Reddy's study (1979) on the 
projection of manipulation into communication. The conduit metaphor is significant 
here, for Coetzee uses it to suggest that truth (the message, language) exists within a 
container. At the same time, Lakoff and Johnson's work on metaphorical coherence 
(1980, 87-105) allows us to see shared entailments between the various metaphorical 
understandings of a concept (argument as both journey and a container, for example). 
Since “shared metaphorical entailment” is able to establish a “cross-metaphorical 
correspondence” we can mentally equate “the amount of ground covered in the 
argument” (JOURNEY metaphor) and “the amount of content in the argument” 
(CONTAINER metaphor) (96).57 And indeed, while Coetzee's characters are 
predominantly concerned with truth as existing within containers, journeys also play a 
part. That is obvious in the number of journeys they undertake (Mrs Curren is here an 
exception, unless we think of her journey in temporal terms, as a journey towards 
death) and in their equation of journey and the pursuit of some truth: in Jacobus's 
personal conquest, in Susan's travels, in the Magistrate's constant references to being 
lost on his way or taking a wrong turning. Equating the reading and deciphering of the 
                                                 
57
 This works if we assume that the “message” Coetzee's characters strive to uncover and decipher is of 
the discursive, quasi-philosophical nature rather than is a mere piece of information whose content need 
not necessarily have the same “scope” or “depth” as that of an argument.  
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message in the novels with the manipulation of a body (of oneself or another person) is 
also relevant. Turner invokes Sweetser's investigations (1990) of cases where one 
projects “the action-story of movement and manipulation onto the story of thinking” 
(Turner, 43). The resulting metaphor THE MIND IS A BODY MOVING THROUGH 
SPACE suggests the importance of embodiment in the fiction of Coetzee and the 
attempts to find language messages or intellectual truths within the body. In Turner's 
list of examples a similar equation takes place. His analysis of Dante and Bunyan 
uncovers how we “interpret the travel story as literally spatial for the body of the 
traveler and parabolic for the mind of the traveler” (44). In Saint John of the Cross, 
Turner sees examples of a “projection of a spatial story of movement and manipulation 
onto a non-spatial story of religious transformation” (45). And in the ouverture to 
Proust's À la recherche de temps perdu Turner claims Proust “repeatedly asks us to 
project the story of a mover in space onto the story of a thinker.” As a result, “[m]ental 
states are physical locations, and a change from one mental state to another is a change 
of spatial location” (45). While Coetzee's examples are less explicit than Proust's, the 
grounding of the intellectual in the bodily, or the abstract in the concrete, is nothing 
extraordinary. As Turner observes, the “spatial and bodily instances” are “archetypes” 
for “many abstract concepts” (51). Indeed, he believes it is “plausible” that human 
understanding of “social, mental and abstract domains is formed on our understanding 
of spatial and bodily stories” (51).  
 In addition to a simple case of parable (target-case parable), where “one of the 
stories is a source and the other is its target” (67), and where the target is conceived 
through projection from source onto target, Turner presents more complex cases of 
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parabolic blending. Meaning in this theory arises from “connections across more than 
one mental space” (57). Blended space (for example, a talking animal in a story) is 
formed by inputs that cannot come exclusively from either source or target. The blend 
includes in itself “abstract information that is taken as applying to both source and 
target, such as schematic event shape and force-dynamic structure” and includes a 
projection from both source and target (59). In a story told to Shahrazad by her father, 
the first step is the creation of a blended space (personified animals, their actions and 
their consequences), and only then can such blended space be projected onto the target 
(Shahrazad and her plan). Each of the blended spaces has “input spaces” where we see 
a “partial projection from the input spaces to the blend” (60). Input spaces may exist in 
a source-target relationship, but this is not always the case. Most importantly “blended 
spaces can develop an emergent structure of their own and can project structure back 
to their input spaces. Input spaces can be not only providers of projections to the 
blend, but also receivers of projections back from the developed blend” (60). Of 
course, as Turner notices, in this case there is little (direct) projection from the source 
(donkey) to the target (Shaharazad): she is not to toil on the farm or eat hay. In the 
blended space (talking, scheming donkey) talking is projected back onto the target 
from which it was initially derived and the parable is to apply to Shaharazad. The 
blended space is characterized by a lack of “constraints of possibility” of the input 
spaces. Yet because of “specifics from both input spaces, the blended space can 
powerfully activate both spaces and keep them easily active while we do cognitive 
work over them to construct meaning . . . [and] develop a projection” (61).  
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 Amongst numerous literary examples of blended spaces and their projection 
analysed by Turner is Dante's Comedia, which he describes as a “single monumental 
synoptic blended space” (63). It consists of a target – “the story of Dante's instruction 
in theology and philosophy” – and the source, “the story of a journey.” But the 
projection is not merely from journey to theology. Instead, its blended space 
“combines all aspects of the story of a journey with all aspects of the story of 
instruction in theology and philosophy” (64). Parable, thus understood, can be a 
conceptual construction where one story is the source and another a target, and a target 
is conceptualised by “projection from the source” (67). However, another possibility is 
that it uses a blended space, where “the source and target are inputs to the blend and . . 
. the blend can project back to the source and target input spaces” most often from 
“the blended space to the target input space” (67). It is also possible for input spaces 
not to be involved in a target-source relation. This may happen in sport, for example, 
where one boat race or sprint can be compared with another that happened in the past, 
but one can talk of one agent being behind and another being in the lead in one 
blended race that unites the present and the past. We project a structure between the 
old and the new event and create “a blended story of a boat race, where there are two 
boats . . . That blended story helps us understand the relationship between the inputs . . 
. gives us a way to integrate the entire situation into one blended story, without erasing 
what we know of its independent inputs” (68). Neither of them can be called a source 
or the target of the other, and “neither is conceived by projection from the other” (68). 
Thus Turner distinguishes input spaces and blended spaces. When different input 
spaces exist in a source-target relationship, they are called “source input space”, and 
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the “target input space” (68). The blended space of a race described by Turner has its 
own internal structure and is not created merely by “copying all of the inferences in the 
blend to the input space” (69) as the blended race contains the same elements (route) 
but also important differences (different teams, boats). Talking of each of those races 
in relation to the other, one uses selection and projects from the blend to an input space 
in a way that fits the input space. The same is presented in an example of a story about 
two Buddhist monks, where counterparts are not blended but the blended space is still 
able to integrate two distinct journeys (73).  
 Turner includes narrative commentary (Booth's “intrusions” (1983)) as an 
example of blended space. This redefinition of the narrative intrusion includes adding 
to Booth's analysis a third space, one existing, metaphorically, “between . . . the space 
of a story narrated and the space of narration” (74). Where Booth saw two spaces, 
Turner stresses that the blended space needs to be recognised as separate for “in 
general we keep the space of what is narrated and the space of narration separate, 
while blending them in a distinct blended space” (74). Such blended space is used by 
Coetzee in “Realism,” the first chapter of Elizabeth Costello, where a chapter on 
literary realism formally questions the realism of its content by “skip[ing]” forward in 
time, by introducing a story with a quasi-meditation on its own opening, or else by 
analysing the reasons and effects of its own “skipping” and “interrupt[ing] the 
narrative” on the reader (16).58 
                                                 
58
 The narrator claims “skips” to be “not part of the text” but “part of the performance” (16). He also 
introduces a skip “in text rather than in the performance” (24) the double-entendre relating to the 
undescribed sex between John and Susan.  
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 Blended spaces occur in everyday speech in counterfactual expressions (“If I 
were you...”), and in everyday speech and literature as personification (76). On the 
analysis of the blend of Death the Grim Reaper, Turner shows how there are no 
quantitative limits on the number of input spaces that create a blend: “A blend can 
have as many input spaces as can be mentally juggled.” (76). In addition, blends can 
be recursive, that is take place “in steps, so that a blend can be in input space to 
another blend” (76). They can use freely “causal tautology” (77) combine metonymic 
elements (80), and involve conventional conceptual metaphors (81).59 
 In the light of the above, I would like to suggest reading Coetzee's 
representation of the human body as a blended space. This space is created by input 
from two spaces. The first one is the level of the body. This consists of experiences of 
embodiment that Coetzee's characters undergo, experiences that relate both to the fact 
of embodiment and the embodiment of others: the experience of meeting the body of 
another person, attempts to understand them, sexuality (both one's own, and the 
relation it creates between people), ageing, illness, bereavement and the mournful 
longing for the body, torture, rape, repulsion, the impulse to understand, or to destroy. 
The second level is one of language and intellect: understanding, expressing in 
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 Turner provides general principles for creating and developing blends in a parable. This can happen 
by completion, elaboration and composition (84).There are blends“exploit[ing] and develop[ing] 
counterpart connections between input spaces,” “[c]ounterparts may or may not both be brought into the 
blend, and may or may not be fused in the blend”, selective nature of blending, “recruit[ing] a great 
range of conceptual structure and knowledge without our recognizing it”, the fact that input spaces may 
be “difficult to discover” in the blend, the possibility of many input spaces contributing to the blend, the 
fact that blends can be created “repeatedly” and may form “inputs to other blends”, that they can 
develop its own structure which is not “provided by the inputs”, can use metonymic relations to 
combine elements, can use conventional metaphor normally in “partial, selective, and transforming” 
way, as well as the fact that “[i]nferences, arguments, ideas and emotions developed in the blend can 
lead us to modify the initial input spaces and change our views of the knowledge used to build those 
input spaces” (83).  
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language, imagining, deciphering, interpreting, or grasping “meanings.” While they 
could be expressed in a simple dyadic structure of sign and interpretation, such a 
reading risks allegorizing the text, finding reductive correspondences between images 
and the presumption of choosing meanings, where no authorial meanings are given by 
the narrative. What is necessary then is the blended sphere of the body: the speaking or 
signifying body, the body endowed with meaning; the body treated as a surface cover 
for the truth, as a kernel of human identity, as an object that can be read, interpreted, 
understood and grasped not in the physical but in the intellectual sense. The blend 
includes in itself several conceptual metaphors, most notably TRUTH IS IN A 
CONTAINER, and BODY IS A CONTAINER, whose mutual interaction leads the 
characters to conflate the two and pursue the significance and meanings of the body.  
 Parable, in Turner's understanding, “distributes meaning across at least two 
stories” (85). In the case of Coetzee the two stories are one of the body and another of 
language or of the “meanings” of events described in his fiction. Often, a parable uses 
another story, the blended space which can have more than two inputs and can be 
formed recursively. For Turner, a typical parable “distributes meanings over many 
spaces” (85). What is crucial here is the understanding of “meaning” in Turner's 
theory. Meaning does not “reside” in the stories, but is to be found “in the array of 
spaces and in their connections” (85). This understanding of meaning proves useful for 
understanding the body as blended space. In Coetzee’s novels, just as in the theory of 
parabolic projection, meanings are not “mental objects bounded in conceptual places 
but rather complex operations of projecting, blending, and integrating over multiple 
spaces” (86). Coetzee's characters do not project from body onto language. Instead, 
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their projections can work from the two spaces into a blended space, from the new 
blended space back onto the two spaces where, redefined, they can be projected 
further. Thus it is possible for some characters to search for a body in language 
(Dostoevsky's interest in the materiality of Pavel's handwriting), and for others – more 
typically – to search for the language (meaning) in the body.  
 In addition to blended spaces, Turner introduces the notion of generic space in 
which resides the “abstract structure shared by input spaces” and which indicates “the 
counterpart connections between the input spaces” (86). Generic space has its own 
structure, which is created with the projection from “source story to a generic story” 
(87), and was previously expressed by Lakoff and Turner as GENERIC IS SPECIFIC 
metaphor (Lakoff, 1989). Here, Turner shows how generic-level information (often of 
an image-schematic nature) is “projected from a specific space to give structure to a 
generic space: “Of course, this generic space 'applies' to the specific space from which 
it came. Once the generic space is established, we may project it onto a range of 
specific target spaces” (87). In such a way, a proverb in its lack of generality, might be 
used in a variety of contexts. Often, where inputs repeatedly construct generic space, 
such space can come to structure input spaces as well and even “establish . . . fixed 
counterparts” (87). Such generic spaces (the structure shared by life and a journey, for 
example) may become conventionalised to the point where any generic-level structure 
sharing, or the existence of blended spaces may go unnoticed by the speaker and look 
more “like projection from one conceptual domain to another” (88). At other times, 
less conventionalised expressions may actively invoke the existence of blended spaces, 
as in a “walking encyclopedia” (89). The difference between generic and blended 
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spaces lies in the fact that the latter have “rich vocabulary” and specificity provided by 
the source and the target, whereas generic spaces have the structure, and vocabulary 
derived from their input space (90). 
 Generic space has a structure which applies to both input spaces. Kövecses 
(2010) sees its relevance as twofold: “either generic spaces can make metaphoric 
mappings between source and target domain possible, or two inputs will share abstract 
structure because a conventional metaphor has established that abstract structure” 
(271). In the example of the Grim Reaper, plants in the source have death counterpart 
in the target (dying). The structure has been created by the conceptual metaphor 
PEOPLE ARE PLANTS. This includes the notions of being alive and dying as well as 
being organic. The death of plants and the death of people are both instances of a more 
general notion of ceasing to live: “This enables us to see counterparts, or 
correspondences, between the two domains: between people and plants and between 
death as cause and reaper” (271).  
 As Kövecses notices, generic spaces are most easily found in proverbs (“Look 
before you leap”), as these, with their “generic meaning[s],” apply to a variety of 
situations that can be specified further: “What establishes the generic space between 
the leap-look domain and these other domains is the metaphors 
THINKING/CONSIDERING IS LOOKING (for the looking part) and the Event 
Structure metaphor (for the leaping part), where ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED 
MOTION” (271). Turner further distinguishes between an emblem and an analogy 
(metaphor). An emblem is a parable which “starts from one story and projects from it a 
generic story that covers other stories belonging to the same conceptual domain” ( The 
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Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as an emblem of a boy's adventure). In a metaphor “or 
analogy,”60 “the generic space applies to a story in a different conceptual domain.” 
(The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as a story about the loss of innocence, political 
development etc.) (102). In addition, various parables and emblems may be 
characterized by varying levels of specificity. More general metaphors have more of 
the “general capability of projecting one story parabolically onto another” (105).  
 Such an understanding of metaphor and parable obviously determines the way 
we speak of meanings, including literary meanings. Parable is not a story whose 
elements directly match onto their meanings outside of the text. Instead, it involves the 
“dynamic construction of input spaces, generic spaces, and blended spaces, multiply 
linked, with projections operating over them” (106). While Coetzee's characters 
“unconsciously” project their meanings this way, they are, at times, also (and also 
“unconsciously”) projecting meaning on a “single residence” - the body. Both for them 
as literary characters and for the readers who “read” them, meaning is “parabolic and 
literary.” The examples invoked to explain blending point to the fact that “the 
dynamism, distribution, projection, and integration . . . in blending are actually central 
and pervasive elements of human thought” (106). This pervasive nature, Turner 
provisionally suggests, may have its origin in the structure of the mind and brain. In 
neuroscience, blending seems nowadays to be “fundamental” (110). Edelman (1989) 
claims that any unitary perception is merely the  result of “parallel activity of many 
different maps, each with different degrees of functional representation” (43). Edelman 
specifically concentrates on the extra-striate visual cortex and the ability it has to 
                                                 
60
 Here Turner uses “metaphor” as synonymous to analogy (102). 
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mediate in various ways form, motion and colour perception. Turner invokes the 
neuroscientific question of “binding” and Damascio's convergence model which 
overlaps to a large extent with Edelman's speculations. In Turner's words, in the 
convergence model, “the brain contains records of combinatorial relations of 
fragmentary records; the recall of entities of events arises from a reactivation, very 
tightly bound in time, of fragmentary records contained in multiple sensory and motor 
regions. Mental evocations that seem . . . unitary and solid are instead always fleeting 
reblendings of reactivated fragments in a very tight and intricate interval of time” 
(111). The model of abstract thought, projection, interpretation, and thus the 
understanding of literature, is for Turner intricately linked with blending. Like other 
theorists presented here, Turner is always trying to ground his insights in the biological 
sciences, and thus escape the “ungrounded” nature of the theories he criticizes. 
Blending is here seen as ubiquitous. It is a “basic process” (112). Meaning is primarily 
a construct of the human mind. It does not “reside in one site but is typically a 
dynamic and variable pattern of connection over many elements.” Our conscious 
experience “seems to tell us that meanings are whole, localized, and unitary” but this 
view is constantly dismissed: “Blending is already involved in our most unitary and 
literal perception and conception of basic physical objects . . . and in our most unitary 
and literal perception and conception of small spatial stories” (112). 
 One more way in which blending might be useful for understanding Coetzee's 
fiction is the light it might shed on what I have termed “two-way movement.” The 
human mind, when faced with inconstancy, and this Turner sees as a “mainstay of 
psychology, psychiatry, biography” as well as fiction, works “all the harder to rebuild 
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constancy across these spaces on the view that . . . this kind of constancy must hold” 
(135). In other words, the human mind is “fundamentally geared to constructing 
constancy over variation” in order to interpret and predict (136). In this light, it is 
significant that Booth's narrative intrusions, which break the constancy and are 
employed by the author to point to the constructed, abound in Coetzee's fiction: in the 
already mentioned authorial comments in Elizabeth Costello, more subtly in the 
ending passages of Foe, or in the use of English idioms in a Russian context (“chalk 
and cheese”), Magda's experience with planes, the literary references they 
communicate and the inconsistencies of her descriptions. They also surface in the 
building of expectations in the reader by presenting a character in pursuit of a goal 
(and one who has “grounds” to be positive about reaching it), and then denying the 
satisfaction of the expectation by a statement or an event that thwarts both the 
characters' efforts and the readerly expectations of a unified and constant meaning.  
 
8. Attridge and Allegory 
 
One of the impulses behind this dissertation was Derek Attridge's J.M Coetzee and the 
Ethics of Reading. Its attempt to bring literary analysis back to the encounter with the 
text and its encouragement of an “extrapolation” partly inspired this dissertation (xi). 
Attridge argues for the specificity (or literariness) of literature stemming from its 
ability to “stage[]” rather than argue, to “perform” and be performed. He foregrounds 
its active quality of “happening” rather than the passive one of being read, stressing the 
unpredictability of the “response.” This demands argumentation for literal (and 
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literary), rather than allegorising reading, one which preserves the singularity of, and 
gives credit to, the work of fiction without reducing it to a figure in another discursive 
system. Attridge thus sees literature as an “event” for “both its creator and its reader” 
(9). Similarly, the meaning of the event lies in the space where the text and the reader 
(defined as “not a free-floating subject but . . . the nexus of a number of specific 
histories and contextual formations”) meet: “the reader . . . brings the work into being, 
differently each time, in a singular performance of the work not so much written but as 
a writing” (9). In that context, the “meaning” of the text itself cannot be stationary. It is 
understood more as a “verb rather than a noun”: “not something carried away when we 
have finished reading it, but something that happens as we read or recall it.” This type 
of an encounter, and this understanding of meaning, is intimately connected to the 
understanding of language. It takes place “only because the language is shaped and 
organized, an active shaping and organizing that we re-live as we experience the 
literariness of the work” (9). The singularity of literature demands, according to 
Attridge, a response honouring that singularity which he terms “responsible” or 
ethical. This response “simultaneously reenacts and brings into being the work as 
literature and not as something else, and this work of literature and not another one”. It 
“takes into account as fully as possible, by re-staging them, the work's own 
performances – of, for example, referentiality, metaphoricity, intentionality, and 
ethicity” (9).  
 The argumentation against allegorical (by implication reductive) readings, 
would not make much sense had it not been for the ubiquity of those readings in 
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commentaries and secondary literature on Coetzee.61 This approach is not embraced by 
Attridge who characterizes Coetzee's fiction as driven by a modernist self-
reflectiveness. Attridge's emphasis is on the ethical dimension of literary experience. 
Literature matters not because of a capability of “mimicking our daily existence and 
the choices it presents us with” but because works of literature are “capable of taking 
us through an intense experience of these other-directed impulses and acts.” The 
“inventive literary work,” therefore, should be thought of as “an ethically charged 
event, one that befalls individual readers and, at the same time, the culture within 
which, and through which, they read” (xi-xii). The literariness of fiction rests in 
“stag[ing]” rather than argumentation (at home in other discourses), in the 
“perform[ance]” of the textual experience (xii).    
 Indeed, the emphasis on the inexpressibility of certain notions and the critique 
of language seems to be, for Attridge, one of the pivotal issues in Coetzee's oeuvre. 
Language is presented as incapable of presenting otherness and thus the novels in 
question problematize the usefulness of language for expression. Coetzee's formal 
inventiveness therefore wilfully interferes with the “transparency of discourse.” This 
formal aspect is also linked to the thematic notion of fictional otherness. Coetzee's use 
of language is “allied to a new apprehension of the claims of otherness, of that which 
cannot be expressed in the discourse available to us – not because of an essential 
ineffability but because of the constraints imposed by that discourse, often in its very 
productivity and proliferation” (4). While this claim is important as it stands, the 
inexpressibility Attridge talks about is not a necessary logical inference from Coetzee's 
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 See Sue Kossew's Critical Essays on J.M. Coetzee or Head's J.M. Coetzee for an examination of the 
variety of allegorical readings Coetzee's fiction.   
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fiction. If language does not represent “otherness”, the idea that language is the object 
of narrative criticism is only partly true: theoretically, it could be argued that the 
quality of otherness may be equally responsible for the inexpressibility of this 
otherness. However, Attridge maintains that the problem does not lie in the “essential 
ineffability” of otherness, but given that the precise “nature” or “essence” is here never 
mentioned, it makes as much sense to talk of the “ineffability” of otherness (not 
necessarily, it must be added, “essential”) as to claim that the tool (language) is unfit 
for purpose. As will become clear later, I take this idea further while maintaining parts 
of Attridge's point: language is indeed criticised, but Coetzee's fiction is also filled 
with suggestions which (mis)lead the characters, and often, readers, to both consider 
the possibility of language failure and to see the reasons behind this failure in the 
ineffability of the body. Coetzee never seems to take sides: putting the blame on the 
ineffability of the body seems as possible as putting it on the limitations of language. 
Indeed, both notions seem to be maintained throughout Coetzee's oeuvre, and the 
tension and interest of his novels may lie precisely in this constant navigation and 
negotiation between language that might fail due to its own nature and the body which 
remains inexpressible. And if language's failure to represent otherness is due to the 
repressive power of discourse, it finds its narrative equivalent in the representation of 
the bodily repression of characters trapped and dissatisfied with their bodily form.  
 Attridge characterises Coetzee's “narrative technique” as constantly denying 
the reader “any ethical guidance from an authoritative voice or valorizing 
metalanguage” (7). The readers are, by extension, left in the dark as to how his 
characters are to be viewed or understood; they are “left to make difficult judgements 
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[them]selves.” This narrative technique is, I think, again reduced only to its expression 
in language: “At the same time, we remain conscious of these narrating figures as 
fictional characters, as selves mediated by a language which has not forgotten its 
mediating role, a language with a density and irreducibility which signals its rhetorical 
shaping, its intertextual affiliations, its saturatedness with cultural meanings” (7). The 
effect of this, for Attridge, is ironic: “For both these reasons, we can never remove the 
aura of something like irony that plays about these representations of human 
individuals – though by the same token we can never determine its strength” (7).  
 What appears to be partly missing in his reading is the bodily nature of 
Coetzee's fiction. Attridge acknowledges political readings of Coetzee's fiction as a 
side effect of South African politics and attempts to reconcile the “subject matter” (that 
may be political) with literary inventiveness. But even when depoliticised, Coetzee's 
novels still seem obsessed with the body. There is impotence, killing frenzy, rape, and 
painful anal boils in Dusklands; cancer, pregnancy, medication, alcoholism, and death 
in the Age of Iron. Waiting for the Barbarians is primarily devoted to torture, but  
political readings of its images do not emphasize enough the links of sexuality to 
aggression, torture and intercourse, desire for impotence, experience of prostitution, 
and the intricate descriptions of Joll's and Mandel's bodies. Michael K is disfigured by 
his cleft palate and hunger; Friday by his mutilated tongue, and perhaps by his 
castration. Dostoevsky searches for the truth inside the bodies he attempts to “read”. 
He is obsessed by the image of his son's body smashing on the ground; he attempts to 
find bodily traces of him in the smell of his clothes, and in the stains and marks of his 
journal. He is troubled by painful ageing, loss of virility, his own body odour, epilepsy 
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and rotten teeth. He is sexually aroused by the cross-dressing Nechaev, the motherly 
Anna, the tomboyish Finn, and perhaps by Matryona as well. David Lurie is a rapist of 
sorts; his daughter gets raped and he is set on fire. Paul Raymont is an amputee; a 
onetime lover of a blind woman. Magda is sexually frustrated, raped, murderous, and 
driven by hatred towards her body and its apparent monstrosity. Elizabeth Costello 
experiences the life of embodiment in various guises: as an object “read” by her son 
and her audiences; in discussions on essentialism and negritude, on Christian and 
ancient representations of the body; as an active agent performing oral sex on a dying 
man; as a victim of sexually charged aggression; as infected by evil upon reading 
literary depictions of historical violence; in the sentimentality of her animal rights 
campaign. If Coetzee presents failures of language, he also repeatedly presents bodily 
mutilation, traumatic bodily experience that this language attempts and fails to express, 
and with which the characters strive to be reconciled. To shift all importance onto the 
inflexibility and repressiveness of language is to overlook the inexpressibility and 
repressiveness of the body and embodiment. Even if not political, the emphasis on 
bodily mutilation and on the failure of language together may shed further light on 
Coetzee's fiction. The lack of authorial guidance is relevant in another way here: the 
suggestion of the futility of language is coupled with the suggestion of the enormity of 
physical suffering. The “constructedness” brought by language is counterpoised with 
the “reality” of the suffering body.62 And finally, the failures of language are paralleled 
by the silence and unspeakability of the body. The interrogation of both spheres, rather 
than a single-handed concentration on the sphere of language, is what seems to me to 
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 Reality not in the sense of presenting real historical events, but in the material sense of taking 
mutilation, disfigurement and bodily suffering as the “subject matter” of the novels. 
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be necessary and does not need to result in a reductionist, allegorizing and political 
reading. In my reading of Coetzee's fiction I am trying to present both those issues: on 
the one hand, the authorial problematization of language, a constant encouragement to 
the belief in language's capacities, and the parallel undermining of that belief; on the 
other hand, the suggested importance of the body, the role it plays in human life, 
actions, historical events or literary inspirations, the promise of transcendence and 
fuller “meaning,” and the parallel movement to annihilate those expectations and 
reduce the body to a mechanism. That which I believe demands further investigation, 
therefore, is the space between the body and language: the attempts to read the body, 
and to embody and inhabit language, the craving for bodily understanding, and the 
inability to translate bodily experience into conceptual thought or language; the 
contrast between what is lived bodily as a “real” experience and what can be expressed 
in language; the unreality of the suffering of the other and the language repression that 
may result in real bodily suffering. It is from those unresolved contrasts that the fiction 
of Coetzee derives its strength.  
 Attridge refers to Coetzee's characters as figures “of otherness” (7). Any 
allegorical reading of this otherness (the author suggests, as an example, readings 
which equate Coetzee with Michael K) risk “bringing him [the character] within the 
circle of the same, overlooking the stylistic movements that keep him constantly 
opaque” (7). Those characters then, are seen as resisting “closure” (7). This is typical 
of Coetzee: “writing that signals its own limits and its own dangers, while opening 
itself to a future of unpredictable readings” (8). As noted earlier, seeing an act of 
reading as an “event,” Attridge advocates reading that is “responsive” to the 
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“singularity” of the work (9). But what precisely is this singularity? The definition 
once again emphasises reading as a dynamic act: “The literary work is constituted (…) 
not by an unchanging core but by the singular fashioning of the codes and conventions 
of the institution of literature, as they exist and exert pressure in a particular time and 
place” (9). From this, the notion of singularity flows easily: “Its singularity is a 
uniqueness derived from a capacity to be endlessly transformed while remaining 
identifiable – within the institutional norms – as what it is” (9). Such singularity 
demands an ethically responsible reading approach. But how does this singularity 
relate to the supposed authority of a critical reading?   
 Coetzee's novels provide Attridge with the perfect field on which such 
responsible reading can be reenacted. Attridge, as he admits, argues for “an 
engagement with the text that recognizes, and capitalizes on, its potential for 
reinterpretation, for grafting into new contexts, for fission and fusion” (10). The 
singularity in question derives from the text which invites “new possibilities for 
thought and feelings it opens up in its creative transformation of familiar norms and 
habits: singularity is thus inseparable from inventiveness” (11). Further, the 
“otherness” of the text is produced by its “singular inventiveness” relative to context 
(11). What happens in the process of reading? Attridge offers an interesting answer: 
In order to be readable at all, otherness must turn into sameness, and it is the 
experience of  transformation (which is the transformation of the reader's 
habits,  expectations, ways of understanding the world) that constitutes the 
event of literary work. A reading that does justice to what is literary in a 
literary work . . . is one that is fully responsive to its singularity, inventiveness, 
and otherness, as these manifest themselves in the event or experience of the 
work. (11)      
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The demand the text makes may thus be deemed “ethical” since inventiveness and 
singularity can be seen as “a kind of ethical testing and experiment” (11). It seems then 
that Atrridge divides human reading practices into two kinds: one (allegorizing) 
approach forces the translation of “otherness” into “sameness,” whereas the other, 
advocated by Attridge, respects the otherness of the text. At the same time, works of 
literature might be classified as those which make the translation easy and those which 
resist it. Coetzee's text seems to be one which makes demands and renders such 
transition difficult, and its results problematic. Coetzee's text is precisely an example 
of a work of art which, thanks to being “formally innovative,” most “estranges itself 
from the reader” and thus “makes the strongest ethical demand” (11). It does this, 
among other things, by “disrupt[ing] the illusions of linguistic immediacy and 
instrumentality” or by “thematizi[ng]” otherness “as a central moral and political 
issue” (12).  
 My claim that Coetzee's characters are mostly disabled and disfigured has its 
parallel in Attridge's view that they are “figures of alterity” in relation to “language, 
culture, and knowledge” (12). There is a difference between those two positions which 
will become obvious in due course. Body does not necessarily imply any alterity, since 
experiences of disease, sexuality or mortality are perfectly universal. Attridge further 
sees Coetzee as an author whose work attempts to “convey the resistance of these 
figures to the discourses of the ruling culture” (13). Once again, my dissertation 
parallels this idea by attempting to sketch the resistances which the body makes to 
discourse, although not necessarily in a “ruling culture.” Where our views differ, is 
over Attridge’s claim that alterity is not a question of an “inscrutable mystery of the 
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unique individual” but an alterity to a universalizing and hegemonic discourse (13). 
While I agree that Coetzee's figures of alterity resist, or are untranslatable into, 
discourse, I am more interested in the recurrence of that bodily mutilation and physical 
suffering with which those figures are marked and how these characters present 
themselves and their readers with an “inscrutable mystery” which they attempt to 
understand and express in a language (any language) that is available to them. In other 
words, this is not only where they attempt to apprehend otherness, but also when they 
are at a loss about sameness. Many of the characters are not only interested in reading 
“alterity”; for most of them reading of their own embodiment, their own pain, 
disability or frailty produces challenges similar to those involved in reading others. For 
Attridge, the figures are silent and silenced but their alterity makes demands on the 
reader with its “intensity of its unignorable being-there.” For the author of this 
dissertation the “unignorable being-there” refers rather to the persistence of bodily 
experience, its alterity, its importance and its incomprehensibility and inexpressibility.  
 Attridge further states that Coetzee's success lies in “inhibiting any 
straightforward drawing of moral or political conclusions” (13). For myself, seeing 
Coetzee leading his characters in their belief in truth within and revelation through the 
body, and constantly thwarting their attempts at interpretation, I choose to see him as 
an author who “inhibits . . . drawing of . . . conclusions” but those conclusions refer 
more to the relationship of the mind (language) and the body than to the moral or 
political. The permanent “inhibiting”, termed 'two-way movement' here, refers to the 
narrative gesture of the author. Through the plot and the characters' obsessive interest 
in the body, bodily searches and experiences are all endowed with a promise of 
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meaning whose nature remains unclear. Certain narrative suggestions do indeed place 
the “meaning” in question within reach, only to deny fulfilment in the next move. 
Inhibiting of this sort does not present the characters' hopes merely as constructed 
projections. Indeed, the novels are based on the tension between language and the 
body: between meaningless and futile language (to this point I agree with Attridge) 
and suggestions of meaningful yet inexpressible bodily experience; between the 
suggested existence of other-than-intellectual meaning, and the denial of that notion 
which seems to point to the constructedness and projection-based nature of this hope. 
At the same time, while I share Attridge's negative views on the reductiveness of 
allegorical readings, I shall attempt to explain the ubiquity of such readings by 
analysing the tension and links between the body and language, and specifically 
between the character and the importance of the unspeakable and mute body as an 
overdetermined metaphor easily inviting allegorical readings of various sorts, yet not 
honouring any of them. The mute, speaking or signifying body, whose muteness and 
whose “truth” are powerful forces, invites the reader (following the characters) to 
ascribe significance to the body.63 This power and influence, coupled with its muteness 
and emptiness, both invite easy allegorization and at the same time reject all 
allegorical interpretations as a forced translation of alterity into sameness. Where 
Attridge presents the benefits and surprises of reading literally and responsibly, I am 
trying to explain the reasons behind irresponsible and reductive interpretations. These 
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 Some of Coetzee's novels are described by Attridge as creating the power of reality so strongly that 
they “enable[] us to be moved by the thoughts and feelings of an imaginary character” and “share” their 
feelings (25). Much of the ethical approach to fiction implicitly suggests readerly identification, or at 
least “respect” for fiction that is almost human.   
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are not merely political. In large part, they stem from the representation of the body in 
Coetzee's novels.    
 One of the aspects of this fiction, which I term “two-way movement,” is 
present in Attridge's book in various guises, but never receives much attention. In his 
analysis of In the Heart of the Country, for example, Attridge presents the emotional 
outburst of the protagonist followed by an “ironic self-undercutting” (29) when it turns 
out that the addressee of the words has left some time earlier. Interestingly, Attridge 
does not extrapolate such instances on a larger scale: they remain instances of speech 
whose significance is thwarted by the introduction of the mundane.64 For Attridge, 
these are “moments at which the character talks himself or herself into a new mental 
position, a new constellation of thought and feeling, with no guarantee that the 
addressee will take the slightest notice – with the likelihood, in fact, that the alterity of 
the addressee will be underscored all the more” (29). Instead of seeing it merely as a 
matter of speech, I would like to suggest that similar underscoring is present in non-
communicative situations (monologue does not “break” against the alterity of the 
other), but also can be presented in characters' propositional attitudes towards their 
experience. Their assumptions, projections, and interpretations of the body and its 
significance are frequently undercut and thwarted by a new insight contradicting them. 
Often, the contradiction of the initial proposition is thwarted again, leading characters 
either to a return to the initial proposition, or, alternatively, to another one that 
navigates between the two impossibilities. This wavering and denial of the validity of 
their ideas only occasionally manifests itself in dialogue. Indeed, it covers a wider 
                                                 
64
 He finds similar examples in the Age of Iron and one in Dusklands (29). 
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range of phenomena of which the passages quoted by Attridge are merely the 
dialogue-based examples.  
 In his rejection of political interpretations of Coetzee, Attridge focuses on 
language to the extent that the depictions of the body and questions of embodiment 
remain unanalysed. The alterity he investigates is openly described as “not an 
otherness that exists outside language or discourse” but instead “an otherness brought 
about into being by language, it is what two thousand years of continuously evolving 
discourse has excluded – and thus constituted – as other. Not simply its other, which 
would, as an opposite, still be part of its system; but heterogeneous, inassimilable, and 
unacknowledged” (29). This Derridean insight rests on the assumption that “language . 
. . has played a major role in producing (and simultaneously occluding) the other” (30). 
It is not entirely clear what Attridge means by this statement: whether he suggests that 
feelings of being “the other” were produced in language rather than that language 
reflects (and later codifies) exclusion resulting from the primary cooperation and 
competition patterns of organisms within populations, or whether he sees social reality 
as created on, and derivative from, the model of phonemic distribution. Either way, the 
choice of language as a “major” agent is symptomatic of his critical emphasis on 
language and his partial neglect of the body or any pre- or extra-linguistic reality. 
Linguistic and textual alterity demands, according to Attridge, a special mode of 
reading. This “textualterity” is a “verbal artifact that estranges as it entices, that 
foregrounds the Symbolic as it exploits the Imaginary, that speaks of that which it has 
to remain silent” (30). While I find the notion uncontroversial, I believe that further 
investigation of the complicated interrelationship of the body and language in 
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Coetzee's fiction might produce an even fuller picture of the ways in which such 
textualterity is created, and the reasons behind the popularity of allegorical readings of 
the author. 
 Allegory is presented by Attridge as “one of the terms in the critical lexicon 
most frequently applied to Coetzee's work.” The author distinguishes two types of 
allegory: universal (where “the novels are said to represent the truths – often the dark 
truths – of the human condition” (32)), and more specific which “translate[s] . . . 
distant locales and periods into the South Africa of the time of writing.” The second 
type “treat[s] fictional characters as representatives of South African types or even 
particular individuals” (33). The fact that allegory is referred to in the text (as when the 
Medical Officer refers to K as “allegory” etc) is taken by Attridge as “throw[ing] some 
doubt . . . on allegorical readings of the work more generally” (34). However, such 
“self-reflexive gesture[s]” are not only “encouragement[s] from fiction,” but are 
accompanied by also “problematiz[ing]” (35) and constantly “frustrat[ing] the 
allegorizing impulse” (Attwell 132) which never fully override invitations to allegory. 
Attridge quotes from Coetzee on literature not “playing games” of “Male Domination” 
or “Class Conflict” and he characterises his own position as not avoiding all 
interpretation but avoiding “certain kinds of interpretation” (36). Explicitly, Attridge 
contrasts the allegorical readings and “the urge to allegorize Coetzee” with literal 
reading characterised by event-shape experience of the text (39): 
What I am calling a literal reading is one that is grounded the experience (sic) 
of reading as an event. That is to say, in literary reading . . . I do not treat the 
text as an object whose significance has to be divined; I treat it as something 
that comes into being only in the process of understanding and responding that 
I, as an individual reader in a specific time and place, conditioned by a specific 
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history, go through. And this is to say that I do not treat it as “something” at all; 
rather, I have an experience that I call Waiting for the Barbarians . . . It is an 
experience I can repeat, though each repetition turns out to be a different 
experience and therefore a non-repetition, a new singularity, as well. (39-40)    
 
It is unclear whether the experience of alterity or otherness is singular and belongs to a 
specific event or is repeated in various of Attridge's readings. Accepting that his own 
reading may more resemble J. Hillis Miller's parable and its performative power, 
Attridge further theorizes his reading practice. What seems striking is that such reading 
practice here looks like reading without conclusions, without a divorcing of the 
reading subject from the text. It is an act of reading that – faced with textual ambiguity 
– refuses to “understand” the work in any way or openly conceptualize it:  
I have two choices . . . I can deploy reading techniques that will lessen or annul 
the experience of singularity and alterity – and this will usually involve turning 
the event into an object of some kind (such as a structure of signification) – or I 
can seek to preserve the event as an event, to sustain and prolong the 
experience of otherness, to resist the temptation to close down the uncertain 
meanings and  feelings that are being evoked. In both cases, I am concerned 
with “meaning,” but in the first case I understand it as a noun, in the second as 
a verb. I can, one might say, live the text that I read. This is what I mean by a 
literal reading. (40) 
 
In this heavily metaphorical passage Attridge prizes the experience of reading as such 
and advocates a return to close reading. At the same time, every interpretation seems to 
objectify the text to be interpreted, even as it acknowledges its alterity. Attridge places 
himself in a position where Coetzee's works seem to him representations and 
performances in “alterity” which should not be made into sameness or interpreted. It is 
not clear how such a position differs from an unthinking enjoyment of a popular novel 
and a readerly focus on “what happens” without attempts at extrapolation or any 
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interpretation of any kind. The question of alterity as an event is problematic as well. 
What presents an alterity for a reader of Barbara Cartland may not connote 'other' for 
Attridge. Secondly, is a sweeping conceptualization of Coetzee's oeuvre as dealing 
with alterity and otherness not an allegory in itself, albeit one that refuses to fill in the 
blank space and provide it with “meaning”? When Attridge presents Coetzee's fiction 
as inviting allegorical reading, for example by its “lack of specificity in a work's 
temporal and geographic locatedness” that “encourage[s] the reader to look for other 
kinds of meaning” (40) the impulse to allegorize might be resisted in a variety of ways: 
out of boredom, lack of knowledge of the English language, wanting to learn “what 
happens next,” carelessness in noticing the fact. Do all of those constitute ethical and 
responsible reading? And how is saying “this book is wilfully vague and invites easy 
allegory but I shall resist the impulse” different from saying “this book is allegorical 
and space may stand for a, b, c, d, or many others”? The only difference seems to lie in 
the fact that Attridge's position is viewed as an informed, professional choice in which 
ethical reading relates to an experience of reading which is subjectively better than an 
uninformed reader trying to, for example, read a book in a language they do not know. 
Attridge's reading practice is akin to the situation of Coetzee's characters in the world 
of the body. As happens with them when an experience is expressed in language, or 
they attempt to comprehend it intellectually, it always eludes us as something else. It 
seems that the bodily ‘truth’ in Coetzee, and a responsible reading practice, both exist 
in the sphere of bodily experience that dies when expressed in language that translates 
singularity into sameness. 
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 There are other complications in Attridge's position. Literal reading is 
characterized as one which “defers interpretive moves” and therefore is not allegorical 
but does justice to the singularity of literature (60). At the same time, decontextualised 
reading is both impossible and unwelcome: “literal reading fails if the reader is not 
possessed of the necessary contextual information. Literal reading needs all the history 
. . . it can get” (60). The distinction between deferring interpretive moves and not 
being able to make any interpretive moves is in practice problematic. Presumably 
Attridge has in mind some kind of return to the text and its close analysis rather than 
easy allegorizing especially when, as suggested, the development of “critical tools” has 
taken us away from the text itself and engagement with it (61).  
 Part of the experience of reading Coetzee can be “the event of the allegorizing 
reading” (61) since Coetzee often “[has] staged  the allegorizing process” in his work 
(62). Thus one “can be doing justice to the singularity and inventiveness of a literary 
work through the operations of its meaning – irrespective of whether we arrive at some 
stable allegorical scheme.” The advocated response, it seems, is to “become conscious 
of the power and allure of allegory, of the temptation to generalize or codify meaning, 
and at the same time gain heightened awareness of the specificity and contingency of 
language and human experience as these resist such generalizations and codifications. 
In fact, a responsive reading . . . will always be alert to the possibility of allegorical 
meaning” (61-62). In the light of this it seems that the mistake readers can make is to 
unthinkingly allegorize and thus succumb to the invitation provided by the novel. Such 
readerly response is then akin to the biggest mistake characters in Coetzee's fiction 
make in unthinkingly allegorizing the body as the seat of truth. The mistake lies not in 
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the interest in the body and its valuation but in the attempt to interpret the body at all 
costs, an attempt that results in mistranslation and does no justice to bodily experience.  
 Partly presenting Coetzee's novels as allegories of otherness, which stage both 
otherness and their own allegorical character, Attridge advocates the value of 
“openness of the moment and to the future, of the perhaps and the wherever” (64), the 
unknown possibility of literature rather than known actuality of reductive allegory. 
Thus when Attridge argues against allegory he seems to be arguing against the result 
of allegorical readings: the forced translation of the text into “meaning” that does 
away with the particularity of the work, and brushes over and assimilates the 
irregularities of the text. He, therefore, argues against the practices undertaken by 
some of the characters. At the same time Attridge does not argue against recognizing 
the work as having the potential to be allegorized, as long as the “allegory” as a final 
and definitive “product” of allegorical reading, a product with pretensions to closure, is 
not produced. Taking my cue from this position, I would like to analyse what precisely 
makes Coetzee's works so pregnant with the possibility of allegorization (which I 
identify with the image of the body), and to present it as a reason behind so many 
allegorical readings varying in their degree of specificity. At the same time, neither 
Coetzee, nor Attridge, nor myself will fill the figure of the blank body with meaning, 
but will rather present the potential for meaning. What I hope this dissertation offers is 
an analysis of the narrative strategies and human thinking processes that result in 
readings and interpretations of a particular kind, but equally result in the elusiveness 




Metaphor and Truth: Reading the Body.  
Waiting for the Barbarians and Life and Times of Michael K. 
 
 In his book, Aesthetic Nervousness, Ato Quayson suggests that the disabled 
body in fiction is “easily assimilable to an allegorical reading,” and that its 
representations carry with them the “potential for immediate allegorization” (173). I 
would like to analyse how such allegorization happens on the example of Waiting for 
the Barbarians and Life and Times of Michael K. Both novels share the theme of 
reading of another person's body, both present the reader with well-intentioned 
interpreters, and both show these interpreters as seeing in disability and mutilation the 
“ciphers of a metaphysical or transcendental meaning” (173).65 Moreover, the novels 
invite the reading of both themselves, and their characters, as “ciphers” of “meaning.” 
Their use of the image of the body presents the interpreter with a “potential for 
immediate allegorisation” that seems to be evidenced by the number and variety of 






                                                 
65
 The two novels differ in that the Medical Officer explicitly presents his final interpretation,  
while The Magistrate does not.      
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Waiting for the Barbarians  
 
     “Pain is truth; all else is subject to doubt.” (5) 
“'I must be tired,' I think. 'Or perhaps whatever 
can be articulated is falsely put.' . . . 'Or perhaps 
it is the case that only that which has not been 
articulated has to be lived through.' I stare at this 
last proposition . . . The words grow more and 
more opaque before me; soon they have lost all 
meaning” (70).   
 
 Waiting for the Barbarians is the story of a man troubled by doubt living in a 
place and at a time where doubt is synonymous with treason.66 Doubt and the will to 
understand are his defining features. His failures to understand the regime, the identity 
of the oppressed and the oppressors, history, and himself are the leading themes of the 
novel. Much of the quest for truth is inspired by the body: the real suffering he 
encounters as a witness, victim and metaphorical torturer, and by the reading of his 
own sexuality and ageing. The novel interrogates the effects of torture suggesting the 
significance of embodiment for personal identity. Inscrutable and unrepresentable, the 
body is contrasted with language. For the Magistrate, it represents true history against 
misleading language accounts. It invites his reading as both a container for, and a veil 
over, personal identity. It uncovers the emptiness of abstract theories of ethics and 
justice. In its capacity to induce “mystical” states, it offers a promise of transcendence. 
                                                 
66
 This lack of specificity has invited allegorical readings. For Dovey, the novel “clearly represents a 
particular phase of South African colonial history” (209) whereas the Magistrate's actions “should be 
read as allegories of the attempts, the limitations and the failures of this discourse [liberal humanist] 
itself” (213). For Head, the text is an “extended moral parable” (4). While often read as “ethical 
universalism” Attwell sees here a “strategic refusal of specificity” (73).   
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For the protagonist, it stands as a figure of truth. While the novel does not assert the 
existence of truth or stable identity, the Magistrate invites the readers to see these as 
accessible through the body, as if pain stripped the subject of cultural and social 
constructs. The two way movement invites to see what is inside as fundamental and 
inexpressible, but undercuts it by suggestions of the projection upon the mute body 
which is all that exists. 
 My aim is to analyse the images of the body in the novel and the suggestions of 
“body knowledge” gained through sentient experience. I first present the Magistrate's 
readings of the torturers' bodies. Later, my focus is on the bodies and identities of the 
victims. The Magistrate occupies the liminal position: he is simultaneously an 
accomplice (a figurative torturer), a witness, an opponent, and a victim. I shall try to 
show how the text invites reading his experience as inspired by the body, and his body 
as having ethical and political consequences. Extended treatment will be given to 
torture where the narrative suggests that body-limit experience allows for the 
“glimpse” of “meaning,” but simultaneously rejects any positive identifications, or 
even existence, of such meaning. 
 Elaine Scarry's The Body in Pain (1985) provides a theoretical background for 
the reading of torture. Her account of the distance between victim and torturer, 
between pain and language underwrite my analysis. For Scarry, pain is a paradigm of 
the metaphysical distance between human subjects; it signals “the absolute split 
between one’s sense of one’s own reality and the reality of other persons” (4). One's 
own pain needs no proof and is a paragon of “what it is to “have certainty.”” The pain 
of another is impossible to grasp. Unavailable to confirmation, it exists as “the primary 
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model of what it is “to have doubt”” (4). The gap between the certainty offered by 
one's own body and the doubt existing outside of it is exacerbated by pain's resisting 
language or “actively” destroying it. In torture one can observe a permanent or 
temporary “reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human 
being makes before language is learned” (4). This gap is also widened by pain's non-
intentionality. In opposition to other mental states, the “capacity to move out beyond 
the boundaries of . . . [one's] own body into the external, sharable world” (5), does not 
exist for pain.67 Thus, pain is not “of or for anything”: “It is precisely because it takes 
no object that it . . . resists objectification in language” (5). Any description of pain 
necessarily entails the use of the language of metaphorical agency (“feels as if”). The 
body is thus often experienced as the “agent” of its own pain. The non-intentionality 
equates “my body hurts” with “my body hurts me”” (47). This figurative “self-
betrayal” is used in torture: forced exercise makes “the prisoner’s body an active agent, 
an actual cause of his pain”68 Solipsism and withdrawal within oneself is evident in the 
Barbarian girl's refusal to discuss her experience and exists as a residue of the 
“shrinking” of the world in torture: “It is the intense pain that destroys a person’s self 
and world, a destruction experienced spatially as either the contraction of the universe 
down to the immediate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling to fill the entire 
universe” (Scarry 35). As the prisoner’s world is shrinking, the torturers' world is 
                                                 
67
 Scarry's is not a universally held position. For arguments in favour of treating pain as intentional see: 
Armstrong (1968), Tye (1995), and Crane (2001) among others.    
68
 In the novel, exercise is forced only on the Magistrate. On this issue Scarry writes: “Part of his sense 
of body as agent comes  . . . when his failure to sustain the prescribed posture or exercise brings from 
the torturer another form of punishment; but, for the prisoner . . . the most emphatic and direct 
exhibition of self-agency comes from the exercise itself” (47).   
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expanding. They are endowed with reasons, motives, selfhood and occupations outside 
the torture room (37).  
 The disintegration of the prisoner’s world is often accompanied by destruction 
of language. This might lead to the collapse of the mental, and expressible, sense of 
self. For Scarry, torture “make[s] emphatic the ever present but, except in the 
extremity of sickness and death, only latent distinction between a self and a body.” 
Thus “the goal of the torturer is to make the one, the body, emphatically and 
crushingly present by destroying it, and to make the other, the voice, absent by 
destroying it” (49). This institutes the split between language and the body. In the 
novel, bodies are “emphatically . . . present” to the point of being seen as containers 
for truth. With their capacity for speech destroyed, the Magistrate's descriptions imply 
the existence of bodily “consciousness” and “language” emergent from pain. But as 
they remain inexpressible, pain and its “language” are appropriated by the regime 
which organizes its own existence in a narrative of inflicting pain and protecting itself 
from it.    
 David Attwell sees history in Waiting for the Barbarians as no longer “an 
absolute horizon of consciousness” but “a structure of ideas . . . that has failed, 
moreover, to transform the terms of discourse” (J.M. Coetzee 72). I would like to 
suggest that what allows such failure, prohibits closure and the possibility to “figure” 
the historical process (unless as “an ideological resource . . . in the hands of the 
Empire” (72)) is the image of the inexpressible and mute body that contrasts with 
“history-as-myth” available in language. Imperial history relies on the body in order to 
construct its myth. Mistranslating and misrepresentating it in its hegemonic discourse, 
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the Empire uses Scarry's “analogical verification” (13) that relies on metaphorical 
structuring of an abstract idea as a body. In Scarry's example “the sheer material 
factualness of the human body” is “borrowed to lend that cultural construct the aura of 
“realness” and “certainty”” (13-14). In the novel, the Empire substantiates itself by the 
“reality” afforded by the suffering body. Pain created by the Empire, endows its 
creator with “incontestable reality” (27). Yet, torture is used precisely because “the 
reality of that power is so highly contestable” and “the regime” is “so unstable” (27). 
Thus, as the Empire needs barbarians to sustain its existence, it uses their pain in 
“compensatory” torture (328) to prove the “realness” of the threat they pose. The 
suffering body exists in imperial history as a structural element: its pain forms the 
foundation on which the Empire is built.  
 
Reading Torturers: 
Joll and Mandel 
 
 The Magistrate's reading of the torturers uncovers the gap between language 
and the body. Their language misleads and misrepresents; the promise of truth offered 
by the reading of their bodies is unfulfilled: the Magistrate is left with fruitless 
speculation, and his intimations of meaning are immediately mistranslated when 
conceptualized and expressed.    
 The unreliability of language begins with his reading of the official register in 
which Joll's arrival on “emergency powers” (1) as a “Warrant Officer in the Third 
Bureau” is paraphrased: “what does that mean? At a guess, five years of kicking and 
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beating people; contempt for the regular police and for due process of law; a 
detestation of smooth patrician talk like mine” (85). Those “guardians of the State, 
specialists in the obscurer motions of sedition, devotees of truth, doctors of 
interrogation” investigate the barbarian threat which, according to the Magistrate, 
exists only on paper (9). The unreliability of language is carried further when Joll's 
“procedures” lead to a death of a clearly innocent prisoner (4, 6). 
 By contrast, the Magistrate's lesson on certainty offered by the body endows it 
with the ability to speak. Where “[p]ain is truth” and “all else is subject to doubt” (5), 
the prisoner's mutilated body constitutes physical proof against the lies in the official 
report in which his death is described as accidental. The Magistrate's visit to the cell 
uncovers falsifications in Joll’s language as does the later sight of a tortured boy 
whose forced confession of “guilt” becomes official “truth” codified in language. 
Similar discrepancies surround the arrest of members of the wrong tribe. 
When language misleads, the Magistrate hopes to successfully read the body. 
Here, the first obstacle is provided by Colonel Joll's prototypical sunglasses which 
metonymically define him: “they look opaque from the outside, but he can see through 
them” (1). Like the Empire, Joll, the agent of pain, protects himself from suffering: the 
“glare of the sun,” “squinting,” “headaches” and “wrinkles.” Never taken off,69 the 
glasses come from the capital (“[a]t home everyone wears them” (1)) and function as 
an alliance symbol. The erroneous suggestion of Joll's physical blindness (1) has been 
often allegorised by the critics who read him as “ethically blind, as is the empire” 
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 The exception of his last appearance in the text does not dispel his unreadability: “sitting in the dim 
far corner, rigidly averting his face” (159).  
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(Penner 77). The glasses conceal Joll’s identity placing him in the privileged position 
of seeing but not being seen. They allow an inexpressible, unreadable, face (“[b]efore 
prisoners, it appears, one maintains a certain front” (3)), and mind (14). His “cryptic 
silences,” and the “paltry theatrical mystery of dark shields” (4) shield him from being 
read and maintain the aura of authority.  
 Joll's obsessive care of his body (“skin of a younger man” (1), “tapering 
fingernails,” “mauve handkerchiefs,” “slender feet in soft shoes” (5)) presents his body 
as carefully performed (“hands clasped before him like a woman” (4), sitting 
“carefully uptight”) and his behaviour as purposefully staged (“[Joll] knows how much 
his affectations irritate [the Magistrate]” (25)). The theatre references are not 
surprising in the light of Scarry's analysis of torturers' “display of agency.”70 Being 
forced to look at the instruments of torture or old blood stains, being treated to the 
theatrical display of the torturer’s body, the display of agency is a calculated 
“grotesque piece of compensatory drama” producing an even stronger “illusion of 
power” (27-28).71 Theatre references are even more explicit in relation to Mandel who 
looks at others like “an actor looks from behind a mask” (84). During the interrogation 
of the Magistrate he is dressed up in conspicuous insignia of his office, continues “his 
pretence of reading the documents” (84) in a staged performance: “He is trying, though 
somewhat too theatrically, to make a certain impression.” His behaviour, looks, and 
his office “are all meant to say something” (90). This something is both power (“he is 
in charge”) and the need for acknowledgement: “he knows how to comport himself in 
an office, knows even how to introduce a note of functional elegance” (90). Their 
                                                 
70
 Elsewhere he is imagined “murmuring to his friends in theatre corridors” (5-6).   
71
 Old soot stains in the cell function as part of such a display in the novel (86). 
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artificiality and “theatrical” performances deny the human body its “natural” 
subjectivity in which the Magistrate believes: “I picture him sitting up in bed beside a 
girl, flexing his muscles for her, feeding on her admiration. The kind of man who 
drives his body like a machine . . . ignorant that it has its own rhythms” (84). 
Theatricality is here equated with vanity: Mandel spends more time “polishing his 
straps and buckles” (127) than torturing prisoners.72 Even in torture his display of 
agency is narcissistic. Where Scarry describes torture victims “made to examine the 
size of the torturer’s fist” (27), Mandel demands that his body be admired: “‘Do you 
see this hand?’ . . . He holds his hand an inch from my face. ‘When I was younger’ – 
he flexes the fingers – ‘I used to be able to poke this finger’ – he holds up the index 
finger – ‘through a pumpkin-shell’” (129).  
 While Joll's glasses hinder reading, Mandell's eyes are endowed with the 
promise of meaning of his inner self: “I look into his clear blue eyes, as clear as if 
there were crystal lenses slipped over his eyeballs. He looks back at me. I have no idea 
what he sees” (129). The Magistrate's reading of the two bodies yields no result: the 
existence of “depth” is repeatedly posited (“clear eyes, windows of his soul . . . the 
mouth from which his spirit utters itself” (137)), but the reading fails to penetrate the 
container reducing the Magistrate's speculations to projective guesses. When the body 
is treated as readable surface, evil is imagined as a “mark” on it (129) thus sharing 
entailments of both text and uncleanliness: “I find myself wondering . . . whether he 
has a private ritual of purification . . . behind closed doors, to enable him to return and 
break bread with other men. Does he wash his hands very carefully . . . or change all 
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 Elsewhere he is rendered as “[v]ain, hungry for praise . . .  A devourer of women, unsatisfied” (92). 
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his clothes” (13). Evil is structured as a lethal illness: “I am trying to imagine how you 
breathe and eat and live from day to day . . . If I were he . . . my hands would feel so 
dirty that it would choke me” (138). In the face of the intellectual failure, the 
Magistrate's attempt to “grasp” the truth residing in the torturer's body is embodied in 
the literal grasping of his arm, but, in its two-way movement, the narrative frustrates 
expectations of closure when Mandell shakes the Magistrate off, and the passage 
introduces the mundane contrasting with the emotional intensity that precedes it (138). 
Thus, while the body remains the “key” to understanding the torturers, such 
understanding is never achieved.73 
 The results of such readings are expressed in the final meeting with Joll. Here, 
the characteristic failure of language renders the Magistrate's painfully trivial and his 
theory of “latent” crimes remains a guess as good as any:74 
I have a lesson for him that I have long meditated. I mouth the words and watch 
him read on my lips: ‘The crime that is latent in us we must inflict on 
ourselves,’ I say. I nod and nod, driving the message home. ‘Not on others,’ I 
say: I repeat the words, pointing at my chest, pointing at his. He watches my 
lips, his thin lips move in imitation, or in derision, I do not know. (160-161)  
 
The failure of the mind to understand, and of the language, to express the nature of Joll 
are accompanied with foregrounding of the body. The Magistrate's “body language,” 
however, expresses little else than the understanding of the mind and morality as 
metaphorically inside the container of the body.  
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 Later, the Barbarian girl is, similarly, “the only key . . . to the labyrinth” of understanding (95). 
74
 Penner suggests that the Magistrate manages to “overcome his hatred by envisioning in Joll the child 
who became the murderer” (86). The ambiguity of the scene certainly invites a multitude of other 




The Barbarian Girl 
 
The girl's blindness situates the Magistrate in Joll's privileged position of 
seeing but not being seen (28). Whereas she has the “look of something that knows 
itself watched” (36); he is “only a blur, a blank,” “a voice, a smell, a centre of energy 
that . . . falls asleep washing her feet and the next day feeds her . . . and the next day – 
she does not know” (31). As Joll's glasses, her blindness invites metaphorical reading: 
while she is of central interest to him, he remains “on the periphery of her vision” 
(31).75 
The hope of successfully reading her identity and the past is offered by the 
scars on her body: “It has been growing more and more clear to me that until the marks 
on this girl’s body are deciphered and understood I cannot let go of her” (33). The 
attempts to recover the girl's pre-torture body or the “image of her as she was” (36) 
before “the doctors of pain began their ministrations” (51) fails. The project is not 
helped by conversations with witnesses and visits to the torture scene (“What signs can 
I be looking for?” (38)). When expressed, the story is insignificant and partial (“I am 
tired of talking” (44)). The Magistrate is overwhelmed by the intimations of mystery, 
“something [that] has fallen in upon [him] from the sky, at random, from nowhere.” 
This feeling is unrequited: to her it is “all one whether [he] lie[s] down beside her and 
                                                 
75
 Blurred vision characterizes his inability to “read” her later: she becomes a “featureless . . . figure,” 
while his interpretations are frustrated with a “reluctance” and “resistance” to remember her or attempts 
to “obliterate” her from his memory (50).  
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fall[s] asleep or fold[s] her in a sheet and bur[ies] her in the snow” (47). Her 
indifference renders projective hypotheses concerning her unverifiable; her submission 
“may be nothing but indifference” (60). 
The Magistrate's fascination with her identity coexists with treating her as 
embodied history. The two fascinations demand two approaches: seeing the girl as a 
container and as a surface. The former is frustrated by the latter, although the container 
imagery is frequently juxtaposed with the surface and depth imagery sometimes 
combining the two into a single image. Thus recurrent images of the girl featureless or 
veiled can become three-dimensional: “face filming over with skin. Blank, like a fist 
beneath a black wig, the face grows out of the throat and out of the blank body beneath 
it, without aperture, without entry. I shudder with revulsion” (45). Elsewhere, as when 
trying to recall her face, the Magistrate summons an image that wavers between 
surfaces and containers: “a faint sense of the presence of the girl, an aura begins to 
emerge . . . I make out her shape . . . It is like caressing an urn  . . . something which is 
all surface” (52). The body functions both as a surface (the text on which the Empire 
wrote its history) and as a container for identity, impenetrable insofar as the girl does 
not allow entry to her “centre.”  
 The reasons for the Magistrate's desire for the girl remain “obscure” (70). His 
interest “has confounded [him] from the beginning” (77), and remains unexplained by 
“raptures she may promise or yield” (70). Quayson sees the girl's disability as 
producing “a structure of impossibility” wherein an “erotic encounter” with the 
disabled is impossible (226). This confusion is counterpoised by repeated references to 
the girl's meaning and the significance of their relationship. In the scene of their 
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parting, for example, the sense of finality promises unspecified revelation: “This is the 
last time to look on her clearly face to face, to scrutinize the motions of my heart, to try 
to understand who she really is: hereafter, I know, I will begin to re-form her out of my 
repertoire of memories according to my questionable desires” (79). Such expectation 
built by the text is immediately thwarted in the logic of the two-way movement and the 
girl's body remains only the body devoid of deeper meaning: “There is only a 
blankness, and desolation that there has to be such blankness . . . I see only too clearly 
what I see: a stocky girl with a broad mouth and hair cut in a fringe across her forehead 
staring over my shoulder into the sky; a stranger” (79). The description rephrases the 
Magistrate's initial impression of the girl: “black hair cut in a fringe across the 
forehead . . . broad mouth” and “black eyes that look through and past [the 
Magistrate]” (27) suggesting the lack of progress in his search. He appears to 
understand more in torture, although the ephemeral “insight” remains visceral and the 
intimations of meaning, expressed in language, amount to little. His speculation 
concentrates on the effects of pain on her identity:    
Thereafter she was no longer fully human, sister to all of us. Certain 
sympathies died, certain movements of the heart became no longer possible to 
her. I too, if I live long enough in this cell . . . will be touched with the 
contagion and turned into a creature that believes in nothing. (88-89)  
 
The anti-Cartesian belief that extreme suffering alters one’s identity to the point of no 
return sees embodiment as central to identity. Non-falsifiable, the Magistrate's 
hypothesis might merely continue his “swoop[ing] and circl[ing] around the 
irreducible figure of the girl, casting one net of meaning after another over her” (89). 
Soon all that remains is the memory of his “oiled hands sliding over her knees, her 
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calves, her ankles” (94-95) while the girl's body gets forgotten: “[f]rom her empty 
eyes, there always seemed to be a haze spreading, a blankness that overtook all of her” 
(94). While her identity is inexplicable (“Not from the moment when I stopped before 
her at the barracks gate and elected her have I known the root of my need for her; and 
now I am steadily engaged in burying her in oblivion” (95)), his ambiguous dreams 
invite allegorical readings. She appears in them as “two shapes” which “arouse 
horror”: “massive and blank, they grow and grow till they fill all the space in which 
[he] sleep[s]. [He] wake[s] up choked, shouting, [his] throat full” (95-96).  
 
The Magistrate: Complicity and Opposition  
  
 The Magistrate's reading of himself places him in the position of being 
simultaneously the Empire's reluctant accomplice and its reluctant opponent. As Joll's 
opponent, the Magistrate is not a heroic man of conscience consciously opposing 
barbarism. He never pursues moral perfection. A victim of circumstance, he gets 
“embroiled” (8) in history and is forced to make choices without willingness or 
conviction. Critical of Joll's incompetence (18-19), he is repulsed by Joll's cruelty: 
“Once I thought him lazy, little more than a bureaucrat with vicious tastes. Now I see 
how mistaken I was. In his quest for truth he is tireless” (23). Set in his parochial ways 
(2), he is aware of the persona he projects. The torturers, described as full of “the 
arrogant candour of . . .  graduate[s] of the War College,” see in the Magistrate, 
presumably, “a minor civilian administrator sunk, after years in this backwater, in 
slothful native ways, outmoded in his thinking, ready to gamble the security of the 
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Empire for a makeshift, insecure peace” (54). He is critical of their ignorance and its 
consequences. Their refusal to see the problem of water supply is the case of 
misguided loyalties; their burning the bush is counterproductive (“the wind begins to 
eat at the soil and the desert advances” (89-90)); and their “general offensive against 
the barbarians” (53) is self-defeating when the enemy's tactics consists in flooding the 
fields: “What is the use of textbook military operations . . . and punitive raids into the 
enemy’s heartland, when we can be bled to death at home?” (110). Despite his 
resentment and opposition, he is still the man of the Empire and sees its superiority: 
the “barbarian way” remains for him “intellectual torpor, slovenliness, tolerance of 
disease and death” (56). His opposition to the Empire results from laziness, dislike of 
change, and an attachment to steady routine (8). Driven by a desire to be undisturbed 
(56) and live and die “in ease” (82), he finds himself carried along rather than making 
conscious moral choices.  
 Such involvement is precipitated by the signifying mutilated body: the sight of 
the beaten boy's “angry” wounds (4, 10), the corpse of the old man who, officially, 
“fell heavily against the wall” (6), which tells a different story: his “lips are crushed 
and drawn back, the teeth are broken” (7), and the girl's reluctant mention of “a kind of 
fork with only two teeth,” of the torturers“putt[ing] it in the coals” and of blinding 
(44). Finding himself unable to return to the state of ignorance, the evil observed 
“infects” him: “I would like to be able to stop my ears to the noises coming from the 
 145 
yard below . . . I know somewhat too much; and from this knowledge, once one has 
been infected, there seems to be no recovering” (22-23).76  
 This complicity of being a passive spectator “stop[ing] [his] ears to the noises 
coming from the hut by the granary” (9) is never actively resisted.77 Atonement is 
metaphorically expressed as washing and cleaning: the attempt to restore the town to 
its previous state. Such “obliteration” full of “new intentions, new resolutions” is seen 
as a prerequisite of a “new start” after which “there would be no more injustice, no 
more pain” (26). Inspired by guilty conscience (“I cannot deny it, the memory leaves 
me sick with myself”), the attempt is futile and misunderstood: “The new men of 
Empire are the ones who believe in fresh starts, new chapters, clean pages; I struggle 
on with the old story, hoping that before it is finished it will reveal to me why it was 
that I thought it worth the trouble” (26).78 His hope for meaning “reveal[ing]” itself is 
as passive as is the break of his alliance with the Empire and his 'atonement' forced 
upon him after a false accusation and his arrest. Being recognized as an enemy of the 
state partly cleanses his conscience (“There is a spring in my walk as I am marched 
away to confinement . . . my alliance with the Empire is over, I have set myself in 
opposition . . . I am a free man” (86)) as does later accusation of Joll (“there were no 
border troubles before you came”) and the Magistrate's expressed wish to see this 
“obscene torturer” hung (125). 
                                                 
76
 Knowledge as infection by evil is directly analysed by Elizabeth Costello, and indirectly as 
knowledge as possession by Dostoevsky. It is also analysed later in this chapter.  
77
 Apart perhaps from the unsuccessful “pleading” for the wounded boy (4). 
78
 While Dovey (1988) sees the Magistrate as the “conscience of the society” I think it is a mistake to 
claim that he sees himself as “the blameless one” (223) and “assuming himself . . . to be free of guilt” 
(236). In fact, she contradicts herself when she claims that the Magistrate seeks to “expiate[] his . . . 




The Magistrate reads himself:  Torturer or witness.   
 
 Similar inconclusiveness characterises the Magistrate's reading of himself in 
relation to the Barbarian girl: “I behave in some ways like a lover . . . but I might 
equally well tie her to a chair and beat her, it would be no less intimate” (46). He is 
simultaneously “enslaved” by her and “responsible” for her (46, 47). He functions both 
as a torturer in the private sphere, an owner of a sex slave, and carer striving to make 
reparations. The first role implies minimal distance from Joll, even if “full” distance is 
even theoretically impossible: “[W]ho am I to assert my distance from him? I eat with 
him, I drink with him . . . I afford him every assistance as his letter of commission 
requests, and more” (6). During the encounter with the tortured boy, the Magistrate's 
charitable gesture is clouded by such lack of “distance”: “I cannot pretend to be any 
better than a mother comforting a child between his father’s spells of wrath. It has not 
escaped me that an interrogator can wear two masks, speak with two voices, one harsh, 
one seductive” (8). For the boy, they both represent the same power. 
 Such political affiliation with Joll threatens to become personal in his 
relationship with the Barbarian girl. Indeed, there are suggestions of the impact of 
politics on the Magistrate’s sexual life and of sexuality on his political stance. His 
offer of a place to sleep and of work (“to . . . tidy, to see to my laundry”) as a 
replacement for the “not satisfactory” cleaner (28) is a badly disguised proposition that 
is thus understood: “She understands what I am offering. She sits very stiff, her hands 
in her lap” (28). Her understanding of his language does not get reciprocated in his 
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understanding of her body: her gesture, a bodily self-definition of herself, escapes him: 
“‘You do not understand. You do not want someone like me’ . . . ‘I am ...’ – she holds 
her forefinger, grips it, twists it . . . ‘Can I go?’” (29). On his second attempt, the 
sexual nature of his proposal is clearer:79 
‘This is not what you think it is,’ I say. The words come reluctantly. Can I 
really be about to excuse myself? Her lips are clenched shut, her ears too no 
doubt, she wants nothing of old men and their bleating consciences. I 
 prowl around her, talking about our vagrancy ordinances, sick at myself . . . 
The distance between myself and her torturers, I realize, is negligible; I 
shudder. (29) 
 
Their relationship consists in attempts to read her body, endowed with the hope of 
learning the truth. The hope that it can be uncovered is, however, repeatedly thwarted.  
 The girl's mutilation is of main interest: “Show me what they have done to your 
feet” (29). Her passivity allows the Magistrate to explore her body: “I work at the 
thongs and eyelets of the coat . . . pull the boots off . . . Inside them her feet are 
swaddled, shapeless . . . They are broad, stubby, the nails crusted with dirt” (29-30).80 
The examination of her feet (“That is where it was broken. The other one too” (30)), is 
followed by washing: 
I wash slowly, working up a lather, gripping her firm-fleshed calves, 
manipulating the bones and tendons of her feet, running my fingers between 
her toes. I change my position to kneel not in front of her but beside her, so 
that, holding a leg between elbow and side, I can caress the foot with both 
hands. (30) 
 
                                                 
79
 Some critics disregard the Magistrate’s sexual motives altogether. Penner, for example, sees in the 
Magistrate nothing more than an “essentially benevolent master” of the girl (79). 
80
 For a theoretical account of torture-induced passivity see: R. B. Ullman and D. Brothers The 
Shattered Self: A Psychoanalytic Study of Trauma (1988) or Shirley Spitz “The Psychology of Torture” 
(1989).    
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Biblical imagery mingles with sexual undertones: caritas and sexuality are 
simultaneously suggested, but neither motivation is dominant. Her “large, puffy, 
shapeless” feet with the “skin scarred purple” (31) are examined in what becomes a 
daily “ritual of washing” (32) that later extends to her whole body:  
I wash her feet, her buttocks . . . I wash her armpits. I wash her belly, her 
breasts . . . I rub her body with almond oil. I close my eyes and lose myself in 
the rhythm of the rubbing . . . [I]n the very act of caressing her I am overcome 
with sleep as if poleaxed, fall into oblivion sprawled upon her body, and wake 
an hour or two later dizzy, confused, thirsty. (32-33) 
 
 The girl's passivity (“she is patient,” “yields to everything,” “slips off to sleep 
before I am even finished” (32-33)) does not contrast with the Magistrate's activity: his 
lack of desire (“My soapy hand travels between her thighs, incuriously, I find” (32)) 
and charitable impulse (“I spread a blanket over her, and a second blanket” (32)) do 
not escape his attention.81 His fetishism invites allegorical reading as a psychosomatic 
revolt against the Empire.82 In Freud, fetishism stems from castration anxiety, whereby 
a fetish functions as a “substitute for the woman’s (mother’s) phallus” which the 
subject “once believed in and does not wish to forgo” (Freud 199). Originating in a 
denial designed to protect from the possibility of loss, fetishism involves the 
construction of an imaginary unconscious compromise: 
In this world of psychical reality the woman still has a penis in spite of all, but 
this penis is no longer the same as it once was. Something else has taken its 
place, has been appointed as its successor . . . and now absorbs all the interest 
which formerly belonged to the penis. (200) 
                                                 
81
 The closest they get to a sexual intercourse in this part is when the Magistrate “rest[s] [his fingers] on 
her sex . . . and begin[s] to caress her.” She soon “push[es] [his] hand away” and the Magistrate 
“experience[s] no excitement” (47). See 32, 35, 36.   
82
 Given that, for Dovey, the Magistrate represents “the liberal humanist writer” (216), his 




In a fetishist, the fear of castration is “ward[ed] . . . off” by “creating the fetish” (201). 
If so, the Magistrate’s fear of castration, successfully overcome and latent, resurfaces 
upon his encounter with the Barbarian girl. While the “normal prototype of all fetishes 
is the penis of the man” (204), the Magistrate’s fetish becomes the girl's feet, her scars, 
and her entire body that is denied fully human status: “The thought of the strange 
ecstasies I have approached through the medium of her incomplete body fills me with 
a dry revulsion, as if I had spent the night copulating with a dummy of straw and 
leather” (50). As Freud relates sexuality to violence, the girl bears the mark of two 
mutilations: once as a woman, in the unconscious, and as a victim of torture. The 
Magistrate's lack of desire is suggested as a result of an unconscious equivalence of 
penetration and aggression: it is thus an act of differentiation from Joll aiming at 
widening the distance “between [himself] and her torturers,” that is once seen as 
“negligible” (29).83 According to Quayson, the fact that disability “short-circuits 
desire” happens precisely because the origin of the girl's mutilation is “traceable to the 
regime of state-sponsored violence and torture to which the Magistrate has 
inadvertently subscribed” (226). The feelings of guilt are metaphorised as repulsion 
towards the dehumanised “obstinate, phlegmatic body” (45)) and “resentment” against 
the “bondage to the ritual of oiling and rubbing, the drowsiness, the slump into 
                                                 
83
 Dovey invokes Girard to present the Magistrate's desire as mediated by Joll, and his failure to recall 
the girl's body prior to torture as a result of his failure to have his desire “unmediated by the oppressor” 
(239). While this is a useful reading, I suggest reading his actions not as mediated but equivalent and the 
public sphere (torture) as having its equivalent in the private sphere (sexual slavery). Dovey claims, the 
Magistrate has “explicit recognition of the way in which he has allowed his desire to be mediated” (240) 
and she sees his “complicity” only in “the way in which his desire has been mediated by the oppressor” 
(244). This does not account for his clear admission of complicity (“envy, pity, cruelty, all 
masquerading as desire”) and his “confused and futile gestures of expiation” (Waiting 135).   
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oblivion . . . I become withdrawn, irritable . . . I shudder with revulsion” (44-45). The 
impotence (not knowing “what to do with the woman in his bed” (63)) is initially 
overcome through “reassuring experiment[s]” (47) with a prostitute, although the 
effect of the barbarian girl is soon overwhelming: “The evening has been a failure, the 
current of renewed desire is broken” (50). The “bird woman” carries no guilt of 
complicity in mutilation. With her “odour of orange-blossom,” the world of “soft bird-
like flurries” and “suave pleasures,” the “elegance of her tiny body” contrasts with the 
“incomplete” (45) Barbarian girl. 
 The equation of sex and torture, and of himself and Joll, are expressed in a 
passage navigating between container and surface imagery: “with this woman it is as if 
there is no interior, only a surface across which I hunt back to and forth seeking entry. 
Is this how her torturers felt hunting their secret, whatever they thought it was?” (46).84 
Seeing in her “as much a prisoner as ever before” (60) the Magistrate accepts his guilt:  
‘What do I have to do to move you?’: these are the words I hear in my head . . . 
Does no one move you?’; and with a shift of horror I behold the answer that 
has been waiting all the time offer itself to me in the image of a face masked by 
two black glassy insect eyes from which there comes no reciprocal gaze but 
only my doubled image cast back at me. (47) 
 
The recognition of the lack of distance between the “dark cellars” and his bed (47-48) 
is made more complex when the Magistrate factors in his charitable motives: 
I gave the girl my protection, offering in my equivocal way to be her father. 
But I came too late, after she had ceased to believe in fathers. I wanted to do 
what was right, I wanted to make reparation: I will not deny this decent 
                                                 
84
 Such equivalence is highlighted by the suggestiveness of the language: the Magistrate “interrogate[s] 
[his] desire” and penetration (“pierc[ing] the surface”) is followed by descriptions of torture as 
“burn[ing],” “tear[ing]” and “hack[ing]” one's way “into the . . . body of the other” (46). Another is the 
location of the torture chamber in the granary, a place of sexual liaisons (13).  
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impulse, however mixed with more questionable motives: there must always be 
a place for penance and reparation. (88) 
 
The Magistrate's role in relation to the girl remains unreadable: it is never clear 
whether he is her “guardian albatross” or a “coward crow afraid to strike while its prey 
yet breathes” (89). 
 
The Magistrate reads himself: victim.  
 
  In pain, the Magistrate interrogates his identity, politics, and ethics. Yet, 
despite numerous suggestions of the centrality of body-limit experience, pain and its 
effects fail to translate into communicable discourse. The novel wavers between the 
suggestions of the body's meaningfulness – where the Magistrate's failure to read it is 
individual and has with no wider 'metaphysical' significance – and the suggestions that 
the body means nothing beyond itself, in which case his failures stem from the 
allegorical, and projected, nature of the “meaning.” 
 His arrest results from the wilful mistranslation of his visit to the barbarians 
(85), of his advice to Joll (12-13) and his criticism (54). Solitary confinement in 
darkness dehumanised him: he “shield[s] [himself] against the light when . . . the door 
is flung open” (86-87). Dirt reduces him to the body: he attracts cockroaches “lured by 
. . . this fountain of flesh giving off its multifarious odours of life and decay” (87). 
Voice becomes alien (“lips feel slack and useless”) and he turns into an animal 
“guzzl[ing] [his] food like a dog,” feeling “bestial life” turning him “into a beast” (87). 
While the cries of past victims “beat[ing] from wall to wall” do not “materialize” (87), 
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the physical proximity to them brings renewed attempts at understanding. Without the 
“freedom to make of the girl whatever [he] felt like . . . at whim, because [he] had no 
duty to protect her save what it occurred to [him] to feel from moment to moment” 
(86), he feels more empathetic: he imagines her as a child “brought in here and hurt 
before her father’s eyes; who watched him being humiliated before her, and saw that 
he knew what she saw,” but he still “shrink[s] from the details of what went on in 
here” (88). 
 The Magistrate's identity dissolution begins with being turned into a “beast or a 
simple machine” (93). Clinging to humanity involves desperate action: pacing, 
counting, “rush[ing] around the cell jerking [his] arms about, pulling [his] beard, 
stamping [his] feet” (93). The reduction to the body is implied through descriptions of 
the stench and diarrhoea. Abstract concepts are traced to their origin in bodily 
experience: “What freedom has been left to me? The freedom to eat or go hungry; to 
keep my silence or gabble to myself or beat on the door or scream . . . I am now no 
more than a pile of blood, bone and meat that is unhappy” (93). Animalised, his 
stomach rumbles “like a cow’s,” the guard attends to his “animal needs” (97). In this 
“misery of being simply a body” (96), there is a constant emphasis on the body: “I 
smell of shit . . . The flies follow me everywhere, circling around the appetizing sore 
on my cheek” and on animality “movement of my hand has become as automatic as 
the flick of a cow’s tail” (127). The body also brings relief: when he “rest[s] [his] hand 
on his [the boy’s] shoulder” (94) at times he is fed, he feels the “healing power of the 
touch run through a body grown stiff with unnatural solitude” (101). After two months, 
the short-lived escape to the bird-woman is motivated more by the craving for touch 
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than by hopes for freedom (105). Feeling “the faint afterglow of her warmth” on her 
bed, “bury[ing] [his] face in the fragrance of her clothes” (101) provide a metonymic 
closeness to the body.85  
 The transition from an observer to a participant in pain is occasioned by the 
“patriotic bloodlust” (114): the public flogging of new prisoners.86 The sight inspires 
bodily reaction: the spectators “drink in the sight of these big naked men being 
beaten,” their faces respond with “curiosity so intense that their bodies are drained by 
it and only their eyes live, organs of a new and ravening appetite” (115), they “press 
forward to take a turn” at beating (116). 
 The notion of evil as infection is raised when both the spectators' gaze and the 
Magistrate's non-involvement (“stop[ping] [his] ears to the noise”) result in being 
“contaminated by the atrocity” (114). While the avoidance of being “poison[ed] . . . 
with impotent hatred of . . . perpetrators” might suggests remaining “in his heart . . . 
not a barbarian” (114), it is a repetition of the Magistrate's earlier failure to hear cries 
of torture. His confused intervention results in pain: though insignificant, it 
symptomatically triumphs over words and renders his views on morality inexpressible. 
His attempt to breach the gap between language and bodily experience and represent 
the moral implications of inflicting pain fails when the Magistrate utters disconnected 
phrases (117) and is silenced: “What I wanted to say next I cannot remember . . .  I 
pursue the thought but it eludes me like a wisp of smoke” (118). Pain destroys 
language (“Words fail me” (117)) not allowing the expression of his visceral “twinges 
                                                 
85
 This fetishistic metonymy is repeated in the the Master of Petersburg in the smelling of the white suit.  
86
 Coetzee does not refrain here from the representation of suffering describing the “loop of wire [that] 
runs through the flesh of each man’s hands and and through holes pierced in his cheeks” (113). 
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of doubt” (118). More significantly, it destroys his beliefs: even later his ethical 
position does not account to more than the “archaic code of gentlemanly behaviour 
towards captured foes” and opposition to “the new science of degradation that kills 
people on their knees, confused and disgraced in their own eyes” (118). 
 While confinement reduces the Magistrate to animal, bodily, existence,87 pain 
provides invitation to allegorise the body through suggestions of its essential 
“certainty” against doubt. Thus, abstract notions of ethics and justice disappear when 
the “head is gripped and a pipe is pushed down its gullet and pints of salt water are 
poured into it.” The irony (“They came to my cell to show me the meaning of 
humanity, and in the space of an hour they showed me a great deal” (126)) can be 
partly dispelled when his words are read as foregrounding embodiment, and 
highlighting the primacy of what the Magistrate and barbarians have in common 
(suffering body), rather than their contingent differences. Their humanity (the 
“essence” of being human) consists in embodiment; the fullest understanding of this 
fact is gained in pain, in Mandel's inhuman “lesson in humanity” (127). 
 Mock execution takes such lessons to the extreme. Drawing on castration 
symbolism (the Magistrate, wearing a “woman’s calico frock” is told to “behave like a 
man” (128)), it reduces him to his instinctual core: his bowels “turn to water” (128-
129), his heart is “hammering,” he breaks down and his last words express a basic 
idea: “with the nausea of cowardice in my mouth, I say: ‘I want to live . . .  To live and 
live and live. No matter what’” (130).  
                                                 
87
 The animal metaphors used here echo previous descriptions of the girl thus uniting them in pain. Her 
scar “as though a caterpillar lay there with its head . . . grazing” (33) is akin to his: “The wound on my 
cheek . . .  is swollen and inflamed. A crust like a fat caterpillar has formed on it” (125).  
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 Up to this point, the Magistrate's abstract theorizing has turned to nothing when 
pain uncovered the gap between language and the body. This time, the text invites 
allegorical interpretation by including a vision whose ambiguity uncovers the practical 
difficulty of literal reading. Part illumination, part hallucination, the vision arrives at 
the moment of expected death. It begins when the primacy of body has been 
established, and the language destroyed. It suggests unmediatedness and immediacy of 
truth as the vision stems from the blended space of the speaking body: 
I try to call out something, a word of blind fear, a shriek, but the rope is now so 
tight that I am strangled, speechless. The blood hammers in my ears. I feel my 
toes lose their hold. I am swinging gently in the air, bumping against the 
ladder, flailing with my feet. The drumbeat in my ears becomes slower and 
louder till it is all I can hear. (131)  
 
In the moment of imminent death, Coetzee suggests the language of the body speaking 
the “truth” through a vision:  
I am standing in front of the old man, screwing up my eyes against the wind, 
waiting for him to speak . . .  
I watch his lips. At any moment now he will speak: I must listen carefully to 
capture every syllable, so that later, repeating them to myself, poring over 
them, I can discover the answer to a question which for the moment has flown 
like a bird from my recollection . . .  
 The girl . . . too is waiting for him to speak.  
I sigh. ‘What a pity,’ I think. ‘It is too late now.’ (131-132) 
 
After situating him “face to face” with “truth,” and intimating an imminent revelation, 
the novel breaks any expectations by the intrusion of the mundane: “I am swinging 
loose. The breeze lifts my smock and plays with my naked body. I am relaxed, 
floating. In a woman’s clothes” (132). The eyes of the barbarian chieftain turn into the 
“blue eyes of Mandel,” and another ordeal begins: 
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I feel a terrible tearing in my shoulders as though whole sheets of muscle are 
giving way. From my throat comes the first  mournful dry bellow . . . the noise 
comes out of a body that knows itself damaged perhaps beyond repair and roars 
its fright. (132-133) 
 
This suggestion of the body as only literal, which breaks the vision, is in turn rejected 
by the suggestion of the partly figurative notion of “body language.” For Scarry this is 
the “destruction of language,” “the moment when pain causes a reversion to the pre-
language of cries and groans” (Scarry 6). The ironic comment treating the screams as 
“barbarian language” (133) can be taken as true. Dominic Head states that “[b]y Joll’s 
logic . . . this would make the barbarian language the language of truth, since it is 
heard, here, as the tone of pain” (J.M. Coetzee 82). The dismissal of such language “as 
Other” can be true as well, but the 'Otherness' Head posits is not merely “barbarian,” 
but relates to the otherness of language and the body (82). The Magistrate experiences 
true history inscribed on his body and unmediated by the official discourse. Crucially, 
there is no record of his ordeal: “you are not a prisoner . . . How can you be a prisoner 
when we have no record of you?” (137). His ordeal is officially non-existent with only 
his body bearing proof. While Gallagher points out that Coetzee “suggests the power 
of the written record to obscure the origins of oppression” (A Story 120), it has to be 
remembered that he also suggests reading the body as resisting language and bearing 






Body knowledge: morality 
 
 There are problems, however, in reading the body as trustworthy and 
unmediated, and physical evidence as resisting misreadings. Indeed, while language 
originates in the body and every language record partakes in the body's materiality, the 
truth of the body is silent without language. That the two are not entirely opposed is 
clear on the example of ancient slips which are both immediate and mediated. In the 
scene of interrogation, his deciphering of the script is analogical to his reading of the 
girl's scars. The “translation” uncovers both the absurdity of the charge and problems 
inherent in language accounts. Interpreted as letters describing a situation akin to 
recent events in the fort, they are presented as allegorical: they can be read “as a 
domestic journal,” “as a plan of war” or “turned upside down . . . as a history of the 
last years of the Empire” (122). Individual signs are similarly ambiguous: “It is the 
barbarian character war, but it . . . can stand for vengeance, and . . . it can be made to 
read justice. There is no knowing which sense is intended” (122). While this 
'translation' problematises misreadings in language, it does so on the example of 
physical evidence, suggesting the inescapable mediatedness of expressing physical 
experience, the potential for misreadings, and the ephemerality of physical evidence 
(the slips fall apart). Those problems become central in the Magistrate's life post-
torture, in his attempts to verbalise his experience.  
 Regaining freedom, the Magistrate moves from the life of a “filthy creature 
who . . . licked his food off the flagstones like a dog” (136) to slow acceptance: people 
are soon eager to hear his story (“[a] fool in love is always laughed at but in the end 
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always forgiven”), allowing him to “sing[] for [his] keep” (139). His scars make them 
“surreptitiously fascinated” (140), but the expressed story of pain (141) fails to do 
justice to his experience. The listeners’ failure to grasp pain renders his a narrative of 
“half-truths” (139). 
 The first “lesson” concerns food: hunger becomes his main fear after the stay in 
prison where all his thoughts were directed “to food”: “I lived from one mealtime to 
the next. There was never enough . . . I bolted my food like a dog and wanted more” 
(140). The change is lasting: he spends his days thinking of food, wanting to be fat, 
“never to know hunger again,” “woo[ing]” and “flatter[ing]” to secure it (142). This is 
a recognition of the fragility of the body and the priority of its needs. 
 The second change concerns the Magistrate's attitude to sex. During his ordeal 
he foregrounded the soothing quality of touch: dreams of women were dreams of 
“someone who would come . . . and take the pain away” (140). The bird woman 
offered “sympathy” and “kindness,” comfort beyond what language can express 
(“what can I possibly say?”), and a haven “away from the empire of pain” (24).   
 The initial spells of impotence coincide with the appearance of the Barbarian 
girl and while they are not seen as age-related, their cause escapes him: “It is not that 
something is . . . happening to me that happens to some men of a certain age . . . but 
time has broken, something has fallen upon me from the sky, at random, from 
nowhere” (46-47). The continued interest in the bird-woman (“I drift into erotic 
reverie, grow hot and swollen . . . linger over her body” (48)), leads him to the 
examination of his sexual history: from the times when “easy morals of the frontier” 
turned him into a “well-fed prize boar” through the increased interest in “work . . . 
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hobbies . . . cartography” (48) to the obsessive marvelling at the oddity of sex (50). 
David Attwell has offered a Barthesian reading of the Magistrate's two relationships: 
 The “bird-woman” is readerly, giving herself over to the agency of the 
 Magistrate; the barbarian girl is writerly, admitting no access to an imagined, 
 fecund essence. So the barbarian girl will simply not be delivered up to the 
 Magistrate’s probings; her otherness cannot be domesticated. (J.M. Coetzee 79) 
 
However, the bird-woman can also be thought of as writerly and admitting no access 
to her “essence.” The Magistrate remains on the level of her “playacting” and her 
“performance;” he is interested only in “[his] own pleasure” (50). He enjoys “be[ing] 
lied to” (45), and does not care if she “believes in the role she plays” (49-50). She 
offers him not a readerly body, but the illusion of readability: his reading does not 
concern her “essence” but a surface appearance of a show staging of its own 
“authenticity.” The Magistrate’s surprise at her departure “with her fellow” (140), 
making him feel “as if something had struck [him] . . . in the breast. A blow” (141) 
comes from the realization of having been denied access to her true identity. I would 
like to suggest that most bodies in Coetzee's novels are “writerly,” all thwart attempts 
at appropriation even if they are suggested as readerly.       
 The bird woman is sometimes a distraction and sometimes a creature allowing 
“floating into . . . oblivion,” a “whip[ing] out” of “senseless hesitancy.” Their liaisons 
leave him with the “mind washed . . .  blank,” having to “reinsert [himself] into time 
and space” with “a deliberate effort” (69-71). The Magistrate sees his later lack of 
interest as a “matter of age, of cycles of desire and apathy in a body that is slowly 
cooling and dying” (49). This explanation overlooks the role of the Barbarian girl, the 
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suggested links between sexuality and aggression, or the envy at being unable to 
“engrave [him]self upon her [the barbarian girl] as deeply” as Joll (148).  
 With time, sex with the bird woman brings “guilty feelings” (60). This is 
followed by taking the Barbarian girl back to her people. The ambiguity half-invites 
reading this as somatization of the Magistrate's refusal to participate in the crimes of 
the Empire, but such reading appears to be both rejected and supported. On the one 
hand, an accidental bumping into the girl in his dream is is too weak to hurt her and is 
followed with “I need not have been anxious after all” (149). On the other hand, there 
is a repeated self-interrogation of himself as a torturer driven by sadistic impulses. 
 Similarly ambiguous is the Magistrate's attitude to his body. Desire is seen as a 
non-intentional burden (163). His erections are “an irritation” or “like rheumatism” 
(164). His visit to a herbalist and figurative herbal “castration” might be read as a 
moral rebellion against the Empire and a refusal to participate in its scheme. Ironically, 
as evasion, the act is reminiscent of the passivity of closing his ears in the previous 
position of non-involvement. But such reading is immediately questioned: the 
Magistrate drinks the concoction “half-heartedly, aware that [he is] misinterpreting the 
signs” (164).  
 
Body knowledge: The Empire and Politics 
 
 Torture brings an increased awareness of history. His meditation begins with a 
vision of immersion, part of surface and depth imagery: “I wade deeper, parting the 
reeds with my hands, feeling the cool slime between my toes; the water, holding the 
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warmth of the sun longer than the air, resists, then gives away, before each stride” 
(145). The vision receives an immediate reading: “I am not unaware of what such 
daydreams signify . . . Without exception they are dreams of ends: dreams not of how 
to live but of how to die. And everyone, I know, in that walled town sinking now into 
darkness . . . is similarly preoccupied” (146). With the exception of children,88 
everyone inevitably shares the imperial understanding of history: 
Empire has created the time of history. Empire has located its existence not in 
the smooth recurrent spinning time of the cycle of the seasons but  in the 
jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe. Empire 
dooms itself to live in history and plot against history. One thought alone 
preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, 
how to prolong its era. (146)  
 
The structure of the Empire involves, as in Cavafy’s poem, the existence of an enemy 
to justify and sustain it. The Empire is thus built on the “pyramid of bones” (146), its 
officers “reach the top only by climbing a pyramid of bodies” (92). The metaphor 
becomes literal when the inhabitants find that the fort is built on old graves, perhaps 
poisoning their water (162-163).89 
 The recognition of one's role in history is more confused. On the one hand, the 
Magistrate perceives himself more as Joll's double: “I was not, as I liked to think, the 
indulgent pleasure-loving opposite of the cold and rigid Colonel. I was the lie that 
Empire tells itself when times are easy, he the truth that Empire tells when harsh winds 
blow. Two sides of Imperial rule, no more, no less” (148-149). The lie of the belief in 
                                                 
88
 According to the Magistrate, children believe in in the order and never-ending cycles of nature. His 
Barbarian lover is repeatedly referred to as a “girl” in his story and appears as child in his dreams. The 
recurrent image of a barbarian child shaping the unpopulated Empire, and the Magistrate's attempts to 
see her face, invite non-literal readings in their ambiguity.  
89
 This is a change from the opening passages of the novel where the Magistrate claims “There are no 
human remains among the ruins. If there is a cemetery we have not found it” (16).  
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peace contrasts with the truth of colonialism; the belief in peaceful border relations 
with a clear demarcation of who is of the empire and who is barbarian. His lie is made 
more pronounced by the suggestion that his dislike of Joll makes him downplay the 
threat of barbarian attack. But his lesson is one of confusion: “I seduced myself, taking 
one of the many wrong turnings I have taken on a road that looks true but has 
delivered me into a heart of the labyrinth” (149). The lessons of pain do result in 
learning: he sees in an “unteachable” core at the centre of each human being (157):  
No one truly believes . . . that the world of tranquil certainties we were born 
into is about to be extinguished. No one can accept that an Imperial army has 
been annihilated by men with bows and arrows and rusty old guns who live in 
tents and never wash and cannot read or write. (157) 
 
 Confusion characterises the Magistrate’s relation to justice. He admits to some 
form of ethical intellectualism in the past: “We cannot just do as we wish . . . We are 
all subject to the law, which is greater than any of us. The Magistrate who sent you 
here, I, myself, you – we are all subject to the law . . .” (152). The Platonic dichotomy 
of the “world of laws” and the “world of second-best” (152), previously went 
unquestioned: “I had no doubt . . . then, that at each moment each one of us, man, 
woman, child, perhaps even the poor old horse . . . knew what was just: all creatures 
come into the world bringing with them the memory of justice” (152). He also 
understands evil as uncleanness and infection, but also believes in visceral and 
instinctual recognition of what is good and evil bad (138). From this perspective, 
however, Joll and Mandel remain inexplicable, and he admits how devoid of 
conviction his past occupation was: “‘When some men suffer unjustly,’ I said to 
myself, ‘it is the fate of those who witness their suffering to suffer the shame of it.’ But 
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the specious consolation of this thought could not comfort me” (153). It is forever 
unclear whether he reads his ordeal as “bearing the shame” for the suffering of 
barbarian prisoners.  
 One other effect of torture is the strengthening of his love for the land. The 
novel repeatedly suggests meaning in nature. The lesson provided by pain is thus of a 
visceral and emotional link and connection to the land, reminiscent of the cord 
experienced by K (145). Such connection offers protection (“I have walked this road . . 
. and come to no harm”), while the body has the power to detect possible danger: “If 
there were strangers [barbarian soldiers] here I would feel it in my bones” (145). Such 
love of the land constitutes a return to an untenable philosophy of peaceful coexistence 
(“peace at any price” (15)) questioned earlier. It naturally contrasts with rational 
knowledge of the Empire or recognition of its precariousness on barbarian land. The 
Magistrate oscillates between his self-professed naivete and a more rational assessment 
of reality, never really choosing one position over the other, disregarding their 
incompatibility, lost and confused as ever.  
 
Voice of Illumination 
 
 The Magistrate actively searches for an unmediated illumination of the truth 
that lies beyond his reasoning. The “answer” to the unspoken question are often felt to 
be immediate and present, and because they are never expressed, they disturb literal 
reading and invite allegorical interpretations. During his stroll in the desert, musing on 
history, he is described as “waiting for spirits from the byways of history to speak to 
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him” (17), trying to find in the “vacuousness of the desert a special historical 
poignancy” (18). This hope is akin to the medical officer's waiting for “transfiguration 
in which pattern is born from chaos and history manifests itself in all its triumphant 
meaning” (Life 158), and K's anticipation of the voice. In the Magistrate's case, the 
voice refuses to appear in the analysis of the ancient script, through proximity to 
barbarian ruins, and the torture chamber. Several passages, however, suggest potential 
for non-literal meaning without specifying it. During a hunting excursion90 when he 
comes upon a waterbuck, it is not literal hunting but the potential for the grasping of 
the suggested mystery that is foregrounded: 
With the buck before me suspended in immobility, there seems to be time for 
all things, time even to turn my gaze inward and see what it is that has robbed 
the hunt of its savour: the sense that this has become no longer a morning’s 
hunting but an occasion on which either the proud ram bleeds to death on the 
ice or the old hunter misses his aim; that for the duration of this frozen moment 
the stars are locked in a configuration in which events are not themselves but 
stand for other things. (42-43)91 
 
The precise meaning of the invited allegory in which “events” are not to be read 
literally but as “stand[ing] for other things” is never explained. The meaningful yet 
inexpressible experience induces visceral feelings of “of not living [his] own life on 
[his] own terms” (43). The Magistrate's body experiences something “significant,” 
whose significance does not extend beyond the fleeting moment of corporeal 
experience. This suggests the dichotomy between the world of the experiencing 
subject and the world of the onlooker, the metaphysical gap or rupture between them. 
                                                 
90
 The Magistrate's reverence for nature is contrasted with its lack in Joll: “thousands of deer, pigs, bears 
were slain, so many that a mountain of carcases had to be left to rot” (1). The image also invokes the 
“pyramid of bodies” of the Empire's enemies (92).     
91
 Compare with K's lesson that there is “time enough for everything” (Life 182-183) analysed later in 
this chapter.     
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It also suggests the constant movement towards the ultimate knowledge, and away 
from it. The repeated suggestion that the meaning is “out there” and can be viscerally 
felt and the constant refusal to verbalise its content function as invitation to allegory 
and an accompanying refusal to accept any particular reading. Such tension is achieved 
suggesting the gap between language and body, or surface and depth, an event and its 
“deeper” meaning, where the narrative progresses in the logic of two-way movement 
promising the revelation of truth and constantly deferring it. Coetzee's fiction is thus 
allegorical (in that it cannot be read merely as literal) without being specifically 
allegorical (in that it invites an infinite number of interpretations without supporting 
and but rather suggesting incompleteness, misreading and reductionism inherent in 
each of them). Further, it is self-consciously allegorical by staging an allegory, and by 
self-reflexively addressing the question of metaphors, allegories and meanings hidden 
in “containers” and written on “surfaces” of people, events, and ideas.  
 The gap between language and the body is obvious in the emphasis on the 
former's misleading nature: torture is rendered as “investigations” (9), Joll's escape is 
described as a “temporary measure” or a “general cessation of operations” (154-155). 
In his search, what the Magistrate learns concerns only the body: its incompatibility 
with language, its primacy, its capacity for meaning that remains inexpressible other 
than through metaphor (evil is infection etc.). In particular, the Barbarian girl's 
muteness protects her from misreadings.  
 The ancient script has the attributes of both the body and language. Its 
materiality offers the hope of intimacy and, consequently, the truth (16). Its language 
medium thwarts this hope by suggesting the misleading mediatedness. Being the “last 
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magistrate” in a starved town anticipating barbarian attack, the Magistrate finds the 
falsity of language inescapable (168-169). His record for posterity fails to express the 
“lived” truth and turns instead into “disingenuous formulas of colonial pastoralism:” 
(Atwell J.M. Coetzee 76). The truth, as Joll suggested, is to be told in the last 
extremity: “Perhaps by the end of the winter . . . when hunger truly bites us, when we 
are cold and starving, or when the barbarian is truly at the gate, perhaps then I will 
abandon the locutions of a civil servant with literary ambitions and begin to tell the 
truth” (169).  
 The Magistrate's self-definition, like that of K's, comes at the end, and like that 
of the medical officer's, expresses the hope of living “outside the history that Empire 
imposes on its subjects” (169). While as its “lost subject[]” he might acknowledge the 
superiority of the Empire's civilization (“new bread and mulberry . . . gooseberry jam,” 
its agricultural knowledge (169)), he has no comprehension of his role: he “lived 
through an eventful year, yet understand[s] no more of it than a babe in arms” (169). 
As the wooden slips turn to dust when touched, and mislead when translated, the 
Magistrate’s bodily intimations turn to nothing when expressed: “There has been 
something staring me in the face, and still I do not see it” (169). 
 Dick Penner reads the Magistrate as “hyperconscious” characterised by the 
profound self-consciousness and a “will to the truth that saves [him] from an endless 
cycle of double-thought and self-recrimination” (Penner 81). I would like to suggest 
that, on the contrary, there seems no end to the endlessness of his double-thought. The  
pastoral sight of children building a snowman, suggestive of joy and peace, is 
immediately questioned by the Magistrate’s “double-thought”: “This is not the scene I 
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dreamed of. Like much else nowadays I leave it feeling stupid, like a man who lost his 
way long ago but presses on along a road that may lead nowhere” (170).92 Such 
figurative use of the word “road,” and the inexplicable lack of appreciation of this 
return to normality are an invitation to allegorical reading,93 as is the contrast between 
what the text does (presenting his dream vision) and what it says (denying it is his 
dream vision). The novel thus constantly invites interpretation, and, in its two-way 














                                                 
92
 Both the snowman and its lack of ambiguous “arms” could be read in a variety of different ways: as 
an acceptance of embodiment, the foregrounding of body metaphors, the Magistrate's pacifism or 
nothing at all beyond the literal. Dovey sees it as “standing for the self . . . objectified in the narrative” 
and “transient” identity (Dovey 257). Atwell sees the “limited possibility” that the children might 
represent “the future community” (South Africa 87). Gallagher sees in this scene “[t]he final affirmation 
of hope for the future,” where the “sense of hope associated with the next generation is . . . suggested by 
Coetzee’s dedication of the novel to Nicolas and Gisela, his own children” (Gallagher 132-133).  
93
 For Dovey such road allegorically signifies “the impasse with which the liberal novel frequently 
terminates” and “an aporia . . . a feature of a liberal discourse” (257).   
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Life and Times of Michael K  
 
    “Your stay in the camp was merely an allegory, if  
    you know that word. It was an allegory – speaking  
    at the highest level – of how scandalously, how  
    outrageously a meaning can take up residence in a  
    system without becoming a term in it.” (166) 
 
    “It did not seem impossible that whoever it was  
    who . . . might be tired of life . . . and want to take  
    a holiday in the country if he could find a guide  
    who new the roads. They could share a bed   
    tonight . . . and in that way . . . one can live.” (183- 
    184)  
 
 
 The narrator of the second part of the novel shares a lot with the narrator of 
Waiting for the Barbarians: his sympathy for the Other, the fascination with the body, 
and the attempts at solving its “mystery.” The difference lies in the fact that the 
medical officer takes a step further in expressing his projected interpretation and, 
presumably, believing it. The interpretation of K's body is given expression in a vision 
of K as a hero of resistance. 
 Michael K is marked by a speech impediment.94 His mute body suggests a 
“mystery.”95 K lives in the social sphere as a body. The novel's opening concentrates 
                                                 
94
 This device is taken further in Foe. 
95
 K is easily allegorised precisely because of his muteness. For one critic a “figure like Michael K 
makes it possible to say something by saying nothing” (Dovey 268). In her own interpretation, K stands 
for a “mode of writing that would relinquish control over meaning” (296), his story “constitutes an 
allegory of Coetzee's act of writing” (278), while all characters “function only to re-present the 
unconscious self” (277).  
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not on him but on his disability. Referred to as “it” (3), K's contact with people is 
marked by his cleft palate. They refuse to “look him in the face” (32), avert their eyes 
(180), or view him “critically” (29) and “with distaste” (33) fearing his touch (126). 
Others cannot “shift [their] gaze from K's bad mouth” (60), eyes flicker towards his 
face in fascination (172) making it difficult to keep eyes off him (47). Their attention 
is directed at the surface: “the thin moustache and the naked lip flesh it did not hide” 
(20). The dehumanisation also takes the form of animal and bodily metaphors used to 
describe him and his life (“intestines of war” (135)). The animal metaphors and his 
silences that make K “amenable to allegorical interpretation” and facilitate his 
“dissolution into the form of fable, parable, and allegory” contrast with the emphasis 
on his body, hunger, and disability, in other words, his embodied “historicity” 
(Quayson 172). The medical officer who attempts deeper reading aiming to resolve 
this contradiction matches the reader's position through first-person narration, but also 
because K's idiosyncrasies, mental capacity, and third-person objectification hinder 
identification.96 The medical officer's reading of K yields ambiguous result. While the 
novel partly rejects his allegorical reading, such rejection is further undermined. The 
novel thus defers meaning, renegotiating what is true and what is projected, what is 





                                                 
96
 Ato Quayson reads K as exhibiting features of the “autistic spectrum” (147-173). 
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The Medical Officer reads himself 
 
 The medical officer shares the Magistrate's lack of belief in the “cause” (134).97 
He admits responsibility “to [his] patients” (131) but life in the camp consists in 
turning “enemies into friends” (134), having “their thinking set right” (132) and 
“effect[ing] a change in men's souls” (134) through “flag-raising exercises and 
educative chanting” (159). Descriptions of his job express the tension between the 
body and language, between his profession and the role of the camp. Not being 
“experts on the soul,” medics are expected to “assum[e] cautiously that it has some 
connection to the body” (134). The “curing process” is effected through language 
(singing) and through disciplining the body (“pushups and marching back and forth” 
(134)). The linear closure of imminent defeat (“the camp commandant at his desk with 
. . . a bullet through his head” (143)) contrasts with the cyclic pointlessness of the 
present (“the camp will not close down even then, camps with high walls always 
having their uses” (147)), and both visions of history, linear and cyclic, contrast with 
short periods of a-historicity: the “holiday-camp atmosphere”  between cargoes of 
prisoners (152), the cricket matches played and planned “if we are still around” (153). 
 The Medical Officer's problem is being trapped in history and discourse that do 
not fit reality. Life outside history, being forgotten by “the Castle” and left “to play out 
the duration of the war in quiet oblivion behind [the camp's] walls” (152-153) is a 
                                                 
97
 None of the characters believes in it. Visagie, a deserter, believes deserters will soon outnumber the 
soldiers (64-65). The guard in Jakkaaldrif camp considers himself lucky to be diabetic and also aims to 
desert: “They'll never see me again. It's not my war.” His experience is made bearable thanks to alcohol 
and visits from camp women “starved for sex” (86).  
 
 171 
fantasy undercut by reality: its peacefulness is followed by a description of the camp 
changed into an internment camp, suggesting that “[r]ehabilitation . . . is an ideal that 
has failed to prove itself” and that history lacks optimistic closure (154). His feelings 
of “living in suspension,” “alive but not alive” while history hesitates “which course to 
take,” are contrasted to Nurse Felicity's for whom history is a “childhood catechism” 
of facts (158). The desire to understand is unfulfilled: he imagines “currents of time 
swirling and eddying” about him, “tending towards a moment of transfiguration in 
which pattern is born from chaos and history manifests itself in all its triumphant 
meaning.” He is “marooned in a pocket of time, the time of waiting, camp-time, war-
time” (158). By contrast, for the “Felicity” projected by him, time is full and filled 
with work. Initially K is read akin to Felicity: “too busy, too stupid, too absorbed to 
listen to the wheels of history” (158-159), but his unreadability yields different 
readings to which the Medical Officer's belief in transfiguration and meaningful 
patterns born out of chaos contribute.  
 The medical officer's dissatisfaction is awakened by contact with K, develops 
after K's escape, and culminates in an emotional monologue. His doubt prepares the 
ground for the influence of K who, in his passivity and silence, cannot be classified 
according to the enemy / friend dichotomy. The Medical Officer becomes obsessed 
with this mysteriously mute body and the story he believes lies inside. He attempts to 





The Medical Officer reads Michael 
 
 The officer's attention is first gripped by the gap between the immediacy of the 
emaciated body (“prolonged malnutrition: cracks in his skin, sores on his hands and 
feet, bleeding gums. His joints protrude, he weighs less than forty kilos” (129)), and 
the misleading language in which K is described as an “arsonist,” an “escapee from a 
labour camp” who ran a “staging post for insurgents,” and fed the “local guerilla 
population” (130). The gap widens since K looks old for his age, claims to be named 
differently, refuses to eat being “not hungry” (130), and answers in an irrational 
manner.98 The initial reading makes him into not “wholly of our world” and not an 
insurgent: “likely someone came along . . . asked him to look after a gun, and he was 
too stupid or too innocent to refuse” (130). Such interpretation does not explain his 
identity: “They have mixed him up with some other Michaels. This Michaels is an 
idiot. This Michael doesn't know how to strike a match. If this Michael was running a 
flourishing garden, why was he starving to death?” (131).    
 The medical officer's interest develops when K rejects help (“Why fuss over 
me, why am I so important?” (135)) continuing his irregular statements: “I always 
wanted to fly. I used to stretch out my arms and think I was flying over the fences and 
between the houses. I flew low over people's heads, but they couldn't see me” (133)). 
The interest is soon more than just medical (136). His description of K as a stone 
“enveloped in itself and its interior life” (135) suggests a container to be explored.   
                                                 
98
 On his mother: “She makes plants grow” (130). On not eating: “They woke me in the middle of my 
sleep . . . I don't need food in my sleep” (131). 
 
 173 
 K's unwavering refusal to testify (137-138) and his confusing answers99 lead 
the medical officer to further involvement: “So, Michaels, the long and the short of it 
is that by my eloquence I saved you” (142).100 The eloquence consists in wilfully 
mistranslating K's body along the lines expected by the police and the falsification of 
documents to keep them “off [their] backs.” It satisfies the staff's desire for peace, and 
the police's desire for interrogation: “It's not a lie . . . There is probably more truth in 
the story I told you than you would ever get out of Michaels if you used thumbscrews 
on him” (141). The agreement between Noël and the officer that there is “no story to 
be had” leaves the Officer free to investigate the mysterious body. His investigation 
searches for the truth, whereas any police interrogation would search for a proof of 
guilt. He wants to hear language of bodily immediacy, the “substance” (140).     
 The medical officer's reading is based on K's attitude to food. Fed through a 
tube, K's first conscious act is to pull it out with “It's not my kind of food” (145), and 
“I can't eat camp food” (146) as explanation. The void created by the ensuing silence is 
filled by the medical officer's questioning leading him to the assumption of “a protest 
fast” (145). Despite hopes to uncover K's “core,” his readings highlight the medical 
officer's own state of mind, metaphorically expressing his captivation as captivity: 
“You have never asked for anything, yet you have become an albatross around my 
neck. Your bony arms are knotted behind my head, I walk bowed under the weigh of 
you” (146). Soon the officer's reading concentrates on the projected spirit of freedom: 
“Maybe he only eats the bread of freedom” (146). Such an attitude implies the respect 
                                                 
99
 “I am not in the war” (138), “I am not clever with words” (139). Pressed about feeding the insurgents 
he replies: “What grows is for all of us. We are all children of the earth” (138). 
100
 This involvement is denied in conversations with his colleague Noël (“I am not protecting him”).  
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of treating K as a free man: “It would be easy for me to tie you down and strap your 
head and put a tube down your throat and feed you, but I am not going to do that. I am 
going to treat you like a free man, not a child or an animal” (147). However, there is 
no reciprocity: K smiles his “repulsive, sharklike” smile and fails to communicate thus 
allowing no conclusions but inviting a multitude of speculations. Often, such 
speculations disappear with the failure of language in the confrontation with the 
immediacy of the body: “There was something more I had wanted to say, but I could 
not speak. It seemed foolish” (148). This surrender grants importance to K and his 
silence.  
 The medical officer's interest in K concerns his history,101 while his 
interpretation verges on the literary and mythical (“There is nothing we can do to 
rehabilitate you from the vengeful mother with flaming hair who comes to you in your 
dreams” (149)). The explanation of Michael's lack of independence begins with the 
physical and literal but soon turns into metaphorical: “when I think of you carrying 
her, panting under her weight . . . I also think of her sitting on your shoulders, eating 
out your brains, glaring about triumphantly, the very embodiment of great Mother 
Death” (150). This literary excess continues in the image of K as “a stick insect . . . in 
the middle of a great wide flat bare concrete plain” who “raise[s] [his] slow fragile 
stick-legs one at a time . . . inch[es] about looking for something to merge with, and 
there is nothing.” Images like these express K's non-belonging: “Why did you ever 
leave the bushes . . . ? That was where you belonged. You should have stayed all your 
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life clinging to a nondescript bush in . . . an obscure garden . . .  doing whatever it is 
that stick insects do . . . nibbling a leaf here and there . . . drinking dew” (149-150).102 
Metaphorical images are coupled with religious symbolism. The innocent “Am I to 
believe that you lived for a year on pumpkin?” (150) turns into the ambiguous 
(sarcastic or religious) interrogation: “Did manna fall from the sky for you, and did 
you store it away in underground bins for your friends to come and eat in the night? Is 
that why you will not eat camp food – because you have been spoiled forever by the 
taste of manna?” (150-151).  
 The demand for a story has its parallel in the demand for K to eat. The medical 
officer's “Give yourself some substance” (140), applies equally to his attempts to save 
K's body (by making him eat), and saving his story (by making him speak).103 Force-
feeding is rejected as it requires treating K as a “child or an animal,” not a “free man” 
(147) and would be an assault on what the medical officer believes is an admirable 
political stance, life outside history: “only you . . . evading the peace and the war, 
skulking in the open where no one dreamed of looking, have managed to live . . . 
drifting through time, observing the seasons, no more trying to change the course of 
history than a grain of sand does” (151-152).104 His hope of bridging language and the 
body aims to preserve both and requires K's opening his mouth in two senses: “You 
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 While there is a universal agreement that the medical officer's interpretation is a projection, both the 
insect imagery and identity based on the relation to his mother are confirmed by K. Michael. The later 
rejection of Officer's version is not complete, and is further undermined.   
103
 A similar polisemy exists in Foe where “substance” is granted through representation in language,  
but refers equally to being a “real-life” person (rather than a fictional character) and to embodiment, life 
“as a substantial body” (Foe 126).  
104
 Nadine Gordimer sees in Michael K “[a] revulsion against all political and revolutionary solutions.” 
Indeed, she sees K as a figure representing Coetzee: “I don't think the author would deny that it is his 
own revulsion” (qtd in Dovey 53).  
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are going to die and your story is going to die too, forever . . . you are going to perish 
in obscurity and be buried in a nameless hole . . . and no one is going to remember you 
. . . unless you yield and . . . open your mouth” (151-152). 
 The meeting of the two men, as imagined by the Medical Officer begins with 
the description of K's body:   
With Michael it always seemed to me that someone had scuffled together a 
handful of dust, spat on it and patted it into the shape of a rudimentary man, 
making one or two mistakes (the mouth . . . the contents of the head), omitting 
one or two details (the sex),105 but coming up . . . with a genuine little man of 
earth, the kind of little man one sees in peasant art emerging into the world 
from between the squat thighs of its mother-host with fingers ready bent for a 
life of burrowing . . . (161) 
 
 
It develops into the comparison of the two bodies and their potential for freedom 
(“Whereas . . . I am the kind who would be snapped up by the first patrol to pass while 
I yet stood dithering over which way lay salvation”), and soon gives way to regret: 
“The truth is that the only chance I had is gone, and gone before I knew. The night 
Michaels made his break, I should have followed. It is vain to plead that I was not 
ready. If I had taken Michaels seriously I would always have been ready” (161). The 
officer claims he would “never have let him out of sight” (161), and, despite 
difficulties of the road and Michael's suspiciousness (162), the two would meet: 
“Suspiciously, angrily even, you would have waited in the middle of the track for me 
to approach and explain myself” (162).   
 The address to Michael expresses the medical officer's desire for guidance. K, 
the only person able to defy war, is believed to be capable of finding a place outside 
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 Compare with Friday's sexuality in Foe.  
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history, in areas that “lie between the camps and belong to no camp, not even to the 
catchment areas of the camps” (162). Initially seen as a “figure of fun,” incapable of 
being rehabilitated,106 K becomes a “hero of resistance” (163) whose resistance lies in 
passivity: 
 In fact you did not resist at all. When we told you to jump, you jumped. When 
 we told you to jump again, you jumped again. When . . . you . . . collapsed in a 
 heap . . . we could all see, even the most unwilling of us, that you had failed 
 because you had exhausted your resources in obeying us. (163)  
 
 
The medical officer reads K's body as an active, conscious, agent: his body “refuses” 
to accept anything but freedom: “Your will remained pliant but your body was crying 
to be fed its own food and only that” (163-164). If the officer's medical training taught 
him to believe that “the body contains no ambivalence,” that suicide is not “an act of 
the body against itself but of the will against the body,” meeting Michael, he is not 
faced with the body from medical textbooks (one which “wants only to live”) but one 
that possesses a “nature” independent of the mind: “here I beheld a body that was 
going to die rather than change its nature.” Its idiosyncrasy lies in the fact Michael's 
stance is not an expressible intellectual strategy: his fast has no “principle,” and no 
“idea” behind it (164). K's body is interpreted as organically incapable of accepting 
oppression.     
 The feeling that K's body has “meaning” beyond being “another casualty of the 
war, another brick in the pyramid of sacrifice that someone would eventually climb . . . 
announcing himself emperor of all he surveyed” (164)) comes when the medical 
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 “I thought that putting you through . . . rehabilitation would have been like trying to teach a rat or a 
mouse or . . . a lizard to bark and beg and catch a ball” (163).  
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officer detects a “gathering meaningfulness” (165), “a thickening of the air, a 
concentration of darkness, a black whirlwind roaring in utter silence above your body, 
pointing to you, without so much as stirring the edge of the bedclothes” (164). The 
recognition endows K's body with meaning: he is more than “a skin-and-bones man 
with a crumpled lip” (165). The objectivity of such reading is problematic. On the one 
hand, the medical officer strives not to read anything into K, “seeking by the last 
means [he] knew” to “detect the germ of dishonesty at the heart of the conviction” 
(165). He believes objectivity to be possible: “I was not deceiving myself, I was not 
flattering myself, I was not comforting myself . . . it was the truth, there was indeed a 
gathering, a thickening of darkness above one bed alone, and that bed was yours” 
(165). On the other hand, his desire is to tell K “what you mean to me” (166) suggests 
this meaning is to be contingent and private.  
 According to Attridge, the medical officer's talk of projections and allegories 
undermines his credibility and “throw[s] some doubt” both on his reading of K and on 
allegorical readings of the novel (Ethics 34). Yet how much “some” is remains a 
crucial question. His use of the term “allegory” and his introspection might be read as 
implying critical distance, an awareness of the mediated nature of language, even as it 
strives for immediacy. In short, they do not justify the total rejection of his 
interpretation, which would have been the case if the use of “allegory” had remained 
unrealised by the character. Further, even if the novel partly “undermine[s] . . . the 
medical officer's attempts to interpret K” (34) in presenting K as devoid of political 
consciousness, this undermining is itself undermined when K expresses a wish for a 
friend with whom to share his life. While the Medical Officer's and K's ideas may not 
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entirely overlap, there appears to be a partial overlap between the former's desire for 
political peace and the latter's desire to be left in peace.      
 The final definition concerns Michael's freedom, and his body's inability to 
conform: “Your stay in the camp was merely an allegory, if you know that word. It 
was an allegory – speaking at the highest level – of how scandalously, how 
outrageously a meaning can take up residence in a system without becoming a term in 
it” (166). It is unclear what the subsequent image of an “escape artist” signifies: 
whether it implies reading Michael politically or whether it self-consciously refers to 
K's inscrutability and his refusal to be allegorised in the medical officer's conceptual 
“system.” The first reading would naturally support Attridge's idea of the novel 
undermining the medical officer's interpretation. In the second reading, however, K 
undermines the officer's particular interpretation, but supports it on a structural level 
by staging or “performing” an allegory by being a mute body shrugging off all 
readings and thus all allegories. Such body cannot be talked about, and its silence, 
whatever it signifies or refuses to signify, always stands at variance with signification 
in language. 
 A similar problem lies with the medical officer's understanding of K's 
garden:107 
Let me tell you the meaning of the sacred and alluring garden that blooms in 
the heart of the desert and produces the food of life. The garden for which you 
are presently heading is nowhere and everywhere except in the camps. It is 
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 Such ambiguous passages invite easy allegorisations. For Dovey, the “escape artist” is a metaphor of  
“that which eludes the conscious meanings of both writer and reader” (310) whereas the garden and 
areas outside camps are “the nonrepresentable unconscious, which resurfaces and undermines the 
conscious meanings of each successive reading” (311). Head sees in K an “enactment of the 
poststructuralist idea of infinitely deferred meaning” (4).  
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another name for the only place where you belong, Michaels, where you do not 
feel homeless. It is off every map, no road leads to it that is merely a road, and 
only you know the way (166).  
 
The realization of entrapment in allegorical language and metaphorical thought does 
not preclude the belief in K's “depth.” While the idea that Michael “knows” what he 
himself stands for is proven wrong later, the medical officer's distance from his 
interpretation is suggested by his questions: “Am I right? . . . Have I understood you?” 
(167) and his request of a bodily gesture. The novel's epigraph from Heraclitus invites 
the interpretation of the characters along the free / slave dichotomy.108 For the officer, 
K represents freedom from history and from language. The medical officer sees 
himself as slave to history, trapped in the mediatedness of language. His allegorical 
readings are continually doubted, interrogated and questioned and hence cannot be 
easily dismissed. His language fails to bridge the gap between language and the body: 
anything said about K would necessarily be allegorical and lack the body's immediacy.   
 
Michael reads himself 
 
 Michael K experiences the gap between language and the body, and he too 
strives to bridge it by repeated self-definitions and attempts to read his body. The 
immediate foregrounding of the body characterises his first appearance: “The first 
thing the midwife noticed about Michael K . . . was that he had a hare lip” (3). The 
mark leads to his isolation in childhood (3), and in adulthood (“because of his face” K 
does not have “female friends” (4)). His “disfigurement” and the fact that “his mind 
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 “War is the father of all and king of all . . . Some he makes slaves, and others free.” 
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was not quick” (4) means that his education consists in watching his mother “polish 
other people's floors” and “learning to be quiet” (4); or attending a special school 
where he spends time “in the company of other variously afflicted . . . children 
learning the elements of reading, writing, counting, sweeping, scrubbing, bedmaking, 
dishwashing, basketweaving, woodwork and digging” (4).  
 His initial self-definition is inspired by the body, the “torment” (5-6) of his 
mother's pain. The question of purpose, “why he had been brought into the world,” is 
tentatively answered: “to look after his mother” (7). It is hoped the definition is to 
receive further elaboration, that as other “reasons[s]” throughout “all those years” this 
one “would in the end become clear” (8-9). His silent acceptance of his mother's plans 
(9) parallels the silent acceptance of the definitions that visit him and overlaps with the 
picture projected by the Medical Officer.109 His mother's death leads to the crumbling 
of this inner identity by depriving K of the source of self-knowledge and the 
justification of his existence. The created void (“his mind blank” (33)) precipitates the 
failure of language making conversations with the hospital staff impossible.110 
 Such suggestion of emptiness, however, is soon questioned when homeless K 
is presented as having reasons for disregarding the curfew (“[h]e did not believe that 
any harm would come to him; and if would come, it would not matter” (34)) and 
meditates about using the surface of his body to his advantage: wondering whether 
“with his filthy clothes and his air of gaunt exhaustion, he would not be passed over as 
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 While the narrative variously tries to render him a passive “simpleton,” (141, 155, 182) it also 
suggests agency: he talks his mother into leaving early and to use the vehicle he builds.     
110
 “'Do you want to make a phone call?' said the doctor. This was evidently a code for something, he 
did not know what.” (30-31).  
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a mere footloose vagrant . . . too benighted to know one needed papers to be on the 
road, too sunk in apathy to be of harm” (39). Thus he unsuccessfully tries to fake 
stupidity: “If I look very stupid . . . perhaps they will let me through” (40). The period 
of forced labour continues the novel's interest in K's body but does not yield any self-
definitions. These come when K abandons the roads and begins a life “off the land” 
(46), the foundation of his new identity.  
 The descriptions of the growing new identity variously invoke the silent body. 
K is described as drinking in the landscapes and needing no words: “Nothing would 
happen, everything would be the same as the day before, there would be nothing to 
say” (46). His muteness contrasts with language: the experience of the farmer's charity 
does not lead to the verbalization, or the understanding, of the 'meaning' of the 
experience. The farmer's “lesson” (“People must help each other, that's what I 
believe”) is met with silence.111 Although his heart is “full,” and although he wants to 
“utter his thanks,” the words “would not come” (48). This mental separation of the 
physical, immediate experience from its abstract, conceptual interpretations results in 
K's experience of the fragmentariness in language and in thought (“[h]is memories all 
seemed to be of parts, not of wholes” (49)), and consistent with the novel's contrasting 
of the body and language, or the literal and the figurative.  
 K shares with the medical officer the striving for the understanding of meaning, 
for wholeness, and for conclusive definitions. In K's case, this bringing together of the 
body and language is more passive and exists as intimations of some yet undiscovered 
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 This silence is in contrast with K's earlier conviction regarding the inherent goodness of the people: 
“People are decent. People would stop and give them lifts” (18). 
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meaning. These appear as “epiphanies” and lead the reader to expect further 
elaboration. They are experienced by Michael as the voice of matter endowed with the 
ability to explain and to define. Such expectation of meaning appears first during his 
attempt to build a cart: “Something will come to me, he told himself” (16). The second 
occurrence takes place upon his arrival in Prince Albert where his mother wished to 
die:  
he began to be aware of a man's voice rising up to meet him in an even and 
unending monologue  without visible origin. Puzzled, he stopped to listen. Is 
this the voice of Prince Albert? he wondered. I thought Prince Albert was dead. 
He tried to make out words, but though the voice pervaded the air like a mist or 
an aroma, the words, if there were words, if the voice were not only the sweet 
lulling or chanting tones, were too faint or too smooth to hear. Then the voice 
ceased, giving way to a tiny faraway brass band. (49)  
 
The voice is expected during his mother's burial:  
 He . . . concentrated, hoping that a voice would speak reassuring him that what 
 he was doing is right – his mother's voice, if she still had a voice, or a voice 
 belonging to no one in particular, or even his own voice as it sometimes spoke 
 telling him what to do. But no voice came. (58)   
  
 Another reference to the voice occurs when K builds his new identity. Having 
arrived on the farm, his initial the sense of belonging (“Now I am here, he thought. Or 
at least I am somewhere” (52)) is disrupted by his body's reaction to the unnatural act 
of killing.112 The feverish delirium brings mysterious visions merging images of 
illness, childhood and his mother. Bordering on supernatural, these provide ample 
material for interpretation and preclude it at the same time: upon recovery K offers no 
metaphysical or ethical knowledge that the visions suggested. The two-way movement 
introduces the mundane and K's “lesson” denies any validity to figurative readings of 
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 By “unnatural” I mean opposed to his “true” nature he assumes later: that of a gardener, protector of 
life.   
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his illness: “The lesson, if there was a lesson, if there were lessons embedded in 
events, seemed to be not to kill such large animals” (57). In short, after suggesting 
some “inner self” of the body, almost palpable in extreme experience of disease and 
giving rise to ambiguous visions (which cannot be interpreted literally) the text rejects 
any invited figurative readings by returning to the mundane: killing smaller animals. 
However, a rejection of the mundane is also suggested since K's mental capacity might 
portray him as oblivious to suggested “meanings” and undermine the validity of his 
“lessons.” The narration's “the lesson, if there was a lesson” self-reflexively refers to 
its two-way movement: its invitation to interpretation, the rejection of it, and the 
further ambiguity undermining the rejection. The reader can either follow in the 
medical officer's footsteps and read K figuratively or read him literally and see any 
“meaning” of him as projection. It is also possible to accept K as incomprehensible 
and Other, but this approach is similarly invited by the novel's suggestions of the 
existence of deeper meaning and brought about in the navigation between the literal 
and the figurative.   
 The voice is a specific variant of the more general hope of illumination. The 
hope for meaning to emerge is expressed, for example, when K buries his mother's 
ashes unsure of whether he is in the right place:  
He fetched the box of ashes from the house . . . and sat down to wait. He did 
not know what he expected; whatever it was, it did not happen. A beetle 
scurried across the ground. The wind blew. There was a cardboard box 
standing in the sunlight on a patch of baked mud, nothing more. There was 
another step, apparently, that he had to take but could not yet imagine. (57-58) 
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In the absence of illumination, K's discovers his “identity” by chance. His life “as a 
cultivator” is inspired by the burial, “distribut[ing] the fine grey flakes over the earth . . 
.  turning the earth over spadeful by spadeful” (59). The planting and watering of the 
seeds fills him with “deepest pleasure” and serves as a foundation of identity: “It is 
because I am a gardener, he thought, because that is my nature” (59).113 Such self-
recognition produces a “sense of exultation,” while his work allows him to live “by the 
rising and setting of the sun” and “in a pocket outside time” (60).114  
 The second loss of identity is also marked by the failure of K's language: faced 
with Visagie Michael “stumbles” “trying to bring out words,” and feels the “old 
hopeless stupidity invading him” (60). Unlike earlier, however, K formulates a lesson 
(“I let myself believe that this was one of those islands without an owner. Now I am 
learning the truth” (61)) and is also able to reason: “He thinks I am truly an idiot . . . 
who sleeps on the floor like an animal and lives on . . . lizards and does not know there 
is such a thing as money” (62).115 The crisis of language relates to the misleading 
nature of language which fails to express bodily truth. In the sphere of language, 
Visagie's perception of the farm is similar to K's.   
 I am speaking to you as one human being to another. There is a war on, there 
 are people dying. Well, I am at war with no one. I have made my peace. Do 
 you understand? I make my peace with everyone. There is no war here on the 
 farm. You and I can live here quietly till they make peace everywhere. No one 
 will disturb us. Peace has got to come one of these days. (64)  
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 This watering of the field, according to Dovey, “is meant to be read as a metaphor of . . . copulation” 
with the pump “enact[ing] a form of penetration and climax” (293). 
114
 The Medical Officer feels himself in the painful “pocket of time” (158) he wishes to escape, 
presumably into K's “pocket outside time.”  
115
 Indeed, his insight and irony is clear: “A soldier without a gun. A boy on an adventure” (63).  
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While their objectives expressed in language are the same, in lived experience K 
becomes the slave and Visagie the master.116  
 The separation from gardening is rendered by the blended space of an 
emotional “umbilical cord” a “cord of tenderness that stretched from him to the patch 
of earth beside the dam and must be cut” (66).117 The cutting of his link to the land by 
the arrival of Visagie leads to the loss of humanity (66) and the return to fragmented 
identity. Without any stable identity K cannot overcome the fragmentariness of his 
experience. The impulse of the medical officer and the reader to “construct” Michael 
into a meaningful whole produces an image absent in K's self-perception. In fact, the 
narrative negotiates between suggestions of emptiness and literal meaninglessness of 
his life, and the suggestion of a figurative meaning.118 The latter is suggested through 
the juxtaposition of the soil and K's body and in the synchronization of their respective 
changes (67) and by endowing him with “secret” attributes of internal, evolving life: 
 I am becoming a different kind of man, he thought, if there are two kinds of 
 man. If I were cut, he thought, holding his wrists out, looking at his wrists, the 
 blood would no longer gush from me but seep, and after a little seeping dry and 
 heal. I am becoming smaller and harder and drier every day. (67-68).       
 
 Similarly to Waiting . . . the novel presents dehumanisation when the body 
takes primacy and, similarly, descriptions of this state waver between suggestions of 
figurative meaning and deeper significance, and the returns to the literal and mundane. 
Initially, K lives on roots and ant-eggs. He sleeps most of his time, “too tired to move, 
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 Visagie's “I am at war with no one” is later rephrased by K: “I am not in the war” in hospital (138). 
117
 Exactly the same metaphor is used in Master of Petersburg (23). 
118
 “He did not know what was going to happen. The story of his life has never been an interesting one; 
there had usually been someone to tell him what to do next; now there was no one, and the best thing 
seemed to be to wait” (67). 
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or perhaps too lackadaisical” wondering if his state is “what was known as bliss” (68). 
Soon images of deteriorating health waver between the literal: pointing to nothing but 
themselves and foregrounding K's body and the figurative, where the account of 
suffering culminates in a vision: 
The smell of peach-blossom enveloped him. There was a voice too, coming 
from all sides, the calm even voice he had heard the first day he saw Prince 
Albert. He stood at the head of the High Street among the verdant gardens, 
unable to make out a word, though he listened hard, of the distant monotone 
that after a while blended with the twitter of the birds in the trees and then gave 
way to music. (69)  
 
This almost spiritual element is broken by the mundane, the arrest and descriptions of 
K's physicality: “the skeletal figure that sat with its back to the wall rubbing its 
exposed calves,” his dirt, leaving the police “repelled by his smell” (70). The gap 
between language and the body is evident when the police reading finds “debilitation 
and incoherence” attributed to “alcohol poisoning” and issues charges (70). Provided 
with a partly misleading police definition,119 K enters the hospital, the sphere of the 
body (“a place for bodies, where bodies asserted their rights” (71)) and exits that of 
language: struggling with words and incapable of communication (72). Transported to 
the resettlement camp, Jakkalsdrif, K's body receives further attention, while his 
language regresses.120 Asked about his story Michael does not speak “[t]here was a 
silence” and the described thought process is not uttered: “Now I must speak about the 
ashes, thought K, so as to be complete, so as to have told the whole story. But he found 
that he could not, or could not yet” (79).  
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 This definition, however, provides insight into K's ethnicity (70). 
120
 The regression is suggested by his muteness, and by his figurative references to childhood: “I am 
back in Huis Norenius, a second time . . . too old to bear it” (74), “It is like going back to childhood . . . 
it is like a nightmare” (77). 
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 The camp further separates language from the body and provides further 
'education'. The gap exists between what he sees and what he hears about camp's 
comparative leniency (79). It can be found in the disparity between praise and the real 
life of prisoners (80). It lies in the “welfare” offered by the camp that apparently 
everyone wants but no one can refuse: “You climb the fence and I'll shoot you . . . No 
hard feelings. I'm just telling you” (85). The camp provides further 'education': in 
language (through his friend) and in the social sphere.121   
 The stay in the camp contributes to Michael's education about the body. Forced 
labour leads to physical and mental exhaustion, manifest in dreams about the body as 
an abyss into which, losing consciousness, Michael plunges.122 He also learns of the 
pleasure afforded by the body. It is derived from both the acceptance of his links to the 
earth and develops through touch akin to that experienced by the Magistrate:  
 They clambered over him and fell upon him as if he were part of the earth. Still 
 hiding his face, he rolled over and found that he could doze even with little 
 bodies riding on his back. He found unexpected pleasure in these games. It felt 
 to him that he was drawing health from the children's touch. (84)   
 
Another development is a fleeting and unclear interest in a woman from the camp 
making him wonder “whether he was at last in love” (89), and meditations on the 
persistence of the body. The latter meditation is consciously analysed as organically 
growing out of his body, although it might be attributed to another's influence (95). It 
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 K is initially stared at (73), but at one point the guards's gaze leads K to interrogate how he is 
perceived: “What does he see? thought K. What am I to him?” (82). This question is repeated later 
(likely by K): “I ask myself: What am I to this man?” (148)), and by the medical officer: “What am I to 
this man?” (149).  
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 “Sitting . . . he closed his eyes and felt as if he were hurtling through endless empty space” (87). 
Such imagery is common in descriptions of Dostoevsky's epilepsy.   
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is, finally, the sight of death and of a mourning mother, strikingly similar to that in 
Waiting . . . , that provides another intimation of a unified “meaning”:  
 Is this my education? he wondered. Am I at last learning about life here in a 
 camp? It seemed to him that scene after scene of life was playing itself out 
 before him and that the scenes all cohered. He had a presentiment of a single 
 meaning upon which they were converging or threatening to converge, though 
 he did not know yet what that might be. (89)    
 
 The identity of a gardener is regained upon his return to the farm, his “home” 
where he feels he belongs: “I want to live here forever, where my mother and my 
grandmother lived” (99). The return involves the return to animality (“What a pity that 
to live in times like these a man must . . . live like a beast . . . in a hole and hide by 
day”) and dehumanisation of being one with nature: he comes to life bathing in the 
dam “turning his face up like a flower” (99). While K's is repeatedly referred to as part 
of nature, nature itself is frequently anthropomorphized: the hills are “like plump 
breasts, curved towards each other” (100), while the seeds are his “children” (101). K 
knows edible plants “as though he had once been an animal and the knowledge of 
good and bad plants have not died in his soul” (102), and ecstatically experiences “a 
deep joy in his physical being” that involves the feeling of unity: being “both body and 
spirit” (102).  
 The unexplained arrival of insurgents forces him to greater wariness in 
concealing himself and his “children,” exacerbating his nocturnal, and animal status. 
The earth offers the only protection: he “slither[s] towards [his] hole” “like a worm” 
with one thought: “Let darkness fall soon, let the earth swallow me up and protect me” 
(107). The arrival does not, as previously, destroy his identity but strengthens it. A 
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short-lived fantasy of making contact with the men, to “sit with them . . . drinking in 
their words” (109), because “[t]he stories they will tell will be different from the 
stories I heard in the camp” (109) is soon dismissed and Michael restates his self-
definition:  
Yet at the same instant . . . K knew that he would not . . . announce himself. He 
even knew the reason why: because enough men had gone  off to war saying 
the time for gardening was when the war was over; whereas there must be men 
to stay behind and keep gardening alive, or at least the idea of gardening; 
because once that cord was broken, the earth would grow hard and forget her 
children. That was why (109). 
 
 
This passage, repeating the earlier mention of the “cord of tenderness”123 is in 
accordance with the image of K as essentially a gardener but its undermining of his 
conflicting desire for language is not complete. His mention of the “idea” of gardening 
parallels the medical officer's use of the term “allegory”: it self-consciously 
foregrounds textuality rendering K much much more than a simple gardener. 
Secondly, the conviction of being a gardener is weakened by the gap between K's 
language and his body making this definition as prone to error as the medical officer's. 
The emphasis on the language character of K's thoughts might reduce his definition to 
another mistranslation of the previously suggested inexpressible truth in the container 
of the body or might render any of his definitions false constructions. The gap appears 
to be experienced by K himself: 
Between this reason and the truth that he would never announce himself, 
however, lay a gap wider than than the distance separating him from the 
firelight. Always, when he tried to explain himself to himself, there remained a 
gap, a hole, a darkness before which his understanding baulked, into which it 
                                                 
123
 “It seemed to him that one could cut a cord like that only so many time before it would not grow 
again” (66). 
 191 
was useless to pour words. The words were eaten up, the gap remained. His 
was always a story with a hole in it: a wrong story, always wrong. (109-110)  
 
Such suggestion is again undermined by descriptions of K's as a gardener treating his 
plants as his children, of the happiness clear in eating the fruit “the firstborn” 
(dignified by a grace directed at the earth (113)) and felt bodily as a “gush of warm 
water,” “tears of joy” (113), aching with “sensual delight” (113-114). Such unity with 
the natural world comes at the cost of humanity and expressibility: he becomes a 
“creature of twilight and night” unaccustomed to daylight (115). The unity is 
suggested by the animal metaphors describing him, and the anthropomorphisms used 
to describe his surroundings (115-116). Such unity annuls the previous gap between 
the body and language: thinking stops, and all that exists is the body.  
 But if readers are willing to accept that K's body is only literally itself just as 
“rust [is] merely rust” (115) and all other reading as projective, the novel's double 
movement frustrates this position by suggesting figurative meanings. The word used 
by the police about the camp (“a nest of parasites hanging from the neat sunlit town, 
eating its substance, giving no nourishment back”) is now appropriated by K to refer to 
his “parasite” life, making “it [] no longer obvious which [is] host and which parasite, 
camp or town” (116):  “If the worm devoured the sheep, why did the sheep swallow 
the worm? What if there were millions . . . creeping away in corners to escape the 
times, too canny to put out flags and draw attention to themselves . . . ?” (116). K's 
bodily silence (and literalness) is thus broken by figurative language. The feasibility of 
a political interpretation of this meditation may or may not be evident to K, but the 
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image easily lends itself to allegorical interpretations which see in K body something 
more than physicality: a potential for signification without words. 
 This emphasis on figurative meanings is undermined again when the focus 
shifts onto the body (“parasites too had flesh and substance” (116)) and the text 
foregrounds literal and painful embodiment: “There was a continual taste of blood in 
his mouth. His bowels ran and there were moments of giddiness when he stood up . . . 
his stomach felt like a fist clenched in the centre of his body” (117). But this return to 
the body 'as the body' is not complete and is frustrated by the use of figurative 
language (heartbeat “as if in another country” (118)) and ambiguous visions (“trains of 
images so rapid and unconnected that he could not follow them,” “the swimming in 
front of his eyes” (120)).  Suffering brings feelings of disembodied strangeness 
(feeling like a “ghost,” (120)), affects his self-perception (his arm becomes a “stick 
protruding from his body” (121)), and life as merely a body becomes unsustainable: “I 
have woken too early, he thought, I have not finished my sleeping. He suspected that 
he ought to eat . . . but his stomach was not ready” (120). The lapse into figures is 
magnified with an increased ambiguity of his dreams and visions, and suggestions of 
spirituality induced by suffering. 
 K's garden, physical evidence of his life, is misread. In Foe, the passage of time 
is to erase the imprint of Barton's body in the place she slept; K expresses the same 
sentiment: “There will be not a grain bearing my marks, just as my mother has now, 
after her season in the earth, been washed clean, blown about, and drawn up into the 
leaves of grass” (124). Where Susan fears misreadings of Cruso's terraces as cannibal 
ruins, K's garden is misread as the outpost of the insurgents. His arrest prompts 
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attempts at self-definition. While K's initial definition was centred around his mother's 
body, now it has its incarnation in the figurative image of the mother-earth. Indeed, 
both are intermingled in a passage that supports the medical officer's idea of an 
overprotective mother:  
 So what is it, he thought, that binds me to this spot of earth as if to a home I 
 cannot leave? We must all leave home, after all, we must all leave our mothers. 
 Or am I such a child, such a child from such a line of children, that none of us 
 can leave, but have to come back to die here with our heads upon our mother's 
 laps, I upon hers, she upon her mother's, and so back and back, generation upon 
 generation? (124)    
 
 
Body knowledge  
 
K's return to Cape Town offers the promise of a new self-definition that would 
determine the appropriateness of the medical officer's interpretation. As K's first 
appearance is marked by physicality, his return begins with a narrative focus on the 
body: eating and sex. Both are contrasted with language: the first leads to illness 
preventing the recounting of his story.124 The second is treated as insignificant and 
inexpressible: “all words had begun to escape him” (179). This twofold re-entry into 
society is repeated when physical hunger and sexual desire meet in his observation of 
the two bathers (180).  
 His story remains inexpressible; it is treated as “paltry, not worth the telling, 
full of the same old gaps that he would never learn how to bridge” (176). Again 
depraved of the source of identity, K attempts to find one in his body “listening to the 
                                                 
124
 Asked about his story, “K was about to reply when without warning his stomach contracted and the 
wine came up in a neat golden stream” (173), later cannot talk due to a “wave of sickness” (176).  
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ringing mount in his ears, the sound of blood running in his veins or the thoughts 
running through his head.” These meditations concern the body, but rely on figurative 
language: “He had the feeling that something inside him had let go or was letting go. 
What it was letting go of he did not yet know, but he also had a feeling that what he 
had previously thought of in himself as tough and rope-like was becoming soggy and 
fibrous, and the two feelings seemed to be connected” (177). 
 K's position rests on the rejection of charity. But if, as a child, it would have 
been enough for him to utter “a stammer of thanks in return” he is now expected to 
provide a story of hardship: “I would have told the story of a life passed in prisons . . . 
When my story was finished, people would have shaken their heads and been sorry 
and angry and plied me with food and drink; women would have taken me into their 
beds and mothered me” (181). The lack of story is sometimes interpreted by Michael 
as a result of his mental capacity: “I have not been clever, and come back to Sea Point 
full of stories . . . I was mute and stupid at the beginning, I will be mute and stupid at 
the end” (182). The novel's double movement consists here in contrasting what K's 
words claim and what they do: his diagnosis of his mental capacity is to be distrusted 
if it is produces highly articulate observations: “They were locking up simpletons 
before they locked up anyone else” and conclusions: “How many people are there left 
who are neither locked up nor standing guard at the gate? I have escaped the camps; 
perhaps, if I lie low, I will escape the charity too” (182).  
 K's lack of development sees him not travelling from the state of oblivion to 
the state of awareness. One of his final self-definitions is symptomatically 
anticlimactic: “Whereas the truth is that I have been a gardener, first for the Council, 
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later for myself, and gardeners spend their time with their noses to the ground” (181). 
The “truth” of this definition is, however, immediately, and metaphorically, 
questioned: “I am more like an earthworm, he thought. Which is also a kind of 
gardener. Or a mole, also a gardener, that does not tell stories because it lives in 
silence. But a mole or an earthworm on a cement floor?” (182). The objection 
functions as another rejection in the logic of the two-way movement: the “final” 
definition is rejected and this rejection is itself undermined. The final lesson begins by 
K presenting himself as a simpleton and continues:  
The mistake I made, he thought . . . was not to have had plenty of seeds, a 
different packet of seeds for each pocket . . . Then my mistake was to plant all 
my seeds together in one patch, I should have planted them one at a time 
spread  out over miles of veld in patches of soil no larger than my hand, and 
drawn a map and kept it with me at all times so that every night I could make a 
tour of  the sites to water them. Because if there was one thing I discovered out 
in the country, it was that there is time enough for everything. (182-183)         
 
 
The “moral” is unlike the medical officer's allegory. Instead, its mundane nature 
threatens any figurative readings of K by denying the existence of any “deeper,” non-
literal, significance. On the other hand, the mundane reality is itself undermined given 
that K's “lesson” invokes Ecclesiastes (Ecc 3:1 – 3:10), and thus questions the 
mundane nature of Michael's “knowledge” and rejects the rejection of allegory. 
Interesting in this light is the critical consensus of the novel's “undermining of the 
medical officer's attempts to interpret K” (Attridge Ethics 34), for the novel appears to 
undermine and support it at the same time. K's final vision of a man wanting “a 
holiday in the country if he could find a guide who knew the roads” (183) directly 
echoes the medical officer's monologue where he speaks of his desire to be led by K 
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(163) to the place to which “only you [K] know the way” (166). The image shakes the 
foundation on which the rejection of the medical officer's interpretation rests, while it 
may also support it given the medical officer's ambiguity when he claims that “no road 
leads to it that is merely a road” (166). While K's imagined companion is not explicitly 
the medical officer, the suggestion is that their wishes overlap and that their searches 
are in part complementary. But while they may share the same visceral impulse, they 
communicate in the mediated way trapped in language where true, non-mediated, and 
'bodily' communication is impossible.  
 Coetzee's novel negotiates and oscillates between extremes: equating the 
human body with the self and contrasting it with language (and mind). It rejects 
allegorical readings of the body, yet also constantly invites them. It moves between the 
mundane (literal) and the ambiguous (metaphorical); it destroys allegory by 
introducing the mundane, as it allegorizes and suggests reading the mundane 
metaphorically. If K's and the officer's (spoken and thought) self-definitions are 
contrasted, their bodily impulses are similar. Coetzee's strategy in creating an open-
ended and overdetermined world which invites allegory relies on introducing 
characters marked by disability, while devoting considerable attention to bodily 
experience (needs, suffering, ageing, sexuality). Thus endowed, his characters are 
placed in the position of a search for truth, for ultimate reality or meaning beyond the 
surface. Transposing the surface / depth dichotomy onto the body and being at his 
most ambiguous in descriptions of the physical, Coetzee leads the reader to expect 
what is actually a constantly deferred revelation of meaning. And when a “meaning” or 
a “lesson” is finally uncovered, it is necessarily a mundane one undermining the 
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readers' expectations. Thus, these narratives problematise the boundaries between what 
is “read into” the text, and what is inherently there; between what can be said about the 
text and what is an over-interpretative, projective construction. The readers are witness 
to attempts at uncovering the truth and accompany characters in their search for 
meanings and definitions, while the readerly hopes are shattered by being shown how 
much of what they assume is their own creation resulting from unfulfilled expectations 
created by the text, but the novels cannot be read entirely in a literal way, even if such 
a way were theoretically possible. What, for example, to make of the voices heard by 
Michael? Of the fact that he miraculously survives? What to make of his meditations, 
dreams, visions? Can they be attributed to Michael's fever, or are they, as the readers 
are led to expect, glimpses of the “truth” and inaccessible in other ways. Coetzee 
purposefully leaves the boundaries between what is in the text and what is an extra-













Chapter 3  
 Organic Metaphor: Embodied History or the History of the Body 
Dusklands and Age of Iron 
 
 The two novels I would like to analyse in this chapter, also deal with the 
problems of reading and interpreting the body. In both novels, the body functions as a 
site of history: a site from which historical processes derive and the site which such 
processes affect. In these works, Coetzee employs what I would like to call an 'organic 
metaphor', the structuring of an abstract concept in terms of the human organism. It 
allows him to present the universal through the image of the body, and to structure the 
body in terms of the universal. The intersection of the two spheres allows for the 
understanding of Mrs Curren's cancer as 'caused' by apartheid (or as representing 
apartheid) just as the Vietnam War could be understood as the result (and a 
representation) of the psychosexual problems of the likes of Eugene Dawn. Both 
novels rely heavily on gender symbolism: they structure the land as a passive female 
body, and the gun, warfare, and conquest as expressions of masculine sexuality.  
 In short, Dusklands and Age of Iron explore history and politics from the 
perspective of an individual, gendered, body. Problems with such body may inspire 
political action but also stem from political oppression. Both texts contrast language 
and the body to present the textuality of what is more commonly seen as bodily and 
the embodiment of what is more commonly rendered as textual. Dusklands is a story 
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of masculine beginnings: Eugene Dawn's New Life Project suggests the dawn of a new 
era as much as the early colonization of South Africa in the story of Jacobus. Age of 
Iron, presents the end of the era by depicting a dying country and a dying female body. 
 
Part I: Dusklands 
 
The Vietnam Project: 
Masculinity and war  
  
  “Most of the trouble in my life has been caused by women” (44) 
 
 In the story of Eugene Dawn, the body is structured both as a container and as a 
surface. It exists as a container when he discusses secret 'true' selves and bodily 
'centres', and as a surface when he speculates about others' two-dimentionality. Such 
structurings allow him to speak of 'reading' others and being 'read' by them. They also 
allow reading his body as a text akin to, and in line with, the myth he studies. The 
novel thus invites the reader to read Dawn's life as mirroring the Vietnamese myth; his 
writing as a metaphorical expression of his insecurities, and his writing's conclusions 
as inspiration behind his action in family life. Dawn craves pure language and feels 
imprisoned in his body. He navigates between the masculinity he craves (here 
associated with language and nurture) and the femininity he wishes to destroy 
(associated with the body and nature). His relationships with masculine authority are 
marked by feelings of inferiority and a longing for acceptance, whereas his relation to 
his body is part of a larger project of the annihilation of the feminine. The suggestion 
that the Vietnam War is a product of insecure masculinity lacks the ambiguity of 
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Coetzee's later work and is challenged only by Dawn's insignificance in the larger 
military enterprise and by the unreadable nature of his superiors. 
 Dawn’s ambivalent relationship with masculine authority betrays a mixture of 
narcissism and feelings of inferiority. Passive self-effacement and a hunger for 
acceptance and recognition, mingle with hatred and contempt towards his superiors. 
This appears to be learned behaviour: “I was always a clever child. I ate my beans, 
which were good for me, and did my homework . . . Everyone praised me. It is only 
recently that I have begun to falter” (5). The feared Coetzee remains unknown even if 
he is powerful enough to replace unspoken hostility:  
I have always obeyed my superiors and been glad to do so. I would not have 
embarked on the Vietnam Project if I had guessed it was going to bring me into 
conflict with a superior. Conflict brings unhappiness, unhappiness poisons 
existence. I cannot stand unhappiness, I need peace and love and order . . . (1)  
 
 
Faced with a “type before whom [his] first instinct is to crawl” (1), Dawn's self-worth 
is maintained by employing the container metaphor and projecting a 'centre' to himself: 
“I am an egg that must lie in the downiest of nests under the most coaxing of nurses 
before my bald, unpromising shell cracks and my shy secret life emerges.” Another 
strategy is diminishing his superiors: “Once upon a time a creative person himself, he 
is now a failed creative person who lives vicariously off true creative people . . . he has 
been put in charge . . . knowing nothing about Vietnam or about life” (1). At other 
times, Coetzee's rejections are attributed to his fear of Dawn's intellect: “when one 
ceases to be the pupil . . . one must expect one’s teachers to feel betrayed and strike 
back in envy” (5). These rationalizations are juxtaposed with admissions of 
dependence on his superiors:  
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The petty reaction of Coetzee to my essay is to be expected in a bureaucrat 
whose position is threatened by an up-and-coming subordinate . . . This . . . 
does not . . . make his insults any easier to swallow. He is in power over me. I 
need his approval. I will not pretend that he cannot hurt me. I would prefer his 
love to his hatred. Disobedience does not come easily to me. (5)  
 
 
Dawn's opposition against male authority is clandestine: he does not complain about 
the lighting in the office for he cannot do it “without opening [himself] to 
counterattack” (7). Feeling himself weaker (“I will not win”), he craves acceptance: “I 
would do almost anything for his respect. I know I am a disappointment to him, that he 
no longer believes in me” (15). His self-confidence comes only from outside 
recognition: “when no one believes in you, how hard it is to believe in yourself!” (15). 
A meeting presents the struggle between deference and striving to be assertive:  
I am bad at confrontations. My first impulse is to give in, to embrace my 
antagonist and concede all in the hope that he will love me. Fortunately, I 
despise my impulses . . . People who doubt themselves have no core. I am 
doing my best to fashion a core for myself, late though it be in life. (1-2)  
 
Such core, as container substance, is the sign of masculinity Dawn claims to be 
lacking: “[Coetzee is] the kind that eats steaks . . . who drinks coffee, I the kind who 
with caffeine in his veins begins to quiver” (2). 
 In confrontation with Coetzee Dawn feels himself a readable surface: “I wore 
my straight shoulders and bold gaze for the interview. Coetzee may know I am 
hunched and shifty – I cannot help these eyes – but I wished to signal him that today I 
was formally accreting myself around the bold and the true” (3). But being “possessed 
of a high degree of consciousness” (5) is no help in making his body unreadable. Thus 
reading Coetzee's container body uncovers merely Dawn's own obsession with 
inferiority: “A certain configuration of his mouth and nose so subtle as to be 
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perceptible only to me tells me that the hectic toxins chasing in my blood and wafted 
in my sweat afflict his expensive senses with distaste” (3). His body becomes an 
artificial performance against readings that might uncover his sensitive core. 
 Dawn's pursuit of perfection in language (2) has an enemy in the body that 
needs to be kept in check. This control involves the management of gestures in 
accordance with the views of a published “authority” on body language: “I am careful 
to create opportunities for my fingers to busy themselves. While I am reading, for 
example, I conscientiously flex and unflex them . . . when I talk to people I keep my 
hands conspicuously relaxed” (4). The disciplining of the body suggests a deeper lack 
of acceptance: “I am vexed by the indiscipline of my body. I have often wished I had 
another one” (5). The body's functions (“masticating”) are “disgusting” and form a sad 
reminder of unwanted embodiment: “I am a thin man, as you will have guessed: my 
body voids all nutriment half-digested” (11). His body stands between himself and the 
desired masculinity.  
 Contrasted with the body is reason and language: “I am the embodiment of the 
. . . struggle of the intellect against blood” (27-28). Convinced of his intellect (“under 
the fire of my intellect mountains crumble” (27)), Dawn sees himself as a “thinker, a 
creative person” (1). Work brings “the highest happiness, intellectual happiness” and 
offers the sense of belonging (“we in mythography are of that cast” (6)). This “genius 
of the household” (14) treats his work with religious reverence: “I say a grace, holding 
the finished chapters to my exulting breast” (13). At the same time, work is to endow 
him with the authoritative masculinity he lacks: “transposed into print”, the “authority” 
of his words is to be “binding” (15).   
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 Where the first “continual battle” is “to keep [his] poise of mind against the 
pressure of [his] enemy body,” his second battle is with his wife's “hysterical assaults” 
(8). Denied language and never speaking, she functions as an embodiment of 
embodiment. Dawn's sexual “connection” with her is a failure:  
Though like the diligent partners in the marriage manuals we attend to each 
other’s whispers . . . though I plough like the hero and Marylin froth like the 
heroine, the truth is that the bliss of which the books speak has eluded us. The 
fault is not mine. I do my duty. (7-8)  
 
This appeal to another published authority further endows her with the responsibility 
for the lack of passion:  
Before the arrival of my seed her pouch yawns and falls back, leaving my 
betrayed representative gripped at its base, flailing its head in vain inside an 
immense cavern, at the very moment when above all else it craves to be rocked 
through its tantrum in a soft, firm, infinitely trustworthy grip. The word which 
at such moments flashes its tail across the heavens of my never quite 
extinguished consciousness is evacuation: my seed drips like urine into the 
futile sewers of Marylin’s reproductive ducts. (8)  
 
 
 His rejection of her stems from her “emptiness,” she is not a container: “She . . 
. wishes to be filled, yet her emptiness is such that that every entry into her she feels as 
invasion and possession” (8). Dawn's personal appropriation of Henley's 
'unconquerability': “I am still the captain of my soul” (10) contrasts with her 
shallowness woven from television and women’s magazines: a wife “out of a novel . . .  
in a library in provincial America” (15). This “simple nature” who is “not equipped to 
understand correctly the insights into man’s soul” does not understand his work (9), 
nor is she able to read him: “I articulate Marylin and her friends better than they do 
themselves. This is because I understand them as they do not understand me” (10). 
 204 
Indeed, he claims to know her better than she knows herself, “having contributed much 
to her making” (12).  
 The metaphor of evil as infection125 has its first occurrence in Marylin's reading 
of Dawn: “Marylin and her friends believe that everyone who approaches the 
innermost mechanism of the war suffers a vision of horror which depraves him utterly” 
(10). While her belief that Dawn’s preoccupation with violence takes its toll is 
mocked, the novel's two-way movement invites precisely such a reading of Dawn's 
disease. His own words suggest such toll when he admits that “relations between [his] 
own and other human bodies have changed” although he does not attribute this to the 
“pictures of human bodies” that he “carr[ies] around with [him] all day” (10).  
 Dawn's rejection of Marylin's ideas requires the reformulation of the 
understanding of the body. It is now seen as a surface, and all that exists is 
immediately readable:  
She believes I have a secret, a cancer of shameful knowledge. She attributes it 
to me for her own consolation, for to believe in secrets is to believe the cheery 
doctrine that hidden in the labyrinth of the memory lies an explanation for the 
haphazard present . . . I would explain it all to Marylin were she not so full of 
their low dogged poison. There are no secrets, I would tell her, everything is on 
the surface and visible in mere behavior, for those who have eyes to see . . . I 
have no secrets from you, not you any from me. (10) 
 
 
Dawn's rejection of psychoanalysis is incomplete: a similar idea expressed by a male 
professional authority in hospital is accorded greater dignity (48). Furthermore, the 
belief in the existence of “dogged poison” as a response to the “moral cancer” 
                                                 
125
 This motif recurs throughout Coetzee's fiction. It often takes the guise of problematization of 
depicting evil in fiction as well as performing such representations. A similar “road” is travelled by 
Elizabeth Costello, who devotes one of her lessons, “The Problem of Evil,” to the ethics of 
representation.    
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attributed to him implies treating his wife's body as a container, while seeing hidden 
intention in outward behaviour undermines Dawn's adherence to behaviourism by 
contradicting his earlier rejection of inner “secrets.”   
 Treated as a surface (a “smiling honey-blonde with long brown legs” (11)), 
Marylin's problems are taken as a nuisance. Her therapy “deprives her of all appeal,” 
her problems are viewed as responsible for the lack of passion: “the . . . tears, the red 
nose . . . anesthetize my most powerful erections and leave me plying grimly at her 
with only the dimmest epidermal sheath” (11). Marylin's worth is negotiated in the 
social sphere and is relative to the desire of other men. But whether it is Lacan's desire 
of the Other or Girard's mimetic desire,126 Dawn's arousal at the thought of her 
infidelity, in the light of his erectile dysfunction, is a joy at a vicarious 
acknowledgement of his social status and his masculinity: “If Marylin is unfaithful she 
is so much the dearer to me, for if strangers prize her she must be valuable, and I am 
reassured” (11).  
 While Marylin is seen as “by character a masturbator” with “fantasies of 
enslavement,” Dawn's own fantasies are rife with both masturbatory elements 
(“highest pitches of ecstasy” could be achieved only with Marylin “sleep[ing] through 
the sexual business” (12)) and sadistic interests: “When . . . I convulse your body with 
my battery-driven probe, I am only finding a franker way to touch my own centers of 
power than through the unsatisfying genital connection” (10). Dawn's phallic 
insecurity is clear when Marylin's photo is set in contrast with those of “great fashion 
                                                 
126




models” who “mock[]” him: “I emerge from the passages of Vogue trembling with 
powerlessness” (13). This feeling, induced by the “passages” of the female body 
imagined as a container, is absent when looking at Marylin's photograph, seen as a 
surface representing a surface.   
 The photographs used for his work cause instead an empowering “electric 
impulse” by representing the male body in contrast to “incomplete” body of others 
(13). The first depicts a sergeant “copulating with a Vietnamese woman . . . tiny and 
slim possibly even a child” (13) and suggests the understanding of war in terms of 
sexual activity, reflected in Dawn's description of his work as facilitating “penetration” 
(20). The second photograph contrasts American masculinity (“glowing wellbeing” of 
“strong young bodies”) with the dismembered corpses of their victims (15). This 
celebration of masculinity makes Dawn “giggle” due to the grotesque character of the 
victim (15-16). The pictures vicariously endow Dawn with desired masculinity 
imagined to be attainable via a rite of passage involving sex and violence:  
 I find my hand creeping toward the briefcase at the foot of my desk as toward 
 the bed of my existence but also, I will admit, as toward an encounter full of 
 delicious shame. I uncover my photographs . . . I tremble and sweat, my blood 
 pounds, I am unstrung and fit this night only for shallow, bilious sleep. 
 Surely . . .  if they arouse me like this I am a man and these images of 
 phantoms a subject fit for men! (15)  
 
 
 War is also a pursuit of metaphysical wholeness, filling an unspecified “void” 
and forming a “tragic reach for transcendence” (18). It offers the hope of 
“substantiality” allowing one to experience oneself as real. Winning confers both 
reality and masculinity, while a lack of retaliation is read as a castrating lack of 
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acknowledgement. The suggestion that the aggressors need their enemies due to an 
internal “lack” is consciously analysed in a passage on the gun as a metaphor: 
Why could they not accept us? . . . our hatred for them grew only out of broken 
hopes. We brought them our pitiable selves, trembling on the edge of 
inexistence, and asked only that they acknowledge us. We brought with us 
weapons, the gun and its metaphors, the only copulas we knew between 
ourselves and our objects. (17) 
 
 
The lack of such acknowledgement fuels further cruelty, as in this passage equating 
violence and sexuality: 
We landed on the shores of Vietnam clutching our arms and pleading for 
someone to stand up without flinching to these probes of reality: if you will 
prove yourself, we shouted, you will prove us too . . . We cut their flesh open, 
we reached into their dying bodies, tearing out their livers, hoping to be washed 
in their blood; but they screamed and gushed like our most negligible 
phantoms. We forced ourselves deeper than we had ever gone before into their 




 The Vietnamese myth that Dawn studies at work has a parallel in his personal 
life. The sons' attempt to appropriate the land requires “overthrowing the sky-god . . . 
identified with the old order of power (foreign empire, the U.S.),” the cooperation of 
the mother, hiding her sons “in her bosom, safe from the thunderbolts of the father” 
and leads to the “unman[ning]” the father (25).127 To Dawn, the myth presents the 
father as vulnerable and surrender as a “fate worse than death” (25-26). The failures of 
the  American tactics (the “well-directed radical blow” (25)) result, in his view, from 
the misunderstanding of the castration symbolism: “The blow that wins the war against 
the tyrant father is not a death-thrust but a humiliating blow that renders him sterile . . . 
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into an “earth-mother” sheltering Bheki and John set to overthrow the old political system, a male 
creation.   
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His kingdom, no longer fertilized, becomes a waste land” (26).128 Dawn's proposed 
solution (the “winged dream”) is to attack from within the structure of the myth in an 
“assault upon the mothering earth herself” (28). His passion for “total war” (28) 
equates the land with the female body and war with masculine sexuality: the 
“spraying” in an “orgasm of the explosion” (29).  
 What follows is the loss of mental control and the revolt of the body: “I am in 
bad health . . . My health is poor. I have a treacherous wife, an unhappy home, 
unsympathetic superiors” (29-30). The implied rejection of his report signifies the end 
of his career but also of the craved subjection to Coetzee and seeking to replicate him:  
I was going to do my best, to show him all I was capable of . . . If he had taken 
notice of me as I really wanted to be noticed, if he had offered any sign of 
acknowledging his election, I would have given myself utterly to him. . .  In 
Coetzee I could even immerge myself, becoming, in the course of time, his 
faithful copy . . . (31)  
 
 
This lack of recognition leads to the return to the container metaphor. This allows for 
the protection of the inner self by projecting the blame onto the unwanted, “tyrant 
body” as the external constraint to his “true” core. His “metaphor of the dolorous 
wound” presents his “core” as a blended space of the corporeal and the cerebral: 
separate from the body, existing “[i]nside [his] body, beneath the skin and muscle and 
flesh that drape [him]” it is capable of figurative “bleeding” (32). Dawn's mention of 
an unexplored continent “two hundred years ago” not only provides a link with the 
second novella but further equates the body and the land. It invites metaphorical 
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structuring of the former in terms of the latter suggesting that his words about the 
absence of “vertiginous freedom” and the lack of space “to beat [his] wings” (32) refer 
as much to history as to his unwanted body.   
 Dawn's 'entrance' into the myth happens not only in writing but through the 
abduction of his son and the attempts to bring him up in a world without women.129 
This eradication of the “effect of his mother” (35), and her “unstable, hysterical 
character” reflected in the boy's “irrational behaviour” of a “ninny” is to make Martin 
into “what [Dawn is] not, a happy man” (38). This exercise in masculinity soon 
concerns only Dawn trapped between the body and language. While his writing is to 
lead him to the disembodied ideal of the “endless discourse of character, the self 
reading the self to the self in all infinity” (38) it is permanently undercut by the body 
and pain. The previously rejected “cancer of shameful knowledge” (10) is rendered as 
a monstrous pregnancy, the image repeated later in the Age of Iron:  
Since . . . 1965 their war has been living its life at my expense. I know . . . what 
it is that has eaten away my manhood from inside, devoured the food that 
should have nourished me. It is a thing, a child not mine, once a baby squat and 
yellow whelmed in the dead center of my body, sucking my blood, growing by 
my waste, now, 1973, a hideous mongol boy who stretches his limbs inside my 
hollow bones, gnaws my liver with his smiling teeth, voids his bilious filth into 
my systems, and will not go. (38)130 
 
 
Such image relies on the understanding of the body as a container and evil as a 
(personified) disease or pregnancy. The feminising connotations of this metaphorical 
pregnancy suggest the failure of his attempts at achieving masculinity. That failure 
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 This action of “cut[ting] ties” (36) is consistent with that required to preclude the father's castration 
in the myth.    
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 Mrs Curren's cancer and pregnancy as embodied guilt or dissolution of the country has its prototype 
in Dawn's cancer-pregnancy and a wish of a “deliverance” (38).  
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culminates in the scene of the police raid that deprives him of adulthood and 
masculinity. Not “used to violence” (39) or to “dealing with force” (44), Dawn pleads 
in a “tinny” voice, weeps and tries to “be brave” (39-40). With characteristic 
egocentrism, he takes his wife’s screams as concern for him, rather than the wounded 
child: “She need not worry, I am all right” (42). Dawn's behaviour displays here his 
typical passivity towards masculine authority and a desire to please: “Nothing would 
please me more than to please this heavy man” (40). He is “coming to love” their 
voices, wishes to learn from the officers (“Perhaps I will be a man yet” (41)) and even 
admires the blow he is dealt (“amazing” (42)). In all this, he fails to become a 
disembodied voice and is, instead, reduced to a mute body: “I am aware, if that is 
awareness, of two cold parted slabs that must be lips, and of a hole that must be the 
mouth itself, and of a thing, the tongue, which I can push out of the hole, as I do now” 
(40). This image is complicated by the description of his loss of consciousness 
“shooting backwards, at a geometrically accelerating pace, according to a certain 
formula, out of the back of [his] head” (42). 
 This passivity continues in hospital: “I agree with my doctors . . . They have 
my welfare at heart, they want me to get better. I do all I can to help them” (43). Such 
cooperation requires revision of his behaviourist position: “[a]ll faults of character are 
faults of upbringing” (44). This absolves him from guilt (“a sterile disposition of the 
mind unlikely to further my cure”), but also prevents engagement with reality: “my 
health is too precarious . . . to dwell on [Marylin]” (44). In this ideal world of an “all-
male institution” (43) women pose a threat: “Most of the trouble in my life has been 
caused by women, and Marylin was certainly my biggest mistake” (44). Dawn’s 
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ambition still remains the recognition and acknowledgement: he admires the guards as 
embodiment of his childhood masculine ideals (46) and tries to be “appreciat[ed]” as a 
“model” patient (45). Feeling different from other patients (he presents himself as not a 
“mental case” and with a “better case history”), and active in the “enterprise of 
exploring the self,” Dawn hopes for an “illuminating” explanation of his breakdown 
that will not reduce it to the mundane “overwork” or “stress” (46). He hopes his 
doctors will read his report when he recreates its words “erect with the power of their 
truth” (46). The continuous craving for the acknowledgement of his masculinity still 
centres on language.   
 Dawn feels himself read (“How is it, they must ask themselves, that a fellow in 
a not uncreative line of work . . . should suffer fantasies of being bound in a prison of 
flesh . . .?” (47), but maintaining medical interest in himself relies on picturing his 
body as a container and, perhaps, acting accordingly:   
My secret is what makes me desirable to you, my secret is what makes me 
strong. But will you ever win it? When I think of the heart that holds my secret 
I think of something closed and wet and black, like, say, the ball in the toilet 
cistern. Sealed in my chest of treasures, lapped in dark blood, it tramps its blind 
round and will not die. (48) 
 
 
The reading of his illness as a somatisation of guilt, and a 'revolt' of the body (48) are 
taken more seriously than when they were suggested by Marylin. But while Dawn 
purports to argue with the interpretation offered, he supports it by structuring guilt as 
bodily infection:   
I do not want to see the children of America poisoned by guilt. Guilt is a black 
poison. I used to sit in the library in the old days feeling the black chuckling 
through my veins. I was being taken over. I was not my own man. It was 
insupportable. Guilt was entering our homes through the TV cables. (48) 
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Such guilt is always the work of others: speculations on the role of the Vietnamese, his 
mother (“spreading her vampire wings”), or his father (“away being a soldier”) serve 
as a hope of learning “whose fault [he is]” (49). However, when the novella ends, 
Dawn remains trapped in his body: where his actions were inspired by it, their 
consequences are also bodily.     
 
“The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee” 
 
 The second part of the novel is composed of three parts, none of which 
functions as a reliable source, presenting different versions of events, each with its 
own internal inconsistencies.131 This chapter concentrates primarily on Jacobus's 
narrative, as here again Coetzee presents the interrelation of universal and personal 
history, showing the individual body behind a historical event and suggesting bodily 
inspiration for the conquest of South Africa. Throughout, the novella invites and 
questions allegorical interpretations by creating the tripartite world in which 




 Jacobus's readings of ethnic others begin with the contrast between African 
'savagery' and European civilization. This suggestion of otherness prepares the ground 
for his sexual humiliation where the reversal of positions is the more acute for this 
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emphasis on otherness. Such 'othering' is expressed in language which equates 
Africans with animals. Thus the Bushman woman's faithfulness is read as a survival 
instinct (“no chance alone in the veld”) that disappears when other instincts dominate 
(she needs to be locked up when other Bushmen males are in the area) (60). Jacobus 
suggests that they “do not breed off white men,” although it is profitable to breed them 
with Hottentots (61). In instances like this, 'others' are subjected to the reductive gaze 
of dehumanising ethnography.    
 The perceived inferiority is read in African sexuality. Jacobus believes that 
“[b]oth men and women are sexually misformed. The men go into death with 
erections” (61). This obscure statement becomes ironic in the light of later events 
where Jacobus blurs the line between sexual and warfare excitement, between war and 
sexual metaphors. Their dances are apparently inspired by the “sexual preliminaries of 
a dove” and represent “two modes of sexuality, the one priestly and ecstatic, the other 
luxurious and urbane” (86). There is no confirmation of Jacobus’s 'knowledge' and all 
such interpretations are shown as projections or fantasies: “Nothing would have 
relieved me more than . . . the dancers to drop their pantomime and cavort in an honest 
sexual frenzy culminating in mass coitus” (86).132 
 A similar sense of superiority results from his readings of life “without polity” 
in an African village. Jacobus's expectations of the visit to one include “the gray-
bearded chieftain . . . demonstration of firearms, murmurs of awe . . . the feast . . . 
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murder foiled . . . ritual dismemberment . . . victory, and amusing but tedious reign as 
a tribal demi-god” (65-66). The real visit disappoints due to the lack of “feeling for 
ceremony” and “only the most perfunctory reverence for authority” (72). The chieftain 
is dying, the air is “thick with flies and stank of urine” (72). The lack of concern of his 
tribe and the images of filth are presented as a physical proof of European superiority 
(72). 
 Jacobus's readings concerning psychology and culture see Christianity as the 
dividing line between Europeans and Hottentots “locked into the present” with no 
conception of linear time (57). Their superficial acceptance of Christianity reduces 
salvation to protection against slaughter and holy days to days of debauchery. 
According to Jacobus: the Hottentot will “gladly sing your hymns if it means they can 
spend the rest of Sunday stuffing themselves on your food” (57). The Bushman, on the 
other hand, is “a wild animal with an animal’s soul” whose ruthlessness leaves them 
undeserving of human respect: “Heartless as baboons they are, and the only way to 
treat them is as beasts” (58).133 Jacobus describes ways of “hunting” the Bushmen 
suggesting an attitude of “no softness:” “A bullet is too good for a Bushmen” (60). The 
settlers' treatment of them goes unquestioned; the story of a trap, presented in the 
language of game-hunting, is thus purely informative:   
The gun . . . had . . . blown the face off a male Bushman and wounded a female 
so badly that she could not move; there was even a third blood spoor leading 
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off into the hills which he did not follow . . . He strung the male up from a tree 
and mounted the female on a pole and left them as warnings (58).  
 
 
Contact with European culture makes the African a “false creature” proficient “in how 
to placate you . . . telling you what he thinks you want to hear” (65). 'Domestication' 
deprives them of 'savage' masculinity: “Put him in Christian clothes and he begins to 
cringe, his shoulders bend, his eyes shift, he cannot keep still in your presence but 
must incessantly twitch” (65). 
 Sexually and mentally immature, Africans are repeatedly read as childish. 
Jacobus's believes his servants see him as their “father”134 and themselves as children 
who “would have died without [him]” (64). During the first meeting with the tribe, 
their childishness is consciously mentioned: “Was I dealing with adults?” (67) and the 
evidence for this reading is provided by the description of their behaviour: “All around 
his alert men took up the cry. “Presents, presents!” they clamoured, and one thrust his 
way forward and began a little dance in front of my horse . . . “Presents!” he sang, “We 
want presents!” (68). Jacobus's lecture on hospitality fails to influence these “little 
slave-boys” (69): “The irony and moralism of forensic oratory . . . were quite alien to 
Hottentot sensibility. They did not flare into action, nor indeed did my speech receive 
any reply” (71). This encounter begins Jacobus's experiences in the village which he 
enters “full of the dangerous euphoria of a man who has made up his mind” (71). 
Unlike the Africans, Jacobus presents himself as a container with a mysterious centre.   
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 If Dawn's and Jacobus's bodies underlie their actions, Jacobus's self-reading 
presents him as Dawn's opposite in his active search for sentient experience. Indeed, 
self-reading outside the binary self-other pair is possible only through the experience 
of pleasure and pain. In the first instance, Jacobus is a 'Renaissance' man of the senses: 
“I have always enjoyed watching coitus, whether of animals or of slaves. Nothing 
human is alien to me” (86).135 His exploration of the land parallels his explorations of 
local women, who “spoil one for one’s own kind.” Like the frontier, their surface 
selves allow for exploration, give power, and carry no responsibility (61). While Dutch 
women have “an aura of property” and bring “not only so many pounds of white flesh 
but also so many morgen of land . . . and then an army of fathers and mothers and 
brothers” African women are seen as perfect sex-slaves:        
a wild Bushman girl is tied into nothing . . . She has seen you kill the men who 
represented power to her . . . like dogs. You have become Power itself now and 
she nothing, a rag you wipe yourself on and throw away . . . Her response  to 
you is absolutely congruent with your will. (61) 
 
 
Such women, and their desire (“pegged out waiting for [his] pleasure”), represent the 
freedom, power and pleasures of the frontier, the “something for nothing” away from 
the constraints of civilisation or the property and kinship relations.  
 On the other hand, self-reading is possible in pain. Fever and the loss of 
consciousness bring “the flexings of the soul’s wings” and the transcendent experience 
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of “inhabit[ing] the past” (77). Jacobus relives his past, meditates “upon the acres of 
new ground [he] had eaten up with [his] eyes . . . upon the deaths [he] had presided 
over,” enters the souls of animals and “repossesses” the inanimate world. His 
meditations on reality and himself employ the dichotomy of a container and a surface: 
How then . . . can the hammer-wielder who seeks to penetrate the heart of the 
universe be sure that there exist any interiors? Are they not perhaps fictions, 
these lures of interiors for rape which the universe uses to draw out its 
explorers? (Entombed in its coffer my heart too had lived in darkness all its 
life. My gut would dazzle if I pierced myself . . .) (78).  
 
 
While the last image evokes the earlier “secret buried within” that cannot “be touched” 
(75), its lack of specificity invites reading Jacobus as having a hidden core and thus 
meaning more than he does literally, on the surface. Jacobus's search for sentient 
experience is a search of a copula with external reality that would prove the 
substantiality of his experience. As in Foe, the suggestion of insubstantiality invites 
interpretation due to its ambiguity: there is the self-reflexive irony of being a literary 
character, the unfulfilled craving of bodily experience, but also the suggestion of 
insignificance in the larger colonial enterprise. Jacobus's meditations on reality and 
dreams, and his description of himself as trapped in the “effete topos of dreaming 
oneself and the world” (78) foreground textuality, but the narrative soon returns to the 
body by suggesting a bodily solution to Jacobus's problem of the connection with 
reality. His vision destroys the “sense of boundaries” between the inside and the 
outside (“What is there that is not me?” (78)).136 Because visual objectification 
deprives the object of its identity, his gaze can seen as colonial: the land becomes him, 
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he encloses the land he crosses. Thus external reality is created by his vision and he 
becomes a container, a “sac with a black core full of images and a gun” (79).137  
 Substantiality and the bodily connection with reality is provided by the gun. In 
the physical sense, the weapon is a body extension equated with the penis,138 but 
because “the need for it is metaphysical rather than physical” (80) the weapon 
overcomes the “loneliness” and “isolation” by standing for “the hope that there exists 
that which is other than oneself” and saving its owner from “the fear that all life is 
within us” (79). Death provides the “evidence” of a “dying and therefore a living 
world” and of the existence of outside reality:  
The death of the hare is the logic of salvation. For either he was living out there 
and is dying into a world of objects, and I am content; or he was living within 
me and would not die within me . . . The hare dies to keep my soul from 
merging with the world. (79-80) 
 
 
Counting is akin to killing or naming in taming the wild. If “[t]he wild is one because 
it is boundless” (80), number and its organizing capacity renders it finite and 
controlled: “Every wild creature I kill crosses the boundary between wilderness and 
number . . . I have presided over the becoming number of ten thousand creatures” (80). 
 Lacking guns and the ability to count, Africans do not control nature: they are 
part of it. This state is to change with the meeting of the two cultures: the gun “will kill 
them in large numbers” and the “yearning for it will alienate them from the 
wilderness” (80). Devoid of the metaphorical phallus, they are neither true enemies nor 
true men: their “grow[ing] into manhood” remains a visual illusion (80). Jacobus's 
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 In the attack on Jacobus, his 'sexually immature' attackers “do not have guns” (80). The weapon 
offers “an ideal form of the life of penetration” (81) of both African bodies and the African land.  
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dialectics of master and slave presents the colonial encounter and a battle for the 
ownership of history as an attempt to reduce the 'container' of the enemy to a 'surface' 
of textual history. An African is thus a representative   
of that out there which my eye once enfolded and ingested and which now 
promises to enfold, ingest, and project me through itself as a speck on a field 
which we may call annihilation or alternatively history. He threatens to have a 
history in which I shall be a term. Such is the material basis of the malady of 
the master’s soul (81).139 
 
 The parallels between the gun and penis, the land and the female body become 
more pronounced when, tired of hunting, Jacobus finds a different way to “initiate 
[him]self into the desert” as a way of enacting “every possible copula” (95). His failed 
attempt at masturbation with the soil, the “ur-act” that ends in “helpless urination” (95) 
clearly equates the land with the body and presents every such copula as one-sided 
self-gratification: “I don’t like accomplices, God, I want to be alone” (95-96). 
 
Being Read: Humiliation 
 
 Jacobus's reasons for cruelty lie in the humiliation of his body. The first 
humiliation is the exhausting and undignified illness. This tamer of the wild is unable 
to tame his body: whatever he eats is quickly evacuated “in a furious gush” (74), 
“heroically,” (75) “in acid gusts” (84) or “fouling [his] bed” (75). This loss of control 
and the need of assistance reverse the previous order. Equalised by the “Hottentot 
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sickness,” he begins to signify the body and nature (76). The illness installs the 
Hottentot in power over the helpless 'master': his lodging in one of the “menstruation 
huts” determines his status as an unclean and feminised other.140 His unwelcome 
appearance in the village ends in a humiliating retreat: “My buttocks grated on each 
other but I could not afford a wrong gesture . . . I had an attack of vertigo, this time 
from the enraged blood that flooded my head” (85).  
 The 'taming' power of vision proves useless in the context of his illness: “I 
imagined the swelling in my buttock as a bulb shooting pustular roots into my fertile 
flesh.” Vision has to give way to the touch that allows objectification: “It had grown 
sensitive to pressure, but to gentle finger-stroking it still yielded a pleasant itch” (83). 
The boil foregrounds embodiment but also introduces 'otherness' within the body. Such 
otherness acquires a life of its own: “The oiliest wisp of wool in Klawer’s gentlest 
hand could no longer wring from it a tremor of pleasure. Instead there began a faint 
throbbing, a little heart in time with my big heart” (84).  
 The scene depicting the “lancing” of the boil evokes an act of aggressive anal 
masturbation; its erotic language clearly foregrounds painful pleasure. The earlier 
meditations on suicide as involving an impossible alterity and a separation into subject 
and object (79) are reenacted when the body is both the agent of pain and its victim, 
the weapon and the target. Extremes of pain and pleasure lead to a carnal relief which, 
it is suggested, is also a relief for the soul: 
I gathered the pus-knob between the knuckles of my thumbs and readied 
myself for violation. With growing might I pressed, bearing down with a full 
fury, more or less, allowing for posture, of an adult male in the pride of his 
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with their skins peeling to reveal “a pink inner self in poor imitation of European colouring” (83). 
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years, through climax after climax of pain and even through the first 
consolations of failure . . . The skin must have been weakened by my exertions; 
for at once, with exquisite surprise, I heard, or if not heard felt in my eardrums, 
the tissues give way and bathe my fingers in a spurt and then a steady dribble 
of wet warmth. My body relaxed, and while I continued to milk the fistula with 
my right hand I could afford to bring my left hand up to the sense-organs of my 
face for the indulgences of inhalation and scrutiny. Such must be the 
gratification of the damned. (89)  
 
In this convoluted relation between the self and the other within, the “whispers” of the 
children stealing his clothes are almost taken as the voice of illumination.  
 Jacobus's major humiliation begins with a fight during which, among “whirling 
limbs” he finds himself “with a mouth full of hair and a human ear” with “nothing to 
do but survive” (90). The text suggest sexual violence in depicting Jacobus as 
“subjected to indignities” with his attackers “waiting for another opening” before 
subjecting him to the “final degradation” (90). Heretofore read as sexually passive and 
impotent, the Hottentot youth threaten to reverse this order by their 'masculine', active 
role that feminises passive Jacobus: 
Naked and filthy I knelt in the middle of the ring with my face in my hands, 
stifling my sobs in the memory of who I was . . . Bodies fell upon me, I was 
suffocated and pinned to the ground. Ants, ants raped from their nest, enraged 
and bewildered, their little pincers scything and their bodies bulging with acid, 
descended between my spread buttocks, on to my tender anus, on to my 
weeping rose, my nobly laden testicles (90, emphasis added).  
 
 
Although directly unmentioned, rape is nevertheless suggested.141 The humiliation 
consists in forced sameness: being feminised by 'effeminate' Africans, infantilised by 
children and “Africanised” by being deprived of his gun. In this instance, Jacobus's 
                                                 
141




psychological survival depends on moving from being treated as a surface on which 
the enemy impresses meanings to the understanding of himself as a container: “I 
withdrew inside myself and in my womb of ice totted up the profit and the loss” 
(91).142 This sameness is also denied (“I am among you, but I am not of you”) or 
wilfully misread: “I had not failed, I had not died, therefore I had won” (92). 
 This forced objectification promises a new self-reading: 
With what new eyes of knowledge, I wondered, would I see myself when I saw 
myself, now that I had been violated by the cackling heathen. Would I know 
myself better? Around my forearms and neck were rings of demarcation 
between the rough red-brown skin of myself the invader of the wilderness and 
slayer of elephants and myself the Hottentots’ patient victim. (97) 
 
Where his previous longing for visual representation of his buttocks left a gap between 
the objective and subjective dimensions of the body, here vision incorporates the 
wound in wholeness and regains control over the objectified parts. Such meditations 
on the body waver between seeing the body as a container and as a surface:   
It had fallen on my shame, a judicious point of attack; but it had been baffled 
from the beginning, in a body which partook too of the labyrinth, by the 
continuity of my exterior with the interior surface of my digestive track. The 
male body has no inner space. (96)  
 
While Jacobus feels violated (“They had violated my privacy, all my privacies, from 
the privacy of my property to the privacy of my body”), he denies the previously 
suggested rape: “The Hottentots knew nothing of penetration. For penetration you 
need blue eyes . . . Their failure to enter more deeply into me had disappointed me” 
(96-97). This confirms assumed racial superiority, but presents the attack as akin to the 
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 Such metaphors appear elsewhere: “There had been legs, metaphorical legs, and much else too, that I 
had been prepared to lose,” “In the blindest alley of the labyrinth of my self I had hidden myself away, 
abandoning mile after mile of defences” (96). 
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Vietnamese refusal of recognition. The Hottentot failure to enter “more deeply” is thus 
read as the lack of acknowledgement:  
Why had they not killed me? . . . Was I to understand the desultory attentions 
paid me as a token of contempt? Was I personally unexciting to them? Would 
some other victim have aroused them to a pitch of true savagery? . . . To these 
people to whom life was nothing but a sequence of accidents had I not been 
simply another accident? Was there nothing to be done to make them take me 
more seriously? (97-98)  
 
The humiliation is partly dispelled by the reinterpretation of the Namaqua as “not true 
savages”: “Even I knew more about savagery than they” (98). After considering 
various ways in which his story might develop and sharing Dawn's frustration with 
story-telling, Jacobus immerses himself in “bloodlust and anarchy whose story would 
fill another book” (99).143 Aggression, as Dawn imagined, confers masculinity on the 
killer: Jacobus feels himself filled out “once more to a man’s stature” (99), the feeling 
that culminates during his revenge.  
 Revenge  
 The revenge begins with a sermon presenting Jacobus's enemies as “nonentities 
swept away on the tide of history,” functioning as a term in his (100). Variously 
referring to them as surfaces with no independent meaning, he also despairs of seeing 
them as containers without substance: the “undifferentiated plenum . . . the void 
dressed up as being” (101). Like the Vietnamese in Dawn's story, their lack of 
substantiality and independent signification is the reason for punishment: 
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 While Dawn finds “spin[ning] motels . . . into long, dense paragraphs” difficult (37), Jacobus fears 




 There was nothing that could be impressed on these bodies, nothing that could 
 be torn from them or forced through their orifices, that would be commensurate 
 with the desolate infinity of my power over them. They could die summarily or 
 in the most excruciating pain, I could leave them to be picked by the vultures, 
 and they would be forgotten in a week. I was undergoing nothing less than a 
 failure of imagination before the void. I was sick at heart. (102). 
  
 This part of the novel is filled, as Jacobus wishes, with “decorum.” The first 
shot of the kind Jacobus has “always admired” (100), kills a girl, a “pretty child,” 
exhilarates: “I will not fail you, beautiful death, I vowed.” Despite the time of day 
(“midday executions lacking the poignancy of a firing squad in a rosy dawn” (101)), 
the aesthetization of death is prominent: “Fill in the morning smoke rising straight in 
the air, the first flies making for the corpse, and you have the tableau” (100). The 
tableau comprises religious references (“Golgotha” (102), the last supper (103)), 
descriptions of the rape of children and executions, in which Jacobus marvels at the 
insubstantiality of the enemy bodies (“The shot sounded as minor as a shot fired into 
the sand. Whatever happened in the pap inside his head left his eyes crossed” (104)) 
but mostly experiences profound boredom.   
 The killings are meticulously described with Jacobus rejecting vulgarity and 
striving for the beauty, precision and poetic quality of his descriptions. His elegant and 
restrained language renders executions an almost religious rite, the fulfilment of a duty 
made sublime. This being Coetzee’s first novel, it represents his early approach 
towards the depiction of violence. Images of barbarity are described in painstaking 
detail. Such representations will later give way (as they do in Elizabeth Costello's 
thinking) to the moral, and artistic problematization of representing suffering, to 
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suggesting rather than representing it, with a continuous meditation on the moral status 
of such representations. 
 The act of colonial cruelty forming the larger historical process is suggested as 
having its inspiration in the body and its humiliation. While the cause of Jacobus's evil 
is unknown, the text suggests an interpretation by presenting Jacobus’s recollection of 
how, as a child, he was taught to “dispose of wounded birds” (105), by breaking their 
necks. The significance of this passage for understanding Jacobus is unclear and the 
problems inherent in reading his behaviour as a result of childhood experience are 
consciously referenced when Jacobus provides an explanatory passage “if any 
expiation explanation palinode be needed,” claiming that nothing he killed was “of 
inestimable value” (106). His role of an “explorer” is to “open what is closed,” to 
expose and “bring light to what is dark,” and, if exploration and reading are 
impossible, to “clear it out of the way.” The former is consistent with the traditional 
metaphorical understanding of truth and knowledge as exposure, laying bare, analysed 
by Blakey Vermeule (109).144 That latter is depicted in his narrative: the emptiness of 
the African bodies would render “skirt[ing]” a betrayal of his mission. Their 
unreadability is read as a void: an emptiness that cannot be endowed with meaning and 
as with Dawn's Vietnamese, the reason for their death: “I know with certainty that their 
life held nothing . . . They died in a storm of terror, understanding nothing. They were 
the people of limited intellect and people of limited being” (106).  
 The text suggests Jacobus re-establishes his link with outside reality through 
killing and recovers his masculinity through the weapon. It invites the reading of the 
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 Vermeule links this to the Enlightenment metaphors of dissection. I think it could be extrapolated on 
torture and mutilation and thus be useful in the analysis of Coetzee's imagery.    
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body as inspiring a 'historical' event and as shielding the mystery of Jacobus's evil. 
Allegorical interpretation is staged consciously: “Through their deaths I, who after 
they had expelled me had wandered the desert like a pallid symbol, again asserted my 
reality” (106). In his own reading, Jacobus sees himself as standing for patriotic 
sacrifice and a religious calling: He goes on to suggest what he symbolizes: the 
patriotic “sacrifice” (“for myself and my countrymen, who exist, and committing upon 
the dark folk the murders we have all wished” (106)) and a religious and historical 
calling (“Who knows for what unimaginable crimes of the spirit they die, through me? 
God’s judgement is . . . incomprehensible . . . I am a tool in the hands of history” 
(106)).145 Both of these interpretations may obviously be incorrect. 
 Jacobus also consciously meditates on his embodiment: he is “afraid” of death, 
“project[s] [himself]” into the day “when the undertaker’s understudy will slit [him] 
open and pluck from their tidy bed the organs of [his] inner self [he] [has] so long 
cherished” and wonders about the afterlife of his body: “does he throw them to the 
economic pigs?” (106). Such a fear is alleviated by the split into subject and object 
initially occasioned by the body and maintained by language: given that the world 
without him is “inconceivable,” death becomes a story told to “frighten [himself], to 
make [his] blankets more cosy” (107). Language exists here as the extension of the life 
of the body: like Mrs Curren, Jacobus feels safe as long as he narrates. The navigation 
between the language and the body renders Jacobus either a language construct: a 
narrating self foregrounding its constructedness, or primarily the mortal body. The 
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promise of a resolution to this dichotomy is suggested and quickly undercut by a 
mundane admission of having “other things to think about” (107). Both visions of 
Jacobus are invited in his ambiguous last words: “I too can attain and inhabit a point of 
view from which . . . I can be seen to be superfluous . . . when the day comes you will 
find that whether I am alive or dead, whether I ever lived or was never born, has never 
been of real concern to me” (107). 
 The Afterword and the Deposition continue to waver between the body and 
language by textualising Jacobus's body and attempting to discover the bodily truth in 
written sources. The previous meditations on Jacobus’s vision are continued here when 
his “keen hunter’s eye” is credited with discovering, naming “differentiating and 
bringing into existence” previously unknown world beings (116). As an explorer he is 
likened to a “god” who creates “civilization in fact, ab ovo” (116, 118).146  
 The documents at the end pursue and mock the pursuit of bodily truth in 
history writing. On the one hand, the historical text moves towards the resurrection of 
the body; it concentrates on “bodily” traces of Jacobuse's expedition: “faeces dotted . . 
. over a broad area” or a rope “eaten by a hyena on August 22.” It lists “dead hair,” 
“mucus and blood,” “rotten teeth, calculus, phlegm, vomit” and other ephemeral 
“relics” whose “atomic constituents are still of course among us” (119). On the other 
hand, history writing moves away from the body towards language, it mistranslates the 
body into a “meaning” which does not do justice to individual bodily experience. Thus 
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 He is godly only in this creationist sense. The narrator calls him: “a humble man who did not play 
God” and who was “unlikely to have tortured his animals” (101). 
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many aspects of Jacobus's life become “an historical irrelevance” and belong to 
“anecdote, the evening by the hearth-fire” (120-121).  
 Both 'The Vietnam Project' and 'The Narrative of Jacobus Coetzee' make such 
bodily “irrelevance” an object of scrutiny. They are interested in a personal history of 
the body rather than the universal meaning of history and politics. This shift from the 
universal to the individual foregrounds the experience of embodiment and pain that 
underlie historical events. Coetzee's interest in history has a frail human body at its 
centre, is inspired by it and forms a part of a larger project of elaborating on human 
corporeality in all its incarnations.  
 
Part II: The Age of Iron 
The End     
      “It was like living in an allegory” (84) 
 
While Dusklands deals with the beginnings of colonisation, Age of Iron, the 
story of a dying body and “the soul it houses” is the story of the end. While Dusklands 
deals with masculinity and links the conquest of the feminine land with male desire, 
Age of Iron investigates femininity linking a dying female body with the decaying 
country. While the story is “of a body” (170), it is also a meditation on history and 
politics. Abstract, universal ideas, are presented here through Mrs Curren’s experience 
of embodiment suggesting a figurative meaning of her pain and illness. Just as in 
Dusklands, the general is presented from the perspective of the individual body, while 
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the individual body has political significance and bears the consequences of the 
universal. 
 
Part I: Mrs Curren, her body, her land 
        
The equation of the dying body and deteriorating country is made in the first 
paragraph of the novel and “in the space of an hour” in Mrs Curren's life (4). The 
garden, her daughter's former playground, is “a dead place, waste,” inhabited by a 
“derelict.” The homeless are now “part of life” (6), “hang[ing] around the parking lots 
. . . drinking under the flyover, eating out of refuse cans” (3). Represented as agents of 
contagion, they themselves “do not sicken”: “Warmed from within by alcohol. The 
contagions and infections in their blood consumed in liquid flame” (4). The images of 
these “scavengers . . . whose number never dwindles” (4) are paired with the news of 
Mrs Curren's cancer diagnosis. In contrast to Dusklands, where the male protagonists 
discipline their bodies, Mrs Curren’s reaction is acceptance reminiscent of the 
Annunciation: “the news was not good, but it was mine, for me, mine only, not to be 
refused” (3).147 These two processes of decay inspire her letter, which is “not a baring 
of my heart. It is a baring of something, but not of my heart” (13). 
The two main social groups of her country are given contrasting bodily 
descriptions. Young black South Africans are represented by “roaming gangs . . .  the 
sullen-mouthed boys, rapacious as sharks, on whom the first shade of the prison-house 
is already beginning to close” (6). Equally little sympathy is felt for their white 
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 Similarly, her letter must “resist the craving to share [her] death” (5).  
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counterparts, “spinning themselves tighter and tighter into their sleepy cocoons” in the 
world of “[s]wimming lessons, riding lessons, ballet lessons . . . lives passed within 
walled gardens guarded by bulldogs.” In contrast to 'iron' black bodies, theirs are 
“soft”: “children of paradise, blond, innocent, shining with angelic light, soft as putti . . 
. drenched in honey . . . Slumberous . . . bliss-filled, abstracted” (6-7). A similar 
emphasis on the body characterises her descriptions of the authorities: she feels a 
visceral “disgrace” at living under their power, “under their meaty bellies, their full 
bladders,” like “kneeling and being urinated on” (9).  
Mrs. Curren political position is ambiguous: critical of apartheid, she realises 
her longing for the past refers to the world to which “[she] alone could look back with 
nostalgia” (63), a past of “the middle-classes, the comfortable classes” spent “roaming 
the country-side from beauty-spot to beauty-spot, bringing the afternoon to a close 
with tea and scones and strawberry jam and cream in a tea-room with a nice view, 
preferably westward over the sea” (63). Contrasted with that of her domestic's 
children, her childhood is remembered as “long sun-struck afternoons, the . . . avenues 
of eucalyptus, the quiet rustle of water in roadside furrows, the lulling of doves.” It 
was a “childhood of sleep, prelude to what was meant to be a life without trouble and a 
smooth passage to Nirvana” (85). Her growing consciousness and the acceptance of 
shame turns this paradise into an image of limbo:  
If justice reigns at all, we will find ourselves barred at the first threshold of 
 the underworld. White as grubs in our swaddling bands, we will be dispatched 
to join those infant souls whose eternal whining Aeneas mistook for weeping. 
 White our colour, the colour of limbo . . . In limine primo: on the threshold of 
 death, the threshold of life. Creatures thrown up by the sea, stalled on the 
sands,  undecided, indecisive, neither hot nor cold, neither fish nor fowl. (85)    
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Her liminal position makes her criticism of the violence in townships ambiguous: it 
could be read as a rational disagreement with enlisting children in armed combat, or as 
expressing an unconscious fear of a threat to her status.  
 Much of the text is devoted to the exploration of pain. Mrs Curren renders it as 
“hurling itself . . . like a dog, sinking its teeth in my back” (9). Her initial acceptance is 
mixed with the hatred of her body:  
I am capable of putting a hand on the bread-board and chopping it off without a 
second thought. What do I care for this body that has betrayed me? I look at my 
hands and see only a tool, a hook, a thing for gripping other things. And these 
legs, these clumsy, ugly stilts: why should I have to carry them with me 
everywhere? (11).  
 
The split into mental subject and corporeal object underlies her seeing the mind as 
independent of, and alienated from, the body. At the same time, she is aware this may 
not be true: “We sicken before we die so that we will be weaned from our body . . . 
Yet this first life, this life on earth, on the body of earth – will there, can there ever be 
a better?” (11-12). Her house, a metonymic extension of her body undergoes the same 
process: it is a dying place, “a site without human past; to spirits . . . to angels, of no 
interest” (13). 
 This understanding of the mind as a non-physical 'core' allows to control pain 
by projecting it outside of her container: “It is not I who am in pain, I say to myself: 
the one in pain is someone else, some body else who shares this bed with me. So, by a 
trick, I hold it off, keep it elsewhere.” This is often unsuccessful, as pain undermines 
such dualism, reduces her humanity to the body and leaves her “tricks” to be “swept 
away like the dikes of Zeeland” (120). Pain can also be controlled by medication, but 
that symptomatically annuls her consciousness. The return to consciousness is the 
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return to “the real thing” of painful embodiment (126) and the life devoid of action: 
“again and again I am back, from the belly of the whale disgorged. A miracle each 
time, unacknowledged, uncelebrated, unwelcome. Morning after morning I am 
disgorged, cast up on the shore, given another chance. And what do I do with it?” 
(126-127). The losing and regaining of painful consciousness is rendered by images of 
immersion: “Lie . . . on the sands waiting for the night tide to return, to encircle me, to 
bear me back into the belly of darkness. Not properly born: a liminal creature, unable 
to breathe in water, that lacks the courage to leave the sea behind and become a 
dweller on land” (127). Drugged dream visions bring mysterious words that invite 
allegorical readings: (“Are they anagrams? They look like anagrams. But for what, and 
in what language?” (126)) and end in ambiguous visions of mass destruction and 
“immers[ion]”: “a hell into which I plummet when I close my eyes” (126). 
 The two sources of pleasure in her life are experienced through the senses. The 
beauty of nature fills her with hunger: “the hunger of the eyes that I feel, such hunger 
that I am loth even to blink . . . I am hungry with love of this world” (16) and moves 
her 'core': “decent sobbing . . . long wails without articulation, . . . emptyings of the 
heart” (17). The other is music existing in a “closed universe,” “enclosing ” the world. 
Unaffected by politics it is “[t]he one border they cannot close . . . the border upwards, 
between the Republic of South Africa and the empire of the sky. Where I am due to 
travel. Where no passports are called for” (20). Not playing  –  her mistakes are 
“grown by now into the bone, never to be corrected” –  she finds solace in music's 
permanence (“the real music . . . does not die” (21)). This permanence contrasts with 
the physical body; music is “pure spirit” born in a container of a repulsive body: an 
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“unlikely temple” (21). Her visions of the afterlife include a hotel lobby filled with 
music where “without pain” or “incident” the elderly listen to “the heavenly unending 
music, waiting for nothing, paging idly though the store of memories” (22).  
 In contrast with the permanence of music the ephemeral body brings only pain. 
It is not shareable: the doctor's “we” is professional politeness (“But not he: I” (23)). 
The hope that “in this one case, my case there may have been a mistake” is understood 
as the hopelessness of being faced with a death sentence: “They plead with the firing-
squad, they weep, they joke, they offer bribes, they offer everything they possess: the 
rings off their fingers, the clothes off their backs” (23). The diagnosis similarly 
positions her against a “blank wall: death” (23). Pain shrinks the world to the size of 
the body and becomes the one undeniable fact in life: “Death is the only truth left” 
(23). Keeping her awake at night (24), it induces visions of the past rendering her a 
creature of the past: “A dodo: the last of the dodos, old, past egg-laying” (25) or an 
archaeological fossil (21). 
 The disintegration of the body in disease is seen as a consequence of years of 
moral corruption.148 Where moral corruption is structured as ugliness, the physical and 
the metaphysical are treated as one: “How ugly we are growing, from being unable to 
think well of ourselves! Even the beauty queens look irritable. Ugliness: what is it but 
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 She openly admits her historical guilt, although she is a passive witness: “A crime was committed 
long ago . . . I was born into it. It is part of my inheritance. It is part of me, I am part of it.” Such crime 
has a price “to be paid in shame: in a life of shame and a shameful death, unlamented.” Mrs Curren uses 
container metaphor to describe her complicity: “Though it was not a crime I asked to be committed, it 
was committed in my name. I raged at times against the men who did the dirty work . . . but I accepted 
too that . . . they lived inside me” (149-150). The shame evolves, according to Mrs Curren, into cancer: 
“I have cancer from the accumulation of shame I have endured in my life. That is how cancer comes 
about: from self-loathing the body turns malignant and begins to eat away at itself” (132). There is a 
constant invitation to allegory in presenting her disease as having a reason, interpretation, or meaning 
beyond itself.   
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the soul showing through the flesh?” (121). Mrs Curren sees expressions fossilising 
into facial features: “A thickening of the membrane between the world and the self 
inside, a thickening become thickness” (116). Their bodies show the figurative closing 
of the eyes to moral dimension of existence. This “evolution backwards” could be seen 
as a reversal of the colonial process started with Jacobus’s sight which incorporated 
and possessed all that he saw. 
 The disease caused by ugliness and shame evolve into a disease that is matched 
by the disease crippling the state.149 Like her disease, politics causes pain, “gloom and 
nausea” (25). Where 'uninvited' illness results in death of the body, the uninvited 
authorities (“Legitimacy they no longer trouble to claim”) produce “decrees like 
hammer-blows: death, death, death” (25-26). Mrs Curren sees the evil emanating from 
their male bodies, theatrically displayed in a “ritual manifestation”: “thanatophany: 
showing us our death. Viva la muerte! their cry, their threat. Death to the young. Death 
to life” (26). She only “half-attend[s]” to the world outside her pain, but what is 
outside is invited to be read as mirroring the inside: a similar disintegration takes place 
in the public and private sphere (36).  
 The first, bodily, link between the two ethnic worlds is seen watching 
Florence's husband on a chicken farm, “splashed with blood” next to a bin full of 
heads: “it was not inconceivable that some of the bodies I had stuffed with 
breadcrumbs and egg-yolk and sage and rubbed with oil and garlic had been held, at 
the last, between the legs of this man, the father of Florence’s children” (38, 39). 
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 Mrs Curren often almost equates the two: “Monstrous growths, misbirths: a sign that one is beyond 
one's term. This country too . . . time for an end” (59).  
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Captivated by the sight of mechanical killing, Mrs Curren sees the physical world 
underlying and supporting her own: “I thought of all the men across the breadth of 
South Africa who, while I sat gazing out of the window, were killing chickens, moving 
earth, barrowful upon barrowful; of all the women sorting oranges, sewing buttonholes 
. . . A universe of labour” (41).  
 Her primary contact with this 'other' South Africa is through Florence's 
unreadable body and, vicariously, through Florence's experience of her son's death. 
Florence's refusal to condemn violence – “I cannot tell these children what to do” (36) 
– is read by Mrs Curren as irresponsible, but it provides access to a physical reality 
absent in official language:  
Of trouble in the schools the radio says nothing, the television says nothing, the 
newspapers say nothing. In the world they project all the children of the land 
are sitting happily at their desks . . . What I know about events in Guguletu 
depends solely on what Florence tells me and what I can learn by standing on 
the balcony and peering north-east: namely, that Guguletu is not burning today 
. . . (36) 
 
 Political differences between the two women surface with their different 
interpretations of Vercueil. Florence's hostility – “he is rubbish. He is good for 
nothing” (44) – suggests reading him in terms of his usefulness in political struggle, as 
is perhaps Bheki's teasing: “They are making you into a dog! . . . Drunkard!” (41, 
emphasis added). Mrs Curren's defence (43) ambiguously stems either from an 
apolitical interpretation of Vercueil or her opposition to the means to the end: “If this 
is how the new guardians of the people conduct themselves, Lord spare us from them” 
(42).  
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 Discussions with Florence, which ostensibly concern private matters, reveal 
further differences in the public sphere. Mrs Curren’s concern with bad behaviour or 
irresponsible parenting applies to both private and public spheres: 
You are showing Bheki and his friends that they can raise their hands against 
their elders with impunity. That is a mistake . . . you admire your son’s 
generation because they are afraid of nothing. Be careful: they may start by 
being careless of their own lives and end by being careless of everyone else’s. 
(45-46)  
 
Florence’s responses present historical reasons behind such behaviour (“It is the whites 
who made them so cruel!”) and express pride in the new generation “like iron” (46). 
While Florence sees in the “age of iron” the time of people not broken by the 
hardships of existence, Mrs Curren sees the militarization of the young. Her rejection 
of the new age again reflects either a threatened privileged position or an ethical 
response to the violence preached. She is, however, aware of the cycles of history:   
What, after all, gave birth to the age of iron but the age of granite? Did we not 
have the Voortrekkers . . . grim-faced tight-lipped Afrikaner children, 
marching, singing their patriotic hymns, saluting their flag, vowing to die for 
their fatherland? . . . Are there not still white zealots preaching the old regime . 
. . a regime of death, to children too young to tie their own shoelaces? (46-47).     
 
A similar disagreement concerns Bheki's rejection of education. His claims that 
schools forces him to “fit into the apartheid system” is dismissed as naïve: “Apartheid 
is not going to die tomorrow or the next day. He is ruining his future” (61-62). 
 These two separate worlds are brought together by the experience of the body. 
The police-provoked accident initially presents the political discrepancy revealed in 
different attitudes to dealing with the authorities (57, 60). Soon, the focus is on Mrs 
Curren's perception of the mutilated body: the “raw” palms, the skin which “hung in 
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strips” (57) and its hypnotising effect: “the flood would not stop . . . Blood flowed in a 
sheet into the boy’s eyes and made his hair glisten . . . it was everywhere. I did not 
know blood could be so dark, so thick, so heavy” (57). The “dark” blood is 
reminiscent of a visit to a hospital where her daughter's trivial cut contrasts with a 
“torrent of black blood”: “Blood on the floor, blood on the benches. What did our 
timid thimbleful count for beside this torrent of black blood?” (58). The experience 
uncovered a different lived histories of whites and blacks in the “country prodigal of 
blood” (58).  
 These meditations combine into a vision of blood transcending the boundaries 
of race, and suggesting sameness in embodiment, the brotherhood of suffering:  
It was blood . . . like yours and mine . . . I stared at it, fascinated, afraid, drawn 
into a veritable stupor of staring . . . Because blood is precious, more precious 
than gold and diamonds. Because blood is one: a pool of life dispersed among 
us in separate existences, but belonging by nature together: lent, not given: held 
in common, in trust, to be preserved: seeming to live in us, but only seeming, 
for in truth we live in it. (58) 
 
The novel wavers between the problematisation of difference and suggestions of 
sameness. The sameness suggested here might exist on a fundamental level that allows 
for difference to be introduced by societal structures. At the core, Mrs Curren suggests 
that the embodiment, corporeality, and the reality of pain and mutilation, transgress 
such constructed boundaries. However, this is negotiated with the foregrounding of 
difference: “never before had I seen anything . . . so black. Perhaps it was an effect of 
the skin . . . velvet dark, over which it ran; but even on my hands it seemed both darker 
and more glaring than blood ought to be” (58). Such difference is foregrounded in a 
vision of the afterlife:  
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A sea of blood, come back all together: is that how it will be at the end of days? 
. . . A body of blood. Of all mankind? No: in a place apart, in a mud-walled 
dam  in the Karoo with barbed wire around it and the sun blazing down, the 
blood of the Afrikaners and their tribute-bearers, still, stagnant. (58-59) 
 
The experience underlies Mrs Curren's political consciousness allowing for the 
sympathy with the victims of state violence and for the emotional, if not intellectual, 
sympathy for their cause.  
 Some identification with the victims is suggested during a hospital visit where 
Mrs Curren sees elderly patients, her “secret brothers,” in a place “where [she] 
belong[s],” (62) described by Florence as a “waiting-room for the funeral” (70):  
I was tired, my hip ached, my heart was thumping . . . But there was more to it 
than that. I was seeing too many sick old people and too suddenly. They 
oppressed and intimidated me. Black and white, men and women, they shuffled 
about the corridors, watching each other covetously, eyeing me as I 
approached, catching unerringly on me the smell of death. (64)      
 
Such intimations of mortality remain as visceral, and inexpressible in language, as her 
attitude to the boy: “There is something stupid about him . . . deliberately stupid, 
obstructive, intractable. He is one of those boys whose voices deepen too early, who 
by the age of twelve have left their childhood behind and turned brutal, knowing” (71-
72). At the same time, Mrs Curren experiences the failure of language: her attempt to 
tell the boy something that cannot wait (emphasised in its urgency by her clutching his 
hand) does not result in communication: “My words fell off him like dead leaves the 
moment they were uttered. The words of a woman, therefore negligible; of an old 
woman, therefore doubly negligible; but above all of a white” (72-73). While her 
ambiguous appeal to individuality might signify various ideas, none of them breaks his 
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“wall of resistance” (72): “Though his eyes were open, he did not see; what I said he 
did not hear” (72). The impenetrability of the interlocutor reduces her language to 
mere sounds, foregrounding the racial, class and generational barriers: “He knew and 
he did not listen, as he had never listened to any of his teachers, but had sat like a stone 
in the classroom, impervious to words, waiting for the bell to ring” (73). A similar 
failure marks her complaint to the police: she is denied language as a party not 
“directly affected” (78). Her shame (“Not for them: for myself” (78)) is soon accepted 
as fate: “Perhaps I should simply accept that that is how one must live from now on: in 
a state of shame” (78). 
 The gap between herself and the boy stretches also along gender lines. While 
Mrs Curren might see in him a “child playing on a bicycle,” the suggested masculine 
modes of readings would emphasise the 'mystique' of war whereby the blood “ooz[ing] 
from the raw flesh” functions as a romantic symbol: “Would these count on the roll as 
honourable wounds, wounds of war?” (61). Such position is repeatedly rejected. 
Bheki's “comrades” putting “childhood behind them” becoming “little puritans, 
despising laughter, despising play” (114) misuse their bodies for political goals, 
allowing them to be annexed by political discourse of violence. Such mystique of war 
is thus a “mask” which, at the moment of Bheki's death, “must have dropped in sheer 
surprise when it broke upon him in that last instant that the stone-throwing and 
shooting was not a game after all” (115). Such “mystique of death” (148) is seen as a 
masculine construction that is repeatedly referred to through images of surface and 
depth: “War is never what it pretends to be. Scratch the surface and you will find, 
 240 
invariably, old men sending young men in the name of some abstraction or other” 
(149). 
 The major step in Mrs Curren’s political development comes after the visit to 
Guguletu. The guide, Thabane, forces her to reassess her relationship with the regime. 
In addition, his question (“What sort of crime is it that you see? What is its name?” 
(90)), uncovers for Mrs Curren the discrepancy between physical suffering and 
language which fails to do justice to bodily reality: “I must find my own words, from 
myself. Otherwise it is not the truth . . . To speak of this . . . you would need the 
tongue of a god” (91). Again her language represents truth as residing in the container 
of the body, and the body as capable of producing its own language. Because the 
images of destruction parallel Mrs Curren's attack of ill health the texts suggests 
identification of the bodily with the political. Her cancer and the authorities both 
'produce' death. 
 The “massive, solid presence” of Bheki's dead body (75) inspires thoughts of 
complicity. Her new knowledge is expressed as illness (shivering), “contagion” (97) or 
paralysis “with shame” (115) but also as the lack of previous blindness (“now my eyes 
are open and I can never close them again” (94-95)). The political is equated with the 
body when, talking of the state, Mrs Curren gestures towards her body: “I am not 
indifferent to this... this war. How can I be? . . . ‘It lives inside me and I live inside it” 
(95). Her exchange with the soldiers is similarly marked by the failure of language and 
the “speaking” of the body itself: “I had hoped the words I needed would just come, 
but they did not. I held out my hands, palms upward. I am bereft, my hands said, bereft 
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of speech” (96-97). Such body language is misunderstood: the colour of her skin 
makes her the enemy in Guguletu, just as it makes her the victim for the soldiers.  
 Another attempt at communicating bodily what her words fail to express again 
equates female suffering with the suffering country:   
What did the old lady want? What she wanted was to bare something to them, 
whatever there was that might be bared at this time, in this place. What she 
wanted, before they got rid of her, was to bring out a scar, a hurt, to force it 
upon them, to make them see it with their own eyes: a scar, any scar, the scar of 
all this suffering, but in the end my scar, since our own scars are the only scars 
we can carry with us. (97-98) 
 
The mastectomy scar becomes the site where the literally personal meets the 
metaphorically political. As in Dusklands, the Age of Iron presents the land as 
feminine and ruled by the masculine forces of oppression: “[h]uge bull-testicles 
pressing down on their wives, their children” (26).150 Conversely, the destruction of 
the land has personal parallels in the removal of the breast. The body image allows for 
the structuring of the political in terms of the personal and the personal in terms of the 
political and historical. Political upheaval, degeneration and decay are somatised and 
metaphorically rendered through Mrs Curren’s illness, while the illness itself invites 
interpretation as a sign of the political. In another conversation with the police Mrs 
Curren reads her cancer politically: “‘Where is the pain?’ . . .  ‘In my heart . . . I have 
cancer of the heart . . . It pains me all the time . . . I caught it by drinking from the cup 
of bitterness . . . You will probably catch it too one day. It is hard to escape’” (142).  
                                                 
150
 The regime is repeatedly referred to as male. Consistent with this is reading the police search of her 
house as rape: “The search a mere pretext. The purpose the touching, the fingering. The spirit 
malevolent. Like rape: a way of filthying a woman” (154). This passage (a reversed image of 
Dostoevsky's arousing search of his landlady's flat) blurs the line between the private and the public as 
does the police's refusal to return her papers: “This is not private, Mrs Curren. You know that. Nothing 
is private any more” (157). 
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 Planned suicide, an act of alterity within the self (109),151 is to precipitate the 
inevitable but also offers the hope of meaning when death is to take place in front of 
the government buildings, “the house of shame” (104).152 Such death might not meet 
the conditions of atonement as well as slow death (129), but is also prone to 
misreadings:   
These public shows, these manifestations – this is the point of the story – how 
can one ever be sure what they stand for? An old woman sets herself on fire, 
for instance. Why? Because she has been driven mad? Because she is in 
despair? Because she has cancer? (105).       
 
Mrs Curren sees Florence as the only interpreter whose assessment might render such 
death significant: “If Florence were passing by, with Hope and Beauty on her back, 
would she be impressed by the spectacle?” (129). At the same time, she imagines – 
and fears – that Florence would pass by, unreadable and uncaring: “From the goddess 
comes no call, no signal. Her eye is open and is blank” (164).  
 The reasons to “go through with it” are equally unclear.153 Her “Yes-no” that 
“has never been allowed into the dictionaries” and that “defeats every man” is 
suggested as a female language (“every woman knows what it means” (106)) that 
contrasts with the determination of Dawn and Jacobus but does not allow clear 
reading.154 The guilt and the possibility for atonement are both suggested and rejected, 
                                                 
151
 Other Coetzee's characters share this assessment. In Jacobus's words: “we know that no man ever yet 
hated his own flesh, that flesh will not kill itself, that every suicide is a declaration of the otherness of 
killer and victim” (79-80). 
152
 “How easy to give meaning to one’s life, I think with surprise” (129). 
153
 The same expression is used by the white soldier in Guguletu (98). It creates another instance of  
metaphorical similarity between the destruction of Mrs Curren’s body and the violence committed on 
South Africans.   
154
 The narrative suggestion is that, lacking self-doubt and investigations of inner motives (Dawn’s 
narcissistic “analysis” notwithstanding), their role to exploit, conquer and colonize the feminine 
predisposes them to be fathers of apartheid: I want to rage against the men who have created these 
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as is Mrs Curren's pursuit of death and “slid[ing] back” from the final step (109). She 
is locked in the vicious circle of shame: “there is a shame to that private knowledge . . . 
so warm, so intimate, so comforting that it brings more shame flooding with it” (109).  
 Images of other's bodies recur in her thinking. Black bodies are presented as 
heavy, with “heavy blood” like a “bucket of lead” (114), in contrast to “thin-blooded” 
white South Africans (47). She is weighed down by Bheki’s “dead weight,” “lying on 
top of [her]” (113). The reason for her planned self-immolation (“I would burn well”) 
contrasts with the persistence of black bodies: “these people will not burn . . . It would 
be like trying to burn figures of pig-iron or lead. They might lose their sharpness of 
contour, but when the flames subsided they would still be there, heavy as ever” (114). 
Bodies “bobbing just under the surface” (114) invoke a similar image in Waiting . . . 
(162-163) and equate the body with the land:   
when I walk upon this land . . . I have a gathering feeling of walking upon 
black faces. They are dead but their spirit has not left them. They lie there 
heavy and obdurate, waiting for my feet to pass . . . waiting to be raised up 
again. Millions of figures of pig-iron floating under the skin of the earth. The 
age of iron waiting to return. (115) 
 
 Mrs Curren's confused self-questioning (“Mrs Curren: nine letters, anagram for 
what?” (158)) eventually leads to the telephone communication with Guguletu in 
which personal loyalty implies revolutionary collaboration. John's spirit remains with 
her “more clearly, more piercingly” than Bheki before: “He is with me or I am with 
him: him or the trace of him” (159). Her waiting for death is, however, less spectacular 
than his raising a pistol to “fire the one shot he will have the time to fire into the heart 
                                                                                                                                             
times” (107). That is consistent with identifying the architects of apartheid as male (26) but is 
simultaneously questioned when power is described as a more universal contagion: “Power is power, 
after all. It invades. That is its nature” (107). 
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of the light” (159). Waiting for death (“on the river-bank awaiting my turn” (164)) Mrs 
Curren refuses to go to the hospital and submit herself to medicated “floating” (167), 
being “drowned” (165), and thus erasing the sense of moral dimension of her pain. The 
visions of Beauty and Florence, of clouds, “the dust of Borodino” (170) and anagrams, 
return. The end is palpable: “I will draw a veil soon. This was never meant to be the 
story of a body, but of the soul it houses” (170).155 Yet it is the story of a body as much 
as it is of the soul; the story of a body as much as it is the story of a land. Dying 
without conviction Mrs Curren does not achieve more than decency: “the ground of all 
ethics” (180). She does not achieve abstract heroism (embodied in her speech by 
ancient sculptures of male bodies (151). Her “marked,” imperfect body is to such 
ideals what her decency is to abstract heroism: “something smaller, blinder, closer to 
the ground” (152, 155).  
 
Mrs Curren: the body and language 
 
 Mrs Curren and her daughter, it is suggested, could not be closer (“A daughter. 
Flesh of my flesh. You” (10)). Mrs Curren believes they used to communicate bodily: 
their embrace had a “true” and “secret” meaning: “the meaning never spoken” (5). Mrs 
Curren realises the one-sidedness nature of their relationship. In the craving for her 
daughter’s touch, she admits the desire to be mothered, to “creep into her own 
                                                 
155
 Mrs Curren uses another image of surface and depth when she expresses her, never definite, view on 
the mind/body problem: “We do not stare when the soul leaves the body, but veil our eyes with tears or 
cover them with our hands. We do not stare at scars, which are places where the soul has struggled to 
leave and been forced back, closed up, sewn in” (180).   
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mother’s lap and be comforted” (17). In pain, such regression to a “child in a long 
white dress and straw hat” (37) in need of consolation is frequent: “I want to be held to 
someone’s bosom, to Florence’s, to yours, to anyone’s, and told that it will be all 
right” (37).156 Her true wish is bodily contact: “When the chill is from the north-west, 
from your quarter, I stand a long time sniffing, concentrating my attention in the hope 
that across ten thousand miles of land and sea some breath will reach me of the 
milkiness you still carry with you” (5). The written word is a poor substitute for such 
bodily communication and Mrs Curren dreams of unmediated physical contact: “In 
another world I would not need words. I would appear on your doorstep . . . and that 
would be the end of words: I would embrace you and be embraced. But in this world, 
in this time, I must reach out to you in words” (8). The verbal substitute often needs 
embodiment to be comprehensible. Hearing “gratitude,” Mrs Curren feels the sign to 
be “dense, dark, mysterious,” and only metaphorical embodiment allows the word to 
be “felt”: “Slowly, like a pomegranate, my heart bursts with gratitude; like a fruit 
splitting open to reveal the seeds of love” (51). Mrs Curren sees communication as 
proximity of the two bodies: “It is through my eyes that you see; the voice that speaks 
in your head is mine. Through me alone do you find yourself here on these desolate 
flats, smell the smoke in the air, see the bodies of the dead, hear the weeping, shiver in 
the rain” (95). Similarly, the letter is addressed to her daughter as enclosed in the 
container of her body: “to me; to you in me” (5). 
 On the one hand, motherhood alleviates suffering and provides strength: “I 
have brought a child into the world, I have seen her to womanhood, I have seen her 
                                                 
156
 Elsewhere she sees herself having “child’s arms” (47). 
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safely to a new life: that I have done, that can never be taken from me. That thought is 
the pillar I cling to when the storms hit me” (66). On the other, the lack of symmetry in 
the  relations between the two women leaves Mrs Curren feeling abandoned: “Dear 
Mother . . . look down on me, stretch forth your hand! . . . Come to me!” (50). 
Pregnancy and disease are often juxtaposed (“For twenty years I have not bled. The 
sickness that eats at me is dry, bloodless, slow and cold” (59)) and the contrast 
between these two pregnancies is matched by two visions of childhood: pastoral past 
and the grotesque childhood of the new age.   
 The valuation of the mother-daughter bond masks deeper resentment. Mrs 
Curren’s refusal to be honest about her condition is rationalised by an appeal to the 
Age of Iron: “The comfort, the love should flow forward, not backward. That is a rule, 
another of the iron rules. When an old person begins to plead for love everything turns 
squalid” (67). The touch of nurses who “renew a touch that has been broken,” is the 
only bodily contact left: “It is their hands above all that I find myself craving. The 
touch of hands. Why else do we hire them, these girls, these children, if not to touch, 
to stroke, in that brisk way of theirs, flesh that has grown old and unlovable?” (67).  
 The significance of the mother-daughter bond is suggested in the mystery of 
Mrs Curren's mother's childhood experience of camping. The invitation to figurative 
reading is made through references to the story's meaningfulness and its power to 
define Mrs Curren: “If each of us has a story we tell to ourself about who we are and 
where we came from, then this is my story. That is the story I choose, or the story that 
has chosen me” (110). The meaning of the story is wilfully ambiguous: Mrs Curren 
would not be able to find the precise spot as “desire, which one may well call love, is 
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gone from [her]” and the “resurrection eternal out of the earth” is no longer possible 
(111).   
 Marginalised as a woman, Mrs Curren's is a middle voice: between white, 
masculine, hegemonic discourse and the muteness of the black population. She calls 
this rhetorical position that of the castrated perpetrator: “I am like a man who has been 
castrated” (111). At other times, this position is inanimate: “I have intimations older 
than any memory, unshakeable, that once upon a time I was alive . . . From the cradle a 
theft took place: a child was taken and a doll left in its place to be nursed and reared, 
and that doll is what I call I” (100). The image of herself as a doll “without substance” 
(101) is consistent with her seeing herself as an empty container and with the craving 
of corporeal substance: “I cling . . . to her herself, to her body, to my birth from her 
body into the world. In blood and milk I drank her body and came to life” (101). Being 
“stolen” separates the remembered bliss of childhood from the doll-like later life.  
 The meditation on substantiality is taken further in the reading of a family 
photograph: “I am on my feet; I appear to be reaching towards the camera; my mother, 
kneeling behind me, restrains me . . . Standing to one side . . . is my brother Paul, his 
cap at a jaunty angle” (101). This simple description seems to conceal deeper 
meanings suggesting absence in the apparent presence and a sinister mystery behind 
the happy façade. The image ceases to be of a happy childhood and provokes thoughts 
on her brother's death and the “mistake” he had committed. What precisely the 
“mistake” is the reader never learns. Whether the absence is merely the absence of 
contact with South African reality is unclear although plausible when Mrs Curren 
refers to the labour of black South Africans unrepresented in the photograph: 
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Who clipped the hollyhocks? . . . Was it my grandfather who got up at four in 
the icy morning to open the sluice and lead water into the garden? If not he, 
then whose was the garden rightfully? Who are the ghosts and who are the 
presences? Who, outside the picture, leaning on their rakes, leaning on their 
spades, waiting to get back to work, lean also against the edge of the rectangle, 
bending it, bursting it in? (102). 
 
Mrs Curren foregrounds what is hidden (“Dies irae, dies illa when the absent shall be 
present and the present absent”) and the picture no longer shows “who were in the 
garden frame that day, but who were not there” (102). Such an acknowledgement of 
“hidden” history, however, not straightforward: “Am I struggling against the reins in 
order to strike the camera out of the hands of whoever holds it before it is too late? 
And who holds the camera? Whose formless shadow leans toward my mother and her 
two offspring across the tilled bed?” (103). Who the “shadow” is, what their intentions 
are, and whether there is any link between this vision and the “mistake” Paul made are 
all questions that remain unanswered. The mysterious figure could equally be the 
never mentioned father, someone who took the picture, someone who made Mrs 
Curren into a doll and infected her with the disease of shame. Again the trivial scene 
contrasts with its suggested significance: “To each of us fate sends the right disease. 
Mine a disease that eats me out from inside. Were I to be opened up they would find 
me hollow as a doll, a doll with a crab sitting inside licking its lips, dazed by the flood 
of light” (103). She sees the picture as a document of the erasure of black labour, the 
moment of recognition of moral corruption that will kill her seventy years later, and 
the moment of her infection that turns into a disease “[g]nawing the socket of my hip, 
gnawing my backbone, beginning to gnaw at my knees” (103). 
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 Mrs Curren contrasts the body and language: her death is the “foe of writing” 
as her writing is “the foe of death,” an attempt to keep it “at arm’s length” (106). The 
physicality of writing contrasts with the disembodied, and dishonest, telephone 
conversations (118). Writing is a means of “sav[ing] herself” (124) although soon the 
object of her “maternal” love becomes not her daughter but John (125). Mrs Curren's 
resentment of the daughter is tied to her inability to love him: “Not wanting to love 
him, how true can I say my love is for you? For love is not like hunger. Love is never 
sated, stilled. When one loves, one loves more. The more I love you, the more I ought 
to love him. The less I love him, the less, perhaps, I love you” (125). This resentment 
increases with the failure of Mrs Curren's language to reach her daughter and to 
translate her own body into language. Instead of “the blood-tug of daughter to mother” 
she realises that her letter grows “more abstract, more abstracted, the kind of letter one 
writes from the stars . . . disembodied, crystalline, bloodless” (125). While the letter 
stems from her body (it is reminiscent of menstruation and pregnancy: when read it is 
to “take on flesh” (119)), her “bleeding on the paper” is “thin”: “I am written out, bled 
dry” (126).  
 In the moments of language’s failure Mrs Curren realises her metaphors 
express the desire for her daughter's presence. The drugged visions allow the body to 
speak: “Borodino: an anagram for Come back in some language or other. Diconal: I 
call. Words vomited up from the belly of the whale, misshapen, mysterious. Daughter” 
(128). Mrs Curren attempts to love the unlovable John: “As a hen that loses its chicks 
will take in a duckling, oblivious of the yellow fur, the black beak, and teach it to take 
sand-baths, peck at worms” (130). Her nagging of him is seen as both oppressive 
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(“Talk had weighed down the generation of his grandparents and the generation of his 
parents. Lies, promises, blandishments, threats: they had walked stooped under the 
weight of all the talk” (132)) but simultaneously protective, attempting to preserve the 
feminine in the boy against the corrupting masculinist power.157 Her words to him 
escape binary classification (“They are not Yes, they are not No”) and stem from her 
body: “What is living inside me is something else, another word” (133). Mrs Curren's 
argument comes not only from the gendered perspective of her female body but, given 
the land is equated with female body, her preaching positions her, as in Dawn's myth, 
as mother earth shielding the son. The source of evil, as in Dusklands, is suggested to 
be the over-valuation of masculinity for which Mrs Curren finds little biological basis: 
“you would find it hard to tell the difference between boy and girl. Every baby has the 
same puffy-looking fold between the legs. The spout, the tendril that is said to mark 
out the boy is no great thing, really” (133-134). Politically problematic (coming from, 
however reluctant, an oppressor) this assertion of lack of difference is paradoxically 
grounded in the difference of the female body and its experience: female experience is 
used here to preach sameness from the core of difference. It advocates a universal 
humanity devoid of stereotypically “masculine” ways of thinking, which Dusklands 
situates in a subject position in relation to a passive feminine land that can be 
objectified and appropriated. 
 Such masculinity is evident in the “metaphysics of the weapon,” one of the 
aggressive “icy, exclusive, death-driven male constructions” (137). John's death is 
                                                 
157
 The men “with strong arms” is both a biological, and – due to the polysemic “arms” – a political                   
category. The same polysemy is used in the Waiting for the Barbarians.  
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described in an almost erotic language that combines the elements of nascent 
masculinity, sexual gratification, and aggressive heroism into a male rite of passage: 
in Florence’s room, in the growing dark, the boy, lying on his back with the 
bomb or whatever it is in his hand, his eyes wide open, not veiled now but 
clear: thinking . . . Envisioning the moment of glory when he will arise, fully 
himself at last, erect, powerful, transfigured. When the fiery flower will unfold, 
when the pillar of smoke will rise. The bomb of his chest like a talisman: as 
Christopher Columbus lay in the dark of his cabin, holding the compass to his 
chest, the mystic instrument that would guide him to the Indies, the Isles of the 
Blest. Troops of maidens with bared breasts singing to him, opening their arms, 
as he wades to them through the shallows holding before him the needle that 
never wavers, that points forever in one direction, to the future. (137-138)158 
  
 The estrangement from her daughter is represented by her attitude to 
emigration, to pain, and finally, by two mothering styles. A photograph of her 
American grandsons wearing lifejackets “like waterwings of old” (178) breeds 
hostility becoming an almost colonial symbol of the taming of the wild: “A recreation 
area, you call it on the back of the photograph. The lake tamed, the forest tamed, 
renamed” (178). There is a distance between the childhood of John and that of his 
“cousins.” Their fear of drowning becomes the fear of life for which Mrs Curren 
rejects them (179) suggesting she has more in common with her “adopted” family. The 
deaths of Bheki and John, paradoxically referred to as as “life” contrast with the lives 
of her grandsons described as “already dead” (179).159 
 In her last moments, Mrs Curren attempts to “call [her daughter] up to say 
goodbye” but realises the link is broken: “I whispered your name. ‘My daughter, my 
                                                 
158
 The language is more explicit when she descibes his “pistol,” that was “his and Bheki’s great secret, 
that was going to make men of them”: “The barrel of the pistol is between his knees; he strokes it up and 
down” (159). 
159
 “Life is biting the dust. Or: life is drowning. Falling through water, to the floor” (179). The contrast 
between the two childhoods is the contrast between the two immersions: feared (in the US) and as 
metaphorically experienced (in South Africa). 
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child,’ I whispered into the darkness; but all that appeared to me was a photograph: a 
picture of you, not you” (180). The body has been replaced by the figure, its 
representation. The last hope is that her love is not rejected, that in a maze of doubt 
there exists a primordial relation between a mother and a child (181). The final 
expression of her belief in love is the last time Mrs Curren mentions her daughter. She 
promises to “release [her] soon from this rope of words” (181) and proceeds to 
describe what is perhaps her own death. 
 
Mrs Curren and the relation to the Other 
 
In the relationship between Mrs Curren and Vercueil the 'feminine' acceptance 
contrasts to the 'masculine' modes of Dawn or Jacobus even though it is driven by an 
attempt at reading. Such an attempt is problematic as it involves making him an object 
of knowledge and translating his “otherness” into part of the same, but his refusal to 
participate in this undertaking is eventually respected. Despite the suggestion that Mrs 
Curren knows something about his past, Vercueil remains unknown and closed in his 
physicality.   
 Vercueil’s mysteriousness concerns even his name “Vercueil, Verkuil, 
Verskuil . . . I have never come across such a name before” (34). He is initially treated 
as the unclean other: “One of the homeless for who August, month of rains, is the 
worst month. Asleep in his box, his legs stretched out like a marionette’s, his jaw 
agape. An unsavoury smell about him: urine, sweet wine, mouldy clothing, and 
something else too. Unclean” (3). His “unhealthy” body is fascinating (6). The timing 
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of his arrival endows him with religious significance: “A visitor, visiting himself on 
me on this of all days” (3). While she orders him to leave the garden, Mrs Curren reads 
more into the event: “Two things . . . in the space of an hour: the news, long dreaded, 
and this reconnaissance, this other annunciation” (4). Like Gabriel, he announces to 
Mrs Curren her cancerous pregnancy.  
 His arrogance and indifference make him a difficult object of charity (7). Her 
attempts at conversation are always rejected: “He did something that shocked me. 
With a straight look, the first direct look he has given me, he spat a gob of spit, thick, 
yellow, streaked with brown from the coffee, on to the concrete beside my foot” (7). If 
the irony of Mrs Curren’s 'pregnancy' lies in the deadly nature of breast cancer, this 
adopted son, often referred to as a child, rejects yet uses her mothering (7,10).160  
 The religious significances ascribed to him invite readings which are, in turn, 
permanently undercut by the mundane. “Not an angel, certainly” he is often seen as an 
“insect . . . emerging from behind the skirting-boards when the house is in darkness to 
forage for crumbs” (12). His body is positively non-angelic: “The worst . . . smell 
comes from his . . . feet. He needs socks. He needs new shoes. He needs a bath” (17). 
His blood is “strange . . . Like honey on ashes” (43).161 While the sense of smell plays 
an important part in her perceptions (carrying the detectable “smell of death” herself) 
her acceptance of Vercueil is sentient: “I am even getting used to the smell, I thought” 
(64). Nevertheless, Mrs Curren continues in her quest for understanding: she takes him 
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 More important than his childishness is the mystery behind his disability which Mrs Curren attempts 
to solve. He cannot move three fingers on his right hand: “Thumb and forefinger stood out; the other 
three fingers curled into the palm” (10). He nods when asked whether this was due to an accident, but it 
is “the kind of nod that committed him to nothing” (10).  
161
 A similar expression, “ashes in honey,” appears in the Waiting for the Barbarians where it is used to 
represent the sexual union between the Magistrate and the Barbarian girl (36).  
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for rides, attempts to converse (16). Sometimes she describes him “like a husband 
giving a driving lessons” (17); most of the time, however, his presence is unbearable.  
 Her attempts to employ Vercueil in the garden are not “trying to turn [him] into 
what [he is] not,” but the realisation that, in contemporary South Africa, “we can’t 
proceed on the basis of charity” (18).162 Hopeful for true bodily communication, Mrs 
Curren resorts to embodied “false etymologies” which trace an abstract concept to the 
body part (caritas to heart) which is metaphorically the seat of sensation underlying 
the virtue in question (20) yet she fails to convince Vercueil of anything. The “celestial 
music” provides an (illusion of) physical connection with Vercueil: “Have our two 
hearts, our organs of love, been tied for this brief while by a cord of sound?” (22). 
Such a 'connection' is not a verbal exchange but a physical union of two bodies, its 
dignity undercut by the mundane suggestion that Vercueil might not be listening: “It 
was nearly dark. Against the garage wall the man was squatting, smoking, the point of 
his cigarette glowing. Perhaps he saw me, perhaps not. Together we listened. At this 
moment, I thought, I know how he feels as surely as if he and I were making love” 
(27). Such visions of connection are presented as coming from the “outside” (“it came 
unbidden”), but the invitation to allegory is annulled by embodying this spiritual union 
in an image of copulating insects: “ravished . . . tail to tail” (27). Despite his 
unreliability, Vercueil is entrusted with sending the letter to Mrs Curren's daughter: 
“These are private papers, private letters. They are my daughter’s inheritance. They are 
all I can give her, all she will accept, coming from this country. I don’t want them 
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 “[b]ecause those who accept charity despise it, while those who give give with a despairing heart. 
What is the point of charity when it does not come from heart to heart?” (18-19).   
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opened and read by anyone else” (28). Vercueil never conclusively agrees to send it: 
he “shift[s] uncomfortably,” and his quiet admission cannot be taken at face value.  
 Vercueil is read sometimes like a child, sometimes like a husband, sometimes 
like an angel messenger, sometimes as simply a derelict homeless man. None of these 
“define” him, while he himself refuses talk of himself. Their contact relies more on the 
unnameable sensations and visions. In all his incarnations, the unspeakable body 
assumes various interpretations but has one function: 
we could set up a house, the two of us, after a fashion, I upstairs, he downstairs, 
for this last little while. So that there will be someone at hand in the nights. For 
that is, after all, what one wants in the end: someone to be there, to call to in the 
dark. Mother, or whoever is prepared to stand in for mother. (77).  
 
Treated as an angel, he is often read as an angel of death. At other times, he is “[n]o 
Odysseus, no Hermes, perhaps not even the messenger. A circler-around. A ditherer, 
despite the weatherworn front” (128). Mrs Curren's attempts at reading are all abortive. 
The unreadable Vercueil can be made to signify anything, but he thwarts all readings, 
eludes her interpretations and is never integrated into Mrs Curren’s scheme. However, 
this unreadable man is the person in whom Mrs Curren trusts with her “breath of trust” 
(122). 
 The idea of entrusting Vercueil with sending the letters is therefore not only 
simply meant to treat him as a messenger to form a link with her daughter. In its 
essence, it is also a test aimed at uncovering how much humanity remains in South 
Africa, where the position assumed by Mrs Curren (trusting the Other at a time of 
perpetual hatred) may be even more important than whether the letter reaches its 
destination. “Because I cannot trust Vercueil I must trust him” says Mrs Curren. Her 
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actions are like “trying to keep a soul alive in times not hospitable to the soul” (119). 
This paradoxical trust in the untrustworthy, accepting the one rejected by all in the 
society, is the most difficult kind of trust:  
Easy to give alms to the orphaned, the destitute, the hungry. Harder to give 
alms to the bitter-hearted (I think of Florence). But the alms I give Vercueil are 
hardest of all. What I give he does not forgive me for giving. No charity in him, 
no forgiveness . . . Without his forgiveness I give without charity, serve without 
love. Rain falling on barren soil. (119-120)  
 
There is no rational explanation for trusting Vercueil and Mrs Curren finds none. Yet 
trust seems to be to her one of the most important factors in human conduct, and when 
all other links with humanity have been broken, it is the trust in someone who should 
not be trusted that is to her one of the last humane impulses. Vercueil is a figurative 
mother to nurse Mrs Curren, and is to become a figurative child to carry her message 
when she is dead. 
 With the progression of her disease, Mrs Curren finds him also a brother in 
degradation. Their lives are degrading “not only to us but to the idea we have of 
ourselves, of humankind. People lying in dark bedrooms, in their own mess, helpless. 
People lying in hedges in the rain. You will not understand this . . . Vercueil will” 
(128). She still sees him as an angel who protects her (“When would the time come 
when the jacket fell away and great wings sprouted from his shoulders?” (146)) and 
equally an agent of death (“Will this be how the story ends: with being carried in 
strong arms across the sands, through the shallows, past the breakers, into the darker 
depths?” (146)), the latter role both invited and rejected by her silent, and promptly 
denied, agreement to be strangled (169). In her dreams she sees herself taught by him 
to swim, with him either guarding her or leading her to death by immersion in water 
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oily perhaps with the oil of the last rites (153).163 To him she admits her confusion, her 
call for peace which deprives her of a voice (“voice that is no voice” (149)). In the last 
stages of her life they begin sharing a bed: his dirty feet and “dry” locust-like body 
threaten to drown in the depths of the sea (173), and he becomes witness to her pain: 
“the look people have when they are rapt in lovemaking: brutal, predatory. He does not 
like that look, he turns his eyes away” (175).   
 While Vercueil's sincerity loses importance (“A mariner’s story. Do I believe 
it? Verily, I do not care” (171)), Mrs Curren's readings waver between suspicions of 
mystery and unspoken identity within him, and the acceptance of him as literal:  
Another challenge issued, another intimation that I know. I am like a woman 
with a husband who keeps a mistress on the sly, scolding him, coaxing him to 
come clean. But my hints pass him by. He is not hiding anything. His ignorance 
is real. His ignorance, his innocence. 
‘There is something that won’t come, isn’t there?’ I said. ‘Why don’t you just 
speak and see where the words take you?’  
But he was at a threshold he could not cross. He stood baulked, wordless, 
hiding behind the cigarette smoke, narrowing his eyes so that I should not see 
in. (177)  
 
Such suggestions of deeper meaning are never verbalised. Moreover, they are 
undermined by Mrs Curren's doubt and her returns to the mundane.  
 Such mundane meditations revolve around Vercueil's masculinity: “He is dry. 
His drink is not water but fire. Perhaps that is why I cannot imagine children of his: 
because his semen would be dry, dry and brown, like pollen or like the dust of this 
country” (179-180). Vercueil's sterility is more than physical: “He does not know how 
to love. I speak not of the motions of the soul but of something simpler. Her does not 
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 Elsewhere, his “seduction” of Mrs Curren “into death” uses the surface / depth imagery: drunk, Mrs 
Curren experiences “a curtain, a cloud,” “a veil” that covers “everything” grow less substantial (113). 
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know . . . what zips and buttons and clasps to expect. Does not know what goes where. 
Does not know how to do what he has to do” (180). Mrs Curren sees his sexual naivety 
to apply equally to death: “The nearer the end comes, the more faithful he is. Yet still I 
have to guide his hand . . . he has no more conception of death than a virgin has of sex. 
But the same curiosity” (180). The last plea to her daughter is a plea for him: “no need 
to be sorry for me. But spare a thought for this man left behind who cannot swim, does 
not yet know how to fly” (181). In the end, Mrs Curren's “Is it time?” refers equally to 
death and to sex. The ambiguity invites sexual reading as time for Vercueil to act and 
for Mrs Curren to “guide his hand.” On such an ambiguous note, the novel finishes: 
I got back into bed, into the tunnel between the cold sheets. The curtain parted; 
he came in beside me. For the first time I smelled nothing. He took me in his 
arms and held me with mighty force, so that the breath went out of me in a 
rush. From that embrace there was no warmth to be had. (181)164 
 
 Where Jacobus embodied virility and signified beginnings, Vercueil embodies 
a slow dissolution without future. Where Dusklands ends with the promise of a new, 
however disastrous, era (Dawn’s new life after therapy, South Africa’s future), the Age 
of Iron, ends with no hope. In these two works, the masculine and the feminine 
experience differ in their attitude to language, to the body, to the Other, to ethics and 
politics. All these are grounded in the experience of the body with its pain, disease, 
and potential for experiencing and inflicting violence. Bodies provide a conceptual 
metaphorical framework in which, and through which, all those abstract notions are 
understood.   
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 A further ambiguity is, of course, offered by the narrator describing her death in the past tense.    
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Chapter 4  
Metaphor and Fiction: The Perversion of Substantiality.  
Foe and Master of Petersburg  
 
 This chapter concentrates on Coetzee's use of the body image in presenting 
embodiment underlying two canonical textual works. The analysis will concentrate on 
the relationship of embodiment and textuality, and the contrast between the body and 
language as depicted in the two characters striving to translate their embodied 
experience into language. Their attempts are complicated by the suggested difference 
between the truth of the body and the nature of language, but also by the status of 
'truth' in fiction. Both Foe and the Master of Petersburg suggest the impossibility of 
translating the body into language, both suggest painful embodiment at the core of 
textual culture, and both invite allegorical readings by their open-ended and wilfully 
ambiguous nature as much as by their self-conscious discussion of metaphor. Both 
invite allegorical reading by presenting the body as the unspeakable seat of the truth, 
and language as misleading and violent.    
 
Foe: Literary Reading 
 
Foe begins with the description of the body. Susan's pain (hands “blistered,” 
back “burnt,”) deprives her of humanity: she becomes “like a flower of the sea . . . an 
anemone . . . a jellyfish” before her life begins anew in water carrying her “by the 
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waves . . . onto the beach” (5). Her new life consists in reading and being read, 
defining and being defined. Her readings of Cruso suggest the misleading nature of 
language. Her readings of Friday, in the absence of language, waver between 
endowing him with depth and impressing meanings onto his surface. Her self-reading 
contrasts with Foe's: the two versions of one story uncover language's power either to 
expose what is hidden or to misrepresent. The ambiguous results of these readings and 
interpretations lead to the main trends of critical commentary which rely on the 
support for one of the pair of propositions. Thus Cruso, a colonial patriarch, has 
received more attention than Cruso guarding the body against the metaphorical 
violence in language. Foe's deceptions and mistranslations in reading and writing 
Susan are analysed more prominently than the competing interpretations of Susan as 
deceitful in her narrative. Readings of Susan's relationship to Friday similarly diverge: 
from seeing her instrumentally using his body to considering their allegiance. The 
ambiguities of the final immersion scene provide grounds for further divisions. 
 
 Deceit in language 
 Susan's initial relationship with Cruso is submissive. At the start, animalised by 
exhaustion, she feels herself looked at “as if [she] were a fish cast up by the waves” 
rather than “an unfortunate fellow-creature” (9). Her descriptions imply his 
superiority: she views him as the “king of this tiny realm;” he “rule[s]” his “island 
kingdom” (14, 13, 11). Her introduction involves “present[ing]” herself to Cruso and 
becoming “his second subject” (11). Any possible irony is undercut by her admiration: 
“One evening, seeing him . . . staring out to sea . . . I thought: He is a truly kingly 
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figure; he is the true king of his island” (37-38). With time, however, the island is 
described as “no more belong[ing] to Cruso than to the King of Portugal or . . . Friday 
or the cannibals of Africa” (26) and Susan's submission grows into a relationship of 
“brother and sister, or host and guest, or master and servant, or whatever it was we had 
been” (30).  
Such a confusion of roles results from the unreadability of Cruso's body and his 
language. His control over the two realms invites reading as an allegory of patriarchal 
oppression. His unreadability is first suggested in the clash between his body and his 
language, when his behaviour (smile) stands at variance which his words (the story of 
Friday's mutilation). Given Susan's refusal to examine Friday's mouth, she lives with 
an uncertainty exacerbated by Cruso's multiple interpretations:  
 Perhaps the slavers, who are Moors, hold the tongue to be a delicacy . . . Or 
 perhaps they grew weary of listening to Friday’s wails of grief . . . Perhaps they 
 wanted to prevent him from ever telling his story . . . Perhaps they cut out the 
 tongue of every cannibal they took . . . How will we ever know the truth? (23).  
 
 
Susan's suspiciousness is overwhelming (“the words uttering themselves” (37)) and is 
never dispelled. The explanations for Friday's obedience (“He has known no other 
master. He follows me in all things”) or the suggestion that he is better off “under a 
lenient master” than “in Brazil, under the planter’s lash, or in Africa, where the forests 
teem with cannibals” (24) are never fully trusted.    
 Cruso’s body is that of “yet another mutineer,” in a “jerkin, and drawers to 
below his knees . . . a tall cap rising in a cone . . . made of pelts . . . and a stout pair of 
sandals” (8). However, the simplicity of the ageing body with a “great head of tawny 
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hair,” a beard “never cut” and hands “sinewy, rough-skinned . . . toil-hardened” is 
complicated by story-telling inconsistencies:  
one day, he would say his father had been a wealthy merchant whose counting-
house he had quit in search of adventure. But the next day he would tell me he 
had been a poor lad of no family who had shipped as a cabin boy and been 
captured by the Moors . . . and escaped . . . to the New World. Sometimes he 
would say he had dwelt on his island the past fifteen years, he and Friday, none 
but they having been spared when their ship went down . . . So in the end I did 
not know what was truth, what was lies, and what was mere rambling. (12)  
 
 
Where some of these histories are confirmed by a “bodily” proof (“the mark of the 
branding iron” used by the Moors), such confirmation is undermined by his responses 
to Susan's questions during a spell of illness (“in fever as in drunkenness the truth 
speaks itself willy-nilly” (12)).  
 Narrative inconsistencies are coupled with chosen silences: Susan never 
understands why Cruso does not keep a journal, use a calendar, build a ship or recover 
his tools (“heathenish inventions” (32)). His terraces, a physical “journal without 
words” (Penner 115), is prone to misreading: “[O]f the walls they will say, These are 
the cannibal walls, the ruins of a cannibal city, from the golden age of the cannibals. 
For who will believe they were built by one man and a slave, in the hope that one day 
a seafarer would come with a sack of corn for them to sow?” (54)). His answers are 
unfailingly enigmatic (“not every man who bears the mark of a castaway is a castaway 
at heart” (33)).    
 Cruso's control of language extends to control of the symbolic order. The laws 
of the island are read by Susan, and many critics, as patriarchal. Law “establishes a 
fundamental limit” by “designating certain things taboo” (Valente 167), and Cruso's 
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first rule is a restriction of language: “[t]his is not England, we have no need of a great 
stock of words” (21). His control of the female voice is accompanied by control of her 
body: “Cruso gave me his knife and warned me not to venture from his castle; for the 
apes, he said, would not be as wary of a woman as they were of him and Friday. I 
wondered at this: was woman, to an ape, a different species from a man? Nevertheless, 
I prudently obeyed, and stayed at home, and rested” (15). His control over her mobility 
is foregrounded by the refusal to provide Susan with shoes.165 Sexual difference also 
influences the division of labour: shoe-making is described as a 'masculine' 
occupation, essentially different from the triviality of embroidery.  
 Susan presents herself as threatening Cruso's position: “[after] years of 
unquestioned and solitary mastery, he sees his realm invaded and has tasks set upon 
him by a woman” (25). The enforced control of her language (“keep[ing] a tighter 
reign on [her] tongue” (25)) and captivity at home lead Susan to find a ‘room of her 
own’: “a hollow in the rocks where I could lie sheltered from the wind and gaze out to 
sea . . . my private retreat, the one place reserved for me on an island owned by 
another” (26). Critical readings of Foe's as representing the “metaphorical alignment 
of women and colonized subjects as victims of patriarchal oppression which has 
deprived both groups of their natural language” (Dovey 356) rely on a metaphorical 
reading of Susan's silence as parallel to the literal muteness of Friday. Such an 
allegorical reading is first facilitated by the suggestive notions of the denial of “voice”:  
there was nothing to talk of save the weather. Cruso had no stories to tell of the 
life he had lived as a trader and planter before the shipwreck. He did not care 
how I came to be in Bahia or what I did there. When I spoke of England and of 
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 “When Cruso returned he knew at once I had been exploring, and burst out in a passion. “While you 
live under my roof you will do as I instruct!” he cried.” 
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all the things I intended to see and do when I was rescued, he seemed not to 
hear me. It was as though he wished his story to begin with his arrival on the 
island, and mine to begin with my arrival, and the story of us together to end on 
the island too. (34-35) 
 
While feminist readings are partly invited by repeated references to voice, body, 
hysteria or rooms, Dovey's “alignment” of women and colonised subjects is 
undermined later when Susan realizes the violence in language and, by extension, the 
possible benevolence of Cruso's silence:   
I tell myself that I talk to Friday to educate him out of darkness and silence. 
But what is the truth? There are times when benevolence deserts me and I use 
words only as the shortest way to subject him to my will. At such times I 
understand why Cruso preferred not to disturb his muteness. I understand, that 
is to say, why a man will choose to be a slaveowner. (60-61)  
 
The text thus suggests Dovey's “alignment” only to undermine it by the suggestion of 
another alignment between Foe and Susan relative to Friday. 
 The co-existence of the notions of body, language, need and desire also lends 
itself easily to a psychoanalytic reading. Desire in Lacan, in Zupančič's view, has “the 
structure of the signifying order, of language and its inherent differentiation;” it is 
metonymic and never fully satisfied. At the same time, “the occurrence of desire is 
correlative with the desire of the signifying order, which is broader than the realm of 
laws and prohibitions” (Zupančič 175). Susan's desire to leave the island is correlative 
with her desire for words, first in conversations with Cruso, and later in attempts to be 
“saved literarily, in and by her own narrative” (Jolly 7). For Lacan, speech, stemming 
from desire, requires “the response of the other . . .  in the view of what will be” 
(Function 299). Cruso's failure to respond, represented as metaphorical mutilation of 
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Susan and the subjection of her body to his laws, offers no future resolution. His laws 
are openly described as circumscribing desires: “Laws are made for one purpose only . 
. . to hold us in check when our desires grow immoderate. As long as our desires are 
moderate we have no need of laws.” Susan's “immoderate” desire (“It burns me night 
and day, I can think of nothing else”) is denied expression (“I do not wish to hear of 
your desire”) in a gesture suggesting a lack of future (“It does not concern the island, it 
is not a matter of the island” (36)). In the convoluted relationship between the literal 
and the metaphorical Susan's desire to shake the foundations of the island is structured 
as an earthquake: “When I lay to sleep that night I seemed to feel the earth sway 
beneath me. I told myself it was a memory of the rocking of the ship coming back 
unbidden. But it was not so: it was the rocking of the island itself as it floated on the 
sea” (26). The event is read as a metaphor (“a sign”) but then Susan offers a mundane 
interpretation in the logic of the two-way movement (“becoming an island-dweller”) 
(26).  
 Departure from the island is rendered as her triumph: “as if a spell of Cruso’s 
gaze on the waters had been broken” (38). His death is precipitated by a reversal of 
roles: “He was a prisoner, and I, despite myself, his gaoler” (43).166 Her victory is the 
culmination of the battle between the sexes and the triumph of female desire over the 
patriarchal order: 
Do tall women who rise out of the sea dismay you? Do they seem like exiled 
queens come to reclaim the islands men have stolen from them? . . . 
Nevertheless, did Cruso in his way and do you in your way believe I came to 
claim dominion over you, and is that why you were wary of me? (86)  
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 Contrary to what Dick Penner claims in his political reading of Cruso's final moments, Cruso does 





The unreadability of the body  
 
 The problems with misleading language do not disappear when Susan reads a 
silent body. Mute Friday is African, “a Negro with a head of fuzzy wool, naked save 
for a pair of rough drawers” (6), and possibly a cannibal.167 He initially regards her, in 
her projective interpretations, as “he would a seal or a porpoise thrown up by the 
waves . . . that could be cut up for food,” and his gestures are interpreted 
unambiguously: “[H]e is trying my flesh” (6). Her fear of being devoured becomes 
obsessive when she learns that Friday was a cannibal “whom [Cruso] had saved from 
being devoured by other cannibals” (12). His metaphorical otherness, exacerbated by 
speechlessness is reflected in animal metaphors used to describe him:168 his hair is 
“fuzzy wool” (5); he smells of “fish, and of sheepswool” (6), and his feet are “horny” 
(106). He is variously a “dog” (21, 32, 37, 55, 80), a “worm” (119), a “beast” or an 
“animal” (32, 45, 70), a gelded “stallion” (98) and a “horse” (42), a fish (24, 60), a 
“cat” (27, 77), an “ass” (37), a “toad” (57), a “whale[]” or a “spider[]” (59). His 
animality (and slavery) is confirmed when Susan ascends the hill “riding on his back.”  
 However, Friday is not “an imbecile incapable of speech” (22); his dumbness is 
a result of his mutilation which metonymically defines him. His story is a constant 
source of fear and fascination: “I began to look on him . . . with the horror we reserve 
for the mutilated” (24). The “horror” silences her and leads to compulsive rituals 
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 Many critics have noted the “racial difference between Crusoe’s and [Coetzee's] Friday” (Spivak, 
169). But while Dominic Head claims that “Coetzee’s Friday is pointedly black,” on their first encounter 
Susan describes his skin as “not black but a dark grey, dry as if coated with dust” (6).  
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 For Chomsky language (or at least linguistic recursion, centre-embedding and computational ability) 
distinguishes human from non-human animals.   
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aimed at warding off the phobic fear: “I caught myself flinching when he came near, or 
holding my breath so as not to have to smell him. Behind his back I wiped the utensils 
his hands had touched” (24). For Newman, this reaction is one of “pollution anxiety” 
in which Friday is positioned as a “social outsider, as a member of a racial minority, 
physically handicapped, sexually ambiguous, and an eater of the ultimate in unclean 
foods” (Newman 98). While Susan's fear can be variously read, the text highlights the 
turning of the victim into a perpetrator combined with identification (“the movements 
of the tongue in my own mouth”).  
 These processes can gesture towards a reading in Lacanian terms. In the 
Imaginary realm “the visible world is the ego’s mirror, and reflected in it are the ego’s 
dreams of identity” (Bowie 198). Throughout the subject's life “the original 
identificatory procedures which brought the ego into being are repeated and reinforced 
by the individual in his relationship with the external world of people and things” 
(199). While Susan's defines herself in opposition to Friday, her ego still depends on 
the visual relationship with her and others' bodies. Her fears of Friday's mutilation 
could easily be unconsciously active “imagos of the mutilated body.”  These, 
according to Lacan “represent the defective vectors of aggressive intentions, which 
they provide with an efficacy that might be called magical.” These are “the images of 
castration, mutilation, devouring, bursting open of the body” (Aggressivity 13). Their 
reappearance in adult life is common: 
The fragmented body manifests itself regularly in dreams when the movement 
of the analysis encounters a certain level of aggressive disintegration in the 
individual. It then appears in the form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs, 
represented in exoscopy, growing wings and taking up arms for intestinal 
persecutions . . . [This] kind of image crops up constantly in dreams, especially 
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at the point when analysis appears to be turning its attention on the most 
fundamental, most archaic fixations. (qtd. in Benvenuto 57)   
 
Although Susan exhibits normal identification and “identifies with the image of the 
human form, that [she] shares with other human beings” (qtd. in Benvenuto 58) there 
are other elements of the text that invite a Lacanian reading, just as the repeated 
references to voice, desire and rooms invite feminist interpretations. For example, 
Coetzee presents something akin to Lacanian transivitism in the reversal of roles in 
which Friday becomes the agent of mutilation and Susan his victim.169 Such 
identification could be read literally (if Susan is read as a prostitute) or metaphorically, 
if her mutilation is figurative. In the latter case the equation of the mutilated tongue 
and castration (“secret . . . as some other mutilations are hidden by clothing”) equates 
Friday's literal silence with Susan's gendered silencing in literature. 
 Elsewhere Susan claims that “where there is blood there is fascination” (105) 
and further theorises her “horror” for “the mutilated”:  
Because they put us in mind of what we would rather forget: how easily, at the 
stroke of a sword or knife, wholeness and beauty are forever undone? Perhaps. 
But toward you I feel a deeper revulsion. I could not put out of the mind the 
softness of the tongue, its softness and wetness, and the fact that it does not live 
in the light; also how helpless it is before the knife once the barrier of teeth has 
been passed. (85) 
  
The previous suggestions that equated structuring speech with the body and the lack of 
a tongue with castration further invite the common reading of Susan as soon to be 
“castrated” in language. This is represented by this description of the tongue with its 
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 “The child who strikes another says that he has been struck; the child who sees another fall, cries. 
Similarly, it is by means of the identification with the other that he sees the whole gamut of . . . display 
[‘parade’], whose structural ambivalence is clearly revealed in his behaviour, the slave being identified 
with despot, the actor with the spectator, the seduced with the seducer” (qtd. in Benvenuto 58).   
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suggestion of female sex organs: “softness,” “wetness,” “does not live in the light,” 
“the barrier.” The unseen organ provides Susan with a cornucopia of readings: 
arguments against the slave-traders' guilt, speculations about the instruments 
employed, as well as ideas about the details: was the tongue removed, or was it 
“merely split, with a cut as neat as a surgeon’s, that drew little blood yet made speech 
afterward impossible. Or let us say the sinews that move the tongue were cut and not 
the tongue itself, the sinews at the base of the tongue” (84-85). At the same time, 
Friday’s body is the more repulsive for its mystery.  
 In Dovey's Lacanian analysis, Friday is a simple metaphor: a “figure of 
essential Otherness . . . the means of representing women’s otherness to men and to 
men’s language” (358). Her reading presents him as “the phallus for Susan Barton as a 
woman writer . . . a fetishized substitute phallus which allows her to elude the fact of 
her own castration in language” (374). Such a view takes 'literal' muteness in the novel 
and supplants this with the figurative 'muteness' of Susan. The 'literal' suggestion of 
Friday's castration is matched by a symmetrical and figurative “castration in 
language,” whose metaphoricity relies on the Lacanian understanding of language. 
While both Susan and Friday are alien to the narratives of the Empire, it is unclear 
where Dovey finds the justification for her statement that Susan manages to “elude . . . 
castration” thanks to Friday (374). While he might be owned in a “phallic” manner 
(offering the promise of rendering her story publishable, shifting unwanted attention 
from her past), he is ineffective in stopping Foe from (mis)reading her story. Such a 
reading is made possible by Friday's silence, the prominence afforded his body, and 
the constant suggestions of his 'meaning'. These are maintained by the container 
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metaphor in which meaning is seen to reside within him. Where he was initially treated 
as an animal surface, he is now endowed with inner life when Susan witnesses his 
“fishing”:   
After paddling out some hundred yards from the [rock] shelf into the thickest 
of the seaweed, he reached into a bag that hung about his neck and brought out 
handfuls of white flakes which he began to scatter over the water. At first I 
thought this was bait to lure the fish to him; but no, when he had strewn all his 
flakes he turned his log-boat under and steered it back to the ledge, where he 
landed it with great difficulty through the swell. 
 
At various points Susan suspects this to be a ritual: either votive (“offering to the god 
of the waves to cause the fish to run plentifully, or . . . such superstitious observance” 
(31)) or commemorative. The second reading, more common in critical literature, is 
partly undermined by the later revelation that the ship sank elsewhere, in “part of the 
coast [Susan] had never visited,” although this undermining could itself be further 
undermined in a variety of ways (Cruso's lie, Friday's memory or conscious decision). 
The mystery, however, allows for rethinking Friday as a container. Matched with the 
common metaphor of truth as existing within a container, Susan, to some degree, 
equates the “inside” with the “true”: “the casting of petals was the first sign [Susan] 
had, that a spirit or soul – call it what you will – stirred beneath that dull and 
unpleasing exterior” (32).  
 The intimacy of the “exterior” (with its metaphorical “writing” in the form of 
mutilation) combined with its persistent silence lies behind Susan's interpretative 
passion. However, her attempts to read Friday's body depend on his ability to signify. 
Her initial wish is to teach him speech by “gesturing with hands or by setting out 
pebbles in shapes standing for words” (56). The process, hampered by Quine's 
 271 
inscrutability of reference (“is it truly a spoon to him, or a mere thing – I do not 
know”) is continued with the hope of “engraving” an idea in his mind that can later be 
activated (“whenever his eye falls upon a spoon” (57)). This educational process relies 
on seeing language as reflecting conceptual ideas. Thus, teaching proves problematic: 
Susan fears that after “years of speechlessness the very notion of speech may be lost to 
him” and that Friday needs an idea to see in her something more than “chattering to 
[herself] as a magpie or an ape . . . for the pleasure of hearing the noise” (57). 
 Susan's own story depends on reading Friday: with the assumption of his 
inside, her story's kernel now rests inside Friday and needs recovering: 
On the island, I accepted the fact that I should never learn how Friday lost his 
tongue, as I accepted the fact that I should never learn how the apes crossed the 
sea. But what we can accept in life we cannot accept in history. To tell my 
story and be silent on Friday’s tongue is no better than offering a book for sale 
with pages in it quietly left empty. Yet the only tongue that can tell Friday’s 
secret is the tongue he has lost. (67)  
 
 
Initially, she strives for immediacy and physicality in communication making “the air 
around him thick with words,” building “a bridge of words”:  
which, when one day it is grown sturdy enough, he may cross to the time 
before  Cruso, the time before he lost his tongue, when he lived immersed in 
the prattle of words as unthinking as fish in water; from where he may by steps 
return, as far as he is able, to the world of words in which you, Mr Foe, and I, 
and other people live. (60) 
 
 
The lessons now resort to pictorial representations of events in the search for “truth.” 
Notwithstanding the complications of the definition of truth employed, truth is 
assumed to be positioned inside and visible in the stirrings of the body: “Of course, 
Friday might not know the meaning of the word truth I reasoned; nevertheless, if my 
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picture stirred some recollection of the truth, surely a cloud would pass over his gaze; 
for are the eyes not rightly called the mirrors of the soul?” (68). However, as with 
gestures and objects, pictures too prove problematic. The pictorial representation 
depends too much on its specificities:  
Are Moors all tall, and clad in white burnouses? Perhaps the Moor gave orders 
to a trusty slave to cut out the tongues of the captives . . . And even if it was a 
Moor who cut out his tongue, his Moor was likely to an inch taller than mine, 
or an inch shorter; wore black or blue, not white; was bearded, not clean-
shaven; had a straight knife, not a curved one; and so forth. 
 
 
A further complication is introduced by the ambiguities of the picture, which “might 
also be taken to show Cruso as a beneficent father putting a lump of fish into the 
mouth of child Friday” (68-69), and of Friday's reaction: if “Friday’s gaze indeed 
became troubled, might that not be because I came striding out of the house, 
demanding that he look at pictures, something I had never done before?” (68). Read as 
human he is now also subject to cultural specificity:   
Who, after all, was to say he did not lose his tongue at the age when boy-
children among the Jews are cut; and if so, how could he remember the loss? 
Who was to say there do not exist entire tribes in Africa among whom the men 
are mute and speech is reserved to women? Why should it not be so? The 
world is more various than we ever give it credit for – that is one of the lessons 
I was taught by Bahia. Why should such tribes not exist, and procreate, and 
flourish, and be content? (69)  
 
Susan's difficulties foreground the problems of communication and language.  
 The conflation of the tongue with language and with the dancing body implies 
the possibility of metaphorically structuring the body as language and language as the 
body. Such a reading receives attention when Susan attempts to read Friday's 
movements. Wearing Foe’s wigs and robes Friday dances “holding out his arms and 
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spinning in a circle, his eyes shut, hour after hour, never growing fatigued or dizzy” 
(82). Reading the body as language might be misleading, for while the suggestion of 
Friday as container is maintained, the solipsism of his dance excludes the possibility of 
communication: “In the grip of his dancing he is not himself. He is beyond human 
reach. I call his name and am ignored, I put out a hand and am brushed aside” (92).170 
As a container Friday is also feared for his possibly dangerous inside:171  
I shiver when I watch Friday dancing in the kitchen, with his robes whirling 
about him and the wig flapping on his head, and his eyes shut and his thoughts 
far away, not on the island, you may be sure, not on the pleasures of digging 
and carrying, but on the time before, when he was a savage among the savages. 
Is it not only the matter of time before the new Friday whom Cruso created is 
sloughed off and the old Friday of the cannibal forests returns? (94-95)172 
 
Friday's dance prompts another fear and the metonymic equation of the lack of tongue 
and castration:  
From that night on I had continually to fear that evidence of a yet more hideous 
mutilation might be thrust upon my sight . . . The whirling robe was a scarlet 
bell settled upon Friday’s shoulders and enclosing him; Friday was the dark 
pillar at its centre. What had been hidden from me was revealed. I saw; or, I 
should say, my eyes were open to what was present to them. I saw and believed 
I had seen, though afterwards I remembered Thomas, who also saw, but could 
not be brought to believe till he put in his hand in the wound. (118-120) 
 
 
Such mutilation is suggested by but also undermined both by the invocation of Thomas 
and the hint that much of what is said about Friday involves “employing a figure” 
                                                 
170
 The suggestion of body as source of transcendence returns when Susan takes to dancing.  She 
“returns” with “an intimation that I had been far away, that I had seen wondrous sights. Where am I? I 
asked myself . . . what I had seen in my trance, whatever it had been - I could summon back nothing 
distinct, yet felt a glow of after-memory, . . . that – had been a message (but from whom?) to tell me 
there were other lives open to me than this one . . .” (103-104.). 
171
 There is no evidence, apart from Cruso's words, that Friday is a cannibal, or a “devourer of the dead.” 
It is only projection to assume that he knows a “warm living woman . . . make[s] a better meal than the 
cold stiff corpse of a child” (106).  
172
 A similar hope is offered by music: “As long as I have music in common with Friday, perhaps he and 
I will need no language” (96-97). 
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(119). The suggestion of some yet unreadable body language (Friday as a bell)173 
invites reading Friday's body despite its escaping the binary categories of male / 
female (his castration is never certain), human / animal, slave / free, speaking / mute.  
 At the same time, Susan wavers between reading him as a surface and a 
container. As a surface, he is too easily imprinted with the interpreter's meaning: 
“Friday has no command of words and therefore no defence against being re-shaped 
day by day in conformity with the desires of others. I say he is a cannibal and he 
becomes a cannibal” (122). According to Foe, “as long as he is dumb we can tell 
ourselves his desires are dark to us, and continue to use him as we wish” (148). As a 
container contained in Susan's story, he is a “puzzle or a hole in the narrative . . . a 
buttonhole, carefully cross-stitched around, but empty, waiting for the button” (121). 
When treated as two-dimensional surface Friday's actions lack participation in 
signification; they are presented as lack of engagement with the depth. His petal ritual 
is thus “sliding” on the “very skin of death” and remaining “safe” despite “the kraken” 
in the depths with “arms as thick as a man’s thigh and many yards long, and a beak 
like an eagle’s” (140). By contrast, on Foe's advice, Susan and the author are to read 
“the unspoken” and enter “the heart” and “eye” of the story. The existence of Friday's 
container content is assumed if any “true” meaning is to be uncovered: instead of 
“sail[ing] across the surface and com[ing] ashore none the wiser,” their plan is to dive 
into “the great mouth . . . that stood open to devour him,” to “open Friday’s mouth and 
see what it holds: silence, perhaps, or a roar, like the roar of a seashell held to the ear” 
(141-142).   
                                                 
173
 Similarly, the narrator of the Master of Petersburg refers to Pavel's body as endowed with a “bell-
voice” and to Dostoevsky's as a “cracked bell” (Master 111, 141). 
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 Despite earlier failures, Susan becomes persuaded Friday can signify by 
“hold[ing] a stick of charcoal, between his toes, or between his teeth, like the beggars 
on the Strand” for “no one is so deprived that he cannot write” (143-144). Her 
conversation with Foe on the primacy of writing over speech invites a third type of 
theoretical reading in Derrida's terms: her belief that “letters are mirrors of words,” is 
countered with the idea that “[w]riting is not doomed to be the shadow of speech” 
(142), that “God’s writing stands as an instance of writing without speech” and that 
“speech is but a means through which the speech is uttered . . . not the word itself” 
(143). Friday's inability or unwillingness gives rise to another hypothesis: “Could it be 
that somewhere within him he was laughing at my attempts to bring him nearer to a 
state of speech?” This is soon undermined, albeit through an imperfect method: 
“Somewhere in the deepest recess of those black pupils was there a spark of mockery? 
I could not see it” (146). His later “writing” similarly invites and denies allegorical 
readings: “open eyes, each set upon a human foot: row upon row of eyes upon feet: 
walking eyes” (147). The image of Friday sitting “with Foe’s robes on and Foe’s wig, 
filthy as a bird’s nest, on his head,” with “his hand, poised over Foe’s papers” holding 
“a quill with a drop of black ink glistening at its tip” (155) might be a mockery of 
writing, but irony soon gives way to a suggestions of meaning when the rows of letter 
o are read as a “beginning”: “Tomorrow you must teach him a.” In the literal sense, of 
course, Friday is doing nothing more than drawing circles. The centrality of this image 
in the novel and the suggestion that his behaviour may be something more and may 
involve signification is another open invitation to interpretation. Thus Penner sees the 
marks as referring to the “expletive O’s” of Defoe’s Friday who used them “in 
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exultation,” “dejection,” “excitement” and “reverence” or as signifying “a zero, 
leaving Friday balanced on a pinpoint of time somewhere between the exultation of 
Defoe’s Friday’s “O! O! O!” and Samuel Beckett’s favourite quotation from 
Democritus “Nothing is more real than nothing” (Penner 123-124). Newman adds her 
own allegory in a bold claim purporting to uncover authorial intention: “Coetzee’s 
point is, of course, that o (omega) is not the beginning but an end” (Newman 102). 
Kossew relies on both homophony and homomorphy in her interpretation mixing the 
literal with invited metaphorical:  
 [there] appears to be some correspondence between these circular o’s and eyes 
 (possibly narrative “I’s”) and the “hole” or gap in the story which is Friday’s 
 silence. It is also possible to read those o’s as signs of completion, as Friday’s 
 alter/native system of language which has its own referentiality and which 
 refuses to be colonized by other systems. (Kossew 162) 
 
Dominic Head discusses Gräbe’s suggestion that walking eyes “probably [refer] to his 
roaming of the English countryside in the company of his would-be “mistress”” and 
implying that Friday “might have his own particular focalization of “voyages” 
undertaken under the guise of some assumed “worthy” objective, like trying to undo 
the injustices of slavehood or exploring the concept of a different kind of voyage as a 
metaphor for writing.” He also considers Hena Maes-Jelinek’s allegorical reading of 
the eyes as signifying “the stare of Friday’s victimized people . . . the history of 
repression” (Head 122). He agrees with Jelinek, for walking eyes “convey not only the 
displacement of the enslaved and the colonized, but also the sense of bearing witness” 
(123). Dovey resorts to Coetzee's theoretical work on Achetberg, where he speaks of 
the “search of a masculine I for the hole in the house of the feminine you . . . the 
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danger of naming the you” and his footnote citing Monique Wittig on “the intervals” 
that men “have not been able to fill with their words of proprietors and possessors,” 
gaps which are not “a continuation of their discourse” and “the zero, the O, the perfect 
circle that you invent to imprison them and overthrow them” (qtd. in Dovey 380-
381).174 Dovey claims that “it is impossible to inscribe this hole intentionally, without 
at the same time filling it up with phallic discourse. All that is possible is a theoretical 
gesture, which . . . is accomplished via the figure of Friday,” her own interpretation 
writes Friday into a psychoanalytic and feminist narrative external to his life (381). 
Spivak correctly observes that Friday's letters can be anything and “there is a structural 
possibility that they are nothing” (Theory 171-172). Their “nothingness” is an 
overdetermined space wherein the container metaphor, coupled with suggestions of 
meaning and signification, invites allegorical interpretations. The possible 
interpretations are both invited by the text and rejected when Foe refers to their 
theoretical discussion as “cavil over words . . . a dispute we know to be endless” (150). 
 
 Truth or fiction 
The four parts of Foe correspond, according to Gallagher to four stages in the 
history of the novel. Part One has an “oral quality; it appears to be an unmediated 
record of a voice speaking in the first person” suggesting “the origins of English 
literature in the oral tradition and the apparently artless renditions of Defoe’s Moll 
Flanders and Robinson Crusoe” (Gallagher 186). The conflation of “oral” and 
                                                 
174
 Coetzee explains further: “The O, the circle, the hole are symbols of that which the male 
authoritarian discourse cannot appropriate.” See Atwell (Doubling 404).   
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“unmediated” implies reading Susan's words as true, and her portrayals in Defoe's 
novel as mediated and thus untrue. However, I would like to suggest that Part One is 
already mediated more than is commonly acknowledged: while Gallagher correctly 
points out that paragraphs begin, but do not end, with quotation marks, she overlooks 
mediatedness in Susan's reference to some previous, and otherwise unmentioned, 
communication with Foe: “the stranger (who was of course the Cruso I told you of) 
gazed at me” (9). In her further adventures, from the “the epistolary narrative” 
(Gallegher 187) of Part Two and realist novel of Part Three, Susan remains the 
narrator whose story is ascribed the value of an original account. Foe's novels are 
uniformly read as mercilessly appropriating her story and turning it into a patriarchal 
lie. Little is made of the suggestion of Susan's death aboard the Portuguese ship in Part 
4 of the novel or the ambiguous possibility that she “might as well have dreamed [the 
island] in a snug bed in Chichester” (40). While her reliability is sometimes questioned 
(Spivak notes that “By everyday common sense, Susan Barton’s credibility or sanity . . 
. would be thrown into doubt,” while Penner maintains from Part Two on “it is 
impossible to tell whether the events Barton relates really “happen” or if they are 
dreamed or imagined” (117)), in critical literature hers is still taken to be the “true” 
account whose “silencing” receives allegorical, and often political reading pertaining 
to real-life events.  
Susan's arrival on the island begins with self-definition: “Let me tell you my 
story . . . for I am sure you are wondering who I am and how I come to be here” (10). 
Carefully introducing herself twice she narrates the abduction of her daughter and her 
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life in Bahia: “I lived in lodgings, and took in sewing, and searched, and waited, but 
saw no trace of my child.” Travelling back, she survives a mutiny on a merchantman:  
Bursting into the captain’s cabin they slew him heartlessly even while he 
pleaded for his life. Those of their fellows who were not with them they 
clapped in irons. They put me in a boat with the captain’s corpse beside me, 
and set us adrift . . . All morning, while the ship drew away . . . I rowed with 
the dead captain at my feet. My palms were blistered – see! – but I dared not 
rest . . . The rest you know. (10-11)   
 
Unstated are the reasons for being in the captain's cabin in a “petticoat (which was all 
[she] had escaped with)” (5). Unstated, although suggested later, is her relationship to 
the captain: “A hand was exploring my body. So befuddled was I that I thought myself 
still aboard the ship, in the Portuguese captain’s bed. But then I turned and saw 
[Cruso]” (29). She is unclear about “all the insults done me on board ship” (10) and 
her stated ignorance of the mutineers' motives assumes the form of an aphorism: 
“those whom we have abused we customarily grow to hate, and wish never to lay eyes 
on them again” (10-11). While Gallagher views this as proof that Susan “shows little 
concern for the victims of oppression, implying in her account of the mutiny that she 
had joined the captain in abusing the crew” (181), it is equally applicable to her as the 
victim of the unspoken “insults.”  
 It is clear from this brief account that Susan’s accounts of her life and her 
definitions in the social sphere are selective and misleading. Her knowledge of Cruso 
might be more extensive than openly stated: “is there not someone you have forgotten 
in Brazil? Is there not a sister awaiting your return on your Brazilian estates, and a 
faithful steward keeping the accounts? Can we not go back to your sister in Brazil, and 
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sleep in hammocks side by side under the great Brazilian sky full of stars?” (44).175 
Such intertexual references to Robinson Crusoe and Roxana might be taken to 
undermine the reliability of her account. She fears “gossip” that could discredit her 
(“Did they truly think of me as Cruso’s wife, or had tales already reached them – the 
sailors’ haunts are full of gossip – of the Englishwoman from Bahia marooned in the 
Atlantic by Portuguese mutineers?”), attempts to control how she is perceived (“Do 
you think of me, Mr Foe, as Mrs Cruso or as a bold adventuress?”), and 
simultaneously asserts her truthfulness: “Think what you may, it was I who shared 
Cruso’s bed, and closed Cruso’s eyes, and it is I who have disposal of all that Cruso 
leaves behind, which is the story of his island” (45). Any literary alteration of her self-
reading (“a dash of colour . . . here and there”) is rejected: “I will not have any lies 
told” (42). 
 Given the inclusion of Friday inside Susan's story, one cannot be successfully 
defined and told without the other. Since neither she, nor Friday possesses the ability 
to write, their definition, in turn, depends on Foe's mediation which, it is suggested, 
will render them as characters in his novels.176 Subaltern in relation to him, they do not 
have “the vocabulary that will get a hearing in institutional locations of power” and 
need “the mediating commentary of someone more at home in discourse” (Spivak 
2195). For Dovey, Foe functions as the Lacanian sujet suppose de savoir “whose 
response, it is hoped will constitute the truth of the speaking subject” (Dovey 342). 
                                                 
175
 In a conversation with Foe she adds what she cannot know in light of her stated knowledge: “my 
daughter is no longer in Bahia, but is gone into the interior, into a world so vast and so strange I can 
hardly conceive it, a world of plains and plantations such as the one Cruso left behind, where the ant is 
emperor and everything is turned on its head” (123).   
176
 As Newman notes, Susan presents herself to Mr Foe as a “figure of fortune” (48), invoking Roxana’s 
subtitle, The Fortunate Mistress. 
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Such reading is invited by structuring him with entailments typically associated with 
psychoanalysts: he is unknown and unreadable (it is unclear if he reads, let alone 
answers, Susan's letters),177 powerful and discreet (“had heard many confessions and 
[is] reputed a very secret man” (48)) and capable of what is impossible otherwise 
(“how can we live if we do not believe we know who we are, and who we have been?” 
(130)). Where metaphorical entailments overlap, it is possible to read Foe as a 
therapist and Susan's narration as transference, waiting to be “defined” and made alive. 
For Gallagher “[w]ithout her story, Susan feels insubstantial, suspended, incomplete, 
trapped in a world of things and events without . . . meaning,” she “needs her story to 
be told in order to take shape as a human being” (175). Her hastening of Foe (Foe 63) 
is used both to give her existence and to liberate her from suffering (63, 66), but also to 
satisfy her vanity: she wants to be “The Female Castaway” (67), to be “famous” (58), 
and “see heads turn in the street and hear folk whisper “There goes Susan Barton the 
castaway” (125).   
 Susan's writing is explicitly driven by bodily desire (“without desire how is it 
possible to make a story?”) but stops at Friday's surface: “I ask myself what the past 
historians of the castaway state have done – whether in despair they have not begun to 
make up lies” (88). She wishes the story both to “give the substance of truth” but also 
to “please its readers” (63). Such pleasing risks mistranslation, and Susan projects her 
anxieties on Foe despairing of the lack of events on the island (53-54). Despite 
                                                 
177
 Some letters are never sent: “To whom am I writing? I blot the pages and toss them out of the 
window. Let who will read them” (64); “I write my letters, I seal them, I drop them in the box. One day 
when we are departed you will tip them out and glance through them” (72); “In the letters you did not 
read” (117).   
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stemming from the body and concerning the body, Susan's language never touches the 
core, the “substance.” Such non-substantiality of language is coupled by the lack of 
viscerally experienced substantiality. This remains unexpressed but is believed to be 
expressible:   
When I reflect on my story I seem to exist only as the one who came, the one 
who witnessed, the one who longed to be gone: a being without substance, a 
ghost beside the true story of Cruso . . . Yet I was as much a body as Cruso. I 
ate and drank, I woke and slept, I longed . . . Return to me the substance I have 
lost, Mr Foe: that is my entreaty. For though my story gives the truth, it does 
not give the substance of the truth . . . (51) 
 
 
The body eludes language and, if it is expressed, is rejected as untrue. The story of 
abandoning her daughter is rejected not only as discrediting her but also as 
“essentially” masculinist: “Do you think women drop children and forget them as 
snakes lay eggs? Only a man could entertain such a fancy” (75).178 She craves 
expression of her female body while she metaphorically thinks of writing in terms of 
masculinity, invoking Gilbert and Gubar’s equivalence of the pen and penis: “I sat at 
your bureau . . . and took out a clean sheet of paper and dipped pen in your ink – your 
pen, your ink, I know, but somehow the pen becomes mine while I write with it, as 
though growing out of my hand” (66).  
 Such a position could easily be read as post-Lacanian and feminist. Susan does 
not accept her lack and is driven by a desire for “bodily unity, wholeness, perfect 
autonomy” (Luepitz 226). But such an understanding of a craving for phallic 
substantiality and signification in psychoanalysis relies on a model of the mind as a 
container, a “substance endowed with qualities . . . a fixed shape possessing 
                                                 
178
 It is also rejected as contrived and fictional: “It is only in books that children are stolen by gipsies.   
You must think of a better story!” (78). 
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dimensions . . . a container awaiting the multifarious contents that experience 
provides” rather than a “series of events within language” (Bowie 76). Susan's position 
could be seen as a refusal to be a Lacanian subject: “essentially no-thing . . . a lacking 
subject who has lost . . . her being” (Homer 71). Any such reading has as its 
foundation the metaphorical alignment of the body and language in Lacan.179 
Similarly, the rejection of the daughter and the denials of her past vocation easily lend 
themselves to allegorizing feminist readings: the rejection of feminine social roles. 
They could be variously read as nostalgia for “a form of self-present speech” which 
reflects “feminist desire for an auto-affective language” (Dovey 353) or a new, gender-
specific potential “overwritten by the predominantly male-determined attributes of her 
racial identity, namely her inheritance of and admiration for the masculine traditions of 
writing and colonization” (Jolly 138-139). Such readings also rely on structurings of 
language in terms of the body.  
 Such easy readings are complicated by Susan's own words. While Susan's 
cross-dressing and insistence that “Bahia is not part of my story” (114) might be read 
as feminist, Foe's writing does not silence her past:   
the Portuguese are a very jealous race . . . A woman who goes abroad freely is 
thought a whore. I was thought a whore. But there are so many whores there, 
or, as I prefer to call them, free women, that I was not daunted. In the cool of 
the evening the free women of Bahia don their finest clothes, put hoops of gold 
about their necks and golden bracelets on their arms and ornaments of gold in 
their hair, and walk the streets . . .  (114-115) 
 
 
                                                 
179
 On the connection between language and the body in Lacan see Colette Soler, “The Body in the 
Teaching of Jacques Lacan” (1995). Such metaphorical alignment also allows one to talk of symbolic 
“castration in language.” 
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Susan's rejection of Foe's definition (117) is motivated by the promise of deciphering  
Friday's mutilation. Her silence is therefore unlike Friday's: “by choice . . . I say so 
little of [Bahia]. The story I want to be known by is the story of the island. You call it 
an episode, but I call it a story in its own right . . . The silence I keep regarding Bahia 
and other matters is chosen and purposeful: it is my own silence” (120-122). While she 
accuses his reading of sensationalism (she does not want to be “one of those thieves or 
highwaymen of [his] who gabble a confession and are then whipped off to Tyburn and 
eternal silence, leaving [him] to make of their stories whatever is [his] fancy”), her 
self-definitions might rely on deception: “It is still in my power to guide and amend. 
Above all, to withhold. By such means do I still endeavour to be father to my story” 
(123). Of course any interpretation depends on the reading of “amend”: the popularity 
of readings emphasising Susan's forced silencing suggests the tendency to read it as 
“correct” rather than as “alter.” Indeed her moral “that he has the last word who 
disposes over the greatest force” might equally apply to correction as to alteration 
(124).  
 Similar ambiguity stems from various uses of 'substantial'. Used initially as 
“true” and opposed to fictitious, it is later used to mean “of a body.” Foe’s suggestion 
that terms like “slave” or “laundryman” applied to Friday “are mere names [which] do 
not touch his essence, he is a substantial body” (121-122), produces an unexpected 
reply bridging the non-fictionality implied in the question with the bodily truth of the 
answer: “I could return in every respect to the life of a substantial body, the life you 
recommend. But such a life is abject, it is the life of a thing. A whore used by men is 
used as a substantial body” (126). When she presents herself as the muse who “comes . 
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. . and touches [writers] with secret fire, after which their pens, that have been dry, 
flow”180 her “courting” (“a game in which each word has a second meaning” (79)) is 
hoped to create a substantial story. Her substance is imagined as a container with a 
specific content (“If I were as obliging as you wish me to be . . . if I were like a bottle 
bobbing on the waves with a scrap of paper inside . . . a mere receptacle ready to 
accommodate whatever story is stuffed in me, surely you would . . . say to yourself, 
“This is not a woman but a house of words, hollow, without substance?” (130-131). 
But such insistence on substantiality (“I am not a story”) is not accompanied by the 
wish to express her substantial history: “[T]o no one, not even to you do I owe the 
proof that I am a substantial being with a substantial history in the world . . . I am a 
free woman who asserts her freedom by telling the story according to her own desire.” 
(131).  
 With the blurring of material reality and discourse, distinctions of the body and 
language crumble:  
In the beginning I thought I would tell you the story of the island and, being 
done with that, return to my former life. But now my life grows to be a story 
and there is nothing my own left to me. I thought I was speaking myself […]. 
But now I am full of doubt. Nothing is left to me but doubt. I am doubt itself. 
Who is speaking me? Am I a phantom too? To what order do I belong? And 
you? Who are you?  (133) 
 
 
Susan accepts her daughter (whose “appearances, or apparitions, or whatever they 
were disturbed me less now that I knew her better” (136)) and is seduced by Foe in an 
act that is her last attempt to “father[]” her story and Foe's attempt to suck the story out 
of her. The act thus consists in literal blood-sucking (Foe's “manner of preying on the 
                                                 
180
 A similar comparison between a brush and a penis is made by Elizabeth Costello (148). 
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living”), Susan's “fathering” ('active' position) and her feminising of Foe in her 
language (“wife,” “mistress”):  
‘Permit me,’ I whispered – ‘there is a privilege that comes with the first night, 
that I claim as mine’. So I coaxed him till he lay beneath me. Then I drew off 
my shirt and straddled him (which he did not seem easy with, in a woman). 
‘This is the manner of the muse when she visits her poets,’ I whispered, and 
felt some of the listlessness go out of my limbs. (139-140).  
 
Getting paid the following morning (“sixpence . . . no great payment for a visit from 
the Muse” (145)) reduces her to the role of a prostitute and finally immortalises her as 
an adventuress in Defoe's novel. The ambiguity of Susan's self-reading depends on 
whether one reads her story as true or false, and on whether one sees her as helping 
Friday or holding him captive to her “desire to have our story told,” treating him as 
“one of the wild Indians whom explorers bring back with them . . . to show that they 
have truly been to Americas” (150-151). 
 These ambiguities are taken further in the last part of the novel narrated by an 
unnamed and ungendered narrator. This narrator has received various metaphorical 
readings including the identification of the narrator with the historical Coetzee 
(Gardam), with abstract “poetic imagination” (Dongohue) or with Susan Barton herself 
(Post).181 Kossew finds the last one unlikely because of the use of the third person in 
relation to Barton's body. In fact, it is not only her body: opening Friday’s mouth, the 
narrator hears “as she said, the roar of waves in a seashell . . . the sounds of the island” 
(154), referring us back to Susan’s earlier words: “It is for us to open Friday’s mouth 
and hear what it holds: silence, perhaps, or a roar, like the roar of a seashell held to the 
                                                 
181
 Kossew provides (after Robert M. Post) a useful summary of critical positions dealing with the 
unnamed narrator, (Post 143-154, qtd in Kossew 172). A similar approach can be found in Nina 
Auerbach (36-38). 
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ear” (142). While that might suggest Foe as the diver, Susan partly undermines this 
reading by passingly claiming Friday in her story as “a figuring (or prefiguring) of 
another diver” (142).  
 In the first “dive” the narrator's words echo the words of the previous parts. 
The description of Foe’s house (“the staircase is dark and mean” (153)) repeats 
Susan’s description: (“The staircase was dark and mean” (113)).182 Friday's hair is 
“indeed like lambswool” (154). The sleeping bodies of the characters are textualised 
“dry as paper” (153). The sound of Friday's mouth is “the faintest faraway roar . . . the 
roar of waves in a seashell,” “the whine of the wind and the cry of a bird,” and other 
“sounds of the island” (154). These repetitions tend to a textual dispersal of the 
narrator.   
 The second entrance to the house takes place in contemporary London: “above 
head-height, a plaque is bolted to the wall. Daniel Defoe, Author, are the words, white 
on blue, and then more writing, too small to read” (155)). Susan’s daughter body “light 
as straw” lies on the landing, her mother in bed with Foe, “her head in the crook of his 
arm” (155) suggestive of her submission. Friday's body bears the imprint of his story: 
“[a]bout his neck – I had not observed this before – is a scar like a necklace, left by a 
rope or chain” (155).183 On the side lies Barton's manuscript beginning with the full 
address: “‘Dear Mr Foe,’ At last I could row no further’” (155).  
                                                 
182
 Later, the narrator's “it is not a country bath-house” (156) rephrases the earlier idea of an afterlife as a 
“bath-house . . . any Sunday in the country” (114).   
183
 Rosemary Jolly links this scar with Susan’s declaration of Friday’s freedom, “worn like a chain 
around his neck” (Colonization 11). In her footnote she notes that: “The marks left by this “chain” 
reappear in the “unnamed” narrative that concludes the novel” and adds that “Atwell remarks upon the 
fact that in the final section Friday has “a scar on his neck . . . unobserved before in the novel.” (15)  I 
would like to add that if it is unobserved, it is nevertheless suggested, for, upon deciding that the ship 
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 The third dive begins, like Susan's, with slipping overboard “with a sigh, 
making barely a splash.” Caught in seaweed, the narrator dives deeper among Friday’s 
petals and reaches the dirty cabin of the shipwreck, the water “still and dead, the same 
water as yesterday, as last year, as three hundred years ago” (157). Newman correctly 
points out that it is a “composite wreck composed in equal parts of Cruos’s original 
ship, Friday’s slaveship, the mutineers’ ship which marooned Susan, and the rescue 
ship” (Newman 100). Susan and the captain both died and now “fat as pigs in their 
white nightclothes, their limbs extending stiffly from their trunks, their hands, 
puckered from long immersion, held out in blessing, float like stars against the low 
roof.” Friday with “woolly hair” is asked “what is this ship?” (157). The bodily answer 
cannot be understood:  
He turns and turns till he lies at full length, his face to my face. The skin is 
tight across his bones, his lips are drawn back. I pass a fingernail across his 
teeth, trying to find a way in. From inside him comes a slow stream, without 
breath, without interruption. It flows up through his body and out upon me; it 
passes through the cabin, through the wreck; washing the cliffs and shores of 
the island, it runs northward and southward to the ends of the earth. Soft and 
cold, dark and unending, it beats against my eyelids, against the skin of my 
face. (157)  
 
Such purposeful silence once more invites an allegorical reading. Penner makes Friday 
“a symbol of the inexpressible psychic damage absorbed by blacks under racist 
conditions” (Penner 124). He also quotes Francis King seeing in Friday “that bedrock 
of the individual personality to which no novelist, however piercing his intuition, can 
ever hope to tunnel deep enough to reach” (127). For Newman, the scene stands for 
“the immersion in history, as death, dirt, decay,” while the touch overcomes “a taboo 
                                                                                                                                             
from which Friday escaped was a slaveship Foe tells Susan:  “Well then, picture the hundreds of his 
fellow-slaves – or their skeletons – still chained in the wreck” (141).  
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on mutilation” (102). Benita Parry's views this image as “signalling [Friday’s] location 
on the fringes of the phallocentric social order, whose dominance through [his] 
speechlessness and asexuality [he] evade[s]” (153). For Head, the “voicing” of 
“silence” is “an extraordinary literary gesture”: “This ‘slow stream’ is interrupted, 
indicating its irresistible historical necessity . . . It is an unvoiced history which is 
acknowledged, a silence with moral compulsion that, itself, silences the authorial 
figure who is obliged to cease his narrative in its presence (126). For Williams, 
“Friday embodies the world of self-absorption without self-consciousness; without the 
Cartesian split of self and other, Friday has no desire and hence no stories” (qtd. in 
Gallagher 181). Invoking this view, Gallagher refuses to see Friday as representing 
silencing “because of race, gender, and class” (181). Coetzee’s role is to speak “as a 
writer who is an appalled representative of humanity, who hesitates to take upon 
himself the mantle of moral authority, even as he tries to criticize injustice and 
promote freedom” (191). Such a promotion of freedom like an innumerable number of 
other causes, relies on a critical “voicing” of the silence and following in the footsteps 
of Susan and Foe. Such readings are led by the text to assume “meaning” and, when 
various meanings are rejected (as was feminism in favour of psychoanalysis, 
psychoanalysis in favour of postcolonialism) and such rejections are undermined by 
the ambiguous final vision, any positive interpretation relies on the assumption that the 
body functions as the figure of “truth.” For Jolly, such allegorisation “violates the body 
by translating it into a term in a representative scheme. This denies the substantiality of 
the body and effectively effaces the body from the text” (Colonization 8). Jolly's 
suggests that in the final stage “authors in / of the story . . . have relinquished their 
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attempts to dominate and thus violate their subjects, and have given themselves over to 
a narrative that is willing to confront the other . . . whose body it – as a narrative – has 
always been unable to master completely” (145). Such a reading assumes the 
allegorical potential of the body without endowing it with specific interpretation. What 
I would like to add is that such allegorical potential exists precisely because of shared 
entailments of truth and the body, allowing one to be seen as represented by the other 
or, understood as containers, enclosed within containers and within the other. Further, 
while many critical discourses rely on alignments of language and the body, these, in 
turn, depend on shared metaphorical entailments of language understood as meaning 
existing in a container (as in conduit metaphor) and the body as a container for the true 
meaning of a person. The partial equation of the body and truth allows the body, in 
Coetzee's own words, to “confront” “the endlessness of . . . scepticism”:  
Friday is mute. But Friday does not disappear, because Friday is body. If I look 
back over my own fiction, I see a simple (simple-minded?) standard erected. 
That standard is the body. Whatever else, the body is not “that which is not,” 
and the proof that it is the pain it feels. The body with its pain becomes a 
counter to the endless trials of doubt . . . Let me put it baldly: in South Africa it 
is not possible to deny the authority of suffering and therefore of the body. It is 
not possible, not for logical reasons, not for ethical reasons . . . but for political 
reasons, for reasons of power. And let me again be unambiguous: it is not that 
one grants the authority of the suffering body: the suffering body takes this 













Master of Petersburg 
     Metaphors – what nonsense!  
    There is death, only death.  
    Death is a metaphor for nothing. (118)    
 
     But he knows too that as long as he tries by  
     cunning to distinguish things that are things from 
     things that are signs he will not be saved. (83)  
    
The description of a dream near the start of Master of Petersburg bears striking 
resemblance to the ending of Foe and expresses the same sentiment:  
 
During a night a dream comes to him. He is swimming underwater. The light is 
 blue and dim. He banks and glides easily, gracefully; his hat seems to have 
gone, but in his black suit he feels like a turtle, a great old turtle in its natural 
element. Above him is a ripple of movement, but here at the bottom the water 
is still. He swims through patches of weed; slack fingers of watergrass brush 
his fins, if that  is what they are. 
He knows what he is in search of. As he swims he sometimes opens his mouth 
 and gives what he thinks of as a cry or call. With each cry or call water enters 
his mouth; each syllable is replaced by a syllable of water. He grows more and 
 more ponderous, till his breastbone is brushing the silt of the river-bed. 
Pavel is lying on his back. His eyes are closed. His hair, wafted by the current, 
is soft as a baby’s. 
From his turtle-throat he gives a last cry, which seems to him more like a bark, 
 and plunges toward the boy. He wants to kiss the face; but when he touches his 
 hard lips to it, he is not sure he is not biting. 
This is when he wakes. (17-18)  
 
The recurrent image of submersion coincides with suggestions of body language and 
bodily truth.184 Thus at one point in The Master of Petersburg when Dostoevsky 
despairs of his inability to reach the truth concerning his son’s death, he feels that 
                                                 
184
 Images of submersion (of diving, drowning or recovering what is sunk) recur in the novel. Pavel is 
lost “at sea . . . overboard” (78), his voice exists “under the waters,” pleading in the “deep dark,” at the 
“bottom of the waters” (111). 
 292 
“somewhere inside him truth has lost its way.”185 This implies “truth” as existing 
within the bodily container: “in the labyrinth of his brain, but also in the labyrinth of 
his body – veins, bones, intestines, organs – a tiny child is wandering, searching for the 
light, searching to emerge” (126). Dostoevsky shares Susan Barton’s belief in 
embodied truth as the ultimate certainty and unquestionable reality, but also the belief 
in the possibility of giving voice to an otherwise silent body.186  
The two passages are symptomatic of problems I would like to examine in 
relation to the novel. The ambiguity of the kiss in the first suggests further ambiguities: 
a divergence of interpretations and Dostoevsky's complex feelings towards Pavel. The 
second suggests the truth of the body, and the gap between the bodily fact and 
language interpretations. It anticipates the bodily, rather than intellectual nature of the 
search and the container metaphor which underlies it. Both passages suggest the quest 
ends in failure. 
The method is bodily, most intensive and productive in sexual liaisons and 
epileptic fits). However, the results and part of the evidence is linguistic: the process is 
hindered by the incompatibility of language and body reality. The details of Pavel's 
death, his relationships with Anna and Matryona, Nechaev and his circle, as well as his 
possession are never clear. The search is conducted by an elderly epileptic, sexually 
perverse and deeply spiritual Dostoevsky using his body as tool for discovering the 
truth, and his language as a means for expressing it. While his body searches, feels and 
strives to resurrect Pavel, his writing is a betrayal of that mission. The result of the 
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 J.M. Coetzee, The Master of Petersburg, Vintage, London: 2004.  
186
 He hopes Pavel will speak through him: “find his way to my high-bone and pipe to me from there” 
(126). 
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bodily search, and the bodily betrayal, are ultimately textualised – in Dostoevsky's 
novel, The Possessed: where ambiguities were introduced by the polysemy of 
“substantial” in Foe, here they stem from “perversion” and “possession” where 
Dostoevsky's implied perversion, among other things, produces the figurative 
perversion of truth in a literary narrative bearing little resemblance to Pavel’s life. 
 
 The bodily search: Anna and Matryona 
 
 The novel begins in October 1869, around the time Dostoevsky started work on 
The Possessed. It immediately concentrates on the body. The “first thing” Dostoevsky 
does in Pavel's room (3) gestures towards Pavel's body: “He kneels and puts his nose 
to the pillow; but he can smell nothing but soap and sun” (3). He is more successful 
with his son’s suit: “He presses his forehead to it. Faintly the smell of his son comes to 
him. He breathes in deeply, again and again, thinking: his ghost, entering me” (3-4). 
This first “contact” produces a flicker of hope for a more permanent one. He often 
finds himself “with the white suit on his lap, breathing softly, trying to lose himself, 
trying to evoke a spirit that can surely not yet have left these surroundings” (12). The 
ritual begins with smelling: “He sniffs the armpits and the smell comes clearly: not 
that of a child but of another man, fullgrown. He inhales it again and again. How many 
breathes before it fades?” (18-19)). It develops into wearing the suit which becomes 
the source of ambiguous visions: “He has a vision of Petersburg . . . under the pitiless 
stars. Written in a scroll across the heavens is a word in Hebrew characters. He cannot 
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read the word but knows it is a condemnation, a curse” (19).187 Sitting in the room 
“that is and is not his,” holding the suit “[h]e feels the cord of love that goes from his 
heart to his son’s as physically as if it were a rope” (23).188 However, what initially 
seems to be an innocent expression of fatherly grief soon acquires a sexual dimension: 
“looking in the mirror, he sees only a seedy imposture and, beyond that, something 
surreptitious and obscene . . . that belongs behind the locked doors and curtained 
windows of rooms where men in wigs and skirts bare their rumps to be flogged” (71).  
 With a similar intimation of perversion, the preceding scene presents an adult 
version of his childhood habit of “spy[ing] on visitors to the household and 
trespass[ing] surreptitiously on their privacy” (71). Going through Anna’s possessions 
he finds a picture of her dead husband and “deliberately smudges the glass, leaving his 
thumbprint over the face of the dead man” (71). In the Age of Iron the search of Mrs 
Curren's flat is perceived as “the touching, the fingering . . . Like rape: a way of 
filthying a woman” (154). Here, shown from the perspective of the searcher, it again 
suggests sexual motivation. While Dostoevsky has “associated [“this weakness”] till 
now with a refusal to accept limits to what he is permitted to know . . . and thus with 
his vocation” (71, emphasis added), he now recognises the cause of his actions: “He is 
in thrall to a spirit of petty evil and knows it. The truth is, rummaging like this through 
Anna Sergeyevna’s possessions while she is out gives him a voluptuous quiver of 
pleasure” (71). The juxtaposition of these two scenes introduces the question of 
Dostoevsky's sexuality (which blurs the “normal” with the transgressive) and 
foregrounds the interpretation compulsion, his tendency to interpret and reinterpret his 
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 Other visions variously employ biblical imagery (54). 
188
 Such an emotional “cord” exists between Michael K and the land (Life 66, 109). 
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actions which makes him forever elusive to the reader and to himself: the act of 
donning the white suit can be an expression of grief, an expression of transgressive 
sexuality, both or, depending on how much Dostoevsky interprets it, an expression of 
something entirely different. Thus sexuality and interpretation coexist in a sexual 
rivalry blurred with love for the son, the love for Anna and an instrumental use of her, 
affection for her child and his perverse interest in the child's sexuality. 
This ambiguity is evident from the start in Dostoevsky's relations with Anna. 
Initially “motherly” and “reassuring” (10), her body is also arousing: “he would like to 
lay his head on her breast and feel those fingers stroke his hair” (10). This craving for 
touch is presented as an effect of bereavement: “The innocence of hands, ever-
renewed. A memory comes back to him: the touch of a hand, intimate in the dark” 
(10). However, it quickly develops into “acute” and “fiery” desire: “he wants to . . . 
drag her behind the gatekeeper’s hut, lift her dress, couple with her” (11). The 
ambiguity of his feelings invites interpretation as does the setting for the scene 
(Pavel’s grave): what might be rivalry between father and son could also be the 
affirmation of life: “exultation . . . a brag flung in the face of death: Us you do not 
have!” (11).  
Anna functions as the source of knowledge about Pavel's life in Petersburg. 
More than that, her body offers the promise of resurrecting Pavel. Their first 
intercourse is still in the spirit of mourning: Anna has “not done this before”; her hands 
“are cold and trembling” (55); she wears and kisses a crucifix and later admits the act 
was the result of pity (59). The second time she “becomes like a dead thing in his 
arms” and the mourning aspect is clearer: “In the act there is nothing he can call 
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pleasure or even sensation. It is as though they are making love through a sheet, a 
tattered sheet of his grief” (56). But her body still seems to lead to Pavel:  
At the moment of climax he plunges back into sleep as into a lake. As he sinks 
Pavel rises to meet him. His son’s face is contorted in despair: his lungs are 
bursting, he knows he is dying, he knows he is past hope, he calls to his father 
because that is the last thing left he can do, the last thing in the world. He calls 
out in a strangled rush of words. This is the vision in its ugly extremity that 
rushes at him out of the vortex of darkness into which he is descending inside 
the woman’s body. It bursts upon him, possesses him, speeds on. (56) 
 
The physical and spiritual experience is repeated on the second night: “Again, through 
her, he passes into darkness and into the waters where his son floats among the other 
drowned” (58). This loving “connection” to his son, however, is undermined by 
suggestions of sexual rivalry: “The children against those who are not children, those 
old enough to recognize in their lovemaking the first foretaste of death.” But this 
“foretaste of death” is itself ambiguous: “playing with death” and “a play of 
resurrection” (63).  
 The desire for transcendence offered by Anna's body (“his limbs will be 
loosened and the spirit released, the spirit that at present seems knotted to his body” 
(127)) is undermined by less spiritual feelings: pornographic fantasies of being 
depicted in a picture from his “erotica” collection (131).189 However, this undermining 
of spirituality is never final: Anna's crossing of the 'shadow line', “the line that his wife 
has yet to come to” – in other words, her proximity to death, maintains the spiritual 
undertones of her role as a guide to Pavel (133). Thus sexual desire for this 
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 Anna's body provides ample material for meditations on embodiment and its possible figurative 
meanings: “Is such a woman marked by abandon . . . that does not care where it leads, to pleasure or to 
pain, that uses the sensual body only as a vehicle, and only because we cannot live disembodied? Is 
there a form of lovemaking she stands for in which bodies press against and into and through each other 
into a darkness in which nothing can be heard but the flapping of bedsheets like wings?” (85).     
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“passionate, greedy” woman coexists with the spiritual: “I was sure you would conduct 
me to Pavel” (133, 223). Dostoevsky's search implies treating Anna's body as a 
container. When he loses interest in the “recklessness” of their lovemaking and the 
way she “give[s] herself so unreservedly to the erotic,” the change has as its basis of 
his reading her as surface: “Sensations that on their first night together were taking 
place deep within her body seem to be migrating towards the surface . . . in the manner 
of so many other women he has known” (230).190 Such two-dimensionality offers no 
depth and implies straightforward readability. At the same time, however, the spiritual 
hope of resurrection191 develops into ideas of demonic possession: in her “climax” 
(when the “soul is twisted out of the body”) she “tosses her head . . . grits her teeth,” 
pronounces the devil’s name and “blasphem[ously]” talks of the “birth of the saviour” 
(230-231, 225).  
 Anna's ambiguous accusation “you use me as a route to my child” rests on the 
notion of evil that might imply both religious and sexual possession:  
You are in the grip of something quite beyond me. You seem to be here but you 
are not really here. I was ready to help you . . . I was ready to try. But now it is 
costing me too much. It is wearing me down. I would never have gone so far if 
I weren’t afraid you would use Matryosha in the same way. (231-232)  
 
Dostoevsky's impulse to discuss Matryona immediately after sex (or mentioning her 
out of context) suggests “using.” On the one hand, he feels a “terrible malice . . . 
toward living children,” a desire to “pluck [a newborn babe] from its mother’s arms 
                                                 
190
 This reading of Anna as surface replaces reading her as a container: “It is as if at her core she were 
on fire” (56). “The women he is used to are not without and intensity of their own, but it is an intensity 
all of skin and nerves. Their sensations are intense, electric, immediate, of the surface. Whereas with her 
he goes into a body that bleeds, a visceral body whose sensations occur deep within itself” (133).   
191
 Earlier, Anna is described as “conductress of souls” (139). 
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and dash it against a rock” (9), a “rage against everyone who is alive when his child is 
dead . . . most of all against this girl, whom for her very presence he would like to tear 
limb from limb” (16). His feelings are contradictory: “an urge to protect her, an urge to 
lash out at her because she is alive” (23). Soon he gives way to the impulse of 
searching for Pavel within her. This initially consists in subjecting her to intimidating 
moments of silence, “an outrageous demand” (23), but it develops into an interest in 
her body: Dostoevsky “cannot fail to notice [her] budding breasts” and “something 
passes between them from which he flinches as though pierced by a red-hot wire” (28). 
Seeing her asleep with Anna he has a visceral sensation that she is “watching him” 
even as he “ascertains” she is asleep. His second approach confirms his suspicions: 
Again he has the uncanny feeling that Matryona is watching him . . . He is not 
mistaken: he is staring into open, unblinking eyes. A chill runs through him . . . 
She is awake and has been awake all the time; thumb in mouth, she has been 
watching his every motion with unremitting vigilance. As he peers, holding his 
breath, the corners of her mouth seem to curve faintly upward in a victorious, 




This alleged lack of innocence is restated later when Matryona finds them in bed: “her 
mother, wild-haired, fast asleep . . . and he, in the act of opening his eyes on the grave 
child at the door. An apparition that could very well be a dream. But he knows it is not. 
She sees all, she knows all” (232-233).  
 Freud suggests that in The Possessed, Dostoevsky wrote what he repressed in 
real life.192 In The Master of Petersburg Matryona's rape is figurative and textual, 
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 See Freud (Dostoevsky). 
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although Dostoevsky's sexual interest in her is repeatedly suggested.193 Its first, 
textual, part takes place in his bed and consists in “the rhythms of storytelling” (72). 
He “turns the screw” (72); he “feels no mercy” and wants to “forc[e] the words upon 
her” (73). Narrating the story of Maria Lebyatkin and her imaginary fiancé he presents 
Pavel as a saviour, buying the white suit, pretending to be her sweetheart, giving 
everyone “a lesson in chivalry” by saving her from disgrace (74). This innocence is 
destroyed by the sadistic element: beaten by her brother, Maria thinks the world is “a 
place where you get beaten” (72), and that God is indifferent to human suffering (75). 
Smiling “an ugly, crooked . . . smile” (75) Dostoevsky gets closer to Matryona’s body: 
She is defeated. She has no more questions. Now she is ready, he thinks. He 
pats the bed beside him. Hanging her head, she slides closer. He folds her 
within the circle of his arm; he can feel her trembling. He strokes her hair, her 
temples. At last she gives way and, pressing herself against him, balling her 
fists under her chin, sobs freely. (75-76)   
  
 Matryona offers a link to Pavel through the suggestion of her sexuality. One of 
Dostoevsky's visions presents Pavel’s semen: “the seed that for a while went on living 
in the body after the breathing had stopped, not yet knowing it would never find issue” 
(76). In another vision Dostoevsky remembers a statue he saw in a museum: “the 
Indian god Shiva lying on his back, blue and dead, and riding on him the figure of a 
terrible goddess, many-armed, wide-mouthed, staring-eyed, ecstatic – riding him, 
drawing the divine seed out of him” (76). These two images combine when Shiva 
becomes Matryona: “[h]e has no difficulty in imagining this child in her ecstasy” (76). 
If the physical “violation” by story is insignificant (“the girl in the crook of his arm, 
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 “It excites him intensely . . . that they should be doing such fiery, dangerous work with the child 
asleep in the next room” (56).   
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the five fingers on his hand, white and dumb, gripping his shoulder”) Dostoevsky's 
imaginary violation goes further: “she might as well be sprawled out naked” (76). His 
later meditation on sex with child prostitutes and their facial expressions is juxtaposed 
with images of Matryona subjected to the “piston-engine” rhythm of his storytelling 
and the careful inspection of her face during the narrative act (72).194 
 Thus, Dostoevsky's use of Anna's body is coupled with meditations on 
Matryona's: wondering whether Matryona can sleepwalk into his bedroom and find 
him in a state of “lust,” whether the “intimate smells” are passed “down from mother 
to daughter,” or whether “[l]oving the mother, is one destined to long for the daughter 
too?” (128). Objects of desire, they are also the inspiration of writing to “channel[] this 
disturbing excitement” (134). Dostoevsky imagines himself writing an anonymous 
novel, “[a] book of the night, in which every excess would be represented and no 
bounds respected,” “Memoirs of a Russian Nobleman. A book that she, Anna 
Sergeyevna, its true begetter, would never see” (134).195 But while Anna inspires it, 
Matryona is at the core of the book. Dostoevsky self-reflexively imagines “a chapter in 
which the noble memorist reads aloud to the young daughter of his mistress a story of 
the seduction of a young girl in which he himself emerges . . . as having been the 
seducer”: 
A story full of intimate detail and innuendo which by no means seduces the 
daughter but on the contrary frightens her and disturbs her sleep and makes her 
so doubtful of her own purity that three days later she gives herself up to him in 
                                                 
194
 “something that goes beyond mere wincing, mere bearing of pain . . . the sudden wide-eyed look of a 
creature that begins to understand its life is in danger” (76-77). 
195
 In Foe Susan Barton also wants to be not only the muse but the “begetter” (126) of the story. In both 
instances women are used for sexual gratification and, afterwards, if they beget a story it is not a story of 
their own choosing. Instead, snippets of their lives are interwoven in a narrative they would not accept.  
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despair, in the most shameful of ways, in a way of which no child could 
conceive were the history of her own seduction and surrender and the manner 
of its doing not deeply impressed on her beforehand. (134) 
 
Their bodies inspire his writing: (“Is that what she is setting him free to do: to write a 
book of evil? And to what end? To liberate himself from evil or to cut himself off from 
good?” (134)) and in both instances Dostoevsky experiences it as a posthumous 
triumph over Pavel: “Poor child! The festival of the senses that would have been his 
inheritance stolen away from him! Lying in Pavel’s bed, he cannot refrain from a 
quiver of dark triumph” (135).  
 The question of Matryona's sexual innocence is linked to that of her political 
innocence; her knowledge of politics is equated with her knowledge of sexual matters. 
It is unclear whether she is “groomed for the harem” (217) or whether she is naturally 
a girl who “will do anything for [Nechaev]” (217) understanding the sexual undertones 
of the statement “perfectly well” (212). Such ambiguity extends further: her 
“hysterical” and “excited” state may result from her illness but might also be “a 
frenzy” of possession (165, 166, 168). Her “great excitement” (109) at the news of 
Ivanov’s murder might be innocent or the result of her possession by Nechaev. She 
actively helps him, knows the meaning of anarchist symbols, and incriminates 
Dostoevsky by using them (173).196 Her charity towards Katri might stem from the 
recognition of sexual abuse (172). Similarly, her musings on death may not be based 
on “the precious memory of Pavel” (208) but a convoluted way of admitting her role in 
Katri's suicide. These ambiguities find reflection in the descriptions of her body:  
                                                 
196
 Matryona's unreadability concerns her political consciousness and her sexual precociousness, both of 
which may be merely projected by Dostoevsky.    
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When she raises her eyes, he is enveloped in a glance that is at once shameless 
and derisive. She draws away from his hand, tossing her hair. ‘No!’ he says. 
The smile she wears is taunting, provocative. Then the spell passes and she is a 
child as before, confused, ashamed. (213)  
 
Dostoevsky is not sure that what he witnessed really happened: whether the evil exists 
inside Matryona or whether it is projected on her surface.197 The latter possibility is 
supported when he equates his epilepsy with “possession” (213).  
 
 The bodily search: Nechaev 
 Nechaev’s realm is the body. Described as living at the bodily limits of 
sentience, his cross-dressing and sexuality exacerbate the image. He has no interest in 
words: “Words are like the wind, here today, gone tomorrow. No one owns words” 
(200). Ready to forge Dostoevsky’s signature, he knows that “[s]tudents will believe 
anything” (199). He has one bodily end: total revolution and language is always the 
means to a material end: “a crowd is not interested in fine points of authorship. A 
crowd has no intellect, only passions” (200). 
 For Dostoevsky, Nechaevism does not consist in ideas but in the spirit in the 
container of the body: “Nechaevism is not an idea. It despises ideas, it is outside ideas. 
It is a spirit, and Nechaev himself is not its embodiment but its host” (44). His 
followers follow his spirit “[p]erhaps because in young people there is something . . . 
to which the spirit in Nechaev calls” (46). As the spirit needs the body, the man and his 
actions are described with emphasis on the body: he is “a man of blood” (46). 
                                                 
197
 Indeed, Matryona is sometimes presented as a surface on which meaning can be impressed: “Speak 
to Martyona . . . if he [Pavel] has left a mark behind it is on her” (142). This contrasts with reading her 
centre as possessed. 
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Similarly, the Nechaevites’ domain is the body, and their characteristic feature is 
bodily transformation. Katri is variously described as a “fat girl” with a “deep voice,” a 
“nun,” a “wrestler” (90), “a warrior woman” (91), a “pig” (92), a “fat little boy” (101). 
She changes appearance by twitching her dress. Upon her arrest she moves “like a doll 
whose limbs are pulled by strings” (169), and “like a beast” (170).  
 In his first appearance, Nechaev is dressed as a woman. Dostoevsky registers 
“the blue of her eyes, the pallor of her skin” (94), the “rustle of her dress and a waft of 
lavender as she passes.” With deep “trained” voice she looks like an opera singer (99): 
“heavily powdered” she is a “handsome creature” (100). Analysed closely, she is less 
than perfect: “Through the coat of powder, from the craters of the chin, he spies hairs 
that the razor did not catch. And the eyebrows are too thick over the bridge of the 
nose” (101). From their first encounter Dostoevsky is reluctantly but steadily drawn 
into Nechaev’s power. By touching Dostoevsky’s foot with his, Nechaev awakens a 
“disturbing excitement” (100). His abuse of Pavel (“a hanger-on, useful for running 
errands”) and his rejection of his friendship (“Friendship is effeminate. We don’t need 
friendship”) can be read in the body: “The foot still rests against his, but now there is 
something inert about its pressure, inert and lumpish and threatening” (100). 
 His frenzy is perceived as religious: “Christ in his wrath . . . that is who he 
models himself on. The Christ of the Old Testament, the Christ who scourged the 
usurers of the temple” (111, 103). His bodily realm is a mixture of idealism and 
perversion: 
This place is like a Spanish convent in the days of Loyola: well-born girls 
flagellating themselves, rolling about in ecstasies, foaming at the lips; or 
fasting, praying for hours on end to be taken into the arms of the Saviour. 
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Extremists all of them, sensualists hungering for the ecstasy of death – killing, 
dying,  no matter which. And Pavel among them! (104-105) 
 
Dostoevsky defines Nechaev bodily: 
He does not act in the name of ideas. He acts when he feels action stirring in 
his body. He is a sensualist. He is an extremist of the senses. He wants to live 
in a body at the limits of sensation, at the limits of bodily knowledge. That is 
why he can say everything is permitted – or why he would say so if he were not 
so indifferent to explaining himself! (113-114) 
 
At the same time, Dostoevsky's first lessons read Nechaev spiritually: “He calls 
himself a materialist. But that is just a fashionable jargon. The truth is, he has what the 
Greeks called a demon. It speaks to him. It is the source of his energy” (112-113). This 
reading of Nechaev also becomes a reading of Pavel: “The same demon must have 
been in Pavel, otherwise why would Pavel have responded to his call?” (113).  
 The knowledge offered by the Nechaevites concerns Pavel's body – more 
specifically, the nature of his death. Their words cannot be trusted: Nechaev never 
convinces Dostoevsky of his truthfulness, nor fully denies accusations of murder 
(119). Instead, he offers a physical link to Pavel by taking Dostoevsky atop a tower 
where he died. Physical proximity to the place of death metonymically implies 
closeness to Pavel's body and thus to the embodied “core” of his identity: “Between 
here and there an eternity of time, so much time that it is impossible for the mind to 
grasp it. Between here and there Pavel was alive, more alive than ever before. We live 
most intensely while we are falling – a truth that wrings the heart!” (121).198 
Dostoevsky attempts to 'feel himself' into the body of his son or feel him within 
                                                 
198
 Elsewhere he is fascinated by the “last fraction of the last instant of his fall” (20) and the thoughts 
that accompany the moment of death “too enormous to be borne.” They are imagined as illumination in 
the final extremity: “Pavel, falling, knew everything” (21), but remain inexpressible in his fiction. 
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himself.199 He begins with the meditation on the word “belief”: “I believe in the body 
on the pavement . . . I believe in the blood and the bones. To gather up the broken 
body and embrace it: that is what it means to believe.” From this he arrives at an 
illumination:  
 ‘I believe in resurrection,’ he says. The words come without premeditation . . . 
 Speaking the words . . . he feels a quick joy, not so much at the words 
 themselves as at the way they have come, spoken out of him as if by another. 
 Pavel! . . . I believe in the resurrection of the body . . . (122)  
 
This active voice speaking through his passive body is stronger than other accounts. 
The police account leads to his attempt to keep Pavel “in retrospect, out of [Nechaev’s] 
clutches” and to “the imperative” to “seek justice for his son.” Nechaev’s account 
demands a deeper reading of its author (124). Such a reading begins with the memory 
of a child rapist200 and a hypothesis that his father's evil might “explain Nechaev's 
vengefulness” (125).  
 Their next meeting sees Dostoevsky display the passivity characteristic of their 
encounters. He is unable to stop Matryona from giving Nechaev the white suit as a 
disguise, he does not return insults and is powerless against having his money taken 
(157). Confronted by Nechaev's body his language fails him: “Now it is his turn to 
take up the position of penniless virtue, Nechaev’s turn to bow his head and be 
scolded. But what he has to say? Nothing, nothing at all” (159). Nechaev's knowledge 
about Pavel (“a sissy”) is imparted as contrasting with his own masculinity as when he 
                                                 
199
 Such 'feeling in' relates to the body rather than soul: “the body of a hot-blooded young man . . . 
striking the earth . . . the rush of breath from the lungs, the crack of bones.” The physicality of a “body 
hitting the earth” is seen as “the measure of all things” (105). 
200
 This memory is of reading his body: looking “intently into the face” and its result, the idea that 
“nothing in his heart has changed” (125).   
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puts his finger into the fire (161). His masculinity is also viewed through Matryona's 
bodily reactions. The result is that Dostoevsky feels himself rendered less masculine, 
unable to “compete with these young men who come from nowhere and vanish into 
nowhere breathing adventure and mystery” (161).  
 His passivity also results in his being talked into getting rid of Nechaev's old 
clothes. The bundle becomes “his” and he experiences himself as like “a girl with a 
stillborn baby, or a murderer with bloody a axe.” This act of collaboration also 
demonstrates the extent of Nechaev's power (162) even as it suggests Nechaev's guilt: 
“How easy for a woman to murder a man: lure him down an alley, accept his embrace 
against a wall . . . sink a hatpin into his heart . . . that leaves no blood, and only a 
pinprick of a wound” (163). Nechaev's power is immediately somatised as an epileptic 
fit within the container of Dostoevsky's body: “On all fours, raising his head, sniffing 
the air like a wild animal, he tries to concentrate his attention on the horizon inside 
himself. But if what is taking him over is a fit, it is taking over his senses too. His 
senses are as dull as his hands” (164).  
 Each of the four meetings with Nechaev follows a similar pattern: each 
foregrounds Nechaev's changing physicality, each offers snippets of “knowledge” 
about Pavel, and each suggests Dostoevsky's growing passivity. This is amplified in 
the he last meeting where Nechaev's accosts Dostoevsky in the street and takes control: 
“Side by side, like a reluctant dog and its master, they walk down Svechnoi Street” 
(175). Nechaev's agenda is again bodily: his plan is to introduce Dostoevsky to the 
truth through a “throng of smelly humanity” (177). The setting of their conversation 
provides further body imagery with the “pathos of three starving children” whose 
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mother sells herself to feed them (180). Barefoot, with unkempt hair and “rheumy, 
incurious eyes” (179), for Nechaev they embody the real Petersburg as “specimens of 
urban poverty” (182). One of them, “younger than Matryona” is “duller, more 
acquiescent” (182). This comparison leads Dostoevsky, almost inevitably, to the 
thought: “[h]as she already begun to say yes to men?” (182). This is the basis of his 
“modest proposal,” a bodily solution to poverty, rejected by Nechaev as a “depraved 
parable” (183).  
 The conversation between the two embodies Maximov's battle of sons and 
fathers as it simultaneously rejects such a reading. Nechaev’s fury is directed at 
Dostoevsky's “generation” which “resent[s] it that the reins are passing into the hands 
of younger and stronger men who are going to make a better world” (187, 188). He 
accuses Dostoevsky of using the poor for financial benefit in fiction, and presents 
Dostoevsky's fiction as sentimentalising the poor: these children are not “three little 
angels on a brief visit to earth” (186), but are presented as desperate enough to eat 
Dostoevsky alive. Dostoevsky is, in turn, critical of Nechaev’s zeal (“steal[ing] Easter 
from Jesus” (187)),201 and the paradoxical desire to be betrayed.202 His promise of 
suicide at thirty-five and rejection of fatherhood (“I am my own father now. I have 
made myself over” (194)) is read by Dostoevsky as a result of childhood experience: 
his vengance a rebellion against father-figures, his thirst for blood as taking his 
                                                 
201
 The comparison of Nechaev to Jesus follows several conversations in which Necheavites liken 
“treacherous” Dostoevsky to Judas (106). Another such comparison is made in Dostoevsky’s words to 
Maximov: “The papers you are holding on to so jealously may as well be written in Aramaic” (46), and 
in his description of Nechaev as “a virgin like Jesus” (188). This is annulled when Nechaev, after 
Pontius Pilate, asks: “Truth? What is the truth?” (203).   
202
  “Nechaev will not be satisfied till he is in the hands of the police, till he has tasted that too. So that 
his courage and his resolution can be put to the test . . . He will drag his broken limbs around, roaring,  
strong as a lion” (193).       
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father’s stance (the desire to be feared and taken seriously) to the extreme (195). 
However, the suggestion of chastity exacerbates the queerness of his body situating it 
at extreme ends: the extremism of the senses and profound innocence.203 The 
unreadability of the body renders the unreadability of Pavel: his sexuality and the 
rejection of his father are simultaneously suggested and problematised. Similarly, 
when the narrative suggests the generation struggle, it also undermines it. It is read as 
Dostoevsky's projection: “You think that because you and your father hated each other, 
the history of the world has to consist of nothing but fathers and sons against each 
other” (188). Instead, Nechaev proposes, revolution will signify “the end of everything 
old, including fathers and sons” and be “Year One. Carte Blanche” (189). In one 
delirious vision it suggests resurrecting Pavel through revolution. Throughout 
Dostoevsky seems willing to sometimes reject and sometimes to accept Nechaev’s 
vision. His final kiss is similarly ambiguous: a fatherly expression of love may well be 
Judas’s kiss of betrayal. 
 Nechaev's and Dostoevsky's readings of each other are never confirmed nor 
falsified. Dostoevsky strives to find Pavel everywhere and chases every single clue 
that may lead to him,204 his efforts are continually thwarted by Nechaev himself or, to 
put it more literarily, Dostoevsky’s efforts at uncovering the projected depth inside 
Nechaev, to find Pavel inside Nechaev, constantly crash against the surface of 
Nechaev’s body. For it is the bodily surface that keeps getting in the way, making the 
                                                 
203
 Nechaev is repeatedly referred to as sexually perverse (he cannot have a “natural connection with a 
woman”). He is thus a herald of new times in which “sensation will not come by the old means any 
longer” (114). 
204
 A prime example here is the encounter with the dog and Ivanov, and the meditation on metaphors 
that accompanies these. 
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identification between Pavel and Nechaev impossible. Nechaev’s behaviour is 
constantly “studied,” “theatrical,” epitomising “an age of acting . . . of disguise” (195). 
His cross-dressing surface is misleading, while his imagined depths escape language: 
“when was it last that words could be trusted to travel from heart to heart?” (195). In 
contrast, Dostoevsky thinks of Pavel as simple: “too much of a child, and too old-
fashioned, to prosper in [this age],” a literary simpleton whose characters converse “in 
a funny, stammering, old-fashioned language of the heart” (196). Dostoevsky's faith in 
the good centre within Pavel’s body derives from the latter's literary attempts at 
“project[ion]” of himself “into another breast” and contrasts with the importance of 
surface for Nechaev (196).  
 Dostoevsky and Nechaev also differ in their attitude to language. For the latter 
reading is a bourgeois “luxury,” debilitating insofar as it prevents action, while 
“sit[ting] around arguing” merely dissipates energy (199). Instead, Nechaev believes in 
provoking the students to action, to a revolution that will level everyone in terms of 
bodily suffering: “if some are suffering, what justice is there till all are suffering?” 
(199-200). For Nechaev, true justice will only be achieved when “all are suffering,” in 
other words, the term “suffering” will lose its meaning (and, consequently, suffering 
will cease to exist) when it will not be identifiable via its reference to its contradiction: 
non-suffering. The community united in pain, felt acutely by all, is Nechaev’s idea of 
political justice. This bodily goal justifies all means (“everything is permitted” and 
draws on language's potential for “forgery” (200). 
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 Nechaev argues for a “bodily” history that consists not in ideas (“in people’s 
minds”) but physical action (“in the streets”).205 His thoughts are valued not as 
thoughts but as physical impulses: “I can think one thing at one minute and another 
thing at another and it won’t matter a pin as long as I act. The people act” (200). While 
such a worldview is rejected on moral grounds (“If you gamble on God’s mercy you 
will certainly be lost” (201)) it is inconsistent in its reliance on words (“We are on the 
brink of a new age where we are free to think any thought. There is nothing we can’t 
think! Surely you know that”) and on literature when Nechaev invokes Raskolnikov in 
support of his argument (201).206 Dostoevsky is confused in his rejection of Nechaev 
(as Nechaev) and his simultaneous metonymic craving for him as the key to Pavel. 
Where Nechaev's fallible logic equates the freedom to think with the freedom to act, 
further confusion results from Dostoevsky's positioning himself between the bodily 
Nechaev and the textual Maximov. Dostoevsky wavers between the two, 
simultaneously trying to bridge the gap between language and the body in his search 
for Pavel, to keep the two separate in discussions with Maximov and Nechaev, and to 
translate the body and its desires into language in his fiction.207 
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 Indeed, although he initially only claims to be “of Russia,” his later implication equates his body and 
his spirit with Russia (202). 
206
 At the same time, the rejection of Dostoevsky's realm of language and authorship (“Who cares who 
actually writes the pamphlet?” (200)) is hypocritical since both are needed as a “means” of luring 
Dostoevsky into a collaboration that, metaphorically, “levels” the two men.  
207
 Dostoevky's inconsistency surfaces in his conversation with Maximov when he claims that while his 
books are unlikely to “offend a child,” inspiration might be both offensive and bodily: “the heart has its 
dark places . . . One does not always know” (144). Similarly visceral is the effect caused by Pavel's 
papers: the trembling and the heart “hammering unpleasantly” are reminiscent of the experience of 
reading forbidden books as a teenager: “terror of being caught red-handed (a terror delicious in itself), 
the same passionate engrossment” (148). The diary also breeds physical suffering: it presents Pavel as 
an orphan, renders Dostoevsky’s gloom, hatred and cruelty towards Isaev or the“the people,” his 
servants (150). The separation of the body and the text is therefore not complete. 
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 Thus, if Anna’s body proved a dead-end in the search for Pavel, Nechaev’s 
body is even more misleading. Not only does he not lead to Pavel, his self-disclosures 
are ambiguous and return Dostoevsky to himself. The author finds himself “a fly in 
Nechaev’s web,” where even possible revenge (exchanging Nechaev for his 
confiscated passport) has perhaps been devised by Nechaev. There is a suggestion that 
in his reluctant seduction Dostoevsky approximates Pavel: “Was it the same with 
Pavel? Was Pavel in his deepest being a son of his stepfather, seducible by the 
voluptuous promise of being seduced?” (206). Thus he hopes Maximov will “swallow 
[Nechaev] whole and crush his bones and spit out the dry remnants,” at the same time 
as he feels “acutest resentment” towards Maximov and his family (206, 207). While he 
agrees with Maximov's “[i]f there must be sons, better to father them at a distance, like 
a frog or a fish,” his question “[h]ow much lower can [I] fall?” suggests a further fall 
in his attempts to read Pavel (207, 206).    
 
 The bodily search: Dostoevsky 
 The search for Pavel also takes place in Dostoevsky’s own body through the 
experience of epilepsy and ageing. The text invites allegorical readings of the body in 
the suggestions of the spiritual dimension of disease. The two-way movement in the 
case of epilepsy consists in building expectation of attacks and a repeated deferral of 
meaning.  
 As we saw earlier, Dostoevsky's fetishism relied on metonymy, but his own 
body offers the hope of direct communication. Thus Dostoevsky summons his son’s 
spirit and feels it inside his body. The reader sees him “concentrating his gaze” on an 
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empty chair, “waiting for the darkness to thicken, to turn into another kind of darkness, 
a darkness of presence.” Language provides a direct connection with the immaterial: 
“Silently, he forms his lips over his son’s name, three times, four times. He is trying to 
cast a spell. But over whom: over a ghost or over himself?” He thinks of himself as 
Orpheus but with “[n]o flute, no lyre, just the word, the one word, over and over” (5). 
Awaiting illumination, the body is passive: it tries to give itself over to the voice.208 
Images of recovering Pavel from death are juxtaposed to visions of drowning and 
falling. Some images take the form of extended passages (17-18), some are a matter of 
phrasing, so frequent they are easily overlooked. Thus “[h]is head begins to swim” (5) 
suggests a submersion that can refer to confusion, epilepsy, or possession – or simply a 
stylistic idiosyncrasy. Such recurrent ambiguities match the ambiguous attitude to 
language displayed by Dostoevsky. Thus his hopes of summoning Pavel are shattered: 
his prayers are not answered. He also suffers from writer’s block. Bodily knowledge 
remains questionable or is inexpressible in language. Whether the final overcoming of 
the block and rendering “Pavel” in fiction unites the two men remains highly 
problematic.  
 Initially, the hope of communication is strong. He likens himself to the ageing 
dogs in the cemetery, packs of which are “waiting for the mourners to leave before 
they begin their digging” (7). Pavel's grave provides a metonymic link to him: the 
mound “has the volume and even the shape of a recumbent body”; its materiality 
allows contact (“rub[bing] his face in the wet earth, burrow[ing] his face into it”) even 
                                                 
208
 The text wavers between presenting Dostoevsky's language as actively used, and Dostoevsky as a 
passive medium of language “surrendering to the words,” “going where they take him” (139). This 
unresolved dichotomy applies also to the final possession, and his final creation.   
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if the experience is “too sudden” and awakens no feelings (8, 9, 8). Its immediacy 
contrasts with the mediatedness of language: between the “boy who still lives in his 
memory” and “the name on the death certificate,” the “number on the stake” (8).209 
However, language does not do justice to the bodily event: the documentation of the 
event remains the “procedure of storing, numbering, encasing, transporting, burying” 
(8-9). Words mislead to the point where a stern promise of a return to the grave (11) 
never happens (22), but words continue to have emotional significance – as in his use 
of “my son” instead of “Pavel” and in his pain in response to Anna's use of the past 
tense (16).  
 Coetzee's Dostoevsky is Freud’s Dostoevsky à rebours: Where Freud describes 
the identification between the writer and his murdered father,210 Coetzee shows the 
father's identification with the son.211 He feels himself his “mother and his father,” 
“everything . . . and more!” (16).212 This “more” of direct identification makes the 
literal pain and death of one into the figurative pain and death of the other. Pavel's 
death for Matryona is “caused” by Dostoevsky: “death the reaper himself” with his 
“hideous bleeding mask” (14). But this agent of death is also a bearer of life: Pavel is a 
homunculus “egg” asleep within him (19). Bodily numbness is intertwined with the 
hope of a live spirit, an idea that “[p]oetry might bring his son back,” requiring merely 
“a sense of the poem” or “a sense of its music” (17). Such hopes are immediately 
questioned: he is “not a poet: more like a dog that has lost a bone, scratching here, 
                                                 
209
 Similarly mediated is the original message informing him of Pavel's death: “Mésaventure. Maykov's 
code word. Suicide” (124). 
210
 Freud (Dostoevsky). For a good analysis of Freudian inspiration of the Master see Rosen (Freud). 
211
 “I am he . . . he is I” (53). 
212
 Explicitly, he “cannot distinguish Pavel from himself”: they are “the same person; and that person is 
no more or less than a thought, Pavel thinking in him, he thinking in Pavel” (21). 
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scratching there” (17) and the voice may be that of the “demon that is taking him over” 
or “his own soul flailing its wings” in anticipation of his own death (16). Such literary 
fantasy does not bear rational scrutiny: Dostoevsky rejects the possibility of meeting 
his son in the afterlife (17). The “stirrings” of the body, which are at times presented as 
communication with Pavel or as spirit possession, are, at other times, merely 
symptoms of illness and old age. Half mourning his son, half mourning the inability to 
write, Dostoevsky lives in “utter blankness” bearing with it “insidious and deathly 
pleasure” (22). His world is “contracted,” limited to what is “within his breast” (22). 
Such solipsism is undercut by suggestions of the body's capacity for transcendence: 
visions appearing as preludes to a fit induce a feeling of something “on its way” that 
remains as yet inexpressible, “something whose name he is trying to avoid” (27). 
These epileptic fits invite interpretation as a mystical means of communication at the 
boundaries of consciousness.213 However, while illness provides the hope of 
communication, it also turns mourning into a “lie” (52).214 In both states Pavel is 
presented as existing within Dostoevsky's body but not representable in his language: 
“His son is inside him, a dead baby in an iron box in the frozen earth. He does not 
know how to resurrect the baby or – what comes to the same thing – lacks the will to 
do it” (52).  
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 Dostoevsky’s epilepsy serves as a bodily instinct warning of imminent danger (“a device, and the 
most childish of devices at that, for extricating himself from a fix” (31) at the police station), yet at the 
same time as it links the body and the mind, it also, through connotations with images of epileptics in 
Dostoevsky’s fiction, links the body, the real life of the author with his creation; much of what happens 
to him in the novel is a replay of his work, which in turn might have been inspired by his life: “surely he 
has been here before . . . and had an attack or a fainting fit! But why is it that he recollects the episode 
only so dimly? And what has the recollection do with the smell of fresh paint?” (31). The juxtaposition 
of the textual and the bodily also takes place on the language level of metaphors in the novel. 
214
 When Dostoevsky experiences “the clearest vision . . . of Pavel smiling at him,” it is immediately 
followed by a reference to his illness: “Now there is sure to be a fit! he thinks” (28). 
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 When the repetitions of Pavel's name (a “charm”) invite the spirit of Nechaev, 
Dostoevsky feels “betrayed” (60). This betrayal consists in being deprived of his inner 
core (Pavel) and being left with the ageing, “offensive” body (66). The dissolution of 
his body influences Dostoevsky's mind (67-68). Joy and gloom are interwoven in their 
successive appearances (“The dawning sun is there not for itself but to undergo 
eclipse; joy shines out only to reveal what the annihilation of joy will be like” (68)) 
and both function as cognitive and affective expressions of a rapidly changing somatic 
state. The moments of confusion preceding epileptic fits, the text suggests, renew 
contact with the 'core' of his being, and only then, and through the body, the contact 
with Pavel is feasible.  
 Epileptic fits provide a lasting sense of confusion, anticipation and 
apprehension. When they arrive, detailed description and ambiguities in language 
suggest the status of an epiphany. The experience structures time as space (“minutes 
stretch before him like a dark passage down which he must scurry”) and produce 
dread: “a wave of terror . . . without object” (68). Waking up with “no idea where he is 
. . . who he is,” Dostoevsky is pure mind: “He is a wakefulness, a consciousness, that 
is all.” His thoughts are are uttered by “consciousness, addressing itself, trying to quell 
its own panic” (69).215 This picture is complicated when the same attack renders 
Dostoevsky a body: “A body falls vertically through space inside him. He is that body. 
There is a rush of air: he is the one who feels the rush. There is a throat choked with 
terror: it is his throat” (69). This contradiction remains unresolved. At the same time, 
there is an invitation for the reader to endow the scene with interpretation (the “fall,” 
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 Pure consciousness devoid of the body is an ideal to which some Coetzee’s characters (Dawn) aspire, 
while some crave being merely a body devoid of consciousness (Magda). 
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for example, is reminiscent of Pavel's final fall) but, in the typical two-way movement, 
such suggestions are soon undermined. The fits do not “provide illumination”: “They 
are not visitations. Far from it” (69). Dostoevsky rejects the spiritual interpretations of 
his illness – “mouthfuls of his life sucked out of him as if by a whirlwind that leaves 
behind not even a memory of darkness” (69) – but such rejections are themselves 
undercut by later suggestions of meaningfulness (“Just a dream, he thinks . . . For an 
instant he is allowed to believe. Then the truth bursts over him and overwhelms him” 
(71)).    
 Dostoevsky’s aim is to hear the body speak its own story (126). This clearly 
delineated goal of making Pavel speak must also override corporeal fragility: the 
“inertia” of “growing old” and turning into a “man in a corner with nothing to do but 
pick over the pages of his losses” (124). The purity of this objective, however, is 
tainted by his emotional involvement and later by something “like the point of a nail 
just beginning to come through a shoe, that he cannot or does not care to define” (138). 
The something else turns out to be appearances not of Pavel but of creatures of the 
imagination. Thus, summoning Pavel as a child, in the “corner of the picture” he 
encounters “something that he thrusts away” (142): 
 what comes back instantly . . . is what he can only call a troll, a misshapen little 
 creature, red-haired, red-bearded, no taller than a child of three or four . . . Who 
 is this troll-creature? . . . With a shock it comes home to him. The cratered skin, 
 the scars swelling hard and livid in the cold, the thin beard growing out of the 
 pock-marks – it is Nechaev again, Nechaev grown small, Nechaev in Syberia 
 haunting the beginnings of his son! What does the vision mean? (143) 
 
This vision's suggestion of meaning invites a variety of interpretations: Dostoevky’s 
betrayal of his child, the replacing of absent father with Nechaev, the evil existing in 
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Pavel from the beginning. None of them are conclusively confirmed but all revolve 
around Nechaev.  
 With time Dostoevsky's body feels Pavel's presence (“[n]owhere and 
everywhere, torn and scattered like Orpheus.”) Against this, the fiction born from this 
body offers the promise of resurrection: “Port, lyre-player, enchanter, lord of 
resurrection, that is what I am called to be” (152-153). Giving voice consists in 
“waiting for [Pavel’s] ghost” (154) while reading his own degenerating body. He is not 
a “full man any longer” but “half a man” (192). Split in half, his diseased and perverse 
part encloses the healthy, strong and young one in its container. His “spells of 
dizziness and palpitations of the heart . . . exhaustion and irritability” become a 
prominent feature as if “the entire state in which he lives can be called a fit” (174). The 
medical condition is extrapolated to the outside world: the “maelstrom of Petersburg” 
(204), Russia and the historical moment. Slowly, however, Dostoevsky realises that 
“he has lost touch” with Pavel (204). His fall is imminent. In a prior conversation with 
Matryona Dostoevsky speculated whether the right word for seizure should be 
“possession,” now he sees his disease as a “mere presentiment of what is now 
happening, the quaking and dancing of the body a long-drawn prelude to a quaking of 
the soul” (213).  
 
 The textual search: The Fall 
 The eventual “fall” of Dostoevsky links the body and language: either may be 
the cause, and either can be the effect. This linking of what is bodily and what is 
linguistic, what is a material sign and what is its meaning, appears first in relation to 
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Pavel's writing. The engagement with Pavel occurs through his language, where 
material writing is metonymically connected with the body. Dostoevsky accordingly 
wavers between the sign as metaphor and the materiality of the sign: his attention 
wanders “from the sense of the words to the words themselves, to the letters on the 
paper, to the trace in ink of the hand’s movements, the shadings left by the pressure of 
the fingers . . . he closes his eyes and touches his lips to the page” (216). The kissing of 
the paper is similar to fetishistic mourning in its metonymic function and further 
juxtaposes language and the body.  
 Dostoevsky's “fall” and suggested possession translates bodily pain into 
spiritual affliction: “He is sick and he knows the name of his sickness. Nechaev, voice 
of the age, calls it vengefulness, but a truer name, less grand, would be resentment.” 
(234). Pavel's physical fall structures the figurative fall of Dostoevsky, but this time 
both happen in the container of his body: “from being a body plunging into darkness 
he shall become a body within whose core a plunge into darkness is taking place, a 
body which contains its own falling and its own darkness” (234). This allows for living 
through the fall and “through the madness of our times” (235) in a way Pavel could 
not: “To live where Pavel died. To live in Russia and hear the voices of Russia 
murmuring within him. To hold it all within him: Russia, Pavel, death” (235). By 
becoming a mouthpiece for the surrounding madness Dostoevsky's body encloses 
Pavel, demons and epilepsy unable to tell them apart.216 The “sordid infirmity” of the 
body engages with spiritual reflections on history, politics, religion or morality that are 
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 His writing is finally that “of a madman – vileness, obscenity . . . untameable,” the bodily product of 
“madness . . . running through the artery of his right arm down to the fingertips and the pen and so to the 
page” (18). In this, he reminds us of Elizabeth Costello who does not distinguish between the voices that 
speak through her but is the secretary of whoever appoints her. 
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not literally communicable. The key term here is perversion, its polysemy referring 
both to sexuality and to the perversion of truth, the translation of facts into fiction. 
Writing is synonymous with both betrayal and perversion. While textual perversion 
merely distorts the facts (235), in Dostoevsky's case it relies on sexual perversion for 
its metaphorical definition: “I write perversions of the truth. I choose the crooked road 
and take children into dark places” (236).      
 Possession alienates Dostoevsky from himself. He is unrecognisable to himself 
and finds himself accompanied by “someone in the room besides himself . . . if not . . . 
a full person then . . . a stick-figure, a scarecrow draped in an old suit, with a stuffed 
sugar-sack for a head and a kerchief across the mouth” (236).217 The apparition leads 
to mental imbalance: he is “distracted, and irritated at himself for being distracted. The 
very spirit of irritation keeps the scarecrow perversely alive; its mute indifference to 
his irritation doubles his irritation” (236). When the figure reappears, its identity is 
unreadable: 
What is the name? Is it Ivanov? Is this Ivanov come back, Ivanov the obscure, 
the forgotten? What was Ivanov’s true name? Or is it Pavel? Who was the 
lodger  who had this room before him? Who was P.A.I., owner of the suitcase? 
Did the P. stand for Pavel? Was Pavel Pavel’s true name? If Pavel is called by 
a false name, will he ever come? (237)  
 
The apparition does not resemble Pavel: its head is “slightly too large, larger than a 
human head ought to be,” there is “something excessive” in its proportions. 
Dostoevsky's language approximates the creature without fixing it with descriptive 
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 His beard is described as “a curtain of bees” echoing the description of the barbarian girl’s pubic hair 
in the Magistrate’s dream (Waiting 14).   
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terms: his vocabulary and creature's qualities are similar to those used by Dostoevsky 
for the figure of Stavrogin in The Possessed.  
 The apparition stands as a mute body inviting both projections of depth and 
multiple interpretations. It motivates religious acceptance: “Is that what he must learn: 
that in God’s eyes there is no difference between the two of them, Paul Isaev and 
Sergei Nechaev, sparrows of equal weight?” (238). It also invites Dostoevsky to 
rethink his attitude to Pavel. The son is either “within him, a child walled up in the 
crypt of his grief, weeping without cease” or is a vengeful man who should be let 
“loose in all his rage against the rule of fathers” (239). The bind is not a real choice but 
“a choice that is no choice” (239). Conflicting feelings (the “rule of fathers and the 
“thanklessness of sons”) culminate in the description of the apparition where the 
boundaries between who is the father, who the son, who the creating power, who the 
creation, are blurred. Similar confusion applies to possession: it is unclear if 
Dostoevsky is the cause of evil or the temporary abode of the evil spirit (241).  
 Saving Pavel in writing coincides with the arrival of the apparition and breaks 
his writer’s block. In his writing, however, appears a vision of child abuse, 
recognisable as a rough sketch for a scene later to be used in The Possessed: 
Thus at last the time arrives and the hand that holds the pen begins to move. 
But the word it forms are not words of salvation. Instead, they tell of flies, or of 
a single black fly, buzzing against a closed windowpane. High summer in 
Petersburg, hot and clammy; from the street below, noise, music. In the room a 
child with brown eyes and straight fair hair lying naked beside a man . . . (241)  
  
 
The apparition represents the non-representable and translates unacceptable desires 
into text. Possession leads to transgressive writing in which the text now possessed by 
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Dostoevsky perverts Pavel's story and his image. While language's triumph over the 
body may consist in representing what does not exist any more, such a triumph is also 
a betrayal insofar as it misrepresents Pavel. Dostoevsky’s creation is fathered by him 
but also fathers him and “begins to write itself” (242).  
 Dostoevky's text continues Pavel’s story. He describes the lazy life, wandering 
through the landlady’s flat, the smelling of her clothes, the photograph (this time spat 
on and polished). Pavel's or Stavrogin's transgression is Pavel’s infecting the 
landlady’s daughter with sexual knowledge. Initially, it amounts to leaving the door 
open, with the knowledge that “the child has crept in, has watched or listened” (244). 
It is “creating a taste in the child, as one creates a taste for unnatural foods, oysters or 
sweetbreads” (244) and forcing his mistress to blasphemy (something that “excites the 
girl unbearably”) strengthening his belief in Svidrigailov’s dictum: “Women like to be 
humiliated” (244). Dostoevsky's renaming of Matryona is a rectification of his earlier 
complaint regarding her name (14). The new name, Dusha, hints at Matryona's later 
role as Darya (Dusha) and her relationship with Stavrogin in the Possessed (246). Such 
renaming might signify possession but also perversion of translating life into fiction. A 
further perversion consists in translating fiction into life and abusing Matryona's 
innocence when his writing is left on the table for her to read. As in the earlier 
conversation about dying, Dostoevsky destroys her vision of goodness. Matryona the 
character, and Martyona the reader are left with no illusions as to Pavel's motivation 
for chivalry: “Why did I do it? For a joke. Summer in the country is so boring” (249).  
 Dostoevsky’s writing is “enough” for “present purposes”: “In a final version it 
would have to be fuller” (249). Dostoevsky’s writing invites interpretation as a 
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figurative parallel of Pavel's fall, just as his figurative perversion of truth parallels his 
sexual perversion (“assault on the innocence of a child” (249)). The concepts of fall 
and perversion are not only literal or metaphorical, but also refer both to the body and 
to language. The movement between the body and the text registers the latter as the 
product of the former, but further it renders bodily loss of innocence as occasioned by 
language. Such confusion of deed and motive, reason and result, textuality and 
sexuality infuses the final “fall” with similar ambiguity. For his “assault,” Dostoevsky 
“expect[s] no forgiveness”: “he has crossed the threshold” (249). His transgression is 
an attempt to hear God: “Now God must speak, now God dare no longer remain silent. 
To corrupt a child is to force God. The device he has made arches and springs shut like 
a trap, a trap to catch God” (249).  
 Such transgression changes him bodily and mentally and transforms his 
identity: “he is outside himself, perhaps outside his soul. Somewhere he stands stands 
and watches while he and God circle each other” (249). The fall is complete and 
involves not only those two agents but the whole universe: “Time is suspended, 
everything is suspended before the fall. I have lost my place in my soul, he thinks” 
(249). Once again, the the mind becomes the body: the corruption of the mind brings 
about the corruption of the body, but which is the cause and which the effect remains 
uncertain.   
 
 Master of Petersburg and Metaphor 
The novel deals with metaphor in two ways. First, it uses images of the body 
and language treating both sometimes as surfaces and sometimes as containers. In the 
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use of container metaphor it suggests depth that needs uncovering both by Dostoevsky 
and the reader.  
Dostoevsky’s speech is profoundly metaphorical: he is the container enclosing 
the body of Pavel, like a coffin or a womb (66, 76, 81). The somatic attacks of illness 
are repeatedly an “illumination” or “visitation” (69) that never arrives. Metaphorical 
thought is evident, and conscious, in his thinking:  
He counts backwards to the day of Pavel’s death, reaches twenty, loses track, 
starts again, loses track again . . . The steps, the days – they have something to 
do with each other. Each step another day subtracted from Pavel’s sum. A 
counting up and a counting down proceeding at the same time – is that what is 
confusing him? (117-118) 
 
Similarly ambiguous is his attitude to epilepsy where the promise of meaning offered 
by following the interpretative impulse is undercut in a two-way movement by a return 
to the mundane and the literal:    
A metaphor, he tells himself, that is all it is – another word for a lapse of 
consciousness, a not-being here, an absence. Nothing new. The epileptic knows 
it all: the approach to the edge, the glance downward, the lurch of the soul, the 
thinking that thinks itself crazily over and over . . . 
He grips the rail tighter, shakes his head to chase away the dizziness. 
Metaphors – what nonsense! There is death, only death. Death is a metaphor 
for nothing. Death is death. I should never have agreed to come. (118) 
 
 Metaphors are a frequent subject of conversations. Dostoevsky's 
characterisation of Nechaevites as the “Baal” (44) is quickly rejected by Maximov: 
“Interesting. A metaphor, perhaps, and not entirely clear . . . I must ask myself, 
however, how practical is it to talk . . . about ideas going about in the land, as if ideas 
had arms and legs?” Yet soon his use of language (“we are not a contemplative order, 
we are of the investigative arm” (44)) contradicts his meaning and suggests the 
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inescapabilty of metaphor. When Dostoevsky accuses Maximov of misreading and 
fearing the contents of Pavel’s papers (“as though the words might leap out from the 
page and strangle you” (46)), he also turns reading into a physical experience (“reading 
is being the arm and being the axe . . . reading is giving yourself up, not holding 
yourself at a distance and jeering” (47)). Such reading is risky in its bodily aspect: 
Maximov's work is read as sublimation of his murderous tendencies: “look into 
yourself: is that your true wish? Do you not truly want to chop off his head and stamp 
your feet in his blood?” (47). Such reading of Maximov can be reversed to shed light 
on Dostoevsky’s “literary” paedophilia as a substitute for what is not lived. While 
Dostoevsky's claim of his literal truthfulness (“I do not speak in riddles. Every word I 
use means what it says” (148)) serves the practical purpose of evading Maximov, it 
stands at variance with Dostoevsky’s prior use of metaphor and the  preoccupation 
with metaphors and figures. While he speaks, perhaps self-consciously, 
metaphorically, he elsewhere finds metaphors both to lead and hinder his hermeneutic 
endeavour.  
 The police are interested in textual evidence to the point where the bodily aim 
of their work (capturing Nechaev) is forgotten. Submerged in paperwork, they 
overlook the metaphoricity of their language: “We can’t get moving until we have 
something in writing – something to get our teeth into, so to speak” (205). They 
“guard” language in their refusal to return the papers confiscated from Pavel’s room 
since “in today’s circumstances it is hard to know what “of a private nature” means 
any longer” (38). Pavel’s short story – a private matter to Dostoevsky, a public affair 
to the police – has a bodily theme: it tells a story of a convict escaping prison in 
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Siberia, falling in love with a peasant girl, and killing a landowner for “forc[ing] his 
attentions on the girl” (40). Fleeing the scene, the young man takes his axe“the weapon 
of the Russian people, our means of defence and our means of revenge” (41). For 
Maximov, “the allusion could not be clearer” (41-42). It is proof of “how deeply he 
[Pavel] had fallen under the influence of the Nechaevites” (42). Such a reading is 
rejected as mistaking fiction for real life. A similar rejection takes place during 
Dostoevsky's conversation with Nechaev on the distinction between story and parable: 
There are enough children in the cellars of Petersburg, and enough gentlemen 
on the streets with money in their pockets and a taste for young flesh, to bring 
prosperity to all the poor folk of the city. All that is required is a cool head. On 




Elsewhere accused of reading Raskolnikov literally, Nechaev sees the idea as “a 
depraved parable” (183) against Dostoevsky's stated intention. Once again he is 
criticised for an apparent inability to read. The distinction between a parable and a 
story marks the distinction between metaphorical and literal uses of language. While 
Nechaev, according to Dostoevsky, confuses fiction with reality and takes metaphor 
for reality, his own “story” mocks Nechaev's idea of justice: 
I don’t speak in parables . . . This is not a parable: it is a story about children 
and their uses. With the aid of a child the streets of Petersburg could be rid of a 
bloodsucker, perhaps even a blood-sucking banker. And in due course the dead 
man’s wife and children might be turned out on the streets too, thus bringing 
about a further measure of levelling. (183-184)            
 
 The rejection of figurative language, repeated in a conversation with Maximov 
(148), presents Dostoevsky as a literal reader. This allows for the rejection of 
Nechaev's metaphors and his actions: “When I look up into the heavens I see only the 
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stars” (185).218 Such professed rejection of metaphors is undermined by Dostoevsky’s 
use of figurative language and by his preferred mode of reading, rendered as giving 
oneself up to the text, “feeling” oneself into characters and authors. Thus while 
Nechaev's ideas on reading are ostensibly rejected (“You are mad, you don’t know 
how to read” (201)),219 elsewhere Dostoevsky advocates precisely such an 
identificatory mode of reading (46-47). Both Maximov and Nechaev navigate from 
text to extra-textual reality: treating Raskolnikov as a call to arms and Pavel's story as 
incriminating evidence. Dostoevsky's rejection of such embodiment contradicts both 
his adherence to embodiment, and his stated literal use of language. 
 Another instance of metaphorical thinking consists in the conscious search for 
hidden meanings. In the case of Ivanov the voice calling Dostoevsky might be the 
“unhappy wail of a dog” but it is believed to signify Pavel (79). Consequently, it is not 
dismissed in its literal quality, but awakens the search for what is non-literal. This 
search is presented as hopeless; no call is to be disregarded: “Pavel will not be saved 
till he has freed the dog and brought it into his bed, brought the least thing, the 
beggarman . . . too, and much else he does not yet know of; and even then there will be 
no certainty” (82). This distinction between “things that are things” and “things that 
are signs” is a conscious deployment of metaphorical thinking contradicting a self-
professed use of merely literal language: 
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 Dostoevsky rejects Nechaev’s talk of “lines” between the Swiss banks and the poor of Petersburg: 
(“With a finger he traces a line from the floor at his feet . . . out through the dim window . . . 'The lines 
end here, but where do you think they begin?'” (180)) and his mistaking of fiction for reality as when 
addresses the author: “The more I talk to you . . . the less I understand how you could have written about 
Raskolnikov. Raskolnikov was . . . alive” (186), “Surely you know that. You must know it – it’s what 
Raskolnikov said in your own book before he fell ill!” (201). 
219
 Such rejection might be based on the incompleteness of Nechaevites' interpretations: Elsewhere Katri 
invokes the Bible, but her knowledge of Jesus's death is either partial or twisted to reflect their political 
goals (106-107).    
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He is waiting for a sign, and he is betting . . . that the dog is not the sign, is not 
a sign at all, is just a dog among many dogs howling in the night. But he knows 
too that as long as he tries by cunning to distinguish things that are things from 
things that are signs he will not be saved. (83)  
 
The dog leads to Ivanov, an oracle or a spy, the “beginning of the unexpected” hoped 
to “take[]” him somewhere (88).220 This promise, awaking the readerly expectation of 
later illumination is not realised: Ivanov's story does not lead to Pavel. His religious 
meditations might suggest the possibility of communication with Pavel, but this 
possibility is undercut when he is murdered. 
 Likened to gambling, this search is repeated in the presence of the apparition 
hoped to be Pavel, or at least speaking in his name. Dostoevsky's creation is both a 
story and a parable of the creative process. This is clear when the circularity of 
metaphorical thinking becomes the subject of the story: “I should not have come. But 
the nots are beginning to collapse, just as happened with Ivanov. I should not be here 
therefore I should be here. I will see nothing else before I will see all. What sickness is 
this, what sickness of reasoning?” (118). This vicious circle is an entrapment in 
language beyond which Dostoevsky wishes to step in the hope of bodily knowledge: 
He is in the old labyrinth. It is the story of his gambling in another guise. He 
gambles because God does not speak. He gambles to make God speak. But to 
make God speak in the turn of a card is blasphemy. Only when God is silent 
does God speak. When God seems to speak God does not speak. (237)   
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 Ivanov might be “playing the part of God’s angel – an angel by virtue of being no angel at all” (92). 
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Dostoevsky's failure to find Pavel is also the failure to understand his creation. The 
search for the non-metaphorical “true name”221 that signifies the imagined substance 
within is doomed since communication, conceptual and linguistic, remains 
metaphorical.  
 The metaphorical nature of language and thought is the reason why Dostoevsky 
does not succeed in his endeavour. While the suitcase, the white suit and the snippets 
of information he has gathered will help in writing, the work itself will be a betrayal 
and perversion of what has truly happened. The father and son will be united in their 
fall, but once again, only metaphorically. Their death will be the literal death of the 
body (Pavel) and the figurative death of Dostoevsky's soul (238). The novel's double-
movement thus wavers between the literal and the metaphorical. Finally, in 
Dostoevsky's world, “speaking in figures” is all that is possible (235). Metaphor 
entraps his language to the point where everything he expresses is transgressive:   
Nothing he says is true, nothing is false, nothing is to be trusted, nothing to be 
dismissed. There is nothing to hold to, nothing to do but fall . . . Not a matter of 
fidelity at all. On the contrary, a matter of betrayal – betrayal of love first of all, 
and then of Pavel and the mother and child and everyone else. Perversion: 
everything and everyone to be turned to another use, to be gripped to him and 
fall with him. (235)222    
    
This “turning” to another use in a parable (and the accompanying lack of fidelity) 
arises from the inescapability of metaphor in language and thought.  
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 Such search relies on the distinction between false (figurative) and true (literal) words. As with 
things and signs (83) Dostoevsky has no method of distinguising the two: “He will give home to any 
word, no matter how strange, no matter how stray, if there is a chance it is an anagram for Pavel” (141).      
222
 In his despair, Dostoevsky resembles E Chantos of Elizabeth Costello trapped in the world of 
metaphor and allegory. 
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 Conclusion  
 
 The novel problematises the quest for truth. With its self-referentiality, its  
employment of metaphor (linguistic and conceptual), the bodily imagery that offers a 
promise of exploration of a projected “essence,” the repeated juxtaposition of surface 
and depth, descriptions of falling, drowning, or else digging and uncovering, it invites 
allegorization and, at the same time, constantly undermines it by showing its 
mediatedness. It consciously meditates on the interrelations between the body and 
language, the literal and the figurative. This leads to allegorical readings rejected en 
masse by Attridge. Dostoevsky's use of the fictionalised Pavel to tell Matryona that 
“[s]imple people can’t tell the difference between dreams and the real thing” (248), 
speaks not just about Maria Lebyatkin but about Dostoevsky's own search for 
immediate meaning or about the readers of Master of Petersburg faced with the staged 














As Stephen Watson claims, “Coetzee wants to create what Barthes would have called a 
‘writable’ text, one . . . which does not attempt to reduce the potentially multiple 
meanings, the ‘plurality’ of the text, by fixing one single meaning for it” (Colonialism 
17-18). Derek Attridge analyses allegorical readings “varying in their specificity”: the 
general ones, whereby “the novels are said to represent the truths . . . of the human 
condition” and the specific ones, driven by the desire to “translate apparently distant 
locales and periods into the South Africa of the time of writing, and to treat fictional 
characters as representatives of . . . even particular individuals” (Ethics 32-33). This 
dissertation believes that there is a third one: a structural allegory, in which the open-
ended nature of the body and its wide potential for allegorization render precisely the 
allegory Barthes had in mind, allegory which each reader can endow with meaning, 
and one never exhausted by the multiplicity of its interpretation. Indeed, this project 
could be continued to describe problems inherent in reading oneself, the question of 
ethics or the animal rights. All of these problems can be structured in terms of the 
body, and all seem to be based on similar conceptual metaphors that create the 
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